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Notes on transliteration and translation  
 
Qur’anic citations are taken, with slight alterations, from the English translation of M.A.S Haleem, The 
Qur’an (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Following Haleem, I prefer to use the English ‘God’ 
over the Arabic Allāh. The exception is in the relevant discussion in Chapter One (‘Reflections on shirk 
in the Qur’an’), where the Arabic Allāh is used to reinforce the theological point that both the Prophet 
and his opponents, the mushrikūn, worship the same divinity. Also, against Haleem, relevant Qur’anic 
verses are translated in their basic, etymological sense of 'shirk’ or to ‘associate’ with God.  
For presentation purposes to avoid an overly-cluttered text, all dates are provided in line with the 
Gregorian C.E. (Common Era) calendar.  
For the translation and transliteration of Arabic terms, I follow the guidelines of the International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES), with the exception of some important adjustments. These 
include: 
- If an Arabic term has come to be widely used in English language, such as Qur’an or Sufi, I 
prefer to omit diacritical marks like hamzas and ʿ ayns. It is a firm belief that a term like ‘Qur’an’ 
is now firmly embedded in the English language. This involves a degree of subjectivity as to 
which terms can be considered as such, for which the readers understanding is sought.  
- In the same spirit the name of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, is used without diacritics.  
- All other Arabic/Islamic terms and phrases are transliterated in line with IJMES guidelines. 
This includes ‘ayns, hamzas and diacritical marks. It includes the names of all other historical 
figures and thinkers, titles of sources, books and institutions. 
- To preserve the integrity of the secondary sources, however, different transliteration systems 
are faithfully recorded when cited in this study. (for example: Qur’ān, Muḥammad).    
- I choose to use anglicized plurals to assist readers not familiar with the broken plural in Arabic. 
The sole exception is ʿulamā’ (scholars) to convey the plural of scholar (ʿālim). 
- For adjectives taken from Arabic terms, I use ‘ī’. For example: Salafī, Muʿtazilī, Ash‘arī, 
Ḥanbalī). The sole exception is Khārijite, to reflect the irregular Arabic khawārij.  
- Blessings that traditionally accompany mention of the both the Prophet and God, such as ‘peace 
be upon him’ (ṣallā ‘llāhu ʿalayhi wa-sallam) in Muslim sources, both English and Arabic, are 
omitted.  
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This thesis explores the meaning of shirk or ‘association’ with God in Islamic thought. The concept of 
shirk is integral to Islam. The Qur’an specifies shirk or ‘associating’ partners to God as the ultimate 
doctrinal sin (Q 4:48). Yet we await a serious and sustained analysis of what shirk means to Islamic 
thought and how the idea of ‘associating’ with God has been conceived across Muslim intellectual 
history. This thesis contributes an in-depth scholarly treatment of the topic. It examines the roots of the 
doctrine of shirk in the Qur’an and the life of the Prophet before examining the place and meaning of 
shirk in the works of a number of post-classical and modern Muslim figures, from Ibn Taymiyya (d. 
1328), Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb (d. 1792), Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) to Sayyid Quṭb (d. 
1966). Each chapter is rooted in a close reading of their writings, a study of their historical and 
intellectual contexts, methodologies and approach to the Islamic tradition and the Muslim communities 
of their age. In so doing, this thesis reveals that while the Qur’anic command to avoid shirk is a major 
theme, the very nature of ‘association’ has been frequently reinterpreted by different Muslim thinkers, 
each in line with their particular contexts. Exploring Muslim conceptions of shirk, even within this 
narrow sampling of figures, opens a rich and hitherto under-explored area of enquiry. This thesis 
ultimately uncovers an image of shirk as a central yet multifaceted and highly dynamic concept in 







Islamic intellectual history can be understood as a gradual unfolding of the manner in which successive 
generations of men have understood the meaning and implications of professing God’s unity. Theology, 
jurisprudence, philosophy, Sufism, even to some degree the natural sciences, all seek to explain at some 
level the principle of tawhid, “To profess that god is One.”1 
 
In recent years the world has witnessed the destruction of ancient heritage sites in different parts of the 
Islamic world. The demolition of the famous Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 
first shed light on a phenomenon quickly dubbed ‘Islamic iconoclasm.’2 Similar acts have taken place 
at sites associated with Sufi or Shī‘ī tradition across north and central Africa, Pakistan and beyond.3 
Most recent and shocking has been the destruction of shrines and ancient heritage sites in Iraq and Syria, 
including the famed site of Palmyra, by the group known as Islamic State (IS). Many observers 
questioned why IS directed men and resources from the battlefield to focus on destroying historical 
artefacts. In their publications and online rhetoric, however, IS were clear: these actions reflected the 
groups commitment to removing from Muslim lands all traces of shirk, a term commonly translated as 
idolatry or polytheism. In February 2015, an unnamed IS fighter stood before ancient relics outside the 
city of Mosul and declared: 
O Muslims! Indeed, these relics behind me are but idols (aṣnām) from the people of previous centuries 
that were worshipped in place of Almighty God. What we call the Ashurians, Assyrians, Arkadians and 
others, used to take these (false) gods for rain, provision and war. They committed shirk with these gods 
(yushrikūn) with Almighty God…And God Most Hight says; ‘We never sent any messenger before you 
without revealing to Him: there is no god but Me, so serve Me’ (Q 21:25).4 
The reaction to these events was unsurprising, including from the Islamic world. Muslim scholars noted 
that such heritage sites had been preserved by Muslims for centuries and argued that Islam in no way 
sanctioned the destruction of historical treasures. In a widely-circulated refutation of IS, published in 
both Arabic and English, the Syrian scholar Muḥammad al-Ya‘qūbī writes: 
Destroying mosques, pillaging graves and dishonouring the sanctity of God…ISIS provides as 
justification the claim that these sacred places contain symbols of idolatry and innovation. (But) it should 
be noted that Muslims have never believed that erecting mausoleums for the Prophets and saints equates 
to apportioning divinity to them; hence this groups destruction…are heinous crimes based on a faulty 
reasoning and primitive understanding of Islamic monotheism…Destroying sites of cultural significance, 
 
1 Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā‘i. A Shi‘ite Anthology, trans. William Chittick (Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press, 1981), 23.  
2 See Finbarr Barry Flood. ‘Between Cult and Culture; Bamiyan, Islamic Iconoclasm and the Museum’, The Art Bulletin 84:4 
(2002); 641-659. Jamal J. Elias. ‘(un)Making Idolatry; from Mecca to Bamiyan’, Future Anterior; Journal of Historic 
Preservation, History, Theory and Criticism 4:2 (2007); 12-29.  
3 See Ondrej Beranek and Pavel Tupek, The Temptation of Graves in Salafi Islam; iconoclasm, destruction and idolatry 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018). James Noyce, The Politics of Iconoclasm; Religion, Violence and the Culture 
of Image-Breaking in Christianity and Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).  
4 T. Neinawa. Tadmīr Da‘īsh al-jahal al-irhāb li-mutāḥaf al-Mūṣul al-ḥuḍārī bi-hājat ‘ibādat al-aṣnām?!!! (26 Feb 2015). 




ISIS is bent on destroying any remnant of culture in the region, notable examples being their demolition 
of important artefacts from the World Heritage site of Palmyra.5 
Less noted was the apparent tension between an acclaimed aversion to images and idols by IS, on the 
one hand, with a sophisticated use of social media and technology to spread images of their destruction 
to a global audience.6 Whatever the motivation behind these acts, the theological language and narrative 
invoked to justify this destruction was clear. Invoking the authority of the Qur’an and the example of 
the Prophet, IS styled its actions as reflecting a central injunction of the faith, to avoid the sin of idolatry 
or shirk. For IS, the sin of shirk was manifest in the very presence of ancient, pre-Islamic relics. Critics 
dismissed this but this leads us to a central point. On the one hand, the destruction of heritage sites by 
IS in Palmyra, Mosul and elsewhere was indeed unprecedented. The sites had been preserved for 
centuries. But from a different perspective, there was little new here. The meanings of the doctrinal 
concept of shirk have been deliberated and debated by rival schools, sects and trends across the history 
of Islamic thought. It is to this that we now turn.  
Outline of topic 
 
The Qur’an is replete with verses declaring the oneness of God and commanding the worship of God 
alone. This is neatly expressed in the phrase known as the shahāda or Muslim declaration of faith, that 
‘there is no god but God’ (lā ilāha illā ’llāh). Central to this emphasis upon one God is a concomitant 
stress in the Qur’an on God’s unity, His dissimilarity from all creation and an insistence that God alone 
is the source of all that there is. The famous ‘throne verse’ (āyat al-kursī) of the Qur’an reads; 
God, there is no god but Him, the Ever Living, the Ever Watchful. Neither slumber nor sleep overtakes 
Him. All that is in the heavens and the earth belongs to Him. Who is there that can intercede with Him 
except by His leave? He knows what is before them and what is behind them, but they do not encompass 
any of His knowledge except what He wills. His throne extends over the heavens and the earth; it does 
not weary Him to preserve them both. He is the Most High, the Tremendous. (Q 2:255) 
The Qur’anic conception of monotheism was to be expressed in later Islamic thought in the term tawḥīd, 
deriving from the Arabic root w-ḥ-d, with connotations of one or oneness. Yet one of the main ways 
the Qur’an expresses the oneness of God and calls for the worship of God alone is by condemning its 
opposite. Numerous verses in the Qur’an warn against committing what it calls shirk. Derived from the 
root sh-r-k, this term denotes a sense of sharing, partnering or being an associate of something.7 In a 
theological context, shirk means to ‘associate’ something with God. The Qur’an stresses shirk as the 
one sin that an all-Merciful God does not forgive;  
 
5 Shaykh Muḥammad al-Yacoubi, Refuting ISIS: Destroying its religious foundation and proving that it has strayed from the 
religion and that fighting it is an obligation, 2nd edition (Hendon, VA: Sacred Knowledge, 2015), 13-4. Also Muḥammad, al-
Ya‘qūbī. Inqādh al-Umma: Fatāwa mufaṣṣala fī ithbāt anna dā‘ish khawārij wa anna qitālahum wājibun (Hendon, VA: 
Sacred Knowledge, 2015), 75-6.  
6 As noted by Finbar Barry Flood. ‘Idol Breaking as Image Making in the Islamic State’, Religion and Society 7:1 (2016), 116-
125. Omur Harmanshah. ‘ISIS, Heritage, and the spectacles of destruction in the global media’, Near Eastern Archaeology 
78:3 (2015); 170-77. 




God does not forgive that anything is associated with Him (yushraka bihi); anything less than that He 
forgives to whoever He will, but anyone who associates with God has fabricated a tremendous sin. (Q 
4:48, 116). 
If anyone associates with God (man yushrik bi-llāh), God will forbid him from the Garden, and Hell will 
be his home.  (Q 5:72) 
Often translated as idolatry or polytheism, this thesis translates shirk as ‘association’ with God. It is to 
associate another being or object with a sense of divinity, worship and honour that is due to God alone, 
in effect placing other than God on the level of divinity. The medieval grammarian Ibn Manẓūr (d. 
1312) expounds this meaning of shirk in the Qur’an;  
Shirk is to give an association (sharīk) to God in his dominion (mulk), for God is Exalted above that…It 
is to give Him an associate in His Lordship (rubūbiyyatihi), for God is Exalted above any associates 
(shurakā’) and equals (andād)… ‘Do not associate with God’ (lā tushrik bi-llāh) means do not equate 
God with anything…whoever equates anything with God from his creation is an unbeliever (kāfir) and 
mushrik. 8 
The doctrinal concept of shirk thus replaces divine oneness and unity with plurality. It places the created 
and contingent on the level of the Creator. Shirk grants a partner or an ‘associate’ to a God whom, the 
Qur’an insists, is unique. “There is nothing like Him” (Q 42:11).  
‘Association’ is a chosen translation of shirk, then, but this thesis shows the very idea of ‘associating’ 
with God can be conceived in different ways. It explores a history of interpretation of shirk in the Qur’an 
and later Islamic tradition. But it is worth noting, briefly, that the central importance of shirk has never 
been questioned. Shirk is foundational to Islamic thought. All Muslim scholars, schools and sects have 
echoed the Qur’an to stress the unique sin of shirk. The rise of numerous theological schools in the 
eighth and ninth centuries, from the Khārijite, Murji’a and Mu‘tazilī schools, did not preclude a 
common condemnation of shirk. As Toshiko Izutsu writes:   
It is thus clear that, from the very beginning, shirk was regarded by common consent not only as a ‘big’ 
sin, but the ‘biggest (akbar) of all big sins. And this has never been questioned in the history of (Muslim) 
theology. But this was also almost the only point of perfect agreement among the Muslim thinkers. 
Beyond this point, everybody took the way he liked, and opinion was divided.9 
The traditionalist and historian Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d.1348) places shirk at the top of his list of 
seventy major sins (al-kabā’ir), above murder, theft and adultery.10 Yet equally, the exact meaning or 
definition of shirk is deliberated and debated across the history of Islamic thought. Islamic intellectual 
history is witness to rival Muslim schools and sects accusing the other of shirk in debates over what 
constitutes normative belief and practice. For instance, al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) records the Khārijites accusing 
the Caliph ‘Alī of shirk due to his decision to appoint arbitrators in the conflict with Mu‘āwiya, viewing 
 
8 Muḥammad ibn Mukarram, Ibn Manẓūr. Lisān al-‘Arab, 15 volumes (Beirut: Dār al-Ṣādir, 1300/1883), 2/2249.  
9 Toshiko Izutsu, The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology; a Semantic Analysis of Iman and Islam (Tokyo; The Keio Institute 
of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1965), 37.  




this as granting to men a decision belonging to God.11 The Mu‘tazilī sect were known for an insistence 
upon the created nature of the Qur’an. In essence a dispute over the nature of God, Mu‘tazilī scholars 
accused rivals of shirk for the refusal to affirm the Qur’an is created. This, in their view, placed God on 
the level of what He revealed.12 The Māturīdī theologian al-Taftazānī (d. 1390) criticises the Mu‘tazilī 
position on free will, which posited humans as creators of their acts and thus, for critics, as rivals of the 
creative power of God. But al-Taftazānī also warns against the excessive use of shirk as an intra-Muslim 
accusation. In so doing he reveals the Māturīdī-Ash‘arī position on shirk: 
He who asserts that man creates his own acts should not be immediately labelled as a mushrik, for shirk, 
in our view, is to posit an associate (sharīk) of God in His essence (bi-dhātihi)…or in the sense of 
deserving worship, as in the case of the idol worshippers. It must be observed that the Mu‘tazilī’s in no 
way do such a thing.13 
 On the question of the divine attributes, the traditionalist Ibn Khuzayma (d. 923) argues for a literal 
interpretation of references to God’s hand, face and throne in the Qur’an in his Kitāb al-Tawḥīd.14 The 
Ash‘arī theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209), arguing for an allegorical reading, dismissively calls 
this work the Kitāb al-Shirk.15 In Sufi tradition, we see a range of approaches to shirk as Sufi thinkers 
came to conceive of ‘association’ in various ways. Ignaz Goldziher (d. 1921) cites the case of Samnūn 
al-Muḥibb struggling to include the name of the Prophet alongside God in the shahāda.16 The idea that 
shirk denotes anything that detracts the believer from God became a trope in Sufi literature.17 These 
few examples suffice to show that while shirk is central to Islamic thought, it is equally contested. While 
all Muslim schools and sects condemn shirk, they have understood what it means to ‘associate’ with 
God in diverse ways.  
An overview of sources 
 
One might expect to find a rich body of scholarship exploring these rival conceptions of shirk in Islamic 
intellectual history. But this is not the case. This absence is notable in light of similar studies devoted 
to other important doctrinal concepts. Izutsu’s analysis of īmān and iḥsān in early Islamic theology is a 
case in point.18 Joseph Norment Bell offers a valuable study of the place and function of love (maḥabba) 
 
11 Muḥammad ibn Jarīr, al-Ṭabarī. Tārīkh al-rusul wa al-mulūk, ed. M. J. de Goeje, 15 volumes (Leiden: 1879-1901), 1/3363. 
Also G.R. Hawting. ‘The significance of the slogan lā ḥukm illā lillāh…’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies 41 (1978); 453-63.  
12 Letters attributed to the Mu‘tazilī Caliph al-Ma’mūn (d.833) state; “their doctrines are pure kufr and shirk in the eyes of the 
commander of the Faithful”. See. Al-Ṭabarī. Tārīkh, 3/1112-32. C.f Gerald Hawting, The Idea of Idolatry and the Emergence 
of Islam: from Polemic to History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 81 and 80, n.41.  
13 Sa’d al-Dīn, al-Taftazānī., Al-‘Aqā’id al-Nasifiyya. 2nd edition (Cairo, 1939), 343. C.f, Izutsu, Concept of Belief, 24. For the 
charge that Mu‘tazilī scholars are mushrikūn in Māturīdī texts; Maḥmūd ibn Zayd al-lāmishī. Kitāb al-tamhīd li qawā‘id al-
tawḥīd, ed. A. al-Turkī (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1995), 98. Also Sherman Jackson, Islam and the Problem of Black 
Suffering (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 102 and 198, n.41.  
14 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq, Ibn Khuzayma. Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa Ithbāt Ṣifāt al-Rabb ‘Azza wa Jalla, ed. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 
Ibrāhīm al-Shahwān (Riyādh: Dār al-Rushd, 1408/1988).  
15 Fakhr al-Dīn, al-Rāzī. Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī al-Mushtahar bi al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr wa Mafātīh al-Ghayb (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 
1414/1993), 27/151.  
16 Ignaz Goldziher. ‘Le culte des saints chez les Musulmans’, Revue de l’histoire des Religiones 2 (1880), 262-3.  
17 Annemarie Schimmel. ‘The Sufi’s and the Shahāda’, in R.G. Hovanissian and Speros Veronis Jr, ed. Islam’s Understanding 
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in Ḥanbalī thought.19 Recent years have witnessed a diachronic study of Muslim perspectives on takfīr 
or excommunication.20 To date, however, there is no similar study of shirk. This thesis seeks to redresses 
this lacuna and contributes an in-depth scholarly treatment on the topic. 
Where we do encounter shirk, it is usually on the margins and referenced only in relation to a primary 
focus of study. Examples here include works of Muslim-Christian relations, which note the traditional 
Muslim critique of the Trinity and Incarnation, or intellectual biographies of Muslim scholars. There 
are exceptions, of course, yet these often address shirk from distinct angles. The historical-revisionist 
scholarship of Gerald Hawting (b. 1942) and Patricia Crone (d. 2015) reinterprets the Qur’anic narrative 
of shirk and the mushrikūn in the course of their questioning of the historical origins of Islam.21 In a 
short article, Elisabeth Sirriyeh briefly sketches interpretations of shirk across a sampling of modern 
Muslim writers, including ‘Alī Sharī‘atī, Abul ‘Alā Mawdūdī and Muḥammad Kamāl Ḥussein. 
Sirriyeh’s article usefully reveals a rich diversity of interpretation – a key aim of this study – but is 
limited by a lack of depth and breadth.22 Turning to Arabic language scholarship, we find studies of 
shirk clearly invested in an ideological or sectarian standpoint, usually undisclosed. The Saudi scholar 
Sulṭān al-‘Umairī explores the legal issue of ignorance and culpability for shirk in Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh), though his conception of shirk throughout is clearly rooted in his particular school of thought.23 
We see the same in studies of the meaning of shirk in Shī‘ī tradition.24 In a curious twist, a recent 
sustained engagement with shirk serves only to underline the lack of scholarly interest in the topic. 
Shabbir Akthar suggests the idea of ‘associating’ with God no longer makes sense in a secular and 
irreligious world which, he writes, increasingly doubts or denies the very existence of God: 
A necessary condition for committing idolatry is belief – whether firm, intermittent or casual – in the 
existence of the only God, a condition unfulfilled for many today…Our problem is that modern godless 
humanity is not temperamentally pagan; modern moderns do not believe in any supernatural being. The 
profundity of modern doubt forces believers to demonstrate even the coherence of the concept of a 
(supreme) supernatural being. There are no gods, angels or demons and there never could be such beings. 
Modern disbelievers are not mushrikūn since the presupposition that one made that a viable charge is 
now unavailable…the accusation of shirk is incoherent…How do we today make the gods one – when 
there are no gods?25 
This thesis, even if accepted, pertains only to a non-Muslim context. Akthar overlooks the relevance of 
shirk within Islamic thought and Muslim discourses. Here, it is hard to see how shirk could ever lose 
 
19 Joseph N Bell, Love Theory in Later Ḥanbalite Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979). 
20 Camilla Adang, Hassan Ansari, Maribel Fierro and Sabine Schmidtke, eds. Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic 
Perspective on Takfīr (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2015).  
21 Hawting, The Idea of Idolatry, passim. Patricia Crone. ‘The Qur’ānic Mushrikūn and the Resurrection: Part 1’, Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies 75:3 (2012); 445-472. We explore much of this scholarship in Chapter One; 
‘Reflections on shirk in the Qur’an’.  
22 Elisabeth Sirriyeh. ‘Modern Muslim Interpretations of Shirk’, Religion 20:2 (1990); 139-59.  
23 Sulṭān Al-‘Umairī,  Ishkāliyyat al-‘idhār bi-al-jahal fī al-baḥth al-‘aqdī; al-itijāhāt, al-buniyya al-istidlāliyya, al-uṣūl al-
manhajiyya (Beirut; Lebanon, Namaa Centre for Research and Studies, 2016). To understand the author’s particular conception 
of shirk, which he takes uncritically to refer to ‘Islam’ as a whole, see Chapter Four.  
24 See Allāma Shaykh Ja’far al-Subḥānī, Al-tawḥīd wa al-shirk fī al-Qur’ān al-karīm (Beirut: Munaẓamat al-Awqāf wa al-
Amūr al-Khayriyya, 1992).  




importance. As a foundational concept of the Qur’an and Islamic tradition, and with the reality of intra-
Muslim sectarian and doctrinal diversity, it is not feasible to argue for replacing shirk with a new 
construct such as ‘substitutionism’ (istibdāl), as he suggests.26 The destruction of heritage sites across 
the Muslim world, as noted earlier, suggest that debates over the nature of shirk, far from irrelevant, 
have rather become central to Muslim and non-Muslim discourse on Islam in the modern age.  
Scope, method and outline of thesis 
 
The concept of shirk is integral to Islam, then, but we await a sustained analysis of what shirk means to 
Islamic thought and how it has been addressed by different Muslim thinkers. This thesis examines the 
roots of the concept of shirk in the Qur’an and the life of the Prophet before exploring how a range of 
thinkers, from the post-classical to modern periods, have understood what it means to ‘associate’ with 
God. More specifically, this thesis examines how the doctrinal idea of shirk or ‘association’ with God 
has implications for the social and political sphere. For this reason, it largely avoids the speculative 
theological and philosophical discourses on the nature of divine oneness and unity that defined the 
formative period of Islamic thought, roughly the ninth to the twelfth centuries, what is called the early 
‘flowering of Muslim theology.’27 Theological debates on the divine essence and attributes, free-will or 
pre-determinism and the nature of Qur’an are not the concern of this thesis. Rather, this thesis explores 
the meaning of shirk at the intersection of scripture, theology and socio-political reform. It examines 
how Muslim thinkers have engaged shirk not just as a doctrinal or theological category but, from this, 
as a socio-political phenomenon defining the societies of their time. The four figures chosen for analysis 
are Taqī al-dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb (d. 1792), Muḥammad 
‘Abduh (d. 1905) and Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966). Each chapter is rooted in a close reading of their works, 
tied to a study of their historical and intellectual contexts, methodologies, use of scripture and approach 
to the Islamic tradition and the Muslim community of their age. In so doing, this thesis reveals a rich 
intra-Islamic debate over the nature and meaning of shirk. It shows that while the Qur’anic command 
to avoid shirk is a major theme, the very meaning of ‘association’ is frequently reinterpreted by different 
Muslim thinkers, each in line with their particular contexts. Exploring Muslim conceptions of shirk, 
then, even within this narrow sampling of figures, opens this rich and hitherto under-explored area of 
enquiry.  
There are several reasons for choosing these figures. Each thinker examined in this thesis, I argue, writes 
in a time of perceived intellectual, social and political crisis. Each also possesses an activist ethic that 
moves beyond intellectual criticism and takes active, concerted measures to reshape and reform the 
Muslim community of their day. Consider Ibn Taymiyya as an example. Surveying a career that 
involved participation in military battles against the Mongols, the close association of rulers and regular 
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periods in prison, Ovamir Anjum speaks of the “activist scholarship” of Ibn Taymiyya and gives the 
following overview:  
If one browses through the biographies of medieval scholars, the image of the typical scholar is that of a 
schoolman, a jurist, a theologian, a conservative figure who served the authorities as a civil servant or 
fled in pious evasion. The typical member of the civilian elite to which the ulema belonged was not an 
activist, warrior or a popular reformer. Ibn Taymiyya was different.28 
Yet a similar assessment applies to all of the figures explored in this thesis. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb is famous for his pact with the ruler Muḥammad ibn Su’ūd which, shortly after his death, united 
the Arabian Peninsula and lay the basis for the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In a different vein, 
Muḥammad ‘Abduh was equally engaged with reshaping Egyptian society after the colonial domination 
of Muslim lands by Western powers. ‘Abduh harnessed the new medium of print and was a journalist, 
editor and scholar with a focus on educational reform, particularly at al-Azhar, eventually becoming 
Chief Muftī of Egypt in 1899. Decades later, Sayyid Quṭb was the leading ideologue of the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement in the mid-twentieth century. Initially close to the Egyptian regime, Quṭb was 
later arrested but continued, via his prison writings, to call for revolution and his vision of an Islamic 
state. In his own time and beyond, Quṭb’s ideas have inspired later movements of radical Islam. In a 
sense, then, none of these figures were just scholars. Each can also be seen as actively engaging the 
socio-political sphere to reshape the Muslim societies of their time.  
There is perhaps a deeper thread linking these figures. They are often described as representative of the 
salafī trend of Islamic thought. Exploring conceptions of shirk under the banner of ‘salafī Islam’, then, 
could provide another framework for this study. But this thesis does not insist upon the category. The 
diversity of this group in itself points to the elasticity, even ambiguity, of use of the salafī label in much 
of modern scholarship. As Ahmad Khan writes: 
To talk about the Salafi reform movement in general is to cast an irresponsibly wide net. The term 
Salafiyya has, historically, invoked such a wide spectrum of ideological strands, often in direct 
contradistinction to one another, that one’s identification of a Salafi reform movement has to be qualified, 
if not isolated, to its particular regional or historical context. 29 
The question of what salafī means is in fact far from clear.30 We find fierce debates in scholarship over 
whether Muḥammad ‘Abduh is a salafī or not, for example, rooted in different definitions of the term.31 
 
28 Ovamir Anjum, Politics, Law and Community in Islamic Thought; The Taymiyyan Moment (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 186.  
29 Ahmad Khan. ‘Islamic Tradition in an Age of Print; Editing, Printing and Publishing the Classical Heritage’, in Elisabeth 
Kendall and Ahmad Khan, ed. Reclaiming Islamic Tradition; Modern Interpretations of the Classical Heritage (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 56.  
30 William A. Graham claims all Muslims can in a sense be considered salafī; ‘Traditionalism in Islam: an essay in 
interpretation’ The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 23:3 (1993), 500. (“Indeed, since the Salaf themselves are the original 
codifiers and transmitters (and hence guarantors) of the Qur’anic text and the reports concerning Muhammad’s word and 
practice, any traditionalist vision among Muslims can legitimately be called Salafi – quite apart from the specific historical 
groups that have adopted the name for themselves.”) 
31 For the claim ‘Abduh cannot be seen as a salafī based on the grounds that such a term never emerges in his works and is a 
later projection; Henri Lauziere. ‘The Construction of Salafiyya; reconsidering Salafism from the perspective of conceptual 
history’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 42:3 (2010), 374. Against this; Frank Griffel. ‘What do we mean by 




The same problem presents itself when considering terms like ‘renewal’ (tajdīd) and ‘reform’ (iṣlāḥ). 
It is almost de rigueur in scholarship to describe our chosen figures as ‘reformers’ or ‘renewers’ of 
Islam.32 But again, this raises the same problem of definition and meaning. The label ‘reformer’ could 
no less apply to a range of very different figures, from Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 
1240), Shah Waliullāh (d. 1762) to ‘Abdul Qādir al-Jazā’irī (d. 1883). In short, the term appears equally 
broad and elastic.  
Lastly, these thinkers are chosen in light of their continuing, contemporary relevance. The influence of 
each extends well beyond their own time and context, up to the present day. Familiar to all students and 
scholars of Islamic studies, the works of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, ‘Abduh and Quṭb continue 
to receive attention and are among a small sampling of Muslim figures known equally to both popular 
laity and scholarship. The visions of shirk expressed by these thinkers, then, reflect a small but 
significant trend of the Islamic tradition.  
Each of the chapters of this thesis explores a specific engagement with shirk. The focus of this study is 
intra-Muslim deliberations on the perceived presence of shirk in different Muslim contexts. The use of 
shirk in relation to non-Islamic traditions lies beyond the scope of this study. Where relevant, this study 
addresses other areas of Islamic theology that overlap with the relevant reflection on shirk. This includes 
the interplay of shirk and unbelief (kufr) and the classic Ḥanbalī distinction between the lordship 
(rubūbiyya) and divinity (ulūhiyya) of God, particularly in the work of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb; the 
interpretation of the divine attributes in the Qur’an, as in the case of Ibn Taymiyya; also, the question 
of the role of reason (al-‘aql) in matters of faith, as in ‘Abduh. These auxiliary issues further illustrate 
each thinker’s engagement with shirk. I largely avoid the distinction found in the hadith corpus between 
lesser and greater shirk (shirk al-akbar, shirk al-asghar). For our purposes, this fails to offer any 
meaningful additional insight to our study. It may be added that the constraints of devoting only one 
chapter to each thinker make it not possible to cover all aspects of their life and thought, nor all relevant 
secondary literature. Only that which relates to and deepens our understanding of the place of shirk in 
their works is included. Further material is signposted in footnotes.  
The choice of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, ‘Abduh and Quṭb makes no attempt to be inclusive 
of all major schools or sects. Nor does a narrow focus on four Sunni thinkers from the Arab Middle 
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East claim these as representatives of ‘mainstream’ or ‘orthodox’ Islam.33 Indeed each of these thinkers 
was divisive and controversial in their time. Each chapter is rooted in a close reading of each thinker, 
but alludes to this criticism and controversy. Opponents of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb receive the greatest 
attention for the simple reason that his condemnation of the Muslim community is the most severe, and 
his movement the most successful, of all the figures examined. Exploring the nature of his early 
opposition sheds valuable light on the contested origins of an influential trend of contemporary Islam. 
That each of these thinkers created controversy should not surprise us. We recall that the focus of this 
study is intra-Islamic deliberations on shirk, the use of the concept of shirk as a tool for internal criticism 
within the Muslim community. Gerald Hawting’s comments on the charge of idolatry as a tool for intra-
confessional polemic neatly applies here;  
The basic meaning of idolatry has been extended to cover diverse beliefs and practices viewed as 
erroneous…(but) those who have been accused of idolatry because of their acceptance of such practices 
and views would deny that they were idolaters and, from the viewpoint of an observer not personally 
involved in the polemic, may be justified in offering such a denial. What looks like idolatry to one party 
seems like perfectly good monotheism to the other.34 
We see this in what follows. Both the figures surveyed in this thesis and their opponents are Muslims. 
Both sides employ Muslim scripture and wider tradition to support their case. This points to the fraught 
and contested nature of any claim to orthodox or normative Islam. But it also reveals something of the 
nature of Islamic tradition itself. The moral philosopher Alasdair McIntyre (b. 1929) suggests we think 
of tradition not as static, fixed and unchanging, but rather as something dynamic and fluid, defined by 
internal criticism and debate within an otherwise shared set of core beliefs and premises.35 Applying 
McIntyre’s reading to the Islamic tradition, Muhammad Qasim Zaman writes: 
Among those inhabiting a tradition, there are defenders of particular norms just as there are critics of 
different degrees of intensity…Nor are we to suppose that a tradition’s internal critics are critical of all 
aspects of that tradition; they would not be internal critics if that were the case, for their goal typically is 
to defend certain aspects of that tradition by critiquing others. Understandably, therefore, the boundaries 
between internal critics and defenders of a tradition….are not always clearly discernible.36 
Talal Asad’s notion of Islam as “discursive tradition” is an increasingly popular way of conceiving the 
rich internal diversity that characterises Islamic thought.37 Contestation, then, is central to the life of a 
tradition. The focus of this thesis is on four internal critics within the Islamic tradition. We see in each 
chapter how each figure roots himself in a reading of the authoritative sources of the Qur’an, the hadith 
and Islamic tradition, deferring to aspects of the tradition while critiquing others and, above all, sharply 
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condemning many of the beliefs and practices that are said to constitute shirk and to define the Muslim 
societies of their day.  
Outline of chapters 
 
This study traces the evolution of an idea. It outlines the scriptural roots of the concept of shirk before 
addressing four distinct approaches to shirk from different periods and scholars of Islamic thought. Each 
chapter combines a close reading of primary sources, involving untranslated and under-examined 
materials, with an extensive engagement of secondary literature. Chapter One explores reflections on 
shirk in the Qur’an. Even here, we find a rich area of enquiry. While the condemnation of shirk is a 
dominant refrain, the Qur’an has multiple ways of speaking of shirk and gives no single or fixed image 
of what it means to ‘associate’ with God. Drawing on three prophetic narratives, Abraham, Jesus and 
Muhammad, this chapter examines three distinct reflections on shirk to illustrate the many and allusive 
ways that the Qur’an conveys a sense of ‘association.’  
Chapter Two overviews the extra-Qur’anic sources that arise from the eight century and which purport 
to describe the life of the Prophet and early Muslim community at the advent of Islam. This includes 
hadith collections, works on the life of the Prophet (sīra) and the histories of pre and early Islam, 
particularly the Kitāb al-Aṣnām (Book of Idols) of Ḥishām Ibn al-Kalbī (d. 819). A very different image 
emerges from these sources to that found in the Qur’an. The Qur’an’s complex and allusive account of 
the nature of shirk is replaced with a clear image of idolatry in pre-Islamic Mecca. Shirk at the time of 
the Prophet is conflated with idol worship, with opponents known as the mushrikūn depicted as idolaters 
in a literal sense. This, in turn, reveals how historians like Ibn al-Kalbī did not conceive of shirk as just 
a metaphysical or doctrinal error. It had tangible manifestations in the social sphere. This chapter 
explores the reports of idol destruction said to have accompanied the spread of Islam. Even at the time 
of the Prophet, then, shirk had a practical and social dimension, manifest in the worship of idols. 
In later centuries the pre-Islamic idols were no longer extant. The centuries after the time of the Prophet 
witnessed the flowering of a rich intellectual tradition, with disciplines of jurisprudence, theology, 
mysticism, philosophy, exegesis and more. The key development for our purposes is that shirk no longer 
refers exclusively to those outside the fold of Islam, but equally to rival schools, sects and practices 
within it. Chapter Three reveals how the famous Ḥanbalī theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) engages 
shirk in two distinct but related ways: firstly, in responding to Ash‘arī allegorical readings of the divine 
attributes, particularly on the question of the love (maḥabba) of God, and secondly, in condemning the 
popular cult of Muslim saints, a defining feature of Mamlūk-era piety. 
 Chapter Four moves to the eighteenth-century Arabian Peninsula. This chapter analyses the expansive 
reading of shirk put forth by Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, a reading that encompasses effectively 




debates of Muslim theology, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb views acts (al-a’māl) as integral to faith and equates 
shirk with unbelief (kufr). In so doing, he declares mass excommunication (takfīr) of the Muslim 
community. 
It is common to read of the deep impact of Western colonialism upon the Muslim world, responses to 
which are said to constitute ‘modern’ Islamic thought. On this basis scholars often presume a rupture 
between eighteenth and nineteenth-century Islamic thinkers and movements that fall on either side:  
Any idea of continuity between the 18th century movements and their late 19th century counterparts can 
only ignore the impact of modernity and colonialism. The impact of the West as a political and 
intellectual force was hardly present in those earlier movements…and the intellectual responses of the 
18th century movements were entirely developed from indigenous concepts of tajdid (renewal). Thus, the 
19th century reformist trends can be set apart from the 18th century revivalist movements. 38 
Chapter Five analyses the works of Muḥammad ‘Abduh and nuances this reading. ‘Abduh responds to 
the challenges of his colonial milieu but still heavily engages the classical Islamic heritage. Emphasising 
the rational character of Islam, ‘Abduh closely ties the concept of shirk to notions of irrationality and 
superstition in religion. Through a complex engagement with Ash‘arī theological concepts, ‘Abduh 
interprets shirk to mean a rejection of the modern science and technology that emerges from the West. 
Chapter Six addresses the nature of shirk in the prison writings of Sayyid Quṭb. Writing at the height 
of the Cold War, Quṭb insists that sovereignty (ḥākimiyya) is an attribute of God and argues that no 
Muslim can acknowledge any political or legal authority outside the sharī‘a. From this, Quṭb subsumes 
a range of Western ideologies, from capitalism to communism to nationalism, under the rubric of shirk. 
These systems usurp the divine attribute of sovereignty and become, for Quṭb, the ‘idols’ of his age.  
Ultimately, this thesis aims to illustrate and emphasise what is the most salient feature of shirk. The 
idea of shirk is integral to the Qur’an and Islamic tradition. It is the antithesis of the monotheistic 
message of Islam. But what does it mean to ‘associate’ with God? As central a concept as shirk is to 
Islam, this thesis reveals how no single image or understanding claims a monopoly over its definition. 
From Ibn Taymiyya to Quṭb, the concept of shirk has been reinterpreted and repackaged by different 
thinkers, each in line with their particular contexts. And it is even possible to trace this back to the 
origins of the concept in the Qur’an itself, a close reading of which reveals no fixed image of shirk and 
multiple ways of expressing the nature of ‘association’ with God. Exploring the history of Muslim 
interpretations of shirk, then, and thus revealing the elasticity and dynamism of the idea itself, is the 
central aim of this study. In what follows, there emerges no single image or understanding of what it 
means to ‘associate’ with God.  
The idea of shirk is integral to Islam, lastly, for what it reveals of its opposite. As noted earlier, the 
Qur’anic account of shirk is one of the ways in which it expresses the core doctrine of the oneness of 
 




God. This applies across this thesis. The diverse conceptions of shirk surveyed in this thesis reflect, in 
turn, different conceptions of tawḥīd. For Ibn Taymiyya, who posits love of God (al-maḥabba) as the 
essence of tawḥīd, the nature of shirk becomes the love of something alongside or in place of God, what 
Ibn Taymiyya terms al-maḥabba ma’a Allāh. Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s insistence upon the rationality of 
Islam leads him to view shirk as essentially irrational and superstitious. Sayyid Quṭb’s reading of 
tawḥīd, wherein the oneness of God excludes all secular authority, leads him to denounce all secular 
systems and ideologies as shirk. It will be shown throughout this thesis how notions of shirk and tawḥīd 
shape and are shaped by the other. In this light they do not appear as irreconcilable opposites, but rather 
closely connected doctrines that give meaning and definition to the other. Exploring the idea of idolatry 
in Jewish theology, the comments of Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit are pertinent here: 
Our book…is principally a conceptual analysis of idolatry as it is seen by its opponents…It is an attempt 
to understand a phenomenon through the way it defines the “enemy”. The assumption is that we can find 
the answer to the question of what the monotheists consider the proper worship of the proper God by 
seeing how they define the alien realm. 39 
This thesis explores Muslim interpretations of shirk, then, but it could equally be framed as a study into 
different conceptions of tawḥīd. It is a way of exploring the meanings of tawḥīd in Islamic thought by 
way of its opposite. However we choose to frame or address the topic, this thesis argues that a deeper 

















39 Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit. Idolatry, trans. Naomi Goldblum (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 






































Chapter I: Reflections on shirk in the Qur’an 
 
So follow what has been revealed to you from your Lord – that there is no god but Him. And turn away 
from the mushrikūn. (Q 6:106) 
 
There is no single term in the Qur’an that expresses the core Islamic doctrine of monotheism. The 
Qur’an expresses the meaning of ‘there is no god but God’ in a variety of ways for this underpins every 
other theme of the Qur’an. The Arabic term for God, Allāh, a contraction of al-ilāh (the god), is found 
almost three thousand times, alongside other terms such as Lord (rabb). Thirty times the Qur’an repeats 
the phrase “there is no god but Him” (lā ilāha illā huwa). The declaration of Muslim faith known as the 
shahāda, that ‘there is no god but God’ (lā ilāha illā ’llāh), is taken from two verses but variations of 
this are repeated throughout:  
God! There is no god but Him. The Ever Living, the Ever Watchful. (Q 3:2) 
Your true god is One God, there is no god but Him, whose knowledge embraces everything. (Q 20:98) 
Know that there is no god but God, and ask forgiveness for your sins and for believing men and women. 
God knows whenever any of you move, and whenever any of you stay still. (Q 47:19) 
This insistence upon the oneness and uniqueness of God is more than a numerical claim. The Qur’an 
ascribes a range of attributes or what are called the “most beautiful names” (al-asmā’ al-ḥusnā’) to God. 
These include the self-sufficient (al-ghanī), powerful (al-qadīr), glorious (al-majīd), eternal (al-
qayyūm), most high (al-‘alā) and creator (al-khāliq), among others.40 Each of these names enrichen our 
understanding of the oneness and uniqueness of God. On the name of ‘creator’, for example, the Qur’an 
repeatedly insists that God alone is the creator of everything and the ultimate source of all that there is: 
People, remember God’s grace towards you. Is there a creator other than God to give you sustenance 
from the heavens and the earth? There is no god but Him. How can you be so deluded? (Q 35:3) 
This is God, your Lord, there is no god but Him, the creator of all things, so worship Him... (Q 6:102) 
God has control of the heavens and the earth; He creates whatever He Wills. (Q 42:49) 
Yet the term that came to define what belief in oneness meant for Muslims is not found in the Qur’an. 
The term tawḥīd emerges in later tradition to express the particular Qur’anic and Islamic understanding 
of monotheism. A Form II intensive noun derived from the trilateral root w-ḥ-d, with connotations of 
one or oneness, several hadith reports suggest that this term was in fact in use at the time of the Prophet: 
Jarīr narrated that the Messenger of God said; ‘some people of tawḥīd  (ahl al-tawḥīd) will be punished 
in the Fire until they are coals. Then the Mercy (of God) will reach them, they will be taken out and 
tossed at the doors of paradise…then they will enter paradise.41 
 
40 For self-sufficient; Q 2:263; powerful, Q 2:20; glorious, Q 85:15; eternal, Q 2:255; most high, Q 87:1; creator; Q 13:16; 
36:81; 3:47; 5:17; 24:45; 28:68; 30:54; 39:4; 42:49. 
41 Muḥammmad ibn ‘Īsā, al-Tirmidhī. Al-Jāmi’ al-Ṣaḥīḥ wa huwa Sunan al-Tirmidhī, ed. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdullāh ibn al-




Al-Bukhārī (d. 870) has a chapter on tawḥīd (bāb al-tawḥīd) in his influential hadith collection. This 
covers all traditions that speak of the nature of God and reflects how the term had come to capture the 
idea of monotheism in Islam as early as the ninth century.42 Scholars from rival schools, sects and trends 
of Islamic thought have written volumes exploring the essential meanings of tawḥīd, The medieval Sufi 
and jurist Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) opens his treatise ‘The Principles of the Creed’ (Qawā‘id 
al-‘Aqā‘id) with the following definition of tawḥīd;  
God is one in his essence without partner (sharīk), unique without likeness, absolute without opposite, 
singular without equal. He is eternal without a predecessor, timeless without beginning, ever-being 
without end, everlasting without termination, all-sustaining without interruption, constant without 
waning. He is, was and ever will be endowed with qualities of majesty (al-jalāl), and the interval of time 
and passing of lifespans with never bring Him to an end. Rather, ‘He is the First, the Last, the Outward, 
the Inward, He is of all things Knowing’ (Q 57:3) 43 
Tawḥīd has both an elusive and pervasive quality. While the term is absent, the idea itself is the very 
essence of the Qur’an. This is perhaps what Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) refers to when he cryptically 
describes tawḥīd as “the secret of the Qur’an.” (sirr al-Qur’ān) 44 
The chapter most often associated with the doctrine of tawḥīd in the Qur’an is chapter 112. A favourite 
of exegetes and widely memorised and recited in Muslim piety, the chapter commonly known as sūrat 
al-ikhlāṣ contains short, eloquent descriptions of the nature of God: 
Say, ‘He is God the One (aḥad).  
God the eternal, (al-ṣamad).  
He begot not nor was He begotten.  
And nothing is comparable to Him. (Q 112:1-4) 
Exegetes focus on the distinction between aḥad and wāḥid as terms for ‘one’. In all other verses God is 
described as wāḥid.45 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) suggests aḥad and wāḥid are synonyms.46 Other 
exegetes like Ibn ‘Ajība (d. 1209) claim aḥad conveys internal oneness, the oneness of God’s essence 
(dhāt) and his indivisible nature (lā yanqasim), whereas wāḥid means oneness in relation to others.47 
The term al-ṣamad occurs only once in the Qur’an. Its lexical meaning denotes something solid or 
impenetrable, but the enigmatic nature of the term leads to a range of interpretations, mostly variations 
 
42 Muhammad Muhsin Khan, trans. Sahih Bukhari: The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Bukhari (Lahore: 1979-83), 
9/285-400. 
43 Al-Ghazālī. Kitāb Qawā‘id al-‘Aqā’id/The Principles of the Creed; Book 2 of the Iḥyā ‘Ulūm al-Dīn: The Revival of the 
Religious Sciences, trans. Khalid Williams and Intro. James Pavlin (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2016), 4-5. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 
hadith no. 5013. 
44 Aḥmad ibn ʻAbd al-Ḥalīm, Ibn Taymīyah. Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā (Bayrūt: Manshūrāt Muḥammad ʻAlī Bayḍūn : Dār al-Kutub 
al-ʻIlmīyah, 2000/1426), 1/269.  
45 Q 2:163, 12:39, 13:16, 14:48, 38:65, 39:4, 40:16.  
46 Al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn’Umar. Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī; al-Mushtashar bi al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr wa Mafātiḥ al-
Ghayb (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2005), 6/161-5. 
47 Ibn ‘Ajība, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Al-Baḥr al-Madīd fi tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-Majīd, ed. Muḥammad ‘Alī Baydūn (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2005), 6/371. For Ibn Manẓūr, aḥad denotes negation (‘I did not see anyone (mā r’aytu aḥad)’) and 





on the idea God is ultimate source of all things.48 The next verse denies divine progeny. Exegetes see 
this to reject both notions of sonship and incarnation of Jesus and the pre-Islamic Arab believe in the 
angels as daughters of God.49 The final verse stresses God is not only one but also unique. The oneness 
of God in the Qur’an is opposed to belief in many gods but, equally, any parallel or likeness between 
God and creation. The Qur’an insists “there is nothing like Him.” (laysa ka-mithlihi shayy, 42:11).  
It is customary to read the Qur’an as addressed to two particular audiences; the pagan opponents of the 
Prophet, on the one hand, and ‘People of the Book’, meaning Jewish and Christian sects, on the other.50 
The Qur’an’s call to monotheism thus emerges from a milieu marked by rival conceptions of the divine, 
and perhaps the most striking feature of the Qur’an is the extent of interaction with its audience. The 
Qur’an repeatedly engages its immediate environment and, in many verses, directly addresses groups 
and individuals that accept or reject its message, pivoting on a binary between believers (mu’minūun) 
and unbelievers (kāfirūn). In other verses the audience figure as speakers, with statements ascribed to 
those around the Prophet starting with the common formulae: “and they say (wa-qālū)”.51 Many verses 
claim to cite questions put to the Prophet, usually by opponents, before enjoining the correct response: 
They ask you about the Hour, ‘When will it arrive?’ Say, ‘My Lord alone has knowledge of it.’. (Q 7:187 
They ask you about the Spirit. Say, ‘The Spirit is part of My Lord’s domain. You have only been given 
a little knowledge.’ (Q 17:85) 
This gives the Qur’an a sense of dynamism and instantaneity.52 But these verses are also highly allusive. 
While clearly referring to the Prophet and his interlocutors, any explicit names or identities are absent. 
As Tarif Khalidi explains, the Qur’an’s interaction with its immediate milieu is deeply referential and 
impressionistic.  
The name “Muhammad” itself is mentioned only four times in the Qur’an….on the other hand, there are 
hundreds of references to Muhammad described as Messenger/Prophet (rasul and nabiyy) and hundreds 
of other allusions to someone unnamed who most probably is Muhammad. Behind this stands another 
curious feature, namely that there are hardly names of contemporary people in the Qur’an….Yes, the 
Qur’an constantly alludes to people (“and those who did this or that” or “he or she who said this or that”) 
but it never names them….The moral of the story is foremost, not the story itself with its names and 
dates and details. 53 
 
48 For an in-depth study of the range of interpretations; Uri Rubi. ‘Al-Samad and the High God: An Interpretation of Sura 
CXII’, Der Islam 61 (1984); 200-7. Edward William Lane writes that samad means; “the Being that continues for ever, after 
his creatures have perished…the Creator of everything, of whom nothing is independent, and whose unity everything indicates. 
See his Arabic-English Lexicon (London: Williams and Norgate, 1984), I/1727.  
49 For verses interpreted as a rejection of Christian doctrines of the sonship and incarnation of Jesus: Q 4:171; 9:30; 19:35, 91-
92. For verses condemning the view that God has daughters; Q 6; 100; 16:57; 43:16.  
50 For the problems of using the term ‘pagan’; Michael Frede and Polymnia Athanassiadi, ed. Pagan Monotheism in Late 
Antiquity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 4-5. For an overview of the Islamic historical-traditional account of the origins of 
the Qur’an, see Fred M. Donner. ‘The Historical Context’, in J. D. McAuliffe, ed. The Cambridge Companion to the Qur’ān 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 23-30.  
51 Q 79:10-12; 25:5-8; 47:24; 43:31. 
52 Nicolai Sinai and Angelika Neuwirth. ‘Introduction’, in idem and Michael Marx, eds. The Qur’ān in Context: Historical 
and Literary Investigations into the Qur’ānic Milieu (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010), 10. (“Even on a superficial reading, the 
Qur’an is not a systematic, gospel-type codification of the essential message of a religious movement that has already 
established itself on the historical scene, but rather a live transcript of this very act of entering the scene.”)  
53 Tarif Khalidi, Images of Muhammad: Narratives of the Prophet in Islam Across the Centuries (New York: Doubleday, 




It is important to stress this aspect of the Qur’an at the outset. The Qur’an appears to assume that its 
immediate audience are readily aware of the nature and identity of the individuals, objects and practices 
to which it refers. This allusive quality is also explained, perhaps, by appreciating its oral origins. Often 
treated as a written literary text, the origins of the Qur’an are said to lie in oral proclamations declared 
over an extended period and its aural aspect, the rhythmic sounds and beauty of its recitation, has been 
central to its historical reception and transmission.54 Scholars also explain the use of allusion and 
ambiguity in the Qur’an by pointing to its deeply homiletic and exhortative nature.55 This sermon-like 
quality pervades its discourse. The stories of Qur’anic prophets, for example, have been called 
“punishment stories”, shaped by formulaic features that stress divine judgment and the consequence of 
rejecting God’s prophets.56 Addressing the contemporary audience, the Qur’an is replete with threats, 
warnings, curses, oaths, reprimands and praise. The imminence of the Day of Judgment is a repeated 
theme.57 Striking use of imagery, metaphor and simile is common. The divine authorial voice often 
interjects these passages with moral or exhortatory comments, called ‘clausulae’, that stand apart from 
the main flow of the narrative and remark upon what is reported, usually indicating divine approval or 
censure or the attitude expected from the Qur’an’s audience.58 
 Will you heed anyone other than God? (Q 16:52) 
 Do they not use their reason? (Q 36:68) 
The Qur’an does not speak dispassionately of the oneness of God, then, nor does so in a vacuum. It 
employs a range of moods, voices and homiletic strategies to insist or argue for its core message of 
monotheism. This sense of debate and contestation in the Qur’an, of interacting with a diverse audience 
of those who both accept and deny its message, is clear to any reader. It is also clear in much of what 
follows in this chapter. 
Roots and meaning of shirk (sh-r-k) in the Qur’an 
 
One of the main ways that the Qur’an expresses the oneness of God and commands the worship of God 
alone is by condemning its opposite. The Qur’an is replete with commands to avoid what it considers 
shirk. Condemnations of shirk are a dominant refrain. Derived from the trilateral root sh-r-k, in a basic 
sense shirk means to share, to partner or to be an associate of something.59 The origins of the term are 
unclear although it has been suggested the term entered Arabic through Sabaean sources from pre-
 
54 See Kristina Nelson, The Art of Reciting the Qur’an (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), xiv.  
55 For the Qur’an as homily see Gabriel Said Reynolds, The Qur’ān and Its Biblical Subtext (London: Routledge, 2008), 230-
258.  
56 A. Welch. ‘Formulaic Features of the punishment stories’ in I. J. Boullata, ed. Literary Structures of Religious Meaning in 
the Qur’ān (Richmond: Curzon, 2000); 77-116.  
57 Q 70:1-14; 81:1-10; 82:1-4; 101:1-5; 88:1-4;  
58 For ‘clausulae’, see Angelika Neuwirth. ‘Structure and the Emergence of Community’, in Andrew Rippin, ed. The Blackwell 
Companion to the Qur’ān (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 152.  




Islamic South Arabia.60 In the works of pre-Islamic poetry the root sh-r-k was used to convey notions 
of sharing or associating but in a profane sense, without religious overtones. Pre-Islamic sources record 
the prophet’s uncle Abū Ṭālib criticising the ancestors of a rival family, the ‘Abd Shams and Nawfal in 
these terms:   
They gave a share in (ashrakā fī) their nobility to those without ancestry.61  
The Qur’an appears to assume the term needs no explanation. It draws on a well-known root from the 
pre-Islamic Hijāz, then, but reconfigures it. In the Qur’an shirk moves from a secular to a doctrinal term 
and comes to mean partnering or associating other gods, beings or objects with God, in effect placing 
other than God on the level of divinity. Ibn Manẓūr (d. 1311) gives the following definition: 
Shirk is to give an association (sharīk) to God in his dominion (mulk), for God is Exalted above that…It 
is to give Him an associate in His Lordship (rubūbiyyatihi), for God is Exalted above any associates 
(shurakā’) and equals (andād)… (the verse) ‘Do not associate with God’ (in the Qur’an) means do not 
equate God with anything…whoever equates anything with God from his creation is an unbeliever (kāfir) 
and mushrik. 62 
The Oriental lexicographer Edward William-Lane (d. 1876) defines shirk as the “attribution of a partner 
or partners to God (so that it may be rendered belief in a plurality of Gods).”63 The more recent Qur’an 
translator, exegete and linguist Muhammad Asad (d. 1992) offers a pithier rendering of shirk: “to ascribe 
divinity to naught but God.”64 On this basis the Qur’an, which insists upon the oneness and uniqueness 
of God and the worship of God alone, reserves its strongest condemnation for shirk. Across several 
verses the Qur’an posits shirk as the only sin that God does not forgive: 
God does not forgive that anything is associated with Him (yushraka bihi); anything less than that He 
forgives to whoever He will, but anyone who associates with God has fabricated a tremendous sin. (Q 
4:48, 116). 
If anyone associates with God (man yushrik bi-llāh), God will forbid him from the Garden, and Hell will 
be his home.  (Q 5:72) 
This makes shirk a unique concept in the Qur’an. No other concept, even kufr (unbelief/ingratitude), is 
condemned in these terms. Elsewhere the Qur’an explains shirk as a ‘terrible wrong” (ẓulm mubīn, 
31:13) and as “inventing lies against God” (al-iftirā ‘alā Allāh al-kadhib).65 While the term shirk occurs 
in five verses, the verb ‘to associate’ (ashraka) and its various cognates are found in seventy-one places. 
The noun ‘associate’ or ‘associates’ (sharīk,shurakā’) are used in forty verses, while the insistence that 
God has no associate (shārik) is a repeated claim. References to the major group of opponents of the 
 
60 For discussions on the non-Arabic, pre-Islamic origins of the root sh-r-k, see P.K. Hitti, The History of the Arabs, 7th edition 
(London: MacMillan, 1961), 105., n.5. Chaim Rubin. ‘On the Probability of South Arabian Influence on the Arabic 
Vocabulary’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 4 (1984), 127. Arthur Jeffery, The Foreign Vocabulary of the Koran 
(Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1938), 186.  
61 Ibn Hishām, ‘Abd al-Malik. Al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya, ed. Muṣṭafa al-Saqqā (Cairo; 1955), I/268. C.f. Gerald Hawting, The 
Idea of Idolatry and the Emergence of Islam; from Polemic to History (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1999), 70.  
62 Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-‘Arab, 2249.  
63 Lane, Arabic-English, 4/1542.  
64 Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur’an (Bristol, UK: The Book Foundation, 2003), 1/131. 




Prophet, known as the ‘associators’ or mushrikūn, are also a central theme. At times the condemnation 
of shirk is expressed through striking imagery and simile. The ‘associator’ or mushrik is likened to a 
man falling from the sky without protection: 
Devote yourself to God and do not associate with Him, for the person who associates with God (man 
yushrik bi-llāh), is like someone who has been hurled down from the skies and snatched up by the birds 
and flung to a distance place by the wind. (Q 22:31) 
In a sense, the entire Qur’an can be read as a warning against shirk. If the oneness and uniqueness of 
God is the underpinning theme in the Qur’an, that which ties all other themes together, shirk rejects this 
at its root. It posits a plurality in divinity which always challenges the oneness intrinsic to the doctrine 
of tawḥīd.   
The Qur’an refers to itself as “guidance” (hudā) for humankind and insists we can learn the 
metaphysical truth of the oneness of God in various ways.66 Each of these function, in turn, as reflections 
on the error of shirk. The first is through the natural order. Numerous verses point to the signs of the 
natural world, the very fact of an ordered creation, as one of the foremost ways of realising the truth of 
God. The nature of God is manifest, it seems, in His creation;  
In the creation of the heavens and earth; in the alteration of night and day; in the ships that sail the seas 
with goods for people;  in the water which God sends down from the sky to give life to the earth when it 
has been barren, scattering all kinds of creatures over it; in the changing of the winds and clouds that run 
their appointed courses between the sky and the earth; there are signs for all these for people who use 
their minds. (Q 2:164) 67 
This is buttressed with logical argument; if there were other gods with God, the Qur’an insists, the world 
would be corrupted.68 Such passages reflect a confidence in the Qur’an, even insistence, that reflecting 
on the signs of nature will inevitably lead to God. But there is a sense from the Qur’an that all of creation 
already recognises the oneness and unity of God. Several verses describe the sun, moon, stars and other 
natural phenomena prostrating in submission to God:  
Do you not realise that everything in the heavens and earth submits to God: the sun, moon, stars, 
mountains, trees and animals (al-dawāb)? So do many human beings, though for many others torment is 
due… (Q 22:18) 
Shirk, then, reflects the failure to be correctly attuned to this reality. It is rooted in the failure to correctly 
‘see’ the natural world. This also means that humankind is unique in this regard: while the rest of 
creation affirms the oneness of God, humankind alone diverges from this in a tendency to commit shirk.  
We also learn of the oneness of God through the prophets. Revelation is closely tied to prophecy in the 
Qur’an. The declaration of Muslim faith ties the oneness of God with an affirmation of the prophecy of 
Muhammad; “Muhammad is the prophet of God” (Muḥammad rasūl Allāh). The stories of prophets are 
 
66 Q 2:2, 185; 3:138; 16:64; 17:9; 29:69;  
67 Q 31:10; 88:17-20.  




a major theme and the Qur’an presents all the prophets as preaching the same essential message of the 
oneness of God to their communities. 69 
We never sent any messenger before you (Muhammad) without revealing to him: ‘There is no god but 
Me, so worship Me’. (Q 21:25) 
We have sent revelation to you, (Muhammad) as We did to Noah and the prophets after him, to Abraham, 
Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, to Jesus, Job, Jonah, Aaron, and Solomon – to David we gave the 
book (of Psalms). (Q 4:163) 
The Qur’anic view of prophecy, then, takes us to a universal and primordial declaration of monotheism. 
But this gives the condemnation of shirk an equally ancient pedigree. A recurring theme is that the 
prophets preach the message of tawḥīd amidst communities that have been led astray from this truth. 
Often, the language of shirk is explicit. The prophet Abraham declares to this community:  
Why should I fear what you associate with Him (mā ashraktum)? Why do you not fear to associate with 
Him things for which He has sent down no authority. Tell me, if you know the answer, which side has 
more right to feel secure? (Q 6:81) 
The sin of shirk is not new. It is deeply rooted in history and condemned by all prophets. The prophet 
Hūd denounces his people and declares; “I am free of whatever you associate with God!” (annī birri’un 
mimmā tushrikūn.70 Elsewhere the presence of shirk is strongly implied. The story of the prophet Moses, 
for example, includes the account of the calf taken for worship by the children of Israel.71 The prophet 
Noah condemns the “gods” worshipped by his community.72 In a passage that can be read as a general 
summation of prophecy, the Qur’an lists eighteen prophets, from Abraham, Noah, David, Solomon, Job 
among others, and concludes; “if they had associated with God (wa law ashrakū), all their deeds would 
have come to nothing.”73 This passage conveys the universal nature of prophecy and the shared rejection 
of all the prophets against shirk. 
Yet the Qur’an argues that the prophets are sent only to reaffirm a truth that we already know. From the 
Qur’anic perspective, all human beings are created with an innate sense of ‘no god but God’. Knowledge 
of tawḥīd is central to what it means to be human. This is expressed in later Islamic tradition as the idea 
of the fiṭra or ‘natural disposition’, often ascribed to the following verse in which God is seen to question 
mankind about Himself before creation: 
When your Lord took from Adam’s children, from their (very) loins, their offspring and made them bear 
witness about themselves, He said, ‘Am I not your Lord?’ and they replied, ‘Yes, we bear witness.’ So 
you cannot say on the Day of Resurrection, ‘We were not aware of this’... (Q 7:172). 
 
69 There are repeated themes around prophecy in the Qur’an; the prophet will preach to his community, face hostility until God 
eventually punishes the unbelieving community on account of their rejection of the prophet. These themes are so strong that 
Devin Stewart describes the Qur’anic prophets as moulded to fit the pattern, rather than the reverse. See Devin Stewart. 
‘Prophecy’, in Jamal J. Elias, ed. Key Themes for the Study of Islam (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications 2010), 286.  
70 Q 11:53-4. The same claim is expressed by Abraham (Q 6:78) and Muhammad (Q 6:19).  
71 Q 7:148-9; 20:87-93. 
72 Q 11:15; 29:14; 71:23. 




For figures like Ibn Taymiyya, the fiṭra has an epistemological function and means that all believers 
have an instinctive ability to choose from a range of legal rulings that which is closest to the truth.74 
The Qur’an and later tradition thus view the Islamic conception of monotheism or tawḥīd as intrinsic to 
human nature. Any deviation from tawḥīd becomes a deviation from our natural state. For this reason 
the very next verse in the Qur’an ties the idea of fiṭra to a warning against shirk: 
…or (that you say), "It was our forefathers who, before us, associated with God (innamā ashrakā 
abā‘unā), and we were only the descendants who came after them: will you destroy us because of the 
deeds of those who invented falsehood?” (Q 7:173) 
In this way the Qur’an presents shirk as not just a rejection of the true nature of God, nor a denial of the 
message of all the prophets and the evidence of the natural world. Shirk is, ultimately, a denial of 
oneself. Created with an innate awareness of tawḥīd, shirk is a rejection of our natural state. 
Outline of chapter 
 
This chapter addresses the central question of what it means to ‘associate’ with God. It explores three 
major Qur’anic reflections on shirk. These are the narratives of Abraham, Jesus and the opponents of 
the Prophet, called the mushrikūn. This does not aim at an exhaustive account but each of these 
reflections offers a different avenue for exploring the meaning of shirk. Taken together, they reveal that 
while the condemnation of shirk is a constant refrain, the Qur’an has many ways of expressing what it 
means to ‘associate’ with God and speaks of shirk across a rich variety of images and contexts. As will 
be shown, the Qur’anic material on shirk ranges from a failure to recognise the one true God, to a belief 
in God but a failure to worship Him correctly. The story of Abraham refers to many forms of shirk but 
centers on his confrontation with the idols worshipped by his community. The Qur’an also discusses 
shirk in relation to purported beliefs around Jesus and in several verses accuses Christians of elevating 
Jesus and his mother to the level of divinity. Addressing the Prophet in its immediate Arabian 
environment, the Qur’an gives a complex, allusive and even ambiguous account of contemporary shirk. 
In the Qur’an itself, then, the idea of ‘associating’ with God is expressed in multiple ways. But this is 
perhaps not surprising. As Daud Rahbar notes, such a digressive treatment of a major concept is in fact 
a common feature of scripture: 
What is expected of a great book of revelation is not absolute logical consistency, but consistency of the 
dominance of an idea. Prophets do not offer philosophy. They offer wisdom of a type, a wisdom which 
has a dominant note. 75 
 
74 Jon Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theology of Perpetual Optimism (Boston: Brill, 2007), 39-44. Livnat Holtzman. ‘Human 
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This has implications for how we translate the term. We often find shirk translated as “polytheism” or 
“idolatry” in English-language scholarship.76 An idolater or polytheist has of course taken other objects 
or gods alongside God and would therefore be accused of shirk. The unique condemnation of shirk in 
the Qur’an also echoes the central sin of idolatry in wider monotheist tradition. But it could be argued 
that ‘idolatry’ is not a satisfactory translation of shirk. Semantically, there is no link between shirk and 
‘idolatry’ as the Arabic terms for idols, ṣanam and wathan, are etymologically distinct from shirk. 
Terms like ‘ibādat al-aṣnām or al-wathaniyya would be more faithful Arabic translations of ‘idolatry’, 
yet these terms are not used in the Qur’an. More fundamentally, it will be shown that shirk conveys far 
more than just idolatry in a literal sense. While idol worship is one form of shirk, the Qur’anic notion 
of ‘associating’ with God is much broader and cannot be reduced to a single image. For this reason, this 
chapter retains a linguistic translation of shirk as ‘association’ with God.  
This lies at the heart of the present chapter. This chapter ultimately aims to illustrate and explore what 
is the most salient aspect of the concept of shirk. As a denial of the oneness and uniqueness of God, the 
condemnation of shirk is integral to the monotheistic message of the Qur’an. But alongside this sits a 
Qur’anic discourse on shirk that is complex, multi-faceted and even highly allusive. ‘Association’ with 
God is condemned in the strongest terms, but also conceived in a rich variety of ways. Shirk is a central 
but equally complex, layered and dynamic category in the Qur’an. It is to this that we now turn. 
Shirk in the Qur’anic story of Abraham  
 
Referenced in over two hundred verses, Abraham is a major pre-Islamic prophet. The Qur’an praises 
Abraham as “truthful” (ṣiddīq), “gracious” (ḥalīm) and, uniquely, the “friend of God” (khalīl Allāh).77 
Aspects of the Abraham narrative in the Qur’an parallel the Biblical account but the Qur’an also stresses 
Abraham as a spiritual precursor to Muḥammad and his community. Both the Qur’an and later tradition 
credit Abraham and his son Ishmael for establishing the ‘House’ (al-bayt), understood as the ka‘ba in 
Mecca, as a sanctuary for God and for implementing the rites of pilgrimage such as circumambulation, 
prostration and prayer.78 The epithet ‘the community of Abraham’ (millat ibrāhīm) occurs in eight 
verses to describe Muhammad and his community.79 The Qur’an also describes Abraham as a ḥanīf. 80 
An enigmatic term, in one verse ḥanīf appears as a synonym of muslim.: 
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Abraham was neither a Jew nor Christian. He was a ḥanīf, a muslim, and not one of the mushrikūn, the 
people closest to him and those who truly follow his ways. (Q 3:67) 
The meaning of ḥanīf is debated in exegetical tradition and scholarship, though it is generally seen to 
denote a non-denominational, monotheistic category and to allude to an indigenous monotheism in 
Arabia that pre-dates the prophecy of Muhammad.81 Islamic tradition preserves the names of those its 
calls ḥunafā’, like ‘Ubaydallah ibn Jaḥsh and Zayd ibn ‘Amr ibn Nufayl, who are said to have rejected 
idol worship and remained monotheistic followers of Abraham in the time before the Prophet.82  
Abraham is thus a spiritual archetype in the Qur’an for the Prophet and his community. Spread over 
twenty-five chapters, the Qur’anic story of Abraham covers a rich variety of episodes and much of this 
narrative centers on his encounter with various manifestations of shirk. We see this across three distinct 
episodes. In the first, the explicit language of shirk is absent but the idea is strongly implied. This is 
when Abraham debates an unidentified king whom arrogantly claims divinity for himself:  
Have you not thought about the man who disputed with Abraham about his Lord, because God had given 
him power to rule (al-mulk)? When Abraham said, ‘It is my Lord who gives life and death’, he said. ‘I 
too give life and death.’ So Abraham said, ‘God brings the sun from the east, so bring it up from the 
west.’ The unbeliever was dumbfounded: God does not guide those who do evil (Q 2:258) 
This echoes the encounter between Moses and Pharaoh, as the latter similarly declares himself a god.83 
Exegetes identify the nameless king as Nimrod, a borrowing from Jewish-Christian sources. Ibn Kathīr 
writes that this debate occurred in Abraham’s youth and God subsequently sent a gnat to enter Nimrod’s 
head through his nose, torturing him to death.84 Abraham’s triumph in this debate reflects the central 
Qur’anic theme that the natural world is replete with signs of God, in this case the rising and setting of 
the sun. These signs confound the king and reveal the error of his self-deification. We see this in another 
scene. In this second image, Abraham reflects upon natural phenomena such as the sun, moon and stars 
and here the language of shirk is explicit: 
We showed Abraham (God’s) mighty dominion over the heavens and the earth, so that he might be a 
firm believer. When the night grew dark over him he saw a star and said, ‘This is my Lord’, but when it 
set, he said, ‘I do not like things that set’. And when he saw the moon rising he said, ‘This is my Lord’, 
but when it too set, he said, ‘If my Lord does not guide me, I shall be one of those who go astray’. Then 
he saw the sun rising and cried, ’This is my Lord! This is greater.’ But when the sun set, he said, ‘My 
people, I disown what you associate with God (mimmā tushrikūn). I have turned my face to he who 
 
5. Richard Bell. ‘Who were the Ḥanīfs?’, Moslem World 20 (1930); 120-4. Andrew Rippin. ‘Raḥmān and the Ḥanīfs’, in W.B. 
Hallaq and D.P. Little, ed. Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams (Leiden: Brill, 1991); 154-168. Mu’nim Sirry. ‘The 
Early Development of the Qur’anic Ḥanīf’, Journal of Semitic Studies 56:2-1 (2011); 345-66. Francois De. Blois. ‘Nasrani 
and Hanif; Studies on the Religious Vocabulary of Christianity and Islam’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies 65 (2002), 17-30.  
81 Sirry. ‘The Early Development of the Qur’anic Ḥanīf’, 355-66. De. Blois. ‘Nasrani and Hanif’, 17-18. For seven classical 
commentary discussions of the term: Athamina Khalil. ‘Abraham in Islamic Perspective; Reflections on the development of 
monotheism in pre-Islamic Arabia’, Der Islam 81:2 (2004); 184-205. H.A.R Gibb. ‘Pre-Islamic Monotheism in Arabia’, 
Harvard Theological Review 55/4 (1962); 269-280.  
82 Abū Ubayda, Mu‘amār Ibn al-Muthannā al-Taymī. Majāz al-Qur’an (Miṣr: al-Khānjī, 1954-62), 1/58. Ibn Ishāq, Sīra, ed. 
al-Saqqa (Beirut, 1971), 1/237-47.   
83 See Q 79:24.  




created the heavens and the earth, as a ḥanīf, and I am not of those who associate with God (wa mā anā 
min al-mushrikīn) (Q 6:75-79).  
Exegetes view this passage to reflect a process of natural insight and deduction (al-naẓar wa al-istidlāl) 
by which Abraham, reflecting upon the natural world, is led to belief in God.85 But the verses also imply 
that Abraham, a prophet, mistakes natural phenomena for his Lord and briefly engages in astral worship, 
thus committing shirk. Uncomfortable with this, al-Rāzī (d. 1209) notes the disagreement among 
exegetes as to whether this occurred before or after Abraham became a prophet. Al-Rāzī places this 
before his prophecy but insists it is of no importance and lists twelve reasons why Abraham’s statements 
are not meant at face value. This includes the view that Abraham only cites the beliefs of his opponents; 
either by way of derision (al-istihzā’) or as a ploy to get opponents to listen to his argument 
(yastadrijuhum ilā istimā‘a al-hujja).86 For exegetes like al-Rāzī it is inconceivable that the prophet 
Abraham, sent by God to deliver the message of the oneness of God, would commit shirk. Verses that 
suggest precisely this must be interpreted otherwise.  
Moving to the third episode, the dominant image of shirk in the Abraham narrative is his encounter with 
the idols of his community. Nowhere in the Qur’an is the error of shirk so explicitly identified with 
idolatry in a literal sense, nor the rejection of this as absolute, as in the story of Abraham. In the Qur’an 
the terms for idol (aṣnām/ṣanam, awthān/wathan) are found almost exclusively in the Abraham 
narrative.87 Abraham appears to use the terms interchangeably; 
Remember when Abraham said to his father, Azār, ‘How can you take idols (aṣnām) as gods? I see that 
you and your people have clearly gone astray’. (Q 6:74) 
(Abraham said) ‘What you worship in place of God are mere idols (awthān); what you invent is nothing 
but falsehood. (Q 29:17) 
The difference between ṣanam and wathan is not clear. Later Muslim tradition struggles to distinguish 
the terms. For al-Suhaylī (d. 1185): “the word ṣanam is applied to an idol made from stone or other 
material, while wathan is used of something other than stone, like bronze and similar material.”88 
Edward William-Lane presents a range of interpretations including the opposite view; ṣanam refers to 
an idol made from metal, with wathan made from stone or wood. Another view is that ṣanam refers to 
an image, with wathan a shapeless object, or that ṣanam specifies human form or any corporeal object.89 
The historian Hishām al-Kalbī (d. 819) offers two contradictory interpretations in the Book of Idols 
 
85 Ibn ‘Ajība, al-Baḥr al-Madīd, 2/274.  
86 Al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, 2/42-8.   
87 Q 6:74; 14:35; 21:57; 26:71; 29:17, 25. For use of the term in the story of Moses; 7:138. 
88 Al-Suhaylī, Abū al-Qāṣim ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn ‘Abdullāh. Al-Rawd al-Unūf fī sharḥ al-sīra li-Ibn Hishām, (Cairo, 1914), 
1/62. C.f A. Guillaume. ‘Stroking an Idol’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 27:2 (1964); 430.  
89 See Edward William Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 1992), 1/1735-6. For further 
exploration of the diversity of interpretation founds in tradition, see Fiorella Scagliarini. ‘The words ṣlm/ṣnm and some words 
for “statue, idol” in Arabic and other Semitic languages’, Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 37 (2007); 253-62. 




(Kitāb al-Aṣnām).90 Both terms refer to idols and it seems Abraham treats them interchangeably, even 
if the precise differences remain unclear.  
Abraham repeatedly stresses the error of idol worship and contrasts the power and majesty of God with 
the perceived powerlessness and inefficacy of the humanly constructed idols. He encourages his father 
and community to reflect upon the nature of idolatry. The essence of his argument is that in contrast to 
God, idols are nothing but inert, inanimate matter:  
When Abraham asked his father and his people, ‘What do you worship? They said, ‘we worship idols 
(aṣnām), and we are devoted to them’. He asked, ‘Do they hear you when you call? Do they help or harm 
you? They replied, ‘No, but this is what we saw our fathers doing’. Abraham said, ‘Those idols that you 
have worshipped, you and your forefathers, are my enemies; not so the Lord of the worlds’ (Q 26:77-83.  
But Abraham does not just condemn idols; he smashes them. While other prophets like Moses (7:142-
151) or Noah (71:23-4) try to dissuade people from the worship of other than God, Abraham takes this 
a step further. He is an iconoclast in the Qur’an. The episodes are worth citing in full: 
(Abraham said) ‘By God, I shall certainly outwit your idols as soon as you have turned your backs! He 
broke them all into pieces, but left the biggest one for them to return to. They said, ‘Who has done this 
to our gods? How wicked must he be!’ Some said, ‘We heard a youth called Abraham talking about 
them.’ They said, ‘Bring him before the eyes of the people, so that they may witness (his trial).’ They 
asked, ‘Was it you, Abraham, who did this to your gods?’ He said, ‘No, it was done by the biggest of 
them – this one. Ask them, if they can talk’. (Q 21:57-64) 
He (Abraham) said, ‘I am sick, so (his people) turned away from him and left. He turned to their gods 
and said, ‘Do you not eat? Why do you not speak?’ Then he turned and struck them with his right hand. 
(Q 37:89-94).  
Destroying idols is thus constitutive of preaching the oneness of God. Yet this serves a didactic function: 
the rationale for the destruction of idols is to spur reflection on the part of his community as to the idols’ 
inherent inefficacy. This is a common theme in monotheist literature. The idea that the destruction of 
idols proves the falsity of idolatry is found across Jewish, Christian and Muslim sources.91 But this, of 
course, gives only one side of the argument. Jan Assman argues that the nature of idolatrous belief and 
practice is much richer and more sophisticated than its monotheist critics allow. In a critical assessment 
of the Old Testament critique of pre-Biblical idolatry, Assman writes;   
Within the horizon of monotheism, the error of idolatry lies…in the incapacity to understand the 
senselessness of one’s actions. The other religions that are built around the cultic scene with image, ritual, 
and recitation are debunked as sheer nonsense… (But) this view of cult images is extremely unfair and 
reductive, because no Egyptian or Babylonian would mistake a statue for a god. An image becomes a 
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medium for establishing contact with the divine only after complex rites of consecration and investiture, 
only temporarily, and only within the special, temporal and social frames of the cultic scene.92 
We get no sense of this from the Qur’an. Here, the prophet Abraham reduces the idol to its base material 
and presumes the foolishness of its worship. In this, the Qur’an draws on a common trope in monotheist 
polemics against idolatry. But more significantly, it identifies shirk with idol worship in a literal sense 
and links the doctrine of the oneness and uniqueness of God, or tawḥīd, with an ethic of idol destruction.  
Shirk, Jesus and Christianity in the Qur’an 
 
Abraham’s encounter with shirk extends across a range of episodes. It points to several ways of 
expressing what it means to ‘associate’ with God, from self-deification and astral worship to literal idol 
worship. Abraham receives special recognition in recent times as a unifying figure across the traditions 
of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.93 Yet in the Qur’an there is a clear sense of contestation over 
Abraham as to which community are his true descendants. The Qur’an presents Abraham as a spiritual 
precursor to the Prophet and uses his status as a ḥanīf in sharp contradistinction to Jewish and Christian 
claims;  
Abraham was neither a Jew nor Christian. He was a ḥanīf, a muslim, and not one of the mushrikūn, (Q 
3:65-7) 
They say, ‘Become Jews and Christians and you will be rightly guided.’ Say, (Prophet), ‘No, (ours is) 
the religion  of Abraham (millat ibrāhīm), the upright (ḥanīfan), who was not one of the mushrikīn (Q 
2:135).94  
This continues in later Muslim tradition. The Caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb reportedly introduced 
himself as al-Shaykh al-Ḥanīf to a Christian.95 It would seem the Qur’an uses Jesus in a similar way. 
Another major prophet in the Qur’an, Jesus is affirmed as a “word from God” and the “messiah”.96 The 
Qur’an includes the story of the virgin birth.97 These are not understood on Christian terms: like all the 
prophets, the Qur’anic Jesus is seen to preach the universal message of the oneness of God and even 
anticipates the prophecy of Muhammad after him.98 The Qur’anic Jesus fits into a general conception 
of prophecy. 
There is a large body of scholarship exploring the Qur’an’s engagement with Christian doctrine.99 Many 
of these works also explore the question of historical influences and the forms of Christianity that were 
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said to be present in the Qur’an’s late antique Arabian milieu.100 Briefly, the Qur’an has various names 
for Christians. The term naṣārā is used in fourteen verses. One verse refers to the “people of the Gospel” 
(ahl al-injīl, 5:47). The most common term is the “people of the book” (ahl al-kitāb), a Qur’anic title 
understood to refer to Jews and Christians as fellow scripturaries in receipt of divine revelation.101 The 
Qur’an appears highly ambivalent towards those it calls Christians, joining praise with criticism. On 
the one hand, Christians are described as those “nearest in amity” to Muslims.102 They have mercy in 
their hearts.103 The Qur’an describes itself as confirming previous revelation and accepts Christians as 
fellow worshippers of one God.104 Yet elsewhere, the Qur’an accuses Christians of having distorted the 
original texts and of deliberately concealing parts of their revelation.105Despite receiving revelation, 
they reject the Prophet and wish for Muslims to embrace their religion.106  
This reflects a deeper doctrinal tension. Though recipients of revelation, a common theme in the Qur’an 
is the accusation that Christians exaggerate (ghulū) in religion. The Qur’an contains several verses that 
have been interpreted as rejecting the doctrines of Trinity, Incarnation and sonship of Jesus. Numerous 
Qur’anic verses reject the idea that God has a son.107 Indeed all chapters that extensively reference Jesus 
include a denial that God has a son and stress Jesus as no more than a messenger.108 The clear sense is 
that Christians have in some way violated the oneness of God and elevated Jesus to the level of divinity. 
The language here includes both kufr and shirk: 
They have disbelieved (laqad kafarū) who say, ‘God is the Messiah, son of Mary’. The Messiah himself 
said, ‘Children of Israel, worship God, my Lord and your Lord.’ If anyone associates with God (man 
yushrik bi-llāh) God will forbid him from the Garden, and Hell will be his home. (Q 5:72) 
Other verses do not explicitly mention shirk but do however strongly imply it;  
People of the Book, do not go to excess in your religion, and do not say anything about God except the 
truth: the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, was but a messenger of God, His word directed to Mary, and a 
spirit from Him. So believe in God and His messengers and do not say ‘three’ – stop (this), that is better 
for you – God is only one God, He is far above having a son. (Q 4:171) 
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These verses underpin the view in later Islamic tradition that belief in the Trinity contradicts the doctrine 
of tawḥīd and represents a particular, Christian form of shirk. As early as the eighth century, for 
example, inscriptions inside the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem include verses rejecting the idea that 
God has an associate (sharīk) and call for victory over the mushrikūn - in this context, likely aimed at 
Christians.109 Al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) applies the prohibition of  marrying female ‘associators’ (mushrikāt, 
2:221) to Christian women.110 Al-Ghazālī writes curtly that the proclamation of no god but God (lā 
ilāha illā ’llāh) rebuts the Trinity.111 Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) neatly summarises; 
You may not point to any human being, with delimitations and a date of birth, and say simply, “That 
person is God”. To the Qur’an, that is neither possible, nor intelligible, nor pardonable…For the Qur’an, 
then, Jesus can be as little an incarnation of God as Muhammad himself or, indeed, any other prophet. 
112 
This is another Qur’anic reflection on shirk. The image of ‘association’ with God in this context is not 
the worship of the self, heavenly bodies or idols, as with Abraham, but to Christian beliefs of the nature 
of Jesus. The Qur’an seems to accuse those it calls al-naṣārā or ‘people of the book’ of having a 
mistaken conception of God and of ‘associating’ the prophet Jesus with some share of divinity.  
Upon closer inspection the nature of the Qur’anic critique poses difficulties. Many verses point to a 
discrepancy between the Qur’anic account and mainstream Christian self-understanding. Christians do 
not describe God as the “third of three” (thālith al-thalātha, 5:73) as the Qur’an claims, for example, 
and several verses seem to understand the Trinity to consist of God, Jesus and Mary, not the Father, son 
and holy spirit.113 The verse 5:116 alludes to Christian shirk but on the problematic grounds that Jesus 
and his mother, Mary, are taken for worship as ‘two gods besides God’: 
When God says, ‘Jesus, son of Mary, did you say to people, “Take me and my mother as two gods besides 
God”?’ he will say, ‘May You be exalted!’ I would never say what I had no right to say – if I had said 
any such thing you would have known it; You know all that is within me, though I do not know what is 
within you.’ (Q 5:116).  
These verses raise the question of whether the Qur’an reflects a misunderstanding of Christian doctrine, 
or condemns only certain Christian heresies present in its Arabian milieu.114 Verse 5:116, for example, 
is often explained by scholars by citing the Panarion of Epiphanius (d. 403), a Christian heresiography 
that speaks of a hitherto unknown sect, the ‘Collyridians’, who were said to worship the Virgin Mary 
and were based in Arabia. In this way Geoffrey Parrinder explains the nature and import of 5:116: 
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The Collyrdians, an Arabian female sect of the fourth century, offered to Mary cakes of bread (colyrida) 
as they had done to the great earth mother in pagan times…The Qur’an may well be directed against this 
heresy. It gives it support against Mariolatry, while at the same time it recognises the importance of Mary 
as the vessel chosen by God for the birth of Christ. 115 
This approach is rooted in a basic assumption that the Qur’an gives an accurate, objective record of the 
Christian doctrines and communities that it encounters. But there is another way of reading these verses. 
A more recent trend of scholarship argues for a deeper appreciation of the creative use of rhetoric, 
polemics and hyperbole in the Qur’an’s treatment of Christianity. The search for Christian heresies to 
explain certain verses overlooks, perhaps, the role of argumentation in the Qur’an, its ability to 
exaggerate, caricature and even satirise the views of Christians. As Sidney Grffith writes: 
Hermeneutically speaking, an important corollary of the recognition of the Qur’ān’s intention 
polemically to criticise Christian belief and practice is the further recognition that in the service of this 
purpose the Qur’ān rhetorically does not simply report or repeat what Christians say; it reproves what 
they say, corrects it, or caricatures it. 116 
The Qur’an does not record the views of Christians, then, but it condemns and even caricatures such in 
the course of debates over the true understanding of God. Griffith gives another way of reading of 5:116: 
The Qurʾān’s seeming misstatement, rhetorically speaking, should therefore not be thought to be a 
mistake, but rather a polemically inspired caricature, the purpose of which is to highlight in Islamic terms 
the absurdity, and therefore the wrongness, of the Christian belief, from an Islamic perspective.117 
This affects our reading of the critique of Christian shirk. Verses that allude to shirk in relation to 
Christian doctrine, claiming that Christians say God is ‘the third of three’ or take Mary as a god, should 
not, perhaps, be taken at face value. Rather, these can be read as rhetorical and hyperbolic ways of 
expressing the core point that Christians have, in some way, exaggerated in their beliefs around Jesus 
and Mary and violated the oneness of God. Gabriel Reynolds asks of 5:116; “could it be that the Qur’ān 
is taunting Christians by intentionally exaggerating their devotion to Mary? Could this verse be more 
about the Qur’ān’s creative rhetoric and less about the Collyridians?”118 
Following this, the need to locate Christian heresies in the Qur’anic milieu disappears entirely. It is also 
worth noting, briefly, that we find traces of this approach in the Islamic tradition. Aware that Christians 
deny taking Mary and Jesus as ‘two gods besides God’, the Mu‘tazilite ‘Abd al-Jabbār (d. 1025) argues 
that 5:116 is only rhetorical; Jesus, he writes, would not claim to be a god besides God. Moreover, Abd 
al-Jabbār insists that Christian veneration of Mary is equivalent to her worship and that the Eastern 
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Churches’ expression of Mary as the ‘mother of God’ (theotokos) confirms this.119 The Shī‘ī thinker 
Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā‘ī (d. 1981) argues much the same. Christians do not believe in the divinity of 
Mary, he concedes, but their veneration of her means that they have, in effect, taken her as a god: 
There is a salāt which contains her prayer, praise, call for help and intercession; there is also a fast 
ascribed to her and named after her; and all this is joined with humility to her remembrance, and to her 
pictures and images, combined with the belief in her authority…That authority, according to their belief, 
enables her to bring benefit and harm in this world and the next, either by herself or through her son. 
They have clearly declared that it is incumbent to worship her. However, we do not know of any of their 
sects which would use the word “goddess” for her.120 
There remains a sense here of a problem that needs to be solved. Exegetes like ‘Abd al-Jabbār and 
Ṭabāṭabā‘ī reconcile this verse with the fact it does not, at first, seem to correctly depict Christian belief. 
Stressing the rhetorical aspect of 5:116 or the reality of Christian veneration of Mary allows exegetes 
to defend the truth and accuracy of the Qur’an and maintain the charge that Christian are guilty of shirk. 
The Qur’anic material on Christianity constitutes another major reflection on shirk, then, but this is  
elusive and complex. It is not clear what Christians are being addressed in its verses, nor the exact 
nature of their beliefs and practices. The Qur’an has various ways of alluding to shirk in relation to 
Christian doctrine and this has been taken to indicate the presence of Christian heretics, or the Qur’an’s 
own creative use of rhetoric and hyperbole. All we are left with from the Qur’an is a recurring image 
of a category, referred to as Christians, that are said to have in some sense violated the oneness of God 
by ‘associating’ Jesus and his mother, Mary, to the level of divinity.  
The mushrikūn in the Qur’an 
 
Much of this applies to our third and final reflection on shirk. This is the Qur’anic material on the 
opponents of the Prophet, called the ‘associators’ (mushrikūn) or ‘those who associate with God’ 
(alladhīna ashrakū). Allusions, debates and condemnations of this group form a significant part of the 
Qur’an and comprise by some distance its largest reflection on shirk. Yet much of the Qur’an’s material 
on these opponents is similarly complex and elusive. As will be shown, the Qur’an frequently alludes 
to these opponents but gives little insight into the nature of this group or the shirk of which they are 
accused. We see little specific beyond a recurring image of a group of opponents accused, in some way, 
of ‘associating’ a host of unidentified objects and beings with God. This allusion extends even to how 
the Qur’an addresses the group. It would seem that references to these opponents far exceed the explicit 
use of the term ‘mushrikūn’. There seems overlap between the two main terms for the opponents of the 
Prophet, mushrikūn and unbelievers (kāfirūn), with many verses condemning ‘unbelievers’ in ways that 
are highly suggestive of shirk:  
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 The unbelievers (alladhīna kafarū) set up equals (andād) to their Lord. (Q 6:1) 
The unbelievers (alladhīna kafarū) think it strange that a prophet of their own people has come to warn 
them; they say, ‘He is just a lying sorcerer. How can he claim that all the gods are but one God? What 
an astonishing thing!’ Their leaders depart, saying, ‘Walk away, stay faithful to you gods!’ (Q 38:4-6) 
The mushrikūn can of course be considered unbelievers in the sense of their disbelief in the doctrine of 
the oneness of God and the prophecy of Muhammad.121 In many verses they are seen to disbelieve in 
the Hereafter, Last Day and bodily resurrection.122 Other verses call the Prophet’s opponents “deniers” 
(al-mukadhdhibūn).123 Yet other verses allude to shirk without using the term. Allusive condemnations 
of what is worshipped (mā ta‘budūn) or called upon (mā tad‘ūn) in place of God are a case in point.124  
They worship in place of God things that can neither benefit nor harm them. (Q 25:55) 
God alone is the truth (al-ḥaqq) and what they call upon in place of God is falsehood. (bāṭil) (Q 22:62) 
Taken altogether, we have no reason to doubt the common assumption that the Qur’an targets one and 
the same group of opponents of the Prophet, using a host of titles, for their perceived shirk and denial 
of key doctrines like the prophecy of Muhammad and the Last Judgement.125 
The question arises as to the identity of these opponents and the nature of their shirk. Briefly, the Islamic 
historical tradition offers an image of mass idolatry in pre-Islamic Arabia. Opponents of the Prophet in 
Mecca are depicted as worshipping idols of stone and wood that represented diverse deities. The early 
historian Hishām Ibn al-Kalbī gives the following image of pre-Islamic Mecca: 
No one left Mecca without carrying away with him a stone from the stones of the Sacred House (ka‘ba) 
as a token of reverence to it, and as a sign of deep affection…Wherever he settled he would erect the 
stone and circumambulate it in the same manner as with the ka‘ba, seeking its blessing thereby…in time 
this led them to the worship of whatever took their fancy, and caused them to forget their former worship. 
Consequently, they came to the worship of idols … like nations before them. 126 
Ibn al-Kalbī and others elaborate on the names, features, history and tribal affiliations of idols. This is 
explored in detail in the next chapter. The obvious question, then, is to what extent this image accords 
with the account of the mushrikūn in the Qur’an? Crucially, it is far from clear. Almost all the Qur’anic 
references to idols (aṣnām, awthān) occur in the stories of earlier prophets, particularly Abraham.127 
The exception is verse 22:30, the only verse in which a term for idols refers to the Prophet’s 
environment. 
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Anyone who honours the sacred ordinances of God will have good rewards from his Lord. Livestock 
have been made lawful to you, except for what has been explicitly forbidden. Shun the filth of idols 
(al-rijs min al-awthān) and shun false utterances. (Q 22:30) 
The Qur’an could, of course, have used aṣnām and awthān to express the shirk in its milieu. Instead we 
find more ambiguous terms like ṭāghūt, seen eight times.128 This term suggests false worship opposed 
to the worship of God, but its precise meaning is unclear in the Qur’an and contested in later tradition.129 
The same applies for the enigmatic term al-jibt, seen in one verse.130 Most frequently, the Qur’an alludes 
to a range of unidentified ‘associates’ (shurakā’), ‘gods’ (āliha) and ‘equals’ (andād) taken for worship 
by the Prophet’s opponents. The term for ‘associate’ (sharīk, shurakā’) is of course etymologically tied 
to shirk, derived from the root sh-r-k, but there seems no distinction between these terms. The Qur’an 
treats these as synonyms, all in the sense of a failure to exclusively worship God:  
Ask them, ‘Can any of your associates (shurakā’) originate creation, then bring it back to life again in 
the end, so how can you be misled? (Q 10:34) 
They have taken other gods (āliha) besides God to help them, though these could not do so even if they 
called a whole army of them together! (Q 36:74-5) 
They set up equals (andād) with God to lead people astray from His path. (Q 14:30) 
These terms could be synonyms for idols, but the Qur’an is not clear. The Qur’an uses a range of generic 
titles to express and condemn shirk in its immediate environment, then, but we get no real description 
of the ‘associates’, ‘gods’ and ‘equals’ to which it refers. Their nature and identity remain elusive. Only 
rarely does the Qur’an move beyond general titles. One isolated passage explicitly names some of the 
features of the wider religious milieu:   
Consider al-Lāt and al-‘Uzza, and the third, other one, Manāt – are you to have the male and He the 
female? That, then, is an unjust division – these are nothing but names you have invented yourselves, 
you and your forefathers. God has sent no authority for them. (Q 53:19-23) 
Even here, the material is scarce. Later tradition identifies al-Lāt, al-‘Uzza and Manāt as three of the 
major idols worshipped in pre-Islamic Arabia.131 This is not clear in the Qur’an, which gives little detail 
as to the nature of these objects but does seem to suggest that these were names of angels worshipped 
as the “daughters” of God.132 This is a common theme. Several verses condemn the Prophet’s opponents 
for attributing daughters to God.133 Many verses suggest these “daughters” were equated with angels:  
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They assign daughters (banāt) to God – may He be exalted! – and the (sons) they desire to themselves. 
(Q 16:57) 
They consider the angels – God’s servants – to be female (ināthan). (Q 43:19) 
What? Has your Lord favoured you people with sons and taken daughters (ināthan) for Himself from the 
angels? What a monstrous thing for you to say! (Q 17:40)  
In another verse the jinn are specified as the ‘associates’ of God.134 In total, then, the Qur’an gives a 
complex account of what it means to ‘associate’ with God in its immediate milieu. Extending from idols 
to jinn to angel-worship, much of its discourse is highly elusive and includes enigmatic terms like ṭāghūt 
and jibt, while also referring to a range of unidentified ‘associates’, ‘gods’ and ‘equals’. It is tempting 
to clarify the picture by fusing all these epithets, viewing the ‘associates’, ‘gods’ and ‘equals’ as angels 
worshipped as ‘daughters’ of God.135 Though possible, this is not self-evident from the text itself and it 
is no less likely that the range of appellations reveals a pluralistic environment, wherein the Qur’an 
perceives many different kinds of ‘association’. This could, in turn, suggest that the Prophet’s opponents 
were not a homogenous group but are subsumed, despite internal differences, under a collective banner 
of mushrikūn. This is conjecture, but it arises from the fact that the Qur’an offers no clear or fixed image 
of ‘association’ with God in its treatment of the mushrikūn. 
The reason for this is clear. Allusion and ambiguity are common to Qur’anic discourse, as noted earlier, 
but in this context it serves a didactic purpose The Qur’an is concerned not to present the names, features 
and identity of what is ‘associated’ with God by its opponents, but to deny outright the very idea and 
presence of shirk in the immediate milieu. While the ‘associates’ and ‘gods’ remain elusive, then, many 
verses in the Qur’an contrast the majesty and omnipotence of God with the powerlessness and inefficacy 
of whatever is ‘associated’ with Him. The tone here is derisive, even sarcastic: 
You people, here is an illustration, so listen carefully: those you call on besides God could not, even if 
they all combined their forces, create a fly, and if the fly took something away from them, they would 
not be able to retrieve it. How feeble are the petitioners and how feeble are those they petition! (Q 22:73) 
The Qur’an aims to condemn shirk, not define it. Implicit in this is a presumption that the Qur’an’s 
immediate audience is well familiar with the ‘gods’ and ‘associates’ that it critiques. But this also leaves 
us with a curious image of the mushrikūn. These are the major opponents of the Prophet, condemnations 
of which are a major theme in the Qur’an and comprise by some distance its largest reflection on shirk, 
yet we still get little insight into the nature of this group or the shirk of which they are accused. All we 
are left with is an image of opponents that are said to have in some sense ‘associated’ a range of diverse 
and allusive objects and beings with God. Beyond this, little is explicit.  
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The mushrikūn and belief in Allāh 
 
Building on this, perhaps the most surprising and significant feature of the mushrikūn is their belief in 
the same God as the Prophet. The Qur’an shows the mushrikūn as major opponents but also attests to 
their close common ground with the Prophet. The mushrikūn also believed in God, or Allāh, and there 
is an awareness that both sides speak of the same God. We do not need to consult the works of pre-
Islamic poetry to show this. Many Qur’anic verses reveal how Allāh was known to both sides: 
If you ask them who created the heavens and earth and harnessed the sun and moon, they are sure to say; 
‘Allāh’. Then why do they turn away from Him?...And if you ask them; ‘Who sends water down from 
the sky and gives life with it to the earth after it has died?’ they are sure to say, ‘Allāh’. (Q 29:61-3) 
Pre-Islamic poetry attests to the significance of Allāh in the religious life of pre-Islamic Hijāz.136 The 
mushrikūn thus affirm Allāh to be creator of heaven and earth, providing all sustenance through rain.137 
In other verses they swear oaths by Him.138 In these respects this group are firmly in line with some of 
the essential teachings of the Prophet. Other verses imply Allāh was a supreme god for the mushrikūn, 
standing above what they otherwise ‘associated’ with Him. In this vein the mushrikūn are quoted as 
defending their practices by invoking the concept of intercession (shafā’a): 
They worship in place of God things that can neither harm nor benefit them, and say; ‘these are our 
intercessors with God.’ Say, ‘Do you think you can tell God about something He knows not to exist in 
the heavens or earth? Exalted is He! He is far above what they associate with Him! (‘ammā yushrikūn) 
(Q 10:18). .139  
This raises the question of whether the Qur’an condemns the mushrikūn because they worship the wrong 
objects, their ‘associates’, ‘gods’ and ‘equals’, or because they perform the wrong worship of God, a 
worship by way of these objects?140 The Qur’an is unclear. But we can assume the intercession sought 
by the mushrikūn was this-worldly, given their denial, elsewhere, of the Hereafter and resurrection.141 
Most responses to this deny the power of all ‘associates’ to intercede, without the permission of God.142 
Elsewhere, again implying the superiority of Allāh, the mushrikūn express and defend their shirk in 
strongly determinist terms:  
Those who associate with God (alladhīna ashrakū) say; ‘If God had willed, we would not have associated 
with the Him (mā ashraknā) - nor would our fathers – or have declared anything forbidden (Q 6:148).143 
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This verse is significant for the mushrikūn here conceive and express their practices in the same terms 
as the Prophet: the language of shirk was shared, it seems, by both sides. Patricia Crone also notes this 
is a clever argument for it invokes the essence of the Prophet’s message – that God is all-powerful – 
against him.144 Indeed the Qur’an often explains shirk in similarly determinist ways: God guides who 
he wills; He has put a veil on their hearts; if God willed, unbelievers would believe.145 It is noteworthy 
that in another verse the Qur’an says precisely the same as the mushrikūn:  
If it had been God’s will, they would not have associated with Him. (wa-law shā’ Allāh mā ashrakū), 
but We have not made you their guardian, nor are you their keeper. (Q 6:107) 146 
The same argument is used by both sides, then, but for different ends. The mushrikūn cite this to defend 
and sanction their shirk. The Qur’an cites this to stress God’s all-encompassing power. But perhaps the 
most striking feature of the Qur’anic mushrikūn is their tendency to worship God alone. It seems that 
the mushrikūn had the capacity to renounce their ‘associates’. At times of danger or distress they would 
turn exclusively to Allāh, abandoning what they otherwise worshipped with Him; 
Whenever they go on board a ship they call on God, sincerely to Him alone, but once He has delivered 
them safely back to the land, they associate with Him (yushrikūn). (Q 29:65) 
When something bad happens to people, they cry to their Lord and turn to Him for help, but no sooner 
does He let them taste His blessing than – lo and behold! – some of the associate others with their Lord 
(bi-rabbhim yushrikūn) (Q 30:33) 147 
The Prophet’s main opponents, then, are presented as not entirely committed to shirk. From the Qur’anic 
perspective, the real problem of the mushrikūn is perhaps less their shirk than their inconsistency – this 
group are only “temporary monotheists”.148  They display a readiness to worship God alone but, equally, 
a tendency to return to shirk by embracing the very ‘associates’ that in more thoughtful moments they 
seem to recognise as futile. This underpins the Qur’anic critique: 
Say, ‘Who owns the earth and all who live in it, if you know?’ and they will reply, ‘Allāh’. Say, ‘Will 
you not take heed?’ Say, ‘Who is the Lord of the seven heavens? Who is the Lord of the Mighty Throne?’ 
and they will reply, ‘Allāh’. Say, ‘will you not be mindful?’ Say, ‘Who controls everything in His hand? 
Who protects, while there is not protection against Him, if you know?’ and they will reply, ‘Allāh’. Say, 
‘Then how can you be so deluded?’ (Q 23:84-90).  
The mushrikūn must be “deluded” (tusḥarūn). Only in this way can the Qur’an understand the group. 
Thus, the Qur’an ultimately condemns the mushrikūn not because they are a group so far removed from 
the Prophet, but for the opposite. The Qur’an struggles with a group of opponents that believe in God, 
share many correct beliefs of Him and even worship Him sincerely, but return to shirk and continue to 
reject the Prophet. Put simply, the gap between the message of tawḥīd of the Prophet and the shirk of 
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his opponents is not large at all. The crux of the Qur’anic critique, it seems, is that there should be any 
gap at all when these opponents are already so close to the true understanding of God.  
The quest for the identity of the mushrikūn  
 
The mushrikūn are an intriguing category. Major opponents and ‘unbelievers’, this group defend their 
practices by invoking the all-determining power of God. While this comprises its major reflection on 
shirk, the Qur’an gives little insight into the identity of this group and the nature of their shirk. We do 
not know if this is a homogenous category of opponents, or if the Qur’an uses ‘mushrikūn’ as a 
collective banner. And the stand-out feature is that they appear so close to the Prophet and the Qur’anic 
conception of God. Toshiko Izutsu neatly captures the Qur’anic perspective:  
The concept of Allah that was prevalent among the pre-Islamic Arabs on the eve of the Islamic era was, 
in general, surprisingly close in nature to the Islamic one, so close, indeed, that the Koran even wonders 
why such a right understanding of God does not finally lead the disbelievers to acknowledging the truth 
of the new teaching. 149 
Scholars have been drawn to the Qur’anic account of this group to understand the nature of their beliefs 
and what this reveals of the religious milieu of pre-Islamic Arabia. Often part of a broader question that 
explores the origins and influences of the Qur’an in late antiquity, it is known that a sparsity of historical 
sources means our understanding of the mushrikūn is heavily mediated by the Qur’an itself and later 
tradition.150 But the literature for what is called “the quest for Arabian paganism” is extensive.151 A full 
overview of the literature lies beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is worth illustrating some key 
trends. There appear several ways of construing the Qur’anic mushrikūn 
A common argument in scholarship, found in the work of William Montgomery-Watt (d. 2006), is to 
construe the mushrikūn in the Qur’an as henotheistic. For Watt, it is clear from the Qur’an that the pre-
Islamic Arabs believed in a supreme god, named Allāh, among a constellation of minor deities.152 Watt 
supports this by drawing on wider scholarship which, he writes, demonstrates that a belief in a supreme 
God was a common feature of religions in late antiquity.153 Watt writes: 
When the Qur’anic material is considered in conjunction with this evidence for a widespread belief in a 
higher of supreme god, it becomes virtually certain that among thinking people in Mecca when 
 
149 Izutsu, God and Man, 101.  
150 Sinai argues our attempt a fuller picture of this category is “bound to remain blurred”. Sinai, The Qur’an, 66.   
151 Ibid., 59-72.  F.E. Peters, ed. The Arabs and Arabia on the Eve of Islam (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999). Fred M. Donner, 
Muhammad and the Believers; At the Origins of Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).  Patricia Crone. ‘Angels 
versus Humans as Messengers of God’; the view of the Qur’anic pagans’, in Phillipa Townsend and Moulie Vidas, eds. 
Revelation, Literature and Community in Late Antiquity (Tubingen; Mohr Siebeck, 2001): 315-36; ‘The Qur’anic Mushrikun 
and the Resurrection (Part I)’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 75 (2012); 445-72. Alfred Welch. ‘Allah 
and other supernatural beings; the emergence of the Qur’an doctrine of tawhid’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
47 (1980b); 733-58. Pavel Pavlovitch. ‘On the Problem of the Pre-Islamic Lord of the Kaba’, Journal of Arabic and Islamic 
Studies 2 (1998); 49-79. H. Gibb. ‘Pre-Islamic Monotheism in Arabian’, Harvard Theological Review 55 (1962); 269-80. 
152 W.M. Watt. ‘The Qur’an Belief in a ‘High-God’ in Pre-Islamic Mecca’, Journal of Semitic Studies XVI;A (1979); 205-11; 
‘Belief in a “high god” in pre-Islamic Mecca, in Journal of Semitic Studies 16 (1971); 35-40. Uri Rubin. ‘Al-Ṣamad and the 
High God’, Der Islam 61:1 (1984), 199; W. R. Arafat. ‘Fact and Fiction in the History of Pre-Islamic Idol Worship’, Islamic 
Quarterly 12 (1969), 19.  
153 The work Watt cites is Javier Taixidor The Pagan God: Popular Religion in the Greco-Roman Near East (Princeton; 




Muhammad began receiving revelation the dominant religious outlook was this belief in a high or 
supreme God, who is called Allah. For the modern student of Islam this has the corollary that the Qur’anic 
message is to be understood as having been addressed to a people with such a belief. 154 
Against the Prophet’s stress on the oneness and absolute divinity of God, the mushrikūn are seen to 
have a graded conception of the divine, viewing Allāh as a ‘high God’ amongst a spectrum of deities. 
For Watt, then, the basic sense of shirk in this reflection is this late antique form of henotheism. Against 
this, Gerald Hawting (b. 1944) offers a very different account of the Qur’anic mushrikūn. Hawting is 
part of a revisionist trend of historical scholarship that challenges the traditional accounts of the origins 
of the Qur’an, situating the Qur’an outside the seventh century Hijāz and in an intra-monotheist, 
sectarian milieu.155 As part of this project, Hawting argues the Qur’anic verses on the mushrikūn should 
be read in light of their polemical spirit. Noting the common ground between the mushrikūn and the 
Prophet, and drawing on accusations of ‘idolatry’ in intra-monotheist polemics, such as Protestant 
condemnations of Catholic ‘idolatry’, he insists that the Qur’anic account of the mushrikūn be read in 
the same vein. The Qur’an, he writes, clearly reveals a group of opponents that would have considered 
itself monotheist: 
The verses of the Koran…do not point to a group that worshipped a multiplicity of gods and bowed down 
before idols, but rather to a group that shared some basic concepts of monotheism (God as creator, angels, 
perhaps the Last Judgment, intercession, etc) but held views that the Koran equated with, and presented 
– surely polemically – as polytheism and idolatry. 156 
The mushrikūn are conceived as a rival group of monotheists that the Qur’an polemically derides as 
mushrikūn on account of intra-monotheist doctrinal difference. Hawting thus entirely rejects the image 
of Muslim historical tradition that the Prophet’s opponents were literal idolaters. This, he argues, has 
too large a discrepancy with the Qur’an’s depiction of the group:  
If we had only the Koran, would we deduce that the polemic against the mushrikūn must be directed at 
Arab polytheists and idolaters? I think not.157 
To the extent that anything outside the Qur’an can help us understand the attack on shirk, it is likely to 
be other monotheist polemic against groups perceived as falling short in their monotheism, rather than 
the ‘historical’ recreation of Arabian idolatry in Muslim tradition.158 
Much of this is taken up by Patricia Crone (d. 2015), who also stresses the need to read the Qur’an in 
isolation of later tradition.159 The Qur’an itself, she notes, is entirely silent on many of the key features 
said to characterise pre-Islamic Mecca in later tradition; a ka‘ba housing idols, the Prophet destroying 
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these idols, every house in Mecca possessing its idol.160 It also reveals a group of opponents that are 
well versed in Christian ideas like intercession.161 Noting that references to literal idols (aṣnām, awthān) 
occur almost always in stories of earlier prophets like Abraham, Crone argues that the idols the Prophet 
faced were only conceptual:  
The fact it is only in the Biblical stories that physical idols are mentioned suggests that those of the 
Messenger’s own time were conceptual. What he is targeting is a falsehood (ifk), something untrue 
fathered by the pagans on God; he sees himself smashing idols in the sense of eradicating wrong beliefs. 
His pagan opponents worshipped the same God as he did, but they had views incompatible with the unity 
of God as he saw it. Their idols have no more to do with pagan idolatry in the literal sense than they do 
in the writings of Luther, or for that matter in modern Iran. 162 
Crone argues, tentatively, that the group known as the mushrikūn were likely a Jewish or Christian sect 
taken to saint and angel worship and, on this basis, are accused of shirk in the Qur’an.163 
Hawting and Crone stress the polemical nature of the Qur’anic material and, from this, assess how this 
impacts our reading of its verses. Yet we may question, briefly, to what extent the Qur’an could or 
should be read in isolation of later Muslim tradition. As a semantically complex and often obscure text, 
much of our understanding of the Qur’an relies on lexical dictionaries provided by the tradition, as even 
Crone concedes.164 The blanket rejection of later Muslim tradition also raises issues. It could be argued 
that the literary evidence of the tradition relating to pre-Islamic idolatry is too great to be dismissed 
outright. As Michael Lecker writes: 
Nobody in his right mind would assume that so many tribal informants could plot together to invent idols 
which had not existed. The legendary elements in the conversion stories of pagan Arabs can be rejected, 
but the factual debates about idols remains intact…unless they were Jews or Christians, conversion to 
Islam meant renouncing idolatry. 165 
That the mushrikūn consider themselves monotheist does not necessarily exclude the presence of an 
outward form of worship involving wooden and stone objects. G.W. Bowersock refutes Crone’s claims 
of conceptual idolatry in Mecca as “minimalist beyond plausibility”, given archaeological findings.166 
Lastly, Hawting and Crone seem to overlook the many ways the Qur’an engages the pagan religious 
and cultural milieu of Arabia. The idea of ‘daughters of God’, for example, is well attested in epigraphic 
evidence in South Arabia.167 Similar evidence shows the wider veneration of al-Lāt in Arabia.168 
 
160 Patricia Crone. ‘The Religion of the Qur’ānic Pagans’, 169.  
161 Ibid., 168. 
162 Ibid., 172. (italics in original).  
163 Ibid., 192-200.  
164 Ibid., 172.  
165 Michael Lecker. Was Arabian Idol Worship declining on the Eve of Islam? (Transcription of lecture delivered at Yad Ben 
Zvi, Jerusalem, 1999), 23-4; People, Tribes and Society in Arabia around the time of Muḥammad (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 
2005), chapter III.  
166 G.W. Bowersock, The Throne of Adulis: Red Sea Wars on the Eve of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 127. 
(“Such a reading would make little sense for an Arabian culture that archaeology has shown to have displayed idols publicly 
throughout the later phases of the pre-Islamic age…to deny that they were tangible objects, in a world where idols could be 
seen in temples and on the ground, is minimalist beyond plausibility.”)  
167 Sinai, The Qur’an, 68. Hoyland, ‘Early Islam as a Late Antique Religion’, 1071.  




Allusions to animal sacrifice in the Qur’an also suggest a pagan, not Biblical milieu.169 Sinai reconciles 
this by defining the religion of the mushrikūn as “Pagan-Biblical syncretism”.170 Drawing on a growing 
argument among historians that pre-Islamic Arabian Hijāz was already part of the wider world of late 
antiquity, a milieu exposed to outside religious influences, the mushrikūn are said to have fused pagan 
traditions with Biblical ideas. Sinai speaks of the need   
to understand the Associators as pagans who had grafted on to their religious heritage assorted Judaeo-
Christian elements, such as the figure of a creator God…the notion of intercession, and the concept of 
angels…It stands to reason, then, that the Qur’anic Associators worshipped ancient Arabian deities yet 
felt free to reinterpret and supplement their ancestral rites by concepts and ideas adopted from the Jewish 
and Christian traditions that were increasingly seeping into the Arabian interior.171 
The incorporation of Jewish and Christian elements into indigenous pagan tradition was, again, a feature 
of late antiquity.172 We perhaps see signs of this syncretism in later Muslim tradition: in some reports, 
upon the conquest of Mecca the Prophet cleansed the ka‘ba of idols but preserved an image of Jesus 
and Mary found therein.173 This fusion of pagan and Biblical tradition, then, where a belief in a creator 
God, angels and intercession is fused with pagan concepts, offers another way of profiling the identity 
of the mushrikūn, condemnations of which comprise the Qur’an’s major reflection on shirk.  
The social and ethical dimensions of Qur’anic shirk  
 
This foregoing analysis overlooks, however, that the Qur’an not only conceives the mushrikūn on 
doctrinal terms. Rather, they are depicted as a real category of opponents, living and interacting with 
the Prophet. This final section explores this and briefly addresses the social and ethical dimensions of 
shirk. At the outset, the Qur’an presumes an indivisible link that connects the correct belief in God with 
an ethic of social justice and personal morality. Affirming the doctrinal truth of God’s oneness is part 
of a broader spectrum that encompasses a range of ethical virtues and moral practices. The believers 
(al-mu’minūn) in the Qur’an, for example, are defined not just by a belief in God and the Prophet but 
equally by a range of virtues that include giving charity, feeding the poor and caring for the needy.174 
Believers do not commit adultery.175 They avoid gossip, backbiting and are true to their promises.176 In 
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some verses the Qur’an intersperses these socio-ethical virtues with ritual acts like praying, giving a 
clear impression that these are two sides of one coin:  
The servants of the Most Merciful are those who walk humbly on the earth, and who, when ignorant 
people address them, reply, with words of peace; those who spent their nights prostrating and standing, 
worshipping their Lord; who plead, ‘Our Lord, turn away from us the suffering of Hell: its suffering goes 
on and on. It is an evil home, a foul resting place!’ They are those who are neither wasteful nor niggardly 
when they spend, but keep to a just balance; those who never invoke anything besides God, nor take a 
like, which God has made sacred, except in the pursuit of justice, nor commit adultery. (Q 26:63-8).  
The longest verse in the Qur’an refers not to the nature of God or the prophets, but to the importance of 
repaying debts.177 The command for believers to ‘enjoin the good and forbid the bad’ is a common 
refrain.178 The image of the ‘believer’ in the Qur’an is thus richer than one who confesses God’s oneness 
and the prophecy of Muhammad. It is tied to notions of social justice and personal morality. Rooted in 
the metaphysical, it spreads to the social and ethical realm. Fazlur Rahman neatly captures this:  
Muhammad’s monotheism was, from the beginning, linked up with a humanism and a sense of social 
and economic justice whose intensity is no less than the intensity of the monotheistic idea… whoever 
carefully reads the revelations of the Prophet cannot escape the conclusion that the two must be regarded 
as expressions of the same experience…The Prophet seems to insist: one God – one humanity. 179 
The same applies, conversely, for shirk. The Qur’an places shirk at the center of a constellation of moral 
and social failings. Again, the Qur’an implies a spectrum wherein false conceptions of God are seen to 
inevitably extend into moral and social corruption. Many verses in the Qur’an define the mushrikūn 
primarily in terms of their negative traits: they are stubborn and arrogant.180 They are liars (kādhibūn).181 
They dismiss the Qur’an as mere myths (asāṭīr).182 The mushrikūn both reject the message and mock 
the messenger, deriding the Prophet as a poet (shā‘ir), magician (sāḥir) and soothsayer (kāhin).183 
Whenever it was said to them, ‘there is no god but God’, they became arrogant, and said; ‘are we to 
forsake our gods for a mad poet? (Q 37:35-6).   
The unbelievers (alladhīna kafarū) think it strange that a prophet of their own people has come to warn 
them; they say, ‘He is just a lying sorcerer. How can he claim that all the gods are but one God? What 
an astonishing thing!’ Their leaders depart, saying, ‘Walk away, stay faithful to you gods!’ (Q 38:4-6) 
This is not unique to Muhammad. The rejection of the prophets is a repeated theme.184 The image of 
the society of the mushrikūn is also defined by a range of immoral customs and practices. Greed, the 
accumulation of wealth and the neglect of the poor are major themes. It is striking that many Qur’anic 
verses, particularly those traditionally ascribed to its earliest Meccan phase, target not the beliefs of the 
mushrikūn but instead these unjust social customs and inequalities:   
 
177 Q 2:282.  
178 Q 3:104, 110; 7:157; 9:71, 112; 22:41.  
179 Rahman, Major Themes, 38. 
180 Q 71:7; 74:16; 80:5.  
181 Q 37:152.  
182 Q 6:25; 25:5 
183 On poet: Q 36:69; 21:5; 37:36; 52:30; 69:41. Magician: Q 38:4-5; 25:8; 44:13-4. Soothsayer: Q 55:29; 69:42.  




No indeed! You do not honour orphans, you do not urge one another to feed the poor, you consume 
inheritance greedily, and you love wealth with a passion. (Q 89:17-20).  
Woe to those who give short measure, who demand of other people full measure for themselves, but 
when it is they who weigh or measure for others give less than they should. Do these people not realise 
that they will be raised up, on a mighty Day? (Q 83:4) 
Verses alluding to the ‘love of wealth’ in pre-Islamic Arabia resonate in later tradition. The hadith, sīra 
and works of early Islamic history stress the pre-Islamic function of the ka‘ba as a sanctuary of regional 
importance, hosting to a range of idols. Pre-Islamic Mecca is depicted in the tradition as a city whose 
wealth depended on its status as a pilgrimage center of idolatry.185 Another social custom condemned 
in the Qur’an is female infanticide.186 In places the Qur’an attacks this custom in conjunction with the 
beliefs of the mushrikūn, pointing to the perceived absurdity of ascribing daughters to God, noted 
earlier, while they prefer the birth of sons. 
When one of them is given news of the birth of a daughter, such as he so readily ascribes to the Lord of 
Mercy, his face grows dark and he is filled with gloom. (Q 43:17) 
When one of them is given news of the birth of a baby girl, his face darkens and he is filled with gloom. 
In his shame he hides from himself away from his people because of the bad news he has been given. 
Should keep her or suffer contempt to bury her in the dust? How ill they judge!..They attribute to God 
what they themselves dislike while their own tongues utter the lie that the best (sons) belong to them. (Q 
16:58-62) 
Shirk is not just condemned in a doctrinal sense, then, but it has tangible manifestations in wider society. 
It is tied to notions of greed, injustice, oppression, arrogance and even the persecution of prophets. 
‘Association’ with God pervades all facets of existence. Again, Fazlur Rahman aptly notes this Qur’anic 
link between doctrine and ethics, shirk and injustice: 
The Qur’an began by criticising two closely related aspects of that (pre-Islamic Arabian) society; the 
polytheism or the multiplicity of gods…and the gross socio-economic disparities that equally rested on 
and perpetuated a pernicious divisiveness of mankind. The two are obverse and converse of the same 
coin. 187 
Whether shirk in doctrine is a cause or symptom of injustice and moral corruption misses the point. The 
Qur’an seems to insist that one cannot be separated from the other. These are different facets of the 
same, essential phenomena. There is, in short, no room for a moral mushrik in the Qur’an.  
Conclusion  
 
 Ultimately, the condemnation of shirk lies at the heart of the monotheistic message of the Qur’an. This 
is one of the main ways the Qur’an expresses the oneness of God and calls for the worship of God alone. 
Shirk is held as the gravest doctrinal error whereby the entire message of the Qur’an can be summarised 
as a warning against shirk. For this reason it is perhaps unsurprising that the Qur’an ties shirk to a host 
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of unjust traits and practices. Only in this way can it understand why the axiomatic truth of tawḥīd, a 
truth evidenced in the natural world, relayed by the prophets and embedded in our innate conscience or 
fiṭra, is rejected. In short, the Qur’anic condemnation of shirk is absolute: 
God does not forgive that anything is associated with Him (yushraka bihi); anything less than that He 
forgives to whoever He will, but anyone who associates with God has fabricated a tremendous sin. (Q 
4:48, 116). 
From this angle, the Qur’an’s material on shirk is clear. Bur from another perspective, shirk emerges as 
a complex and multifaceted category. The Qur’an speaks of many kinds of shirk and gives no fixed 
image or understanding of what it means to ‘associate’ with God. The elusive, ambiguous and even 
argumentative nature of its discourse raises questions over how to interpret its verses, but the sense 
remains of a multi-faceted concept operating on various levels. The idea of ‘association’ with God 
implicit in shirk includes the worship of the self, heavenly bodies and idols to Christian beliefs of Jesus 
and Mary. Addressing its opponents, the Qur’an paints a complex account of shirk that gives no clear 
sense of the nature of the ‘association’ that it condemns. More deeply, the Qur’anic material on shirk 
traverses a spectrum that ranges from the failure to recognise the one true God, as in the idolaters of 
Abraham, to a belief in God but a failure to worship Him correctly, as in Christian beliefs of Jesus and 
the beliefs of the mushrikūn. It ranges from rejecting the authority of prophets like Abraham and 
Muhammad, to exaggerated beliefs of the prophets like Jesus, placing him on the level of divinity. It 
covers literal idol worship, traditionally the antithesis of monotheism, to a group of opponents of the 
Prophet that appear ‘surprisingly close’ to the Qur’anic conception of God.  
This lies at the crux of the present study; while the concept of shirk is central to how the Qur’an speaks 
of divine oneness, it is also a multi-layered category. Though inclusive of idol worship, it is not reduced 
or essentialised to such. The worship of idols is one subset of shirk, but the idea of ‘associating’ with 
God in the Qur’an extends much further. It is perhaps this very breadth and flexibility intrinsic in the 
idea of ‘association’ that makes the condemnation of shirk so central to the Qur’an. For our purposes, 
that the Qur’an has many ways of speaking of shirk would seem to open the idea of ‘association’ to 
diverse interpretations in later Islamic thought. If we find diverse conceptions of shirk in later Islamic 
intellectual tradition, as shown in the following chapters, it is possible to trace this back to the Qur’an 
itself, a close reading of which reveals a range of reflections of what it means to ‘associate’ with God. 
But there is perhaps another, final reason why the condemnation of shirk is the critical stress-point of 
the Qur’an. This relates to the fact the Qur’an affirms Muhammad as ‘seal of the prophets’, the last in 
a line of prophets sent to mankind throughout history.188 Jane McAuliffe describes how this sense of 
finality underpins much of the homiletic and exhortatory character of the Qur’an:  
Among its strong self-declaratives are the Qur’an’s assertions of its overriding pre-eminence, its utter 
finality. With this revelation, God has completed his salvific sequencing of prophets and messengers. 
 




The words spoken to Muḥammad, the ‘seal of the prophets’, constitute God’s full and final guidance 
for humankind. 189 
While a grave doctrinal error, the Qur’an also presents shirk as deeply-rooted in human history. It has 
been condemned by all the prophets. It seems that mankind has always been guilty or in need of warning 
against the error of ‘associating’ with God. Yet as ‘seal of the prophets’ there will be no prophets sent 
to guide humanity after Muhammad. The Qur’an, then, is the final warning to humankind against shirk. 

























189 Jane D. McAuliffe. ‘Introduction’, in ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Qur’an (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 





































Chapter II: Reflections on shirk in early Muslim tradition 
 
To deny idols, or still better to destroy them, is like translating into concrete terms the fundamental 
expression of Islam, the formula lā ilāha illā ’llāh. 190 
 
This chapter moves from the Qur’an to explore reflections on shirk in the early Muslim tradition. By 
‘early Muslim tradition’, we refer to the extra-Qur’anic sources that emerged from the eight to tenth 
centuries C.E and which purport to enhance our understanding of the life of the Prophet and Arabia at 
the advent of Islam. This includes the hadith collections and works on the life of the Prophet (sīra), but 
it focuses on the histories of pre and early Islamic Arabia, particularly the Kitāb al-Aṣnām (Book of 
Idols) of Ḥishām Ibn al-Kalbī (d. 819). This chapter takes the work of Ibn al-Kalbī as broadly 
representative of the tradition as a whole, but also draws on the histories of al-Azraqī, al-Wāqidī (d.  
823) and Ibn Sa‘d (d. 845).191 What follows is not an exhaustive account of all the allusions to shirk in 
these sources, which lies beyond the scope of one chapter, but an attempt to draw out certain key themes 
that illustrate the nature and meaning of shirk in the early Muslim tradition.  
This is important for two reasons. Firstly, it reveals the difference between reflections on shirk in the 
works of hadith, sīra, and Ibn al-Kalbī to that found in the Qur’an. As seen previously, the Qur’an offers 
a complex account of shirk in its immediate milieu and alludes to the worship of unidentified 
‘associates’, ‘gods’, angels, jinn and the ṭāghūt. The exact identity of the mushrikūn in the Qur’an, or 
the nature of their shirk, is not explicit. The mushrikūn also appear very close to the Prophet on some 
core doctrinal issues. But a very different image emerges in the sources of early Muslim tradition. Here, 
shirk at the time of the Prophet is readily conflated with idol worship. Opponents known as the 
mushrikūn are depicted as idolaters in a literal sense, worshipping idols of wood and stone. Early writers 
like Ibn al-Kalbī quite self-consciously seek to clarify ambiguities in the Qur’anic account and read an 
image of idols into its verses on shirk. He gives the following interpretive gloss;  
When God sent His prophet, who came peaching the doctrine of tawḥīd and calling for worship of Him 
alone, without any associate (sharīk), (the Arab opponents) said; ‘Has he made all the gods one God? 
Indeed, this is a curious thing!’ (Q 39:4). They had in mind in this verse the idols. 192 
Ibn al-Kalbī provides a wealth of information on the nature of idolatry that is entirely absent from the 
Qur’an, including the names, sites, features and tribal affiliations of pre-Islamic idols. In total, the Kitāb 
 
190 Titus Burckhardt, Art of Islam: Language and Meaning (London: World of Islam Festival, 1976), 5.  
191 Ibn al-Kalbī, Abū al-Mundhir. Kitāb al-Aṣnām, ed. Aḥmad Zakī (Cairo: al-Dār al-Qawmiyya li al-ṭibā‘a wa al-nashr, 1964). 
Nabih Amin Faris, trans. The Book of Idols: Being a translation from the Arabic of the Kitāb al-Aṣnām (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1952). Al-Azraqī, Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad. Akhbār Makka wa-mā jā’a fīhā min al-athār, ed. Rushdī al-
Ṣāliḥ Malhas, 2 volumes (Mecca: Matābi‘ Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1978). Al-Wāqidī, Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar. Kitāb al-Maghāzī, ed. 
M. Jones (Cairo, 1959-66). Ibn Sa‘d, Muḥammad. Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-Kubra, ed. E. Mittwoch and E. Sachau, 9 volumes (Leiden: 
E J Brill, 1905-1921). Taking Ibn al-Kalbī as representative of the tradition is adopted by Gerald Hawting, The Idea of Idolatry 
and the Emergence of Islam: from Polemic to History (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge, 1999).  




al-Aṣnām provides biographical details of some twenty-five idols. It augments our image of Manāt, for 
example, briefly referenced in the Qur’an (Q 53:20): 
The most ancient of all the idols was Manāt. The Arabs used to name (their children) ‘Abd-Manāt or 
Zayd-Manāt. Manāt was erected on the seashore in the vicinity of al-Mushallal in Qudayd, between 
Medina and Mecca. All the Arabs used to venerate her and sacrifice to her…(indeed) at the end of the 
pilgrimage…when they (the Arabs) were about to return home, they would set out to the place where 
Manāt stood, shave their heads, and stay there a while. They did not consider the pilgrimage completed 
until they visited Manāt. 193  
We find similarly vivid accounts of pre-Islamic idols not mentioned in the Qur’an, with names such as 
dhū-l-Khalāsa and Hubāl.194 The early tradition also contains aspects missing from the Qur’an like the 
prohibition of images, found across numerous hadith narrations. This is in turn related to the second 
key theme of this chapter. The clear equation of Qur’anic shirk with idol worship at the time of the 
Prophet reveals how early historians like Ibn al-Kalbī did not conceive of shirk as just a metaphysical 
or doctrinal error. Rather, shirk had tangible manifestations in the social sphere. The second half of this 
chapter explores this in more detail, examining the many reports of idol destruction that are said to have 
accompanied the spread of Islam. These accounts reveal the sense of rootedness and attachment to 
idolatry in pre and early Islamic society, with reports even highlighting the struggle of newly-converted 
tribes to fully renounce idols after embracing Islam. Even at the time of the Prophet, then, shirk is not 
conceived in abstract doctrinal terms. ‘Associating’ with God had a practical, social dimension. 
Declaring tawḥīd entailed the removal of idols and the active reshaping of the social space.  
Questions of historical criticism are not the concern of this chapter. Nor does this chapter explore any 
archaeological evidence of pre-Islamic idolatry.195 We may briefly note that as Muslim historians 
writing a century or more after the Prophet, in an Islamised milieu of the eighth and ninth century, we 
have reason to doubt the veracity of at least some of the material found in Ibn al-Kalbī and others. As 
Nicolai Sinai and Gerald Hawting note, the Kitāb al-Aṣnām is not consistent on much basic information 
relating to idols: it contains different locations for the same idol, conflicting definitions of ṣanam and 
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wathan as terms for idols and rival accounts of the Arabian origins of idolatry.196 Other works differ 
from Ibn al-Kalbī and give conflicting information on the sites and features of specific idols.197 It has 
been shown that the Kitāb al-Aṣnām evinces common tropes and motifs against idols found in Jewish 
and Christian polemics, and thus reflects later concerns, with material added from later sources.198 In 
line with this revisionist account of the historical origins of the Qur’an, Hawting insists that the works 
of Ibn al-Kalbī and others are useful in revealing how the early Muslim community of the eighth to 
tenth centuries imagined shirk at the time of the Prophet, but not as an accurate historical resource.199  
For the purposes of this thesis, however, this is precisely the point. The aim of the present chapter is not 
to separate historical fact from fiction on the question of pre-Islamic Arabia. Rather, importance lies in 
the fact that the traditional image surveyed in this thesis has been accepted and internalised in later 
Islamic thought. As will be seen in later chapters, each of the figures examined in this thesis, from Ibn 
Taymiyya to Sayyid Quṭb, have accepted the traditional image of pre-Islamic Mecca as a center of 
idolatry, understood the Qur’anic mushrikūn to have worshipped idols of wood and stone, and used this 
image of pre-Islamic idolatry as a foil for the different manifestations of shirk in their own times. Herein 
lies the importance of the Islamic historical tradition. This chapter now turns to overview this material. 
Idols and images in the Hadith 
 
This section overviews some of the hadith materials relating to shirk and illustrates the relationship 
between the hadith sources and the Qur’an. It is worth noting at the outset that the terms for idols, aṣnām 
or awthān, occur frequently in the hadith collections, much more so than in the Qur’an. As shown in 
the previous chapter, the Qur’an uses these terms only rarely and almost exclusively in relation to the 
story of the prophet Abraham. In the hadith collections, however, these terms are regularly used to 
depict the Prophet’s environment of seventh century Arabia:  
It is narrated from ‘Urwa ibn ‘Abasa that he said to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him); “with 
what were you sent?” He said “I was sent to uphold the ties of kinship, to break the idols (kasr al-awthān), 
so that God would be worshipped alone with no associate. (sharīk) 200 
Many narrations focus on the correct Islamic practice regarding idols. This seems important in a newly 
Islamic environment in which the customs and memory of idol worship would have run deep. Thus, 
one narration tells of the Prophet warning not to sacrifice to idols, swear in their name or sell them.201 
 
196 For an overview of the objections see Nicolai Sinai, The Qur’an: A Historical-Critical Introduction (Edinburgh: 
University of Edinburgh Press, 2017), 65-66.  Hawting, The Idea of Idolatry, 92-110, 111-129. 
197 The idol Allāt, for example, is placed in Ṭā‘if or Mecca depending upon the source and described as either a worked stone 
or an anthropomorphic figure with a “head”. Hawting, Ideo of Idolatry, 16 and 138. W.R. Arafat. ‘Fact and Fiction in the 
history of pre-Islamic idol worship’, Islamic Quarterly 12 (1968), 8-10. 
198 Sinai, The Qur’an, 65. Hawting, The Idea of Idolatry, 89-92.  
199 Hawting, Idea of Idolatry, 66. This of course is the approach of Orientalist scholars like Ignaz Goldziher who understands 
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communities compiling the hadiths, but not as an accurate historical resource conveying accurate information about the 
Prophet or early Muslims. See Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2 vols., Eng. translation (London: 1967), 89-125. 
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In another tradition, from the collection of Abū Dāwūd, an old woman comes to the Prophet asking of 
the correct Islamic practice regarding vows and sacrificial offerings. The Prophet’s response is notable 
for it captures both the sense of a break with an idolatrous past and implies a distinction between aṣnām 
and awthān that is not readily apparent from the Qur’an itself: 
It was said that a woman came to the Prophet and said; ‘Messenger of God, I have taken a vow to play 
the tambourine over you’. He said; ‘Fulfil your vow.’ She said; ‘And I have taken a vow to perform a 
sacrifice in such and such a place, a place in which people sacrificed in the jāhiliyya. He asked; ‘for a 
ṣanam?’ (li-ṣanam). She replied; ‘No’. He asked; ‘for a wathan?’ (li-wathan) She replied; ‘No’. He said; 
‘fulfil your vow.202 
The prophet Abraham uses the terms interchangeably in the Qur’an.203 The previous chapter noted how 
later commentators struggle to distinguish ṣanam from wathan. For al-Suhaylī (d. 1185), the term 
ṣanam applied to an object cut from stone, while wathan denoted something other than stone, like 
bronze.204 William-Lane presents a range of interpretations including the opposite; that ṣanam refers to 
an idol of metal, with wathan made from stone or wood. Another view is that ṣanam refers to an image, 
with wathan a shapeless object.205  Both terms relate to idols, then, but the fact that the Prophet ask two 
questions here would imply they are not complete synonyms. The hadith collections also include 
categories not found in the Qur’an, like hidden shirk (shirk al-khafī) or lesser shirk (shirk al-asghar), 
usually referring to pious ostentation. The Prophet is reported to warn that hidden shirk is a constant 
threat to believers, harder to find than “the creeping of ant over a rock.”206 
Building on this, a major theme in the hadith and traditional sources is to clarify aspects of which the 
Qur’an is silent or ambiguous. Many hadiths thus explain and illustrate the meaning of Qur’anic verses 
that allude to shirk, such as the ‘gods’ worshipped by the community of the prophet Noah. The Qur’an 
lists these as Wadd, Suwā‘a, Yaghūth, Ya‘ūq and Nasr (71:23) but tells us nothing else about them, 
providing no information save the names and their purported status as ‘gods’. The hadith materials fill 
this lacuna. A clarificatory report attributed to Ibn ‘Abbās tells us the following: 
These were among the idols of prophet Noah’s nation, which in time ended up among the Arabs… These 
idols were named after some righteous men among Noah’s people. When these righteous men died, Satan 
inspired the people to make statues of them, named after them. These statues were placed in their 
favourite meeting places as reminders of righteousness, and no one of that generation worshiped them. 
 
202 Sulaymān ibn al-Ash‘ath al-Sijistānī al-Azdī, Abū Dāwūd. Sunan, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd (Cairo: 
Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1935), 3/3312.  
203 See Q 6:74; 29:17.  
204 Al-Suhaylī, Abū al-Qāṣim ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn ‘Abdullāh. Al-Rawd al-Unūf fī sharḥ al-sīra li-Ibn Hishām, (Cairo, 1914), 
1/62. C.f A. Guillaume. ‘Stroking an Idol’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 27:2 (1964); 430.  
205 See Edward William Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 1992), I/1735-6. For further 
exploration of the great diversity of interpretation founds in tradition, see Fiorella Scagliarini. ‘The words ṣlm/ṣnm and some 
words for “statue, idol” in Arabic and other Semitic languages’, Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 37 (2007); 
253-62.  





However, when that generation died off, the purpose of the statues was forgotten. The following 
generation from then on started to worship them.207  
It seems that these names refer to the commemorative statues of saints, later worshipped outright. This 
illustrates the interplay between the Qur’an and hadith sources in terms of clarifying the Qur’anic 
allusions to shirk. In other cases, the early Muslim tradition moves beyond the text of the Qur’an and 
reads an image of pre-Islamic idolatry into highly ambiguous verses. We see this in the following verse:  
They apportion to God a share of the produce and the livestock He created, saying ‘This is for God’ – so 
they claim – ‘and this is for our associates (shurakā’una).’ Their associates share does not reach God, 
but God’s share does reach their associates: How badly they judge! (Q 6:136). 
This verse alludes to some kind of practice in its immediate milieu. But it is also obscure and seems to 
presuppose knowledge on the part of its audience. The traditional sources give meaning to the verse by 
relating it to a custom and ritual of pre-Islamic idolatry. Ibn Ishāq explains this verse by way of a tribe 
named Khawlān that divided livestock and crops between God and their idol, ‘Umyānis, favouring the 
latter.208 Ibn al-Kalbī offers the same explanation.209 Here, the commentators identify the unnamed 
‘associates’ or shurakā in the Qur’an with a specific idol and an obscure verse is clarified via the 
traditional image of pre-Islamic idolatry. It is possible of course that this is a fictitious account designed 
to shed light on an unintelligible passage.210 Yet the point for this chapter is that Ibn Ishāq and Ibn al-
Kalbī read an image of pre-Islamic idolatry into a verse that does not explicitly refer to such.   
A broader reading of the traditional material even challenges the Qur’anic account of shirk in places. 
The previous chapter examined the social and ethical dimensions of shirk in the Qur’an. The Qur’an’s 
doctrinal critique of shirk is part of a larger condemnation that extends to the ethics and social 
malpractices of the mushrikūn. In the traditional sources, however, a more complex image emerges, 
wherein pre-Islamic society does appear to have had some praiseworthy attributes, notwithstanding the 
prevalence of shirk and idols. Several hadith narrations attest to this, as related by Yassin Dutton: 
Any depiction of the (pre-Islamic period in Arabia known as the) Jahiliyya as 'all bad' is obviously an 
exaggeration: what the traditional sources tell us is not so simple. Rather, we recall Hind's comment, on 
making bay'a to the Prophet on the Day of the Conquest of Makka, 'Would a noble woman commit zina, 
Messenger of Allah?', with the obvious implication that noble women, even in the Jahiliyya, would not, 
along with the well-known hadith that 'The best of you in the Jahiliyya are the best of you in Islam, when 
they understand'. 211 
 
207 Muhammad Muhsin Khan, trans. Sahih Bukhari: The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Bukhari (Lahore: 1979-83), 
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These hadiths indicate that the society of the mushrikūn was not entirely devoid of ethics and honour. 
We could also point to a high valuation of pre-Islamic, jāhilī poetry across later Muslim history. Later 
tradition also preserves a sense of admiration for the pre-Islamic qualities of hospitality, generosity and 
courage, captured in the concept of murū’a.212 None of this is found in the Qur’an. The interplay 
between the Qur’an and early tradition thus operates on several levels. The traditional literature can be 
seen to clarify, develop and at times even challenge the Qur’anic reflections of shirk.  
Another theme frequently encountered in the hadith sources is the prohibition of images. The apparent 
opposition to figural imagery in Islam has long been of interest to Muslim and non-Muslim scholars.213 
This is not rooted in the Qur’an, which appears silent on the issue, but is seen across a range of hadith 
narrations. Many hadiths, for example, speak of angels not entering a house or room in which there are 
images.214 The proscriptions can be broadly placed into two categories. On the one hand, several 
narrations link images with the threat of falling into shirk. This is implicit in the following:  
Abū al-Hayāj al-Asadī said: ‘Alī ibn Abi Ṭālib said to me: “Shall I not send you with the same 
instructions as the Messenger of God…sent me? ‘Do not leave any image (ṣūra) without defacing it or 
any built-up grave without levelling it.’” 215 
Commenting on this, Ibn Qayyim (d. 1350) writes, “in most cases, the reason why nations fall into shirk 
is because of images (al-ṣūr).”216 Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) says much the same.217 The concern over 
images, icons and their veneration is of course not exclusive to Muslim sources. Marco Scholler notes 
the strong parallels between Ibn Taymiyya and the criticism of ‘idolatrous’ images in the works of the 
Protestant reformer, John Calvin (d. 1564).218 Yet many other hadiths are concerned not with shirk but 
the idea that, in depicting a creature, the artist arrogantly claims God’s creative power for himself. God 
alone is al-Muṣawwir (the ‘fashioner’) of creation.219 Consider the following example: 
 
212 For more on this see M.M. Bravman, The Spiritual Background of Early Islam: studies in ancient Arabic concepts (Leiden: 
Brill, 1972).  
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King. ‘Islam, Iconoclasm and the Declaration of Doctrine’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 48:2 (1985), 
267-9. Oleg Grabar. ‘From the Icon to Aniconism: Islam and the Image.’, Museum International 55:2 (2003); 46-53. K.A.C 
Cresswell. ‘The lawfulness of Painting in Early Islam’, Ars Islamica 11/12 (1946); 159-66. Patricia Crone. ‘Islam, Judeo-
Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 2 (1980); 59-95. Mika Natif. ‘The Painters 
Breath and Conceptions of Idol Anxiety in Islamic Art’ in Josh Ellenbogen and Aaron Tugendhaft, ed., Idol Anxiety (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); 41-56. Ismā‘īl al-Fārūqī. ‘Misconceptions on the Nature of the Work of Art in Islam’, 
Islam and the Modern Age Vol 1 no. 1 (1970): 29-49. Titus Burckhardt, Mirror of the Intellect; essays on traditional science 
and sacred art (Cambridge: Quinta Essentia, 1987).  
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The Prophet said; those who make these images (al-muṣawwirūn) will be punished on the Day of 
Resurrection. It will be said to them, ‘give life to that which you have created!”220 
This is, again, not exclusive to Islamic tradition. On the same grounds the early Christian Clement of 
Alexandria (d. 215) discusses art and images under the eighth commandment, the prohibition of theft.221 
In creating images, then, the hadiths suggest that man usurps God’s role as creator and fashioner, with 
image-making a vain attempt to equal God; an attempt that carries an intrinsic limit as artists are unable 
to give life to what they produce. In light of the many narrations that condemn the image-maker (al-
muṣawwir), then, it is not surprising that Islamic legal discourse is critical of pictures, imagery and 
figuration. The Shāfi’ī jurist Sharaf al-Dīn al-Nawawī (d.1284) writes:  
The authorities of our school and others hold that the making of picture of any living thing is strictly 
forbidden and that it is one of the great sins, because it is specifically threatened with the grievous 
punishment mentioned in the Hadith…the crafting of it is forbidden under every circumstance, because 
it imitates the creative activity of God. This is the summary position of our school on the question, and 
the absolute majority of the Companions of the Prophet and their immediate followers the succeeding 
generations accepted it.222 
However, there seems more ambiguity in the hadith sources than al-Nawawī allows. While criticism of 
artists, figuration and imagery is a major theme, other reports imply the image itself is not problematic, 
only its content and the context in which it is seen. The following report of an interaction between the 
Prophet and his wife ‘Ā’isha is a case in point: 
Narrated Al-Qasim: Aisha said that she hung a curtain decorated with pictures on a curtain. The Prophet 
tore that curtain and so she turned it into two cushions, which remained in the house for the Prophet to 
sit on.223 
This hadith does not explain the Prophet’s reaction nor ‘Ā’isha’s response, but it implies an ambivalence 
in the correct Islamic attitude and use of images. This seems to hinge on the difference between hanging 
an image, thus leading to distraction or perhaps even veneration, and placing an image in a less visible, 
or less respected, location. We cannot be sure. But it is worth briefly adding that the hadith and legal 
proscriptions did not stop the flowering of a rich tradition of artistic painting, imagery and figural 
representation across the history of Islamic civilisation, particularly in the Persian and Indian milieus.224 
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Shirk, idols and the Ka‘ba 
 
For a religious tradition that is critical or ambivalent of images there is of course one famous exception. 
The ka‘ba, the cuboid dome structure located in Mecca, enjoys a unique place in Muslim piety. The 
direction to which all Muslims perform prayer (qibla), its image adorns mosques, prayer mats and 
private homes across the Muslim world. As a core and universal symbol of Islam, it is perhaps the 
closest equivalent in Islam to a symbol like the Cross in Christianity.225 References to the ka‘ba (literally 
‘cube’) in the Qur’an are rare. The term is found in only two verses: 
God had made the Ka‘ba – the Sacred House – a means of support for people, and the Sacred Months, 
the sacrificial animals including the garlanded: all this. Know that God has knowledge of all that is in 
the heavens and the earth and that He is fully aware of all things. (Q 5:97 and 95) 
Other references to an unspecified “house” (al-bayt) are seen by commentators to refer to the ka‘ba.226 
The Qur’an describes this ‘house’ as first constructed by the prophets Abraham and Ishmael as a shrine 
to one God.227 It notes this as the first place of worship established for people.228 Ibn Kalbī opens the 
Kitāb al-Aṣnām with a common historiographical account, found throughout the sources, of how later 
generations diverged from message of Abraham and Ishmael and turned the ka‘ba into a centre of 
idolatry, housing three hundred and sixty idols.229 The ka‘ba is significant for this chapter for it is the 
scene of perhaps the most famous episode from the life of the Prophet. This is his destruction of the 
idols housed in the ka‘ba upon the Muslim conquest of Mecca in the year 630 AD, known as the year 
of victory (‘ām al-fatḥ). This episode is entirely missing from the Qur’an but it is widely attested 
throughout the hadith and sīra literature. It is also, aside from the heavenly ascent known as the Mi‘rāj, 
the event from the life of the Prophet that is most frequently immortalized in traditions of Islamic 
painting. From the sīra of Ibn Isḥāq (d.770);  
He (Muhammad) found a pigeon made of aloe-wood, and he broke this idol with his own hand and 
threw it outside. The other idols stood fixed with lead, and the prophet made a sign with his stick in the 
direction of the idols, saying ‘truth has arrived and falsehood has gone, because falsehood was 
perishable.’ Nor, did he point to the front of any idol, but it fell down on its back, nor did he point to its 
back, but it fell down on its face. Not one idol remained standing…(He shouted) “People of Quraysh! 
God has freed from you from the arrogance of idolatry!” 230 
The is reportedly the Prophet’s first act upon entering Mecca. Al-Azraqī includes a report that he spared 
images of Jesus and Mary found inside the ka‘ba.231 The implications of this, and what it reveals of the 
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Prophet’s attitude to images, suggests a further ambivalence that has been explored by scholars.232 These 
accounts do not explain why the Prophet found idol worship condemnable. Ibn Isḥāq, al-Azraqī and 
others relate Muslim history, not theology, and presume the error of idol worship to be self-evident. Yet 
this episode also, more than any other, explicitly conflates shirk at the time of the Prophet with idolatry 
in a literal sense. Ibn al-Kalbī relates the following poem of a companion;  
Have you not seen Muhammad and his men,  
On the day of Victory, when the idols were demolished?  
Then, the light of God shone with all its brilliance.  
And shirk was submerged in a sea of darkness.233 
The destruction of these idols marks a clear break with the pre-Islamic past and heralds the victory of 
Islam in Mecca. Later generations of Muslims have written works exploring the meaning, significance 
and implications of this iconic act. It is the longest and most detailed chapter in the prophetic biography 
of the eighteenth-century figure Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb (d. 1792), for example, and inspires 
his own campaign of shrine destruction.234 In a different vein, the modern Sufi writer Titus Burckhardt 
(d. 1984) offers a more spiritual or esoteric interpretation;    
If the Kaabah is the heart of man, the idols, which inhabited it, represent the passions which invest the 
heart and impede the remembrance of God. Therefore, the destruction of the idols…is the clearest 
possible parable for Islam of the “one thing necessary”, which is the purification of the heart for the sake 
of tawhid, the bearing of witness that ‘there is no god but God’.235 
As with the prophet Abraham in the Qur’an, in this episode the destruction of idols is constitutive of 
declaring the message of tawḥīd. If the presence of physical idols is the major manifestation of shirk in 
the Prophet’s time, the destruction of idols seems the clearest means of awakening people to the doctrine 
of the oneness of God. This removal of the idols, moreover, returns the ka‘ba to its primordial state as 
a shrine to the one God, first established by Abraham and Ishmael, cementing the tie between the ka‘ba, 
Abraham and the Prophet.236 But it is also possible to give this a political reading. Beyond affirming the 
doctrine of tawḥīd, the destruction of idols heralds the political victory of Islam and signals the reform 
of society in line with Islamic precepts. It marks the reforms of the unjust norms, values and customs 
of the pre-Islamic society of which idols were such a defining part. Seen from this angle, the Prophet’s 
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Early Muslim idol destruction  
 
This episode also reveals that shirk at the time of the Prophet is not just conceived by Ibn al-Kalbī and 
others as a doctrinal or metaphysical error. Rather, it had tangible manifestations in the social sphere. 
Though rooted in doctrinal notions of divinity, shirk had a social and political dimension. This chapter 
turns to explore this in more detail. The following section examines the accounts of early Muslim idol 
destruction in the traditional sources. This gives a revealing insight into this social dimension of shirk, 
particularly the rootedness of idols in the social and tribal fabric of Arabia at the time of the Prophet. 
Above all, it must be stressed that the Prophet’s destruction of idols was not unique. Though iconic, it 
did not stand sui generis. Ibn al-Kalbī and others relate many stories of idol destruction carried out by 
the Prophet, companions and early converts to the faith. The sources give an impression that idol 
destruction was a common practice for the early Muslim community, a means of signifying a rupture 
with pre-Islamic past and of embracing of the new faith.  
From Ibn al-Kalbī and others the impression emerges that as the Prophet’s position in Arabia grew 
stronger, he would dispatch followers to destroy the idols of surrounding areas. Ibn al-Kalbī reports that 
while travelling towards Mecca, that is, shortly before destroying idols in the ka‘ba, the Prophet sent 
‘Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib to destroy the idol al-Manāt: 
The Quraysh and the rest of the Arabs continues to venerate al-Manāt until the Apostle of God set out 
from Medina in the eighth year of the hijra, the year in which God granted him victory. When he was at 
a distance of four or five nights from Medina, he sent ‘Ali to destroy her. ‘Ali (then) destroyed her. 237 
The same fate awaited al-Lāt and al-‘Uzza, also named in the Qur’an (53:19-22). Ibn al-Kalbī reports 
the Prophet dispatched his followers ‘Amr ibn al-Mundhīr and Khālid ibn al-Walīd to destroy them.238 
The destruction of al-‘Uzza is addressed later in this chapter. But idol destruction is not only the work 
of the Prophet or companions. A common theme in the literature is that conversion to Islam entails the 
destruction of one’s previous idol.239 This is reflected in the story of the custodian of the idol, Nuhm: 
The custodian of Nuhm was called Khuzā‘ī ibn-‘Abd Nuhm of the Muzaynah (tribe)… When he heard 
of the Prophet, he sped to the spot, destroyed the idol, and then said: “I went to Nuhm to offer a sacrificial 
devotion to it, as I used to do. But then on second thought I said to myself, ‘This is but a mute god, dumb 
and void of intellect.’ And so I refused my sacrifice. (I then said) ‘From this day forth my faith is that of 
Muhammad, (and) the great God of heaven, the all-Mighty.’”240 
Idol destruction is synonymous with embracing Islam. It signals a break with an idolatrous past and a 
loyalty to the new faith. These accounts also point to another dynamic in the encounter of early Islam 
and idols. This is the element of space and territory. The sense to be gleaned from the Kitāb al-Aṣnām 
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and other works is that idol destruction directly parallels and is proportionate to the territorial expansion 
of the early Muslim community: as word of the Prophet spread, idols were destroyed. The destruction 
of idols thus establishes communal boundaries; it is a means of demarcating sacred space for the early 
Muslims. The destruction of Manāt by ‘Alī, then, reflects as much the increased strength and emergence 
of the early Muslim community in Arabia as the error of idolatry itself. This adds another layer to our 
reading of shirk in Ibn al-Kalbī. It offers a dynamic of shirk and communal space that is not apparent 
from the Qur’an itself.241  
At this point it is worth noting, albeit briefly, that Ibn al-Kalbī and other writers never question the 
legitimacy of destroying idols. The sense is that idol-worship is self-evidently stupid or irrational. In 
the destruction of Nuhm, for example, the custodian need only realise that Nuhm is a ‘mute god, dumb 
and devoid of intellect.’ The hold of the idol cannot withstand a moment of critical reflection. A related 
theme is of idolaters embracing Islam after seeing their idol unable to defend itself from destruction. 
This alone demonstrates the powerlessness of the idols and breaks its hold over the worshipper. Al-
Wāqidī reports the companion Amr ibn al-‘Ās was sent by to destroy the idol Suwā‘; its custodian warns 
of the grave risks if it is attacked, but quickly converts after seeing ‘Amr effortlessly destroy the idol.242 
Elsewhere, the idol need not be destroyed. It suffices to see it in a degrading position. Ibn Sa’d recounts 
the following story of a figure known as Rashīd ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi: 
Rashīd had been custodian of an idol of the (tribe) Banu Sulaym. One day he saw two foxes urinating on 
it, and he then said, “Can a Lord have two foxes urinating on his head? He is debased whoever has foxes 
urinating on him!” Then he assaulted it and shattered it. 243 
This is a repeated theme in the literature.244 The embarrassment of the idol is enough to prove the falsity 
of idol worship and leads to the conversion of Rashīd. The message throughout the early Muslim sources 
is therefore clear; idolatry is irrational, and it takes but a moment of thoughtfulness by the idolater, of 
witnessing the idol is a compromising position or its destruction, to show this.245 
The appeal of idols 
 
The reports of idol destruction in Ibn al-Kalbī and others act as a mark of conversion to Islam, signalling 
the futility of idols, a break with the pre-Islamic past and the territorial spread of the Muslim community. 
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Upon closer reading, however, another aspect can be gleaned from these reports. In the same sources, 
the idea emerges that the early Muslims were keen to destroy idols not merely as an assertive declaration 
of the doctrine of tawḥīd, or to herald the victory of Islam, but for more defensive reasons. Many reports 
point to the continuing appeal of idols, revealing the deep roots and attachment to idolatry in pre-Islamic 
Arabia and, with it, the reluctance of many, even converted Muslims, to fully renounce idols. Early 
Muslim idol-destruction, then, can also be read as a practical measure to block any relapse to idolatry 
on the part of these newly-converted communities.  
We find several examples of this. Al-Wāqidī describes the difficult negotiations between the al-Thaqīf 
tribe and the Prophet over their idol, the aforementioned al-Lāt. Al-Wāqidī reports that the tribe asked 
for a stay of execution for al-Lāt upon their conversion to Islam. They followed this with a request that 
al-Lāt remain in place for a year. The Prophet refused both yet assents to the request that al-Thaqīf did 
not have to destroy the idol themselves.246 Ibn al-Kalbī alludes to this. He reports that al-Thaqīf were 
warned by the Prophet not to return to worship al-Lāt, nor avenge its destruction.247 Scholars survey 
these reports and suggest an economic significance to al-Lāt – the idol was central to economic life and 
perhaps had a similar economic and cultural role to that of the ka‘ba for the Quraysh.248 Yet we should 
not discount the sense of religious attachment to al-Lāt that also emerges in the literature. An instance 
of this is al-Ṭabarī’s (d. 923) account of how the women of al-Thaqīf mourned the loss of al-Lāt. 
Appearing in public with their heads uncovered, the women cried;  
Oh, shed tears for the protector al-Lāt 
Ignoble ones have forsaken here,  
those not competent in wielding swords. 249 
These lamentations are said to have occurred after the destruction of al-Lāt - that is, after the tribe’s 
conversion to Islam. The women of al-Thaqīf mourning the loss of their idol, then, accusing the men of 
failing to protect it, were converted Muslims.  
Nor is the case of al-Thaqīf unique. A similar story is found regarding the idol Dhu’l-Khalaṣa. Ibn Sa‘d 
reports that Dhu’l-Khalaṣa remained in place even after its tribe, the al-Daws, converted to Islam and 
prayed towards Mecca. The smaller idols surrounding Dhu’l-Khalaṣa were destroyed but the main idol 
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remained. The Prophet asks the companion Jarīr ibn ‘Abdullāh about the fate of the idol and thus orders 
its destruction. The story is worth recounting in full:  
The Prophet asked (Jarīr) what was happening in his area and he said ‘O Prophet, God has made Islam 
appear (among them) and the call to prayer has manifested itself in their mosques and courtyards. The 
tribes have destroyed the idols (aṣnām) which they used to worship’. (The Prophet) said; ‘what happened 
to Dhu’l-Khalaṣa?” (Jarīr) said; ‘It remains in its place but God will do with it as he pleases, God willing.’ 
So the Prophet of God… send him to destroy Dhu’l-Khalaṣa … but he said, “I do not remain ready (in 
the saddle) on a horse’. The Prophet…stroked his chest and said, “O God! Make him guided and guided 
in true religion!” (Jarīr) then went out with his people numbering some two hundred in all. He was not 
away long until he returned. The Prophet… said; ‘did you destroy it?’ He said; ‘Yes! By He who sent 
you in truth. I took what was on (Dhu’l-Khalaṣa) and I burnt it in fire.  I left it in such a state of destruction 
that they who have an affection for it will be deterred from it and no-one stopped us.’ 250  
As with the women of al-Thaqīf, Ibn al-Kalbī reports the women of al-Daws mourning the destruction 
of Dhu’l-Khalaṣa.251 Yet this report is valuable for it suggests a brief period of co-existence between 
the newly-converted al-Daws and their previous idol; something the Prophet ended when informed of 
it. The appeal of Dhu’l-Khalaṣa for the al-Daws was not entirely extinguished with their conversion to 
Islam, then, and G.R. King adds that Jarīr’s claim that he was not a strong rider, “may have been true, 
but it also has the appearance of an excuse for inaction.”252 King suggests Jarīr reached a deal with the 
al-Daws wherein the tribe accepted Islam but its main idol remained, spared the destruction afforded 
lesser idols.253 In any case, the reluctance to renounce idols after conversion to Islam is evident in the 
sources. The continued existence of Dhu’l-Khalaṣa the lamentations of the women of al-Daws and the 
potential reluctance of Jarīr all point to the continued attachment of the tribe to its idol. In short, it seems 
both the al-Thaqīf and al-Daws were willing to embrace the doctrinal message of Islam but wished for 
the social manifestations of their previous religion, their idols, to remain in place. The Prophet’s order 
of idol destruction was a means of removing shirk in all its facets. 
It is often claimed that idolatry was already in decline in pre-Islamic Arabia at the advent of Islam. This 
is usually on the basis of material found in the sources of pre-Islamic poetry, and is said to have paved 
the way for the monotheistic message of the Prophet. Scholars describe pre-Islamic Arabs as hardly 
devoted to their idols. R.A Nicholson writes; 
Religion had so little influence on the lives of the pre-Islamic Arabs that we cannot expect to find much 
trace of it in their poetry… of real piety the ordinary Bedouin knew nothing…He may invoked Allah in 
the hour of need, as a drowning man will clutch at a straw, but his faith in superstitious ceremonies was 
stronger. He did not take his religion too seriously. 254 
 
250 Ibn Sa‘d, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-kubra, 1/77-8. King. ‘The Prophet Muhammad’, 99-101. Lecker. ‘Was Arabia Idol 
Worship…?’, 21.  
251 Ibn al-Kalbī, Kitāb al-Aṣnām, 36-7. Book of Idols, 31.  
252 King. ‘The Prophet Muhammad’, 101.  
253 Ibid.  
254 R. A Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907), 135. For similar claims see Arafat. ‘Fact 
and Fiction’, 20. (“any idea of religion (among the Arabs) as such was very vague, and the majority of the Bedouins…were 
finding it difficult to acquire intelligent as well as deep faith.”) J. Henninger, ‘Pre-Islamic Bedouin Religion’, in Merlin L. 
Swarz, ed. Studies on Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 7-8. G. Levi Della Vida, Les Sêmites et leur role 




William Montgomery-Watt labels pre-Islamic idolatry as “uninfluential in Muhammad’s time.”255 The 
traditional sources surveyed in this chapter suggest otherwise. The works of Ibn al-Kalbī, Ibn Sa‘d, al-
Wāqidī and others speak of the struggle of converted tribes to fully renounce idols. It is not possible to 
assess the depth of religious feeling in the sources, but reports do at times stress the sense of emotional 
attachment to idols. Ibn al-Kalbī alludes to this in relating the final wish of one of the pre-Islamic Arabs: 
Al-‘Uzza continued to be venerated until God sent His Prophet who ridiculed her together with the other 
idols and forbade her worship…This proved very hard upon the Quraysh. Then Abū Uḥayḥah was taken 
sick by what proved to be his last and final sickness. As he lay on his deathbed, Abū Lahab came to visit 
and found him weeping. ‘What makes you weep…is it death which is inevitable?’ Abū Uḥayḥah replied; 
‘No. But I fear that al-‘Uzza will not be worshipped after I depart!”256 
Far from irrelevant, then, we get a sense from Ibn al-Kalbī and others that the continuing appeal of idols 
lent real, practical need for their destruction by the Prophet. Seen from this angle, early Muslim idol 
destruction becomes less a marker of conversion to Islam, more a means of blocking a return to idolatry.   
We can explore this point further. It could be argued that the source of the appeal of idols has deeper 
roots, far from exclusive to the pre-Islamic Arabs. Something of the physical visibility of idols, perhaps, 
is appealing. Figures from different religious traditions have long noted the human attraction to sensory 
images and representations of the divine. This is key to the defence of devotional and liturgical use of 
icons by the early Church father, John of Damascus (d. 749). For John, icons and images serve as 
reminders for believers and encourage good works and piety.257 Even reformation-era critics like John 
Calvin (d. 1564) do not deny the appeal of icons; indeed, therein lay precisely the threat of idolatry as 
the icon replaced the God it represented.258 Major figures from the Islamic tradition write much the 
same. The eleventh-century polymath Abū Rayḥān Muḥammad al-Birūnī (d. 1050), for example, views 
ordinary Muslims as no less attracted to sensory images than other groups. Al-Birūnī observes Hindu 
idol worship in India and likens this to popular Muslim piety;  
It is well known that the popular mind leans towards the sensible world, and has an aversion to the world 
of abstract thought which is only understood by highly educated people, of whom in every time and place 
there are only a few…these words of mine would at once receive a sufficient illustration if, for example, 
a picture of the Prophet were made…and shown to an uneducated (Muslim) man or woman. Their joy in 
looking at the thing would bring them to kiss the picture, to rub their cheeks against it, and to roll 
themselves in the dust before it, as if they were seeing not the picture, but the original. 259 
Al-Birūnī presumes a social hierarchy between the religious elite (al-khāṣṣ) and the mass of ordinary 
believers (al-‘āam). He explains that popular attraction to sensory objects is the primary reason behind 
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the creation of idols.260 Yet Muslims were not immune from this and would resemble Hindu idolaters 
if they had images of the Prophet. For al-Birūnī, then, the issue of idolatry or shirk is not one of religious 
adherence, but intellectual class. Idols attract because they fulfil a human attraction to sensory images, 
an attraction that only the religious elite can transcend.  
This offers another angle from which to see the reluctance of al-Thaqīf and al-Daws to renounce idols. 
The struggle of these tribes reflects more than just the rootedness of idols in pre-Islamic Arabia, perhaps, 
and points to a deeper human attraction to sensory objects or representations of the divine. On this basis 
it is tempting to note some of the vivid descriptions of idols found in the Kitāb al-Aṣnām: 
(The idol wadd) was a statue of a huge man, as big as the largest of human beings, covered with two 
robes, clothed with the one and cloaked with the other, carrying a sword on his waist and a how on his 
shoulder, and holding in (one) hand a spear to which was attached a standard, and (in the other) a quiver 
full of arrows.261 
The doctrine of tawḥīd runs directly counter to this. Against the appeal of sensory images, the Prophet 
preaches the doctrine of a non-visible God. Against the many idols that the Arabs could visualise, the 
Prophet preaches a God that is immaterial, inaccessible to our perception. Idols are easily accessible 
while the Islamic conception of God retains an aspect of mystery. The difference between the vivid 
imagery of idols in the Kitāb al-Aṣnām and the following description of the nature of God, attributed to 
‘Alī, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, is clear:  
None can fully understand his being however hard he may try. Reason and sagacity cannot visualise Him. 
Intelligence, understanding and attainments cannot attain the depth of knowledge to study of scrutinise 
His divinity. Human faculties of conception, perception and learning, and attributes of volition, intuition 
and apprehension cannot perceive Him or fathom the extent of His might and Glory.262 
Believers are drawn to the sensory world while the Qur’an speaks of a God who is utterly unique and 
dissimilar from creation: “there is nothing like Him” (42:11) and “No vision can take Him in, be He 
takes in all vision” (6:103). The Prophet and early Muslims destroy idols, then, not just to affirm the 
doctrine of tawḥīd, that there is ‘no god but God’. The campaigns of early Muslim idol destruction can 
also be read as an implicit acknowledgement of the human attraction to sensory images and the ease 
with which believers can be drawn away from the worship of one God. The chief appeal of idolatry, the 
major reflection of shirk in the life of the Prophet, thus lies not in its doctrinal or metaphysical claims, 
but precisely in its real, tangible manifestations in the social sphere. This social dimension of shirk, in 
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The power of idols 
 
In closing, this chapter briefly illustrates a tension in Ibn al-Kalbī over the essential nature of idols. The 
Kitāb al-Aṣnām contains numerous reports of idol destruction that are held to reflect the inefficacy and 
powerlessness of idols and, following this, the irrationality of idol worship. But elsewhere, and in 
seeming contradiction to this, Ibn al-Kalbī ascribes a power and agency to idols that makes them a threat 
to the early Muslims. Ibn al-Kalbī’s account of the destruction of al-‘Uzza is a case in point. He reports 
that the Prophet dispatched the companion Khālid ibn al-Walīd to a valley called Nakhla, where there 
stood three trees. Khālid was commanded to cut the first tree down. Upon returning, the Prophet asked 
if he saw anything; he replied that he did not. Khālid returned and cut down a second tree, with the same 
response. On the third visit, Ibn al-Kalbī reports: 
When Khālid arrived on the scene he found a black Abyssinian woman with dishevelled hair and her 
hands on her shoulders, gnashing and grating her teeth. Behind her stood Dubayya al-Sulāmī, then 
custodian of al-‘Uzza. When Dubayya saw Khālid approaching, he said:‘O al-‘Uzza…summon your 
strength and deal Khālid an unmistakable blow! For unless you kill him on this day, You shall be doomed 
to ignominy and shame!’ Thereupon Khālid replied; ‘O al-‘Uzza, may you be blasphemed! Not exalted! 
Verily I see God has abased you.” Turning to the woman, he (Khālid) dealt her a blow which severed 
her head, and she crumbled into ashes. He cut down the tree and killed Dubayya the custodian, after 
which he returned to the Prophet and reported his exploit. The Prophet then said; ‘That was al-‘Uzza, but 
she is no more. The Arabs shall have none after her. She shall never be worshipped again.’ 263  
This report is not found in the hadith collections, but its appearance in Kitāb al-Aṣnām reveals its 
presence and circulation in the early Muslim community. The Mu‘tazilī al-Jāhiz (d.868) also relates the 
story.264 Black women emerging from idols even seems a common trope; al-Azraqī includes this in his 
account of the Prophet’s destruction of idols in the ka‘ba.265 The key is that al-‘Uzza is not presented 
as inanimate or powerless; hence the need for Khālid to return three times to ensure its destruction. The 
idol al-‘Uzza is not simply an inert, inanimate stone. Jamal J. Elias writes: 
The implications of Ibn al-Kalbi’s account of the killing of al-‘Uzza are clear; Muhammad did not deny 
that al-‘Uzza was real. She was not a mere tree that the deluded Arabs, in their ignorance, insisted on 
worshipping…Clearly, Ibn al-Kalbi did not deny the existence of other gods or that idols or icons 
possessed supernatural powers. He simply believed that Allah was superior to them all; part of the proof 
of this was that his worshippers could vanquish all other gods as well as their devotees.266   
Briefly, the later Islamic tradition is also replete with accounts of the power of idols and the danger they 
posed for Muslims. The explorer al-Muqaddasī (d. 991), for example, writes of two idols found in India: 
As for the idols in this region, there are two in Harawa made of stone; no one approaches them. They 
have a power such that should a man try to lay his hand on one, it will be held back and will not reach 
the idol…it is said that if one expresses a wish in their presence, the request will be granted…the two 
statues are quite enchanting. I saw a Muslim man who said he had forsaken Islam to return to the worship 
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of the idols, having been captivated by them; when he returned to Nayasbur (in Iran) he became Muslim 
again. The two idols really are miraculous! 267 
We see a clear sense of wonder and wariness in this passage. Al-Muqaddasī speaks of the danger of the 
idols, their power to grant wishes and to even lure Muslims into forsaking Islam. For Ibn al-Kalbī and 
al-Muqaddasī, then, idols possess a degree of agency that make them more than just inanimate objects. 
It would seem that we have shifted far from the repeated emphasis in the Qur’an, outlined in the previous 
chapter, on the powerlessness and futility of any ‘associate’ and ‘god’ worshipped in place of God. In 
its explicit mention of al-‘Uzza, moreover, the Qur’an condemns this as “nothing but names that you 
have invented yourselves.” (53:23) There seems a tension, then, as Ibn al-Kalbī has neither the Prophet 
nor Khālid deny the metaphysical reality of al-‘Uzza. It is seen to exist in a meaningful sense but it is 
inferior to God, as shown in its destruction. In this light Ibn al-Kalbī illustrates an implicit tension in 
early Muslim sources between monotheism and monolatry; the latter defined as worship of one god 
despite the belief in the existence of other gods. Elias again writes:  
Belief that there is no God except Allah is the fundamental point of Muslim doctrine, to the extent that 
the profession of faith (shahāda) - the formal act through which a person becomes a Muslim- is a 
declaration to this effect (together with the acceptance of Muhammad as God's Prophet). However, 
beyond the level of credal statements, the distinction between monotheism (the belief in only one God) 
and monolatry (the worship of only one God) is not as clearly maintained. Indeed, early Muslim sources 
speak of the existence of other gods, albeit false ones.268 
Ibn al-Kalbī’s report of the destruction of al-‘Uzza is a clear case in point. The Prophet does not destroy 
al-‘Uzza because of its powerlessness and inefficacy, but for the opposite. He aims to destroy an object 
that he acknowledges to exist in a meaningful sense.  
Conclusion  
 
This chapter does not aim at an exhaustive account of all material relating to shirk in what we have 
termed the ‘early Muslim tradition’. A full overview of this lies beyond the scope of one chapter. Rooted 
primarily in a reading of Ibn al-Kalbī’s Kitāb al-Aṣnām, it has instead sought to survey the relevant 
sources and draw out two key themes. The first is to stress the difference between the Qur’anic reflection 
on the mushrikūn and that found in the hadith, sīra and Ibn al-Kalbī. The Qur’an presents a rich and 
multifaceted account of what it means to ‘associate’ with God in its immediate milieu. It alludes to the 
worship of unnamed ‘associates’, ‘gods’, ‘equals’, angels and other terms, yet we get no clear image of 
the identity of the opponents of the Prophet, nor the nature of their shirk. This is precisely what is found 
in the early Muslim tradition. Here, the Qur’an’s complex and elusive ways of discussing shirk gives 
way to an explicit image of Meccan idolatry. The mushrikūn are depicted as idolaters in a literal sense. 
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Unnamed ‘associates’ and ‘gods’ in the Qur’an are equated with specific idols from pre-Islamic Arabia, 
with the sources providing a wealth of information on idols. This is in evidence perhaps no more so 
than in the iconic account of the Prophet’s destruction of idols in the ka‘ba upon the conquest of Mecca, 
an episode nowhere found in the Qur’an.  
This leads us to a second key theme. The rich material pertaining to idols, and the many reports of their 
destruction at the hands of the Prophet and companions, tells us that early historians like Ibn al-Kalbī 
did not limit shirk to a doctrinal error. Shirk carried no less a social dimension, with idols deeply rooted 
in the cultural and tribal fabric of early Islamic society. Reports of the struggle of early Muslims to 
renounce idols, even lamenting their destruction, suggest that this social manifestation of shirk was 
perhaps a greater obstacle to the Prophet than its doctrinal facet. In the eyes of Islamic historical 
tradition, then, the Prophet did not condemn shirk or preach the doctrine of tawḥīd in abstract terms. 
Integral to this was an active reshaping of society, involving the destruction of idols that were seen as 
tangible manifestations of shirk in the social sphere.  
The question arises as to what this means for future conceptions of shirk, after the idols were destroyed. 
While ‘association’ with God in the life of the Prophet is manifest in the idols of al-‘Uzza, al-Manāt, 
Nuhm and others, this image of shirk quickly becomes obsolete once these idols are destroyed and the 
nascent Muslim community moves beyond its Arabian milieu. This question, of course, provides a neat 
springboard for the rest of this thesis. As will be shown, each of the figures surveyed in this thesis accept 
the image of shirk in the life of the Prophet that has been surveyed in this chapter. These figures even 
conceive of the nature of pre-Islamic idolatry in ways that are clearly shaped by their intellectual 
contexts and projects: this is clear, for instance, when Ibn Taymiyya writes how pre-Islamic idols were 
taken as objects of love (al-maḥabba) besides God, or when Muḥammad ‘Abduh describes the nature 
of pre-Islamic idolatry as irrational. Yet it will also be shown that each of these thinkers uses this 
historical image of pre-Islamic idolatry as a foil for the shirk of their own age. For each of these figures, 
from Ibn Taymiyya to Quṭb, the sin of shirk was no longer manifest in the pre-Islamic idols of al-‘Uzza 
or al-Manāt, yet the problem of ‘association’ remained and had assumed different forms, comprising a 
major obstacle to their reformist projects in the Muslim societies of their age. And if the Qur’an itself 
has many ways of expressing what it means to ‘associate’ with God, this multiplicity is reflected 
throughout this thesis as the nature, meaning and manifestations of shirk are constantly reinterpreted 
and repackaged by these different thinkers, each in line with their respective contexts. This thesis now 











































Chapter III: Love, saints and shirk: Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) 
 
God will bring forth a people He loves, and they will love Him (Q 5:54) 
It is ibn Taymiyya’s distinction that he opposed by word and deed almost every aspect of religion 
practiced in the Mamluk Empire.  269 
 
The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were a uniquely turbulent period of Muslim history. From the 
West, Crusader forces captured Palestine and parts of Syria. The Eastern half of the Muslim world, 
including the great Abbasid capital Baghdad, faced destruction by the Mongol armies. The horror and 
brutality of the Mongol invasions, their slaughter of the Caliph, was unprecedented in Muslim history. 
The Islamic Empire itself had long fractured into various competing dynasties. The Mamlūk Sultanate 
(1250-1517) in Egypt was particularly chaotic, characterized by frequent violent changes of power.270 
The medieval historian Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1234) offers a neat overview of the era: 
Islam and Muslims have during this period been afflicted by such disasters that no other nation has 
experienced. One such experience came from the invasion of the Tartars (Mongols). They came from the 
East and inflicted incredible damages. Another was the arrival of the Franks (Crusaders), God’s curse be 
on them, (who came) from the West…But another affliction was that the Muslims themselves had been 
divided, and their swords lifted up against their fellows. 271 
Muslim thinkers responded to the trauma in various ways. Some jurists such as Yaḥya ibn Sharaf an-
Nawawī (d. 1284) offered a self-critical analysis. For an-Nawawī, the standards of the religious scholars 
or ‘ulamā’ had fallen to a degree that precipitated the moral decline of the Muslim community. 
Contemporary jurists had failed to sustain the exacting standards of the jurists of the past and this decline 
in religious guidance caused division and weakness in the community at large.272 More commonly, 
Muslims interpreted events in apocalyptic terms. Ibn Kathīr’s (d. 1378) voluminous al-Bidāya wa al-
Nihāya (The Beginning and the End) explains the chaos of the age as signalling the end times.273 The 
Bidāya became the basis for numerous Mamlūk-era historical works.274 
The noted Muslim reformer Taqī ad-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) emerges from this period. 275 
He is widely seen as one of the most incisive and controversial thinkers of Islamic history. He is also 
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among the most important medieval thinkers for modern Islamic discourses given his influence upon 
contemporary salafī and Wahhābī trends.276 Yet Ibn Taymiyya is a product of a very different cultural 
and political milieu than his contemporary readers. Born five years after the Mongol destruction of 
Baghdad, in 1263, Ibn Taymiyya fled the Mongol advances as a child before settling in the relative 
safety of Damascus, then a centre of Ḥanbalī thought.277 A precocious student, he taught Qur’anic 
interpretation in the Umayyad mosque in Damascus shortly after the death of his father, in 1284, aged 
just twenty-one.278 His first written treatise, Manāsik al-Ḥajj (Rituals of Pilgrimage) is dated to 1292 
and concerns the correct performance of the obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca. Ibn Taymiyya here raises 
themes that continue across all later works: the worship of God alone, strict adherence to the practices 
of the Prophet and companions (salaf) and avoidance of unlawful innovation (bid‘a) in religion.279  The 
Mongol threat remained throughout his life and Ibn Taymiyya performed a range of roles including that 
of diplomat, propagandist and even fighter in defence of the Mamlūks against three separate Mongol 
incursions, between 1299 and 1303.280 Relations with the Mamlūk authorities, however, were complex. 
While enjoying periods of favour, it is well documented that Ibn Taymiyya spent much of his adult life 
in prison due to his seemingly heterodox views.281 His famously difficult, even cantankerous personality 
was also a source of opposition among scholarly and political elites.282 Yet the historical records clearly 
point to a forceful, charismatic personality. His biographer, Ibn ‘Abd al-Hādī (d. 1343), gives the 
following account of Ibn Taymiyya’s time in prison: 
When he entered prison, he found prisoners busy whiling away the time with various kinds of games 
such as chess, backgammon and such like that lead to neglecting ritual prayers. The shaykh rebuked them 
for that in the strongest terms and commanded them to perform the ritual prayer…He taught them what 
they needed to know of the sunna…He roused them to perform good deeds…Busy with learning and 
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religion, the prison turned out to be better than (Sufi) prayer rooms, hospices, lodges and religious 
schools. When prisoners were released, many of them chose to remain by his side. 283  
In a similar vein, we read of his raiding wine taverns in Damascus in an attempt to enact religious reform 
in society.284 Ibn Taymiyya eventually died in prison, in 1328, ostensibly due to his criticism of the 
popular custom of grave visitation (ziyāra). This topic is addressed in detail later in the chapter. 
Ibn Taymiyya responds to the chaos of his age with neither the self-criticism of an-Nawawī nor the 
apocalypticism of Ibn Kathīr. Rather, he responds by articulating a project of wholesale reform of 
Muslim thought and practice, at the heart of which lies a return to what he considers the original 
teachings of the Qur’an, sunna and practice of the first three generations, known as the salaf. In a typical 
passage, he writes:  
How well did Mālik observe; ‘later Islam can only approve of what early Islam did approve.’ But 
whenever nations relaxed in their adherence to the tenets of their prophets and became deficient in their 
faith, they invariably replaced these tenets for what they themselves originated, such as unlawful 
innovation (bid‘a) and shirk. 285 
Ibn Taymiyya describes the earliest generations as the “golden age” of Islam.286 His reading of the 
beliefs and practices found in the original sources are the measure for all subsequent Muslim thought 
and practice. As Walid Saleh notes, the superiority of the salaf over the later tradition is offered less as 
an argument throughout Ibn Taymiyya, more as a self-evident principle.287 
This attempt to retrieve the original teachings of the Qur’an and sunna, as he understands them, against 
later developments in Islamic thought often brought Ibn Taymiyya into conflict with scholarly and 
political authorities. His rejection of the process of triple-divorce, for example, whereby a husband 
could unilaterally divorce his wife in one sitting, went against the consensus of each of the four legal 
schools, including his own Ḥanbalī school.288 Yet we need to stress that, for Ibn Taymiyya, his rulings 
were not conceived as new. They were a retrieval of the earliest, and hence correct, ruling of the Qur’an 
and sunna that had been lost, buried under layers of tradition. This conviction underpins his entire 
epistemology. As Rapoport and Ahmed note:  
Although Ibn Taymiyya’s views represent a radical break from the theological traditions of his time, he 
does not see them as novel. Rather, he sees his role as that of…peeling off the obscuring layers of 
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interpretation added on in later centuries, often by well meaning theologians and jurists. The closer one 
is to the original Prophetic message, the closer one gets to truth. 289 
Ibn Taymiyya’s writings cover the full range of intellectual sciences of his time, from jurisprudence, 
theology, political theory, exegesis, Sufism and popular religion.290 Academic scholarship is still in the 
process of uncovering much of the depth and breadth of his legacy.291 Here we may note that the breadth 
of his intellectual interests, allied to an uncompromising wish to pin each science back to what he views 
the early teachings of the salaf, turns Ibn Taymiyya into one of the greatest polemicists of Islamic 
history. The polemical element in his writings is seldom absent. Across his works Ibn Taymiyya attacks 
all Muslim groups that he deems to diverge from the early teachings of the salaf. This is a wide net and 
includes Ash‘arī theologians, philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), Shī‘ī Islam, various forms of 
Sufism, among others.292  
We clearly encounter this side of Ibn Taymiyya in this chapter. For now it is worth considering, briefly, 
his polemics against the theosophical mysticism of the Sufi master Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 1240), particularly 
the notion of ‘unity of being’ (waḥdat al-wujūd) advanced by supporters like Al-Qūnawī and Ibn Sābi‘īn 
(d. 1270).293 This gives us a taste of his tendency for polemics. Alexander Knysh reveals how Ibn 
Taymiyya explores this sophisticated doctrine in detail, and ultimately condemns Ibn ‘Arabī and his 
followers for blurring, to his mind, the essential distinction between God and creation.294 Ibn Taymiyya 
describes the ideas of Ibn ‘Arabī as a greater threat to Islam than the Mongol invasion itself: 
Opposing (by word or deed) these (proponents of waḥdat al-wujūd)) is the greatest of religious 
obligations, for they have corrupted intellects and creeds of the people, including Shaykhs, scholars and 
rulers…their harm is greater in religion than harm of the one who corrupts the worldly affairs of the 
Muslims but leaves their religion untouched, such as the bandit of the Mongols who take away people’s 
wealth but leave alone their religion. 295 
We may also consider his engagement with Christian doctrine.296 This is the most extensive in Sunni 
tradition and yet even here Ibn Taymiyya often condemns threats to Muslim orthodoxy from within.297 
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He uses Christianity as a trope for intra-Muslim polemic. Ibn Taymiyya condemns Christian beliefs in 
the divinity of Jesus, for example, before quickly noting parallels within Islam, such as Shī‘ī veneration 
of the Imams.298 As we will see, the notion of Christian influence lying beneath Muslim engagement in 
shirk runs throughout his critique of the cult of Muslim saints.    
Ibn Taymiyya in recent scholarship 
 
It is hard to date many of Ibn Taymiyya’s works with precision, making it difficult to trace any 
development or change in his thought. 299 Clearly emerging in scholarship, however, is an image of Ibn 
Taymiyya as a much richer and more complex figure than that of simple polemicist and reformer. This 
often involves correcting the views of earlier scholarship. The Orientalist impression of Ibn Taymiyya 
as a strident opponent of Sufi mysticism, for example, has since been roundly rejected, even if his exact 
relationship to Sufism remains unclear.300 Ibn Taymiyya’s relationship with his own Ḥanbalī tradition 
was not without significant disagreement and controversy.301 While opposed to Muslim philosophers 
(falāsifa), Ibn Taymiyya is nonetheless called “a philosopher in his own right” 302, with some suggesting 
the “shares with the philosophers the philosophical spirit”303 given his deep engagement with the 
philosophical tradition that he condemns.304And while Ibn Taymiyya’s reputation as a tireless reformer 
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and polemicist is not in doubt, several recent studies point to a strong sense of lenience and empathy 
that infuses his writings.305 We return to this final element later in the chapter. 
In short, Ibn Taymiyya defies simple categorisation. Exploring the full range of Ibn Taymiyya’s thought 
lies beyond the scope of this chapter. By closely engaging his treatment on the notion of shirk, or 
‘association’ with God, however, we do get something of a sense of the breadth and complexity of his 
thought. In what follows this chapter reveals how Ibn Taymiyya engages shirk in two distinct contexts; 
first, in theological polemics with Ash‘arī kalām theologians over the nature of love between God and 
man. Second, in polemics against the widespread cult of Muslim saints and grave veneration. Taken 
together, Ibn Taymiyya’s engagement with shirk reveals his broad intellectual interests, polemical 
character, commitment to the salaf and, ultimately, his pragmatic and empathetic attitude towards the 
beliefs and practices of the masses. His writing on shirk, then, provide a lens through which we arrive 
at a much fuller and richer impression of his thought.  
Ibn Taymiyya’s theological project 
 
While Ibn Taymiyya engages the full range of intellectual sciences of his day, his main writings were 
on matters of theology, more specifically the foundations of the religion (uṣūl al-dīn). He explains the 
reasons for this in response to a question from a student, ‘Umar bin. ‘Alī al-Bazzār (d. 1350). In a long 
letter, Ibn Taymiyya writes that he was disturbed by the rise of a range of heterodox schools in his time, 
including Shī‘ī Islam, philosophers, monistic Sufism and Ash‘arī kalām theologians, among others, 
whom threatened not the branches of jurisprudence (fiqh) but rather the very core beliefs of the religion. 
This, Ibn Taymiyya writes, forces him to focus on theology.306 Yet for a Ḥanbalī the depth of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s engagement in theology was unusual. Hoover suggests this is what led al-Bazzār to raise 
the issue.307 The following passage from the historian and biographer Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī (d. 1393) 
gives a sense of some of the opposition to Ibn Taymiyya’s interest in theology within his Ḥanbalī school; 
Groups among the imāms of the Hadith scholars, those of them who had memorized (the Quran), and 
their jurists used to love the Shaykh (Ibn Taymiyya) and considered him great. However, they did not 
love his deep involvement with the kalām theologians and the philosophers. In this, they followed the 
way of the imams of the early hadīth scholars, like al-Shāfi‘ī and Aḥmad (Ibn Ḥanbal).308 
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This opposition is rooted in the dominant tendency of the Ḥanbalī tradition that until Ibn Taymiyya’s 
time resisted engagement in theological discourse or kalām. We see this in works like Dhamm al-Kalām 
(Censure of kalām) by the Ḥanbalī Sufi al-Harawī (d. 1089) or the Taḥrīm al-nazār fī kutub ahl al-
kalām (Forbidding studying the books of the kalām theologians) of Ibn Qudāma (d. 1223).309 For these 
thinkers, the science of kalām led to doubt, erroneous belief and was above all unsanctioned in the tenets 
of revelation.310 Ḥanbalī scholars who did engage in kalām, such as Ibn ‘Aqīl (d. 1119) and Ibn Jawzī 
(d. 1201), were sharply criticised from within the tradition.311 Yet as Ozervarli and others reveal, Ibn 
Taymiyya perceives the threats to the religion as such that a wholesale rejection of kalām, characteristic 
of the Ḥanbalī tradition, was no longer feasible in his time. 312  
Central to Ibn Taymiyya’s engagement with kalām was his treatment on the divine attributes in the 
Qur’an. This is usually found under the rubric of tawḥīd al-ṣifāt (the oneness of God’s attributes) in his 
works. The question of how to interpret the divine attributes was central to the historical development 
of Muslim theology. For Ibn Taymiyya, the Qur’anic references to God’s hands, throne and face should 
be accepted as they are: God is to be understood by the names He has given Himself, without enquiring 
into their meaning (takyīf), assimilating or likening (tashbīh, tamthīl) them to created attributes, nor 
stripping them from God (ta‘ṭīl) by way of metaphorical interpretation. Ibn Taymiyya opens his famous 
work of doctrine, the al-‘Aqīda al-Wasaṭiyya, with the following; 
Part of faith in God is to believe in how God describes himself in His Book and how His prophet describes 
him…(and this includes) not resorting to alteration (taḥrīf), nor stripping away (ta‘ṭīl), nor enquiring as 
to meaning (takyīf) nor assimilating (tamthīl), while also believing that that ‘there is nothing like him’… 
yet not rejecting how He has described Himself…by (way of) disbelieving in the names of God and his 
signs, and by not enquiring in the meaning of nor assimilating His attributes with the attributes of His 
creation.313 
This stands squarely against Ibn Taymiyya’s main theological interlocutor, the Ash‘arī Fakhr al-dīn al-
Rāzī (d. 1209). Al-Rāzī’s famous ‘universal rule’ (qānūn kullī) argues for a metaphorical interpretation 
of the anthropomorphic attributes of God, or for delegating the meaning of such verses to God 
 
309 Geore Makdisi, trans. Ibn Qudāma’s Censure of Speculative Theology tahrīm al-Nazar fī Kutub ahl al-kalām (London: 
Luzac, 1962), 16. See also Joseph Bell whom, after citing from Ibn Qudāma’s polemic against kalām, writes; “a more explicit 
condemnation of kalām, demonstrating complete disregard for its potential usefulness to the Hanbalites themselves, could not 
be asked for”, in Joseph Norment Bell. Love theory in later Ḥanbalite Islam (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1979), 54.  
310 For a useful overview of these objections and their bases, see Aziz al-Azmeh. ‘Orthodoxy and Hanbalite Fideism’, Arabica 
35 (1988); 253-267.  
311 See Hoover. ‘Ḥanbalī Theology’, 627-633. Livnat Holtzman, ‘The Mihna of Ibn ‘Aqīl (d. 1119) and the fitnat Ibn al-
Qushayrī (d. 1120)’, in The Oxford Handbook, 660-679. For the case of Ibn Jawzī, see Merlin Schwarz, A Medieval Critique 
of Anthropomorphism: Ibn al-Jawzī’s Kitāb Akhbār al-Ṣifāt; a critical edition of the Arabic text (Boston/Leiden: Brill, 2002), 
1-71.  
312 For more on Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments for the permissibility, even the necessity, of engagement with kalām reasoning and 
argumentation: M. S. Ozervarli, “The Qur’anic Rational Theology of Ibn Taymiyya and His Criticism of the Mutakallimūn” 
in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, 78-100. Racha el-Omari, ‘Ibn Taymiyya’s ‘Theology of the Sunna’ and his polemics with the 
Ash‘arites’, Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, 101-123. Hoover, ‘Theology as Translation’, 40-86. 
313 Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm, Ibn Taymiyya. al-‘Aqīda al-Wasaṭiyya (Al-Qāhira; al-Maktaba al-Salafiyya al-Maktabatuhā, 




(tafwīd).314 Ibn Taymiyya was put on trial in Damascus in 1306 for this non-metaphorical reading on 
charges of anthropomorphism (tajsīm).315 Sherman Jackson covers the proceedings of the trial in depth 
and notes how Ibn Taymiyya famously refuses to seek the protection of the Ḥanbalī school, insisting 
that his view was not that of the Ḥanbalī school but of the Prophet and the salaf itself.316 
A theology of love 
 
Arguably the core feature of Ibn Taymiyya’s entire theology is his emphasis on love (maḥabba) as a 
divine attribute and the centrality of love in the relationship between God and man. The Qur’an speaks 
of God’s love in many verses, as we will see, and a growing body of scholarship emphasises this aspect 
of Ibn Taymiyya’s theology.317 Joseph Bell observes: 
Love is far from an isolated or minor topic in the system of ibn Taymiyya. Related to the question of 
love…are such major tenets of the orthodox Muslim creed as the doctrine of predestination…and the 
proper profession of monotheism.318  
The immediate context for this is Ibn Taymiyya’s theological polemics against the Ash‘arī school of 
his day. Ash‘arī kalām theologians such as al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013) and al-Juwaynī (d. 1085) had come to 
deny love as an attribute of God, instead reinterpreting God’s love in the Qur’an as referring to His will 
(irāda). Briefly, Ash‘arī thinkers denied God loves for that would imply some need of God, while also 
assimilating God too closely to human qualities. Ash‘arī’s also held that love required some form of 
similarity (munāsaba) between lover and beloved, something not possible for God. Moreover, Ash‘arī 
theologians held that man cannot truly love God for God is, in His essence, unknowable - man loves 
only God’s commands and closeness and obedience to God.319 Al-Juwaynī sketches the Ash‘arī view; 
Among the issues on which scholars differ is the matter of the love of God…(For some) ‘God loves a 
human’ does not suggest God’s affection for him, but His blessings toward His servant. The human love 
for his Lord (moreover) means submission and obedience to God. God, the Exalted, is too Sanctified to 
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either incline toward someone, or be inclined towards…Others take (God’s) love to mean His will…The 
most correct of our masters…hold that love means will...Once it is affirmed that (God’s) love means His 
will…you understand that (the term) love is not applicable to the Exalted Lord.320 
Against this, Ibn Taymiyya subjects the attribute of God’s love to the same non-metaphorical reading 
that we saw earlier. Jon Hoover offers a neat overview of the essence of Ibn Taymiyya’s objection: 
(For Ibn Taymiyya) this (Ash‘arī) reinterpretation involves both likening (tashbīh) and stripping away 
(ta‘ṭīl). First, the kalām theologians imagine the love ascribed to God to be like human love in a literal 
sense and thereby conclude that ‘love’ cannot be ascribed to God. Then, to free God of the untoward 
passions of human love, they strip God of His love by calling it instead ‘will’. The only reasonable 
course, according to Ibn Taymiya, is to affirm all of God’s names and attributes equally and without 
modality. The only similarity between the names and attributes of God and the names and attributes of 
creatures are the very names.  321 
Ibn Taymiyya thus challenges the dominant theological tradition of his time, as expressed by illustrious 
Ash‘arī figures.322 The great influence of this view was such that even Ḥanbalī thinkers like Abū Ya‘lā 
(d. 1066) and Ibn ‘Aqīl had come to adopt the Ash‘arī position.323 
By contrast, Ibn Taymiyya stresses the reality of love between God and man. Love is not a metaphor 
(majāz) to be explained or interpreted away, he argues, but it is a real aspect of the relationship between 
God and man.324 Love operates both from God to man and from man to God. On the former, God’s love 
for His believers, Ibn Taymiyya is content to list many Qur’anic verses affirming this love. He writes; 
Concerning the love of the Lord, Glorified is He, for His servant (maḥabbat al-rabb li-‘abdihi), the 
Exalted has said… ‘He will love them, and they will love Him” (Q 5:54). Similarly, ‘Be good, for God 
loves those who are good (al-muḥsinīn) (Q 2:195). And ‘Be just, for God loves those who are just (Q 
49:9)…(and) ‘God loves those who fear Him’ (Q 9:4). ‘God loves those who fight in his path…’(Q 
9:7)…And as for the actions that God loves, the obligatory and preferable, the outward and inward, these 
are many and well known.325 
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We find similar passages elsewhere.326 He condemns Ash‘arī interpretations of God’s love as His ‘will’ 
as a corruption (taḥrīf) of the Qur’an.327 Ibn Taymiyya gives the second type of love, the believer’s love 
for God, no less prominence. He stresses this as the foundation of the religion and all religious acts (aṣl 
al-dīn wa aṣl a‘māl al-dīn).328 Man’s heart was created only for the love of God, he explains, and this 
is the state of our natural, primordial disposition (fiṭra).329 The Prophets have been sent to firm up 
(taqrīr) and complete (takmīl) this fiṭra, not change it.330 The following passage captures this as Ibn 
Taymiyya writes: 
This love is real. The Book and the Sunna speak of it. The position of the salaf, the imams, and…all the 
shaykhs of the religion who are followed and the imams of Sufism, is that God, glorified is He, is to be 
loved in His essence (li-dhātihi), with a real love (maḥabba haqīqa). Indeed this is the perfection of love. 
As the Exalted has said; ‘those who believe have a more intense love.’ (Q 2:165) 331 
Against the Ash‘arī theologians, then, for Ibn Taymiyya the believer loves God in Himself or His 
essence (li-dhātihi); he does not merely love God’s commands or closeness to God.332 He criticises the 
“great ignorance” (jahl ‘aẓīm) of the Ash‘arī view and closes by arguing that we would not love 
closeness or obedience to something that is not, in itself, already an object of love. 333   
Again, we see that while Ibn Taymiyya stands against the dominant theological traditions of his time, 
he does not consider his view novel. Rather, he presents this as a retrieval of the earliest view of the 
salaf that was buried beneath layers of errant kalām speculation. In a highly polemical passage, Ibn 
Taymiyya suggests the reinterpretation of God’s love as His will was a means for heretics (zanādiq) to 
weaken and destroy the Muslim community from within.334 Yet elsewhere he speaks more favourably 
of Ash‘arī theologians, particularly in contrast to non-Sunni opponents like the Shī‘ī’s. 335 The strength 
of Ibn Taymiyya’s anti- Ash‘arī polemics, it seems, varies according to the issue and context at hand.  
The love of God and the shirk of love  
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We therefore see the centrality of love in the theology of Ibn Taymiyya. Love is a reality, he insists, not 
a metaphor, and is the defining feature of the relationship between God and man. It is inevitable, then, 
that Ibn Taymiyya draws a close connection between the love of God and the central doctrine of tawḥīd. 
Ibn Taymiyya speaks of the ‘tawḥīd of the love of God’ (tawḥīd al-maḥabba li-llāh).336 He writes that 
loving God is central to what it means to worship Him and to believe in His oneness. Indeed, worship 
of God comprises complete love for Him (al-‘ibāda tataḍamman kamāl al-ḥubb).337 He writes:  
The message of tawḥīd, the message for which all the Messengers were sent, includes love for God alone 
and absolute rejection of love for the created unless that is loved by God, in which case (this love) is 
subsumed under love for God. This is in contrast to the one who loves (something) with God (al-maḥabba 
ma’a Allāh), which is shirk. 338 
Love is therefore intrinsic to tawḥīd. We return shortly to the notion of ‘love with God’ and shirk. For 
now, it is worth exploring further this close interplay between love and the doctrine of tawḥīd.  
Ibn Taymiyya does not prioritize love of God over the law. We express our love for God, he writes, by 
following the Prophet and obeying God’s law.339 This involves “enjoining the commanded and leaving 
the prohibited.”340 In this way Ibn Taymiyya transforms obedience to sharī‘a, indeed all acts of worship, 
into expressions of love for God; 
Following the sunna of the Messenger, and following his sharī‘a, inwardly and outwardly, necessarily 
follows from the love of God. 341  
Elsewhere it appears that what is in the heart is a more decisive measure of love than outward action. 
Ibn Taymiyya speaks of an unidentified Companion (Nu‘aymān ibn ‘Amr in the tradition) who 
continued to drink alcohol in Medina after its prohibition. Yet the Prophet, Ibn Taymiyya explains, 
refrained from punishing the Companion and stated; “for he (still) loves God and His Prophet.”342 Love 
of God and the Prophet, in this light, seem not so simple a matter of outward obedience.343 Nor is God 
the only legitimate object of love. We may love created things in so far as they are loved by God or are 
subsumed under the love of God. Ibn Taymiyya describes this as love for God (al-maḥabba li-llāh). 
Love of the Prophets and all that which God Himself loves, such as prayer and jihad, falls under this 
category. This is commendable for it falls under an over-arching love of God. Ibn Taymiyya writes: 
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(The believer) knows that God loves His Prophet and His righteous servants, so he (also) loves them 
because of God. Similarly, knowing that God loves that what is commanded be done, and that what is 
prohibited be abandoned, he (the believer) loves that too. 344 
Ibn Taymiyya points to hadith traditions affirming the Prophet’s love for his Companions and wife, 
Aisha.345 But there is perhaps a problem of subjectivity here. We may love food and sleep, for instance, 
because they assist in the performance of religious duties. This would be laudable, falling under the 
category of ‘love for God’. But we may also love food and sleep on the grounds of greed and laziness. 
The nature of the love in question varies considerably, of course, yet Ibn Taymiyya does not explore 
these subjectivities. It would seem that intention, what is in the heart, is key. Ibn Taymiyya is also open 
to the charge, he realises, that many love God only because of His beneficence (iḥsān) towards them, 
and in the hope of earning His reward and recompense. This is still praiseworthy, he writes, though he 
calls this the “love of the masses” (maḥabbat al-āmma). More perfect for Ibn Taymiyya is the “love of 
the elites” (maḥabbat al-khāṣṣa), those who love God purely in Himself.346 This distinction of ways of 
loving God, we should note, is highly resonant in Sufi tradition.347 
This leads us to the notion of shirk and love. The essence of shirk in Ibn Taymiyya’s theological writings 
is that something becomes an independent object of love alongside God. It is when something other 
than God is loved in its essence.348 The crucial distinction here is between the love of something for 
God (al-maḥabba li-llāh) and the love of something with or alongside God (al-maḥabba ma’a Allāh). 
This second category constitutes shirk. Ibn Taymiyya explains:   
Whoever loves a created object (makhlūq) as he loves the Creator (khāliq) gives to Him an associate 
(sharīk). He then takes, besides God, rivals (andād) and loves them as he loves God, even though he may 
profess that God is the Creator…This is why God and His Messenger distinguished between he who 
loves for God and he who loves with God (al-maḥabba li-llah wa al-maḥabba ma’a Allāh.) For the 
former, God is his beloved (maḥbūb), the one he worships … The latter is he who loves with God, and 
who therefore makes the object of his love a rival (nidd) of God. 349 
This, Ibn Taymiyya crucially tells us, was the essence of pre-Islamic idolatry. The mushrikūn associated 
their idols with God as equal objects of love. Ibn Taymiyya writes: 
The mushrikūn did not associate their gods with God in every way. Rather, they believed that God was 
their creator and Sovereign (mulk), and that they were created by Him…But they associated between 
their gods and God in terms of love and veneration.” (al-maḥabba wa al-taẓīm) 350  
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Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) echoes this theology of love, describing love as the “foundation of 
the religion” (aṣl al-dīn).351 Ibn Qayyim describes the essence of shirk as a devotion of love to more 
than one object (aṣl al-shirk bi-Allāh al-ishrāk fī al-maḥabba).352 The central dichotomy running 
through Ibn Taymiyya’s theology remains that of tawḥīd and shirk, then, but he expresses and 
understands this via the notion of love. The pre-Islamic mushrikūn were idolaters who, in essence, 
associated their idols with God by way of a love meant solely for God.   
This is the meaning of shirk in Ibn Taymiyya’s theology. In this light we may perhaps translate shirk 
not as ‘association’ with God for Ibn Taymiyya, but rather as a ‘division’ or even ‘sharing’ with God. 
This is faithful to the Arabic root sh-r-k and seems to better reflect the subtleties of his position. But 
this reading of shirk raises a host of important questions. The first concerns the potentially broad scope 
of shirk. Ibn Taymiyya lists some of the created objects that typically become objects of love: 
Many people have a Caliph, a scholar, shaykh or emir and make him a rival (nidd, pl. andād) of God, 
though they may well say that they love him for God…Sometimes, they treat him as the Christians do 
the Messiah, they invoke him and call him for help. They put him in place of God and His messenger. 
353 
Yet there is no reason to limit shirk simply to leaders, scholars and emirs. Following Ibn Taymiyya, it 
would seem that anything may lead to shirk if it is turned into an object of love in its own right. Whether 
food is loved for the sake of God or as a gluttonous object of love, for example, is ultimately a matter 
of intention. Again, it appears that only the heart knows whether an object is loved for God or as a rival 
of God, whether it belongs to the love of tawḥīd or shirk. But there is perhaps a greater issue to address 
from Ibn Taymiyya. We briefly recall the centrality of loving God to his theology. The essence of the 
believer is that his heart is devoted solely to God. Ibn Taymiyya writes; “If the heart is not sincere to 
God, it worships other than Him, making another God alongside Him.”354 Ibn Qayyim puts this in even 
starker terms: 
The love of God is the most serious requirement of the religion, the greatest of its sources, the most 
sublime of its foundations. And whomsoever loves any created object like he loves God, this is from the 
types of shirk that God does not forgive. 355 
Yet it could be argued that devoting one’s heart solely to God is, in reality, a great challenge. In worldly 
life even sincere believers struggle to love God alone or only that which God loves, to cleanse their 
heart entirely from the love of illicit objects. Ibn Taymiyya himself notes the unnamed Companion 
struggling to renounce alcohol after its prohibition in Medina. This raises the question of whether all 
believers, to some degree, are guilty of shirk. Ibn Taymiyya seems keenly aware of this. He recognises 
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the challenge of truly loving God alone and, in an isolated passage, concedes of al-maḥabba ma’a Allāh; 
“this is that which it is almost impossible to be free from.”(huwa alladhī la yakād aḥad an yuslim min)356 
He notes this kind of shirk has struck “most people” in his time.357 Here we see a keen awareness of the 
inclinations of popular piety in Ibn Taymiyya; an aspect of his thought that we return to when exploring 
his writings on the cult of Muslim saints. 
Ultimately, the foregoing reveals how the notion of love is the central element of tawḥīd and shirk in 
Ibn Taymiyya’s theology. The essence of the mushrik for Ibn Taymiyya is he who loves other objects 
alongside God, turning them into independent objects of love and sharing them with a love that is due 
God alone. This, in effect, turns the object into an idol or to use Ibn Taymiyya’s preferred term, a rival 
(nid) of God. For Ibn Taymiyya, a true monotheist has no space in the heart to love other than God or 
to love something not, ultimately, for the sake of God. Thus he speaks of how one falls into shirk only 
through a deficiency in tawḥīd (naqṣ tawḥīdihi wa īmānihi).358 But Ibn Taymiyya also acknowledges 
this level of love of God is not so easily attained. We may all, it seems, potentially turn other than God 
into objects of love.359 This in turn suggests another explanation for the centrality of love in his theology. 
Ibn Taymiyya heavily engages a theology of love not only for the sake of anti-Ash‘arī polemics, 
perhaps, but also, more deeply, because of his ultimate awareness that avoiding shirk by way of loving 
other than God is a challenge for all, including even sincere believers.  
Ibn Taymiyya on the cult of Muslim saints 
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s writings on al-maḥabba ma’a Allāh do not, however, represent his most extensive 
treatment on shirk. For this we must look elsewhere, more specifically to his polemics against the cult 
of Muslim saints and the veneration of graves, central features of popular piety in the Mamlūk Near 
East of his time. Ignaz Goldziher (d. 1921) offers what remains the most exhaustive treatment of the 
history of saint veneration in Islamic tradition.360 Many key features of the cult of saints, such as beliefs 
in their powers of intercession, the sanctity of saints’ relics, the veneration of graves or the custom of 
supplicating to saints, have been contested throughout Islamic tradition, as we will see. Ibn Taymiyya’s 
value lies in his representing the critical trend of Islamic thought. He is considered among the most 
incisive and tireless critics of saint veneration in Islam.361 Some liken his views to Protestant 
denunciations of Catholic ‘idolatry’.362  
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We must make three key observations at the outset. First, it bears stressing that Ibn Taymiyya’s 
extensive engagement with the cult of saints reflects the popular reality of his time. Josef Meri examines 
the religious culture of fourteenth century Syria, exactly the time in which Ibn Taymiyya is writing, and 
offers the following depiction: 
To the medieval devotee, saints and miracles were an essential part of life…In saints, devotees found the 
strength to cope with war, disease, and pestilence. Saints had the power to address injustice and exact 
punishment…Saints brought good fortune and plenitude, imparted knowledge, blessings, hope, comfort, 
solace and protection from evil. They were God’s agents on earth…Venerating saints was endemic. 363 
This is clear from Ibn Taymiyya’s works, particularly his Compendium of Legal Rulings (Majmū‘ al-
Fatāwa: hereon Majmū’). Many of the questions put to Ibn Taymiyya are recorded in the Fatāwa and 
these give valuable insight into the popular religious environment of his time. Consider, for example, 
the following query that was put to Ibn Taymiyya; 
It is reported from some of the sayings of the scholars is that if you have an accident, or an issue of which 
you fear, then read the verse of the Throne (āyat al-kursī), facing (the grave of) Shaykh ‘Abdul Qādir al-
Jīlānī and send greetings upon him seven times, and make a step towards his grave with each greeting 
and he will remove your need… Is this permissible or not? 364 
Second, we may question how Ibn Taymiyya’s attitude towards the cult of saints links to his treatment 
on shirk and the love of other than God. His polemics against saint veneration has received attention in 
scholarship.365 Yet there has not, to date, been an attempt to explore the possible connection here with 
his theology of love. This is perhaps not surprising; Ibn Taymiyya seldom makes this link explicit, as 
we will see. We explore the strong if implicit link in Ibn Taymiyya between saint veneration and the 
love of other than God in more detail later in the chapter.  
Third, and finally, it is worth outlining the crux of Ibn Taymiyya’s condemnation of the cult of saints, 
that which underpins and animates his entire discourse. The crucial point is that Ibn Taymiyya views 
the culture of saint veneration, in its various facets, to be rooted in an exaggeration of the powers of 
saints and others to help independently of God. Veneration of saints and holy figures ‘associated’ these 
with the worship of God. His aim, then, is to re-direct piety away from the created, towards the Creator: 
Requesting healing from illness, or the wellbeing of the family, or deliverance from adversity in this 
world and the hereafter, or victory over one’s enemy, or guidance of the heart, or forgiveness of sins, or 
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entry into heaven or deliverance from hell… it is only permissible to request this from God alone. It is 
not permissible to say to a King, prophet or shaykh – living or dead – ‘forgive my sins’… and other 
things like that. Whoever asks this from a created being is a mushrik with his Lord.  366 
This stems from Ibn Taymiyya’s conception of worship (‘ibāda). While in his anti-Ash‘arī writings Ibn 
Taymiyya defines worship as “complete love” (kamāl al-ḥubb) to God, when turning to the cult of saints 
he defines worship by a broad range of religious practices. Worship thus includes prostration, making 
sacrificial offerings and offering supplications (du‘ā’), among others. The last practice here is key; both 
Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim describe du‘ā’ as the “essence of worship” (mukhkh al-‘ibāda).367 As 
acts of worship, all these practices must be performed to God alone;  
The worship of God alone, without any partners, means holding steadfast to the Oneness of God Most 
High. This means that all the religion is to God – that we worship only Him, trust only in Him, supplicate 
only to Him, fear only Him, pray and fast only to Him, vow and sacrifice only to Him, and perform 
pilgrimage only to His house. 368 
Yet Ibn Taymiyya faces numerous obstacles here. Following Memon and others, we should not imagine 
the cult of saints as popular only among ordinary or ‘lay’ Muslims, an instance of popular piety against 
the scholarly elite. Rather, the veneration of saints enjoyed broad appeal throughout medieval Mamlūk 
society, religious sanction by jurists and Sufi orders and, above all, a “protective umbrella” by the 
Mamlūk authorities.369 It extended across all strata of Ibn Taymiyya’s society.370 It should not surprise 
us, then, that for this reason it becomes the defining image of shirk in his works.  
Graves as the new idols 
 
The spread of constructed graves or tombs (qabr, qubūr) and shrines (mashhad, mashāhid) was perhaps 
the most distinctive feature of the cult of saints throughout the medieval Near East. An extensive body 
of scholarship points to the central role these played in the religious culture of the day. S. D. Grotein 
describes these as “the very centre and pivot of popular religious life.”371 As the major ḥajj ritual to 
Mecca was beyond the means of most ordinary medieval believers, the tombs and shrines of local saints 
took on an added significance for local forms of popular piety.372 Meri writes how Muslims would 
supplicate to the dead by their grave, believing this lent extra efficacy to prayers.373 He also points to 
the interreligious element of these sites; Jews, Christians and Muslims at times visited the same site and 
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shared in worship.374 It seems kissing, rubbing and touching graves were popular practices, deemed to 
confer blessings on the believer.375 
All of this is readily apparent in Ibn Taymiyya’s works. He condemns the veneration of graves as both 
an unlawful innovation in religion (bid‘a) and shirk. On the former, Ibn Taymiyya argues none of the 
Companions are reported to have performed any of these actions around graves.376 While jurists 
disagreed on touching the Prophet’s grave, he writes, there is absolute prohibition against kissing it.377 
On the latter, Ibn Taymiyya describes these forms of veneration of graves as “manifestations of shirk 
(maẓāhir al-shirk) that corrupt the religion and make it appear like the religion of the mushrikūn.”378 
He employs the language of idols (aṣnām, awthān) in this context. The clear sense is that kissing, 
rubbing and touching graves turns them into idols. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya speaks of 
…The houses of created beings (buyūt al-makhlūqāt)…(meaning) those graves taken as idols (awthān) 
and festivals and for the purpose of shirk with God, as they are called upon in place of God. Indeed, 
many of those whom venerate graves prefer them over the House of God, and prefer their shirk in the 
worship of idols over the Oneness of worship the Most Merciful, just like the mushrikūn (shirk al-awthān 
‘alā tawḥīd al-raḥmān)… 379 
Elsewhere, Ibn Taymiyya describes popular graves as the “idols of the age”.380 As foci of popular shirk, 
he likens them to the idols of the time of Abraham and also those of pre-Islamic Arabia, al-Lāt and al-
‘Uzza.381 Those venerating graves, moreover, by which he means a great many fellow Muslims, are 
scathingly referred to as the “mushrikūn of our times” 382, again likened to the Children of Israel whom 
took the golden calf for worship.383  
We find much the same for the prevalence of shrines, albeit with the addition that shrines reflect Shī‘ī 
influence upon the Muslim community. Ibn Taymiyya’s anti-Shī‘ī polemics are well known.384 Of all 
sects, he condemns the Shī‘ī’s as most devoted to the worship of tombs and shrines and most deeply 
rooted in shirk.385 It is the Shī‘ī’s who open the “doors of shirk” to the Muslim community.386 They 
erect shrines, Ibn Taymiyya explains, to rival mosques and flock to shrines while their mosques are 
empty.387 The Qur’an itself, he stresses, speaks of worshipping God only in mosques (masājid), not 
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shrines.388 There are no reports of shrines in the early generations of Islam, he writes, and in explaining 
their historical emergence Ibn Taymiyya takes a religious-polemical reading of history, lamenting how 
the Caliphate weakened and the Muslim community eventually split, allowing heretics (zanādiq) to 
overpower and outnumber true Muslims.389 This is a thinly disguised reference to Shī‘ī dynasties like 
the Fatimids (909-1171). For Ibn Taymiyya, then, shrines are a brazen reflection of Muslim religious 
and political decline at the hands of the Shī‘ī’s. Polemics aside, we should not entirely dismiss Ibn 
Taymiyya on this point; historians have noted that the Fatimid dynasty in Cairo undertook an extensive 
policy of shrine construction and renovation.390 
From the Majmū‘ it seems much of the veneration of graves and shrines was conspicuously modelled 
on the ḥajj pilgrimage. Ibn Taymiyya speaks of the circumambulation of certain graves (ṭawāf), akin to 
that performed around the ka‘ba.391 He stresses the only inanimate object it is permissible to kiss is the 
ka‘ba, not any grave or shrine, and only because it is sunna, not because it possesses efficacy in itself.392 
But the most expressive passage in this regard is not found in Ibn Taymiyya, but Ibn Qayyim. In an 
extended polemic, partly cited below, Ibn Qayyim writes:  
They place their faces upon the grave, kiss the ground, bare their heads and their voices rise in a clamour. 
They cry almost weeping. They see themselves having received greater benefit than the pilgrims to 
Mecca…You see them prostrating, bending themselves, and seeking favour and satisfaction from the 
dead…Then they turn to circumambulating the grave in imitation of the Bayt al-Harām (ka‘ba)…they 
begin to kiss it, touch it… thus they conclude the rites (manāsik) of the grave with shortening and shaving 
their hair there. In all this, they take pleasure from their idol… their prayers, ceremonies and sacrifices 
were to other than God. 393 
The parallels with the ḥajj are clear. We may question the historicity of such passages; notwithstanding 
the spread of the cult of saints throughout the medieval Near East, to what extent do we allow for 
hyperbole and exaggeration in Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim? Crucially, it seems Ibn Taymiyya and 
Ibn Qayyim had good reason for concern, nor were they alone in expressing such. The historian al-
Sakhāwī (d. 1497), for example, comments that those wishing to perform the ḥajj would circle the grave 
of the saint Fātima al-‘Ābida al-Mūsailiyya seven times, believing this would enable them to perform 
the ḥajj that year.394 Al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505) describes the veneration of graves in his time as “a kind of 
innovated ḥajj “(wa hadhā naw’ min al- ḥajj al-mubtad‘a).395 Al-Mustawfī (d. 1239) comments that 
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many Iraqi’s venerated the grave of a local saint especially around the time of the ḥajj in Mecca.396 
Notwithstanding a clear sense of hostility and polemics, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim’s reflect 
concerns around grave veneration that reverberate across the medieval sources. 
The visitation of graves and shrines (ziyāra) 
 
The act of journeying to visit the graves of saints and prophets was a key feature of the cult of saints in 
Ibn Taymiyya’s time. This popular custom was, and still is, known as ziyāra (visitation) or ziyārat al-
qubūr (visiting of graves). Visiting the graves of the righteous is not new to Islamic tradition, as 
references in hadith collections suggest.397 Yet by Ibn Taymiyya’s time this had become a key 
expression of popular piety.398 We have a wealth of scholarship indicating how certain beliefs 
underpinned and defined the ziyāra, including the notion that supplication was more likely answered 
by graves, that divine blessings or rewards are tied to certain graves and, lastly, that the saintly dead 
could answer prayers or intercede with God.399 Again, we readily glean this from Ibn Taymiyya’s works. 
To cite just one example, Ibn Taymiyya is asked;  
As for those whom are called ‘visitors’ (al-zā‘irīn) to the graves of prophets and saints, like the grave of 
(Abraham) the Friend of God, those whom come to the tomb, kiss it and support its upkeep… Is this 
what God and His messenger have ordered or not? Is there reward in this or not? And is this from the 
religion that God praise be to Him sent to His prophet – peace be on him – or not? 400  
Ibn Taymiyya extensively engages the ziyāra as part of a broader critical treatment on the cult of saints. 
Numerous scholars claim that Ibn Taymiyya indiscriminately opposes the custom of ziyāra.401 This is 
a common misreading, with his actual position far more complex. Ibn Taymiyya does not oppose the 
ziyāra altogether, and the defensive tone in his writings suggests a great sensitivity to the charge:  
If the visitor to the Prophet’s mosque visits the grave of the Prophet…this is among the greatest of 
righteous acts and in nothing of mine or others works is there a prohibition of that. Nor did I deny the 
permissibility of visiting the graves of prophets and saints, or the graves of others. Rather, I mentioned 
in many places the desirability (istiḥbāb) of visiting graves as the Prophet, God’s peace and blessings be 
upon him, used to visit the people of Baqī and the martyrs of ‘Uhud. 402 
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In truth, Ibn Taymiyya cannot oppose the ziyāra completely. There is precedent in the hadith narrations, 
he acknowledges, for some kind of ziyāra. The Prophet is reported to have said; ‘visit the graves, they 
will remind you of the Hereafter’.403 Other reports speak of the Prophet overturning an initial ban on 
ziyāra.404 Ibn Taymiyya even casts himself a moderate on the issue, noting how some figures, including 
al-Bukhārī (d. 870), opposed all forms of ziyāra.405 While he may sympathise with this view, as we see 
shortly, Ibn Taymiyya acknowledges that ziyāra has at least some basis in the tradition. To oppose the 
ziyāra altogether, in short, is to oppose the salaf itself.  
Lawful and unlawful ziyāra  
 
Ibn Taymiyya distinguishes legal ziyāra (ziyāra shar‘iyya) from innovative ziyāra (ziyāra bid‘iyya).406 
He also calls these ‘the visitation of the people of tawḥīd’ (ziyārat ahl al-tawḥīd) and ‘the visitation of 
the people of shirk’ (ziyārat ahl al-shirk).407 Legal ziyāra is that performed according to his reading of 
the sunna. Here, the visitor greets the dead, prays to God for their forgiveness and is reminded of the 
Hereafter. This is just like that performed in the Muslim funeral prayer (janāza).408 This is the extent of 
legal ziyāra, however. The central point here is that nothing is seen to compromise the sole of worship 
of God, nor turn the dead into an object of worship. 
Polemics against ziyāra bid‘iyya are, by contrast, a major theme. Ibn Taymiyya explains the term ziyāra 
in his time invariably meant the unlawful kind.409 In general, the ziyāra bid‘iyya applied to any visitation 
not in line with the sunna. Yet unlawful ziyāra was itself a varied phenomenon. Ibn Taymiyya speaks 
of three distinct types of ziyāra bid‘iyya, in descending order of repugnance. First, we have the ziyāra 
bid‘iyya that involves direct prayer to the dead. This is when the believer visits the grave to pray directly 
to the dead, without recourse to God. This is the most grievous form of shirk. Ibn Taymiyya writes: 
As for the one who comes to a grave of a prophet or a righteous person…and asks his need from him 
such as asking him to end his illness…or fulfil his debt, or take vengeance from his enemy, or to heal 
him, his family or his beast and what is like this, from those matters that none but God, the Mighty and 
Majestic has power over, then this is clear shirk (shirk sarīḥ), it is obligatory that his repentance be 
sought, or he is (to be) killed. 410 
The reference to death is presumably for apostasy: praying directly to the dead means one has left the 
religion of Islam entirely.411 The issue of takfīr or excommunication in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought, or more 
specifically the various ways of reading him on the issue, is explored in detail in the next chapter. The 
second category of unlawful ziyāra involves visiting graves with the express purpose of seeking the 
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intercession of the dead with God. Schöller and Heck describe this as a major factor behind participation 
in the ziyāra.412 Ibn Taymiyya writes:  
If he says, “I ask him so that he that he may intercede with God for me, because he is closer to God than 
me… And I seek a means to God through him, just as a means to the ruler is sought through his special 
counsel and helpers’ - this is from the actions of the mushrikūn and Christians, for they claim to take 
priests and rabbis as intercessors, who intercede for them in their requests, and God informs us of the 
mushrikūn that they said, "We do not worship them except that they bring us closer to God." (Q 39:3) 413 
Ibn Taymiyya thus condemns this as shirk and likens it to the Meccan opponents of the Prophet, known 
as the mushrikūn, and Christian practices. We explore later in the chapter how Ibn Taymiyya also speaks 
of intercession in the sense of reflecting an excessive love with God (al-maḥabba ma’a Allāh).  
The permissibility of seeking the intercession of prophets and saints, as opposed to directly addressing 
God alone, is of course a key issue in Islamic theological tradition. Its importance is gleaned by its many 
theological terms; shafā‘a, tawassul, wasāṭa. The Qur’an itself seems ambiguous; while several verses 
reject the idea of intercession with God,414 others support the idea for those given permission by God.415 
Within classical Sunni tradition, Khaled el Rouayeb notes how most medieval Sunni thinkers affirmed 
the legitimacy of seeking the intercession of prophets and saints.416 Ibn Taymiyya rejects this dominant 
position, however, and proscribes seeking intercession from dead saints or prophets, including even the 
Prophet himself. He affirms the Prophet’s eschatological intercession, affirmed by hadith narrations, 
wherein Muhammad intercedes on behalf of Muslim sinners in the Day of Judgment.417 But this marks 
the limit of his reading. While some hadiths have the Companions imploring the Prophet for intercession 
while he was alive, Ibn Taymiyya stresses this stopped after his death.418 For Ibn Taymiyya, the prophets 
are intermediaries only in terms of conveying God’s commands; they are not intermediaries in any 
aspect of worship. He writes:  
The Prophets – may God’s peace and blessings be on them all – are mediators (wasā‘iṭ) between God 
and His creation only in conveying His words (tablīgh kalāmihi), and commands, and proscriptions, and 
promises and threats, and reporting what He has said of His names and attributes…they are not mediators 
in His creation in (terms of) worship, or granting provision, or giving life and death, or rewarding deeds, 
or punishments, and not in responding to prayers or giving answers to questions. Rather, God alone is 
the Creator of all things, and He responds to the destitute when he calls. 419 
Pleading to dead prophets for intercession, he writes, “likens the Creator with the created”.420 It is thus 
incompatible with the worship of God alone and rooted in an errant belief in their ability to act 
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independent of God. Indeed Ibn Taymiyya states that Prophetic intercession on the Day of Judgment is 
reserved only for Muslims who do not compromise the worship of God in this life.421 There is something 
of a bitter irony here for Ibn Taymiyya; those Muslims who, in error, seek the intercession of the Prophet 
in this life only bar themselves from such in the Hereafter. 
The third and final type of unlawful ziyāra seems the least serious. This is when the believer travels to 
a grave, invokes God directly and yet includes the name of a saint or prophet within that supplication. 
Ibn Taymiyya offers the following example:  
As for the third type, it is that one says, “O My Lord, I come to you with so-and-so, or with the blessings 
of so-and-so…(So) do this for me, or this.” And many people today do this, even though it is not reported 
that any of the Companions or followers from the salaf ever made this kind of supplication (du‘ā’)…  422 
Ibn Taymiyya’s critique is more restrained, perhaps because this supplication is ultimately addressed to 
God. He does not condemn this as shirk, but dismisses it is unlawful innovation.423 Taken together, Ibn 
Taymiyya engages a range practices around graves in the medieval Muslim society of his day. He reads 
and condemns each accordingly. Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of ziyāra is neither one-dimensional, nor 
absolute; he recognises different kinds of ziyāra, lawful and unlawful, and his critique of the latter 
sharpens according to how much the dead are seen to stand between the believer and God.  
Yet the sense remains that while Ibn Taymiyya affirms the category of legal ziyāra, he does so only 
reluctantly. The Prophetic mandate for some kind of grave visitation forces him to recognise the custom, 
yet he tightly limits its proper boundaries and focuses on the numerous types of improper, unlawful 
ziyāra. Put simply, Ibn Taymiyya strips the ziyāra of much of what made it a popular institution in his 
time. His general tone, moreover, is instructive. He delights in listing the countless forgeries around 
graves.424 He writes there is nothing in the Qur’an and hadith about the special efficacy of supplication 
by graves.425 It is clearly attested, moreover, that prayers to God and blessings on the Prophet reach him 
from any place.426 The following passage well captures his general outlook; 
There is no benefit to the sharī‘a in knowing the graves of the prophets, this is not (a means of) preserving 
the religion…So whoever intends to bless the prophets, or believe in them, or revive their remembrance 
of them, it possible to do this (anywhere), without knowing where they are buried – peace by on them 
all. 427 
Ibn Taymiyya also considers it unlawful, on the basis of a hadith tradition, to specifically journey to 
other than the three mosques of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem. This includes even the Prophet’s grave 
in Medina: while in Medina one may visit the Prophet’s grave, he insists, but this cannot be the purpose 
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of the visit.428 Yet Ibn Taymiyya’s reasoning here is hard to square with the fact that, for many, the 
Prophet’s grave was the great attraction of Medina itself, also the fact that by his time the mosque 
complex in Medina had expanded to include the tomb, as he recognises, thus blurring the distinction 
between the two.429 We may also note the tendency in Ibn Taymiyya to cursorily dismiss the reliability 
of many hadith traditions that do in fact encourage ziyāra to the Prophet’s grave.430 As we will see, this 
provided a great source of criticism for his opponents.  
Ultimately, Ibn Taymiyya affirms a ziyāra that fits his reading of the salaf and does not, to his mind, 
place the dead between the believer and God. In this, he so tightly constructs the category as to render 
it a largely unexceptional feature of Muslim piety. But this ideal form of ziyāra, quite simply, did not 
exist. It exists only in Ibn Taymiyya’s vision of an ideal Muslim society. It stood in stark contrast with 
what the custom had become in the Mamlūk society of his day. 
The threat of Christianity  
 
We should not overlook the inter-religious element of Ibn Taymiyya’s critique. This runs throughout 
his polemic. Josef Meri and others shed light on the considerable inter-religious, even syncretistic, 
flavour of the cult of saints in medieval Syria. This is perhaps not surprising: experiences of death, loss 
and the remembrance of saintly dead are of course not exclusive to Muslims.431 The veneration of saints 
seems to have clearly cut across confessional lines. Meri paints the following picture;  
Jews, Muslims and Christians interacted, commented on each others piety, employed similar rituals and 
venerated their holy dead…a form of communitas existed among devotees of different faiths when they 
formed friendships…as they worshipped God, venerated saints and partook in 
celebrations…Fundamental rituals, such as making votive offerings, lighting candles, prostrating before 
or kissing a shrine were not expressly pagan, Jewish, Christian, or Muslim…Moreover, the veneration 
of prophets was of universal appeal as evidenced by shrines were Muslims, Jews and Christians at times 
collectively worshipped.432 
While no doubt attractive to modern liberal sensibilities, for Ibn Taymiyya this inter-religious 
environment threatened the purity and superiority of the Muslim community. He devotes an entire work, 
the Iqtiḍā’ al-Ṣirāt al-Mustaqīm Mukhālafat aṣḥāb al-Jaḥįm (Necessity of the Straight Path against the 
People of Hellfire), to call for complete religious and social dissimilarity between Muslims and non-
Muslims.433 We have briefly touched on Ibn Taymiyya’s use of Christianity as a trope for intra-Muslim 
polemic. This runs throughout his writings on the cult of saints. A repeated theme in Ibn Taymiyya is 
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that exposure to Christian influences lay behind the Muslim veneration of saints and shrines.434 In a 
revealing passage Ibn Taymiyya recalls his own encounter with a Christian monk. He writes:  
Those (Muslims) who venerate graves and shrines bear a strong similarity with the Christians. In Cairo 
I met one such venerator who was a monk. He debated me around Jesus and Christianity, and I explained 
to him the corruption in all this….I said to him; ‘You are mushrikūn’, and I explained their shirk by way 
of devotion to statues and graves, their worship of them and how they seek help by them. He said to me, 
‘We do not commit shirk, nor do we worship them. We seek only intercession through them (natawassul 
bihim), as indeed many Muslims do when they approach the grave of a righteous man.’…I said to him, 
‘this is also shirk and this is not from the religion of Islam, even though a great many Muslims do it…’ 
When he heard this he said; ‘yes, then, by this estimation, we are indeed mushrikūn’. 435 
We may doubt the historicity of this account - particularly its conclusion - but the point remains; Ibn 
Taymiyya’s is a multi-faith environment, particularly reflected in the cult of saints, and he sees a clear 
connection between Christian belief and practice and Muslim shirk.  
This also lends Ibn Taymiyya’s writings a deeply conspiratorial tone. He often accuses Christians of 
deliberately luring ignorant Muslims astray. Christians portray their religion as a kind of fifth legal 
school to Muslims, he claims.436 They present Jesus and Mary as akin to the Prophet’s descendants, 
Ḥussein and Nafīsa.437 At times, he writes, you even find Christians bringing ignorant Muslims to 
churches to seek the blessings of their holy figures.438 The message is clear; Christians are not to be 
trusted and Muslim engagement in shirk is directly proportional to their exposure to Christian influence. 
Here again we must question the line between history and hyperbole in Ibn Taymiyya. As Meri notes, 
“Muslims venerating Christian saints was hardly the norm.”439 
An ideal(ised) salaf 
 
The idea that Christian influence lies behind deviant Muslim practices is central to Ibn Taymiyya. Yet 
we find enough evidence to question this from within the Islamic tradition itself. As noted earlier, a 
stress on the essential purity and right understanding of the salaf underpins Ibn Taymiyya’s entire 
epistemology. It lies at the heart of his reform. In exploring broader Islamic tradition, however, we find 
numerous accounts of the Companions performing acts similar to that which Ibn Taymiyya condemns 
as shirk in his own time. Al-Sakhāwī (d. 1497) reports the companion Bilāl journeying from Damascus 
with the express intention of visiting the Prophet’s grave, for example, and tearfully rubbing his face 
against the grave upon arrival.440 Ibn ‘Abī Shayba (d. 849) records the companion Abū Ayūb al-Anṣārī 
resting his face on the Prophet’s grave while supplicating to God, hoping God would respond by way 
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of this proximity to the Prophet.441 Abdullah ibn Aḥmad, the son of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, records his father 
as having no opinion against touching and kissing the Prophet’s grave.442 There are countless other 
examples from the tradition. The point here is to note, briefly, that these are all acts that Ibn Taymiyya 
condemns as shirk in his own time.  
Most crucially, there are even glimpses of this counter-evidence in the Majmū‘ itself. While Ibn 
Taymiyya tends to dismiss the many hadiths affirming ziyāra to the Prophet’s grave, as noted earlier, it 
seems he cannot ignore all such reports. He acknowledges a hadith whereby Abū Hurayrah is rebuked 
for performing ziyāra to Mount Sinai, where God spoke to Moses, rather than the mosques of Mecca, 
Medina and Jerusalem.443 We also see a clear unease in Ibn Taymiyya over ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Umar, a 
Companion and major scholar of early Islam, who is said to have journeyed specifically to pray in sites 
associated with the life of the Prophet. This was an act of venerating the Prophet that concerned Anās 
b. Mālik (d. 712).444 Ibn Taymiyya quickly explains away ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Umar as the only Companion 
who acted in this way.445 But these few references alone point to the difficulty for Ibn Taymiyya in 
reconciling his reading of the salaf with the occasional counter-evidence that he cannot entirely ignore.  
A broader reading of the evidence from the tradition, then, leads us to question Ibn Taymiyya’s reading 
of the salaf. That the Companions may have performed actions similar to what Ibn Taymiyya condemns 
in his own time seeps even into the Majmū‘. And yet this presents, in truth, a great challenge: either 
many of these practices do not, after all, constitute shirk, forcing Ibn Taymiyya to rethink his critique, 
or the salaf were not so perfect in religion as he idealises. Both of these are problematic, the latter 
unthinkable. The notion that such practices have roots in early Islamic tradition, in the Companions no 
less, threatens his intellectual and reformist project. It is at this juncture, then, that we perhaps best 
understand Ibn Taymiyya’s frequent recourse to Christianity, to the purportedly Christian origins and 
influences of these practices. This offers him a way out. Drawing on Christianity allows Ibn Taymiyya 
to salvage his idealised reading of the salaf and explain away the origins of the veneration of saints and 
shrines among Muslims, even if a deeper reading of Ibn Taymiyya here uncovers a tension that he never 
entirely resolves.  
Saints, shirk and love 
 
Ibn Taymiyya therefore engages the concept of shirk in two distinct contexts; on the question of the 
love of God and the popular Muslim veneration of saints. Yet we do find occasional glimpses in his 
works that would seem to tie these two aspects together. These are only subtle and indirect, but they are 
enough to suggest that, at least in Ibn Taymiyya’s mind, there is a clear link between the veneration of 
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saints, graves and the idea of al-maḥabba ma’a Allāh. Illustrating this is the following quote, where Ibn 
Taymiyya describes some of the nature and characteristics of taking an object of love alongside God;  
The one who loves with God…he takes him as an intercessor for himself, without knowing whether God 
has authorized (him) to intercede for him. The Exalted has said; ‘They worship, in place of God, that 
which neither benefits nor harms them nor is useful to them. ‘They say ‘these are our intercessors before 
God’) (Q 10:18). 446  
As we recall, the idea of intercession is central to Ibn Taymiyya’s conception of unlawful ziyāra. Taking 
intermediaries with God, then, is both a defining aspect of unlawful ziyāra and a symptom of loving the 
dead alongside God. We can also see this from the opposite angle. Ibn Taymiyya briefly refers to love 
when describing the characteristics of unlawful ziyāra. He explains that excessive love of the dead is a 
key cause of unlawful ziyāra. Ibn Taymiyya writes:  
The Prophet distinguished the ziyāra of the people of tawḥīd from that of the people of shirk. The ziyāra 
of the people of tawḥīd involves greeting the dead, supplicating for them (with God), just like the janāza 
prayer. The ziyāra of the people of shirk involves likening the created with the Creator, vowing to the 
dead, prostrating to them, supplicating to them, and loving them like how one loves the Creator (wa 
yuḥibbūnahu mithl mā yuḥibbūn al-khāliq). It turns the dead into a rival (nid) of God, equating them with 
the Lord of the worlds. 447 
Taken together, then, a close reading of Ibn Taymiyya points to a clear if implicit link between his two 
treatments on shirk. The passages cited above act as a bridge in his thought, connecting the shirk of al-
maḥabba ma’a Allāh with that of grave and saint veneration. This in turn offers another way of reading 
Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of saint veneration. It would seem we fail to appreciate the depth of his 
condemnation of the cult of saints if we ignore his broader theology of love. Ibn Taymiyya condemns 
the cult of saints not only because he deems its practices to be unsanctioned in his reading of the salaf. 
There is a much deeper element. Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of saint and grave veneration stems ultimately, 
if implicitly, from his stress on the believers’ sincere love for God alone.  
Yet this is only ever subtle and indirect in Ibn Taymiyya. This raises the question of why he is not more 
forceful and explicit in condemning the cult of saints as a manifestation of al-maḥabba ma’a Allāh, 
accusing its practitioners of failing to truly love God. The answer lies, perhaps, in Ibn Taymiyya’s 
numerous intellectual projects and the different purposes and audiences for which he was writing across 
his career. In short, Ibn Taymiyya writes different works for different audiences. Livnat Holtzman notes 
this in surveying his critique of his Ash‘arī adversary, al-Rāzī;  
Ibn Taymiyya wrote several works which directly responded to al-Rāzī. Thus...his voluminous Bayān 
Talbīs al-Jahmiyya was a response to (al-Rāzī’s) Asās al-Taqdīs. Likewise, his al-Ḥamāwiyya al-
Kubrā…referred to ideas inspired by al-Rāzī’s thought. However, while Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyya…was 
an inaccessible text written for scholars, al-Ḥamāwiyya al-Kubrā was a fatwa, a legal response that was 
issued for a wide audience of educated and lay traditionalists. Thus, ideas that are discussed at length in 
Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyya appear in digestible form in al-Ḥamāwiyya al-Kubrā. 448 
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Ibn Taymiyya modifies his critique of al-Rāzī according to the context and audience at hand. This is 
the key point. We see the same in his treatment on shirk. In his writings on the attribute of love Ibn 
Taymiyya writes primarily as an anti-Ash‘arī theologian. He condemns Ash‘arī interpretations of God’s 
love as His will, we recall, and stresses love (al-maḥabba) as the core element of tawḥīd. The essential 
nature of shirk, in this context, is to love something with a love due to God. In contrast, the social 
reformer and ‘activist’ side of Ibn Taymiyya comes to the fore in his polemics against the cult of saints. 
Here he writes not with elite, Ash‘arī theologians in mind, but rather the beliefs and practices of Muslim 
society at large. As is clear from the pages of the Majmū‘, the cult of saints enjoyed strong hold over a 
great many Muslims. Ibn Taymiyya seeks to correct not Ash‘arī interpretations of divine attributes, but 
widespread beliefs and deeply rooted customs. In this context, social and religious reform is best served 
by invoking clear hadith prohibitions against these practices, also their supposedly Christian origins, 
rather than espousing theological views on the nature of love between God and man. And yet, as we 
have seen, there remain traces in Ibn Taymiyya that reveal his own implicit awareness as to the 
connection between saints and love. For Ibn Taymiyya, the entire cult of saints was predicated on 
turning dead saints into objects of love alongside God. The popular veneration of saints and graves was, 
in his eyes, perhaps the most brazen manifestation of al-maḥabba ma’a Allāh. That this is not made as 
explicit as it could be points to the different contexts and audiences of his works, also his different roles 
as theologian and social reformer.  
Ibn Taymiyya; the ‘Sensitive Puritan’ 
 
In closing, this chapter explores one final aspect of Ibn Taymiyya’s engagement with shirk. As noted 
earlier, he is widely regarded as a fierce and uncompromising critic of any perceived deviation in Islam. 
The polemical element is a constant feature in his works. Yet a growing body of scholarship argues that 
Ibn Taymiyya’s reformism is rooted in a strong sense of realism, even empathy, for the misguided piety 
of the masses. The works of Yahya Michot and Raquel M. Ukeles stand out in this regard.449 Ukeles 
explores Ibn Taymiyya’s attitude to the popular mawlid festival and shows that, while condemned as 
an unlawful innovation (bid‘a) in religion, he nonetheless recognises the love for the prophet that 
underpins the festival. For Ibn Taymiyya, participants in the mawlid will be rewarded by God for their 
love of the prophet manifest in the festival, despite the mawlid itself being an unlawful innovation. 
Ukeles’ study sheds light on Ibn Taymiyya’s ability to perceive the deeper underlying piety of the 
masses, the pious inclinations that lie behind outwardly unlawful acts. On this basis she labels Ibn 
Taymiyya a ‘sensitive puritan’.450 
A deeper reading of Ibn Taymiyya’s writing on shirk strengthens this image. Ibn Taymiyya considers 
the cult of saints to be the major manifestation of shirk in his time, but his works also reveal a sense of 
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lenience and empathy towards the Muslim masses that take to venerating saints and graves. Fellow 
Ḥanbalī critics like Ibn ‘Aqīl took an unsympathetic view, arguing that the masses devise a sharī‘a of 
their own making as soon as the tenets of Islamic law become too taxing. For Ibn ‘Aqīl, the masses 
preferred free-mixing and social gatherings around graves and shrines, rather than disciplined prayer in 
the mosques.451 Ibn Qayyim similarly explains the prevalence of shirk by way of the deep ignorance of 
the masses of the true teachings of Islam. This makes them easy prey for Satan, he writes, who lures 
them into shirk around saints and graves under the guise of worship.452 
Against his fellow Ḥanbalī’s, a different ethic emerges in Ibn Taymiyya. The roots of shirk, he explains, 
lie not in the ignorance or laziness of the masses but in their inability to realize that God would, indeed 
does, listen to those as ordinary and insignificant as themselves. He writes: 
And many of those in error say; ‘this (intermediary) is closer to God than me, and I am far from God, so 
it is not possible that I call to God without this mediation (wāsaṭa)’, and other types of sayings of the 
mushrikīn. And (in response to this) God Most High says: “when my slaves ask you (Muhammad) about 
Me, then indeed I am near. I respond to the calls of the supplicant, when he calls…” (Q 2:186). And (in 
explaining this verse) it is reported that the Companions said: ‘O Messenger, is God near to us, that we 
face Him, or far from us that we call out to Him?’ So God revealed this verse. 453 
The difference with Ibn ‘Aqīl and Ibn Qayyim is clear. Ibn Taymiyya’s explanation carries less of a 
condemnatory tone vis-à-vis the masses and reveals his insight into the hearts of the common people. 
It was the masses’ failure to grasp the closeness of God that led them to commit shirk. There is a bitter 
irony here for Ibn Taymiyya; ordinary believers turn to intermediaries in a sincere attempt to draw 
closer to God, and yet in so doing they fall into shirk, only removing themselves from God further. 
Again, we may suggest here a strong if implicit link with Ibn Taymiyya’s stress on love (maḥabba) in 
the relationship between God and man; that is, in the widespread devotion to saints and graves, Ibn 
Taymiyya was able to see the demonstrable, practical consequences of a failure to comprehend the real 
love that God has for his servants. The causal link between an Ash‘arī reinterpretations of God’s love 
and popular devotion to saints, shrines and intermediaries is never made explicit by Ibn Taymiyya, yet 
this would no doubt fit neatly with his overall theology of love, saints and shirk.  
We see another example of Ibn Taymiyya’s lenience and empathy when considering his attitude towards 
the destruction of shrines and graves. Numerous hadith reports encourage the physical removal of 
graves. These reports, in turn, give way to the legal maxim of ‘levelling the graves’ (taswiyat al-
qubūr).454 On account of his polemics against the cult of saints, Ibn Taymiyya is often labelled an 
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“iconoclast” in scholarly literature.455 It is perhaps surprising, then, that Ibn Taymiyya never places any 
pronounced emphasis in his writings on the need to physically remove graves or shrines. Throughout 
the chapter on ziyāra in Majmū‘ Fatāwa, for example, Ibn Taymiyya mentions this in one isolated 
passage. After noting the hadith tradition where the Prophet orders ‘Ali to not ‘leave an image without 
defacing it, or a high grave without levelling it’, Ibn Taymiya’s comment is brief; “this is a command 
to destroy shrines, not build them.” 456 Similarly, the problem of grave and shrine veneration occupies 
the last quarter of the Iqtiḍā’ al-Ṣirāt al-Mustaqīm and yet their physical removal is mentioned, again, 
in only a brief sentence. Ibn Taymiyya writes; “such mosques as are erected over graves of prophets, 
the righteous, kings etc. must be earmarked for removal either by demolition or in some other way.”457 
Turning to Ibn Taymiyya’s life story, we find isolated reports by al-Birzālī and Ibn Qayyim of his 
destroying a rock outside Damascus that had become the object of local worship.458 Yet there are no 
reports of his destroying any of the major shrines littered across the Mamlūk society of his day. Ibn 
Taymiyya is also absent from Schöller’s exhaustive analysis of the history of tomb destruction 
throughout the medieval Near East.459 In both Ibn Taymiyya’s life and thought, then, the destruction of 
tombs and shrines seems hardly a major concern.  
This raises the question of why Ibn Taymiyya neglects the issue. We perhaps find answers when looking 
elsewhere in his works. Yahya Michot’s study of Ibn Taymiyya’s attitude towards the performance of 
Mamlūk military music is a useful case in point. While Ibn Taymiyya condemns this as an unlawful 
innovation, Michot demonstrates that his response to military music is tempered by realism. Ibn 
Taymiyya is keenly aware of practical realities in the realm of religious reform, and writes;  
The renewer of God’s religion and the reviver of the Prophet’s sunna only communicates what it is 
possible to know and implement…One shall with leniency (al-‘afūwa) obstain from commanding and 
prohibiting things that it would not be possible for people to know and implement until the time when 
that becomes possible. (This is) just as the Messenger showed leniency…until the time when he 
expounded it. (To act) in this way shall not signify approving prohibited things, nor abandoning 
commanding the obligatory things. Obligation and prohibition are indeed conditional on the possibility 
of knowledge and action.460 
In short, religious reform is enacted only as and when it is feasible to do so. Ibn Taymiyya writes this 
in relation to military music, yet the same ethic of pragmatism and leniency appears evident in relation 
to graves, shrines and shirk. Given the broad popularity of the cult of saints, the Muslim society of his 
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day was far from ready for a campaign of grave and shrine destruction. It therefore never emerges as 
the major theme in Ibn Taymiyya’s works that we might, given his polemics, expect.  
This also forces us to reconsider the very nature and function of religious reform and what it means to 
follow the salaf for Ibn Taymiyya. Widely known as an uncompromising reformer and champion of the 
salaf, his writing on shirk and saint veneration points to a more complex, multifaceted character. Behind 
his polemics against the cult of saints lies both a theology of love, seen earlier, also an ethic of realism 
and pragmatism in matters of social and religious reform. The following passage best captures his view;  
The way of the salaf is indeed more perfect in everything. The Muslim shall nonetheless implement what 
he is capable of (fa inna ṭarīqat al-salaf akmal fi kulli shay’. Wa lākin yaf‘al al-muslim min dhalika mā 
yaqdiru ‘alayhi). 461 
The second sentence, as Michot stresses, is no less significant than the first.462 This is the true meaning 
of the salaf for Ibn Taymiyya; the salaf is an aim to be striven for, not an ideal to be achieved. A close 
reading of Ibn Taymiyya on shirk, then, strengthens his image as a pragmatic and lenient reformer, what 
Ukeles calls the ‘sensitive puritan’. 463  
Yet it could equally be argued that lenience and pragmatism is not, in fact, the main reason for Ibn 
Taymiyya’s reluctance to pursue the destruction of shrines. This is perhaps only incidental or secondary, 
further avoiding an iconoclastic campaign that was never, in fact, destined to happen. We must recall 
the essential nature of the shirk that underpins popular devotion to saints and shrines. For Ibn Taymiyya, 
the cult of saints was ultimately rooted in the love of other than God, of al-maḥabba ma’a Allāh. On 
this note attention is drawn to a striking passage in Ibn Taymiyya’s Kitāb al-Īmān: 
There is no doubt that the basis of belief is the belief of the heart…The heart is, in this way, the very 
root (of belief)…The body cannot stay apart from what the heart wills. The external (ẓāhir) always 
follows the internal (bāṭin). When the internal is good the external is necessarily good, when the former 
is corrupt, the latter is corrupt. 464  
Devotion to shrines and graves, the widespread veneration of saints and the dead, are not the real 
problem for Ibn Taymiyya. These are symptoms of the problem. The crux of the issue lies in the hearts 
of believers; outer expressions of shirk only express the love of other than God that is carried within 
hearts. To destroy shrines and graves, then, while not first attempting to reform hearts, is to misread the 
nature of shirk and thus the means to correct it. It would seem that everything, for Ibn Taymiyya, returns 
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We must stress that Ibn Taymiyya’s views were controversial. We find significant difference with Ibn 
Taymiyya in the Ḥanbalī tradition itself. One century previous, Ibn Qudāma had condemned Ibn ‘Aqīl 
for denying the intercession of saints and the legitimacy of travelling to their graves.465 Ibn Jawzī writes 
of the blessing (faḍīla) of visiting and spending time at the tomb of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal.466 Outside 
Ḥanbalī tradition, no less a figure than al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) defends ziyāra as a meritorious act earning 
divine reward, and also takes the notion, derived from Ibn Sīnā, that the souls of the dead join with the 
living, strengthening the latter’s supplication with God.467 In his own time Ibn Taymiyya faced great 
opposition from the Shāfi‘ī jurist Taqī al-dīn al-Subkī (d. 1355). Al-Subkī challenges Ibn Taymiyya’s 
narrow conception of ziyāra shar‘iyya in a work entitled Shifā’ al-siqām fī ziyārat khayr al-anām (The 
Remedy for the Ill in Visiting the Best of Mankind).468 While al-Subkī contests Ibn Taymiyya’s grading 
and interpretation of many hadith reports, the prohibition on visiting the Prophet’s grave and seeking 
his intercession was particularly repugnant. Al-Subkī writes: 
It is proper to entreat and ask for the help and intercession of the Prophet with God. No one from amongst 
the salaf and the khalaf denied this, until Ibn Taymiyyah came alone and disapproved of this, and 
deviated from the straight path, and invented a position that no scholar has said before, and he became a 
deterrent example for Muslims.469 
Nor were these marginal views. Al-Subkī’s position was dominant throughout the classical period.470 
El-Rouayeb describes al-Subkī as “entirely mainstream” for Sunni medieval thought, noting his 
influence upon later critics of Ibn Taymiyya such as Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 1566).471 Indeed Caterina 
Bori examines letters distributed among Ibn Taymiyya’s close circle of followers and reaches the same 
conclusion. For Bori, this reveals not a mass movement, but the righteousness and elitism of the select 
few.472 Bori even hints at dissent and desertion from within Ibn Taymiyya’s close circle of followers.473 
Things look no more promising when looking at later centuries. El Rouayeb argues that subsequent 
generations of Sunni scholars largely ignored and neglected Ibn Taymiyya until the Wahhābī emergence 
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of the mid-18th century.474 Recent scholarship challenges this somewhat, highlighting Ibn Taymiyya’s 
influence upon 17th century Ottoman reformers, yet the general impression remains of a scholar on the 
intellectual margins.475 This is in stark contrast to the hagiographical depictions found among his 
modern supporters. For example;  
Ibn Taimiyah deputises the prophets in combating the superstitions of his age and the unwarranted 
concessions to idolatry in his times; he subjected these doctrines to such a hostile criticism that it caused 
a flutter in the ranks of dissenters and blasphemers… His writings on the subject so profoundly altered 
the course of religious thought in the later centuries that a number of reformers after him raised their 
voice to restore the true faith. 476 
As we have seen, the reality was much different. Ibn Taymiyya’s contemporary popularity stands in 
clear contrast to how his ideas were received in both his own time, and beyond.  
A full enquiry into the reasons for Ibn Taymiyya’s marginality takes us beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Yet we may tentatively suggest some factors. It seems that Ibn Taymiyya drew the boundaries of correct 
belief and practice more strictly than others were willing to concede. As Taylor demonstrates in his 
analysis of al-Subkī, the sheer variety of hadith material around graves and their visitation allows for 
counter readings.477 This is, of course, not entirely absent from Ibn Taymiyya’s own works. Ibn 
Taymiyya’s notoriously difficult personality probably did little to bring people to his cause and was 
said to concern even supporters.478 More deeply, the sense remains that Ibn Taymiyya was marginalised 
above all by his uncompromising vision of a return to his reading of the salaf. Alongside the lingering 
suspicion that the beliefs and practices of the salaf were not quite as Ibn Taymiyya insists, no less 
significant is the fact that his writings allow no room for religious development or change. For Ibn 
Taymiyya, Muslim society can only ‘go back’ to how it was at the time of the Prophet, seven centuries 
previous. Yet history had moved on since Islam’s earliest community, and it is perhaps an inevitable 
aspect of religious history that a community integrates elements that were not explicitly present during 
its earliest days. Ibn Taymiyya seems to allow no room for this. As Muhammad Memon notes;  
Ibn Taimīya failed to recreate the Muslim society in the image of its Salaf…His failure lay in denying 
any validity to the historical evolution of Islam which had, away from its rigid orthodoxy, taken place in 
a series of brisk interactions with the traditions and faiths of diverse peoples. 479 
One way of reflecting this was Ibn Taymiyya’s broad conception of unlawful innovation (bid‘a) in 
religion. A major trend of Islamic tradition, typified by notable jurists such as al-Ḥaytamī (d. 1566) and 
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‘Izz al-dīn ‘Abd al-Salām (d. 1262), allowed for historical development and evolution by conceiving 
different types of innovation, ranging from commendable (bid‘a ḥasana) to condemnable innovation.480 
We do not see this in Ibn Taymiyya. He offers no conception of commendable innovation and would 
likely dismiss the idea as oxymoronic. This commitment to return to his vision of the salaf may explain 
Ibn Taymiyya’s appeal to supporters, then, but also his marginality for others. As Taylor aptly précises;  
Ibn Taymiyya was hardly the ardent spokesman for the cultural and religious elite; rather, he was the 
persecuted champion of a minority position among his colleagues and the eloquent spokesman of a lost 
cause. 481 
Such a lost cause is evident from the reports of Ibn Taymiyya’s funeral in 1328. Funeral processions 
have long been a marker of religious authority in Islamic history.482 In Ibn Taymiyya’s particular case, 
however, it also reveals the great failure of his reformist project. The medieval sources speak of the 
huge throngs that came out for his funeral and, in an ironic twist, reveal how Ibn Taymiyya was quickly 
turned an object of popular veneration. Soon after his death, his possessions became relics and people 
sought blessings by drinking the water in which his was corpse was washed. We quote the account of 
al-Birzālī (d. 1339), narrated by Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373); 
One group drank the excess water from the washing of his body. Another divided among themselves the 
remainder of the sidra leaves with which he had been washed. Someone paid 150 dirhams for the cord 
containing quicksilver that he used to wear around his neck to deter lice. For the skull-cap that he used 
to wear on his head someone paid, it is said, 500 dirhams! ...The people came and went around his grave 
for several days, by night and day. They spent the night beside it or came in the morning. He was the 
object, in dreams, of many true visions. One group of people bemoaned his passing away in several 
poetic elegies.’ 483 
There is no clearer indication of the obstacles Ibn Taymiyya faced in attempting to reshape society in 
his image of the salaf. Ibn Taymiyya was quickly turned into exactly the kind of grave veneration and 
shirk that he stridently condemned in his lifetime. Yet, as we have seen, the issue for Ibn Taymiyya was 
not simply one of failing to follow the salaf. It ran much deeper. The veneration of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
grave was ultimately, if implicitly, a question of love: Ibn Taymiyya and his grave had become an object 
of love alongside or in place of God. In line with his own empathetic reading of the masses and the 
nature of shirk, however, Ibn Taymiyya would likely explain this as a result of the masses failure to 
comprehend the reality of God’s love for them.  
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Chapter IV: Shirk and unbelief: Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb (d. 1792) 
 
 
A pluralistic culture in Islam has traditionally accommodated a wide range of religious behaviors and 
beliefs. It was just this elasticity of doctrine, ritual and practice that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab challenged. 484 
 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb had a near obsessive preoccupation with the doctrine of shirk.485 
 
We do not takfīr Muslims. We only takfīr mushrikūn. 486 
 
 
Over two centuries after his death, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb (d. 1792) remains one of the most 
controversial figures of recent Islamic history. To supporters, he is a great reviver of the religion.487 To 
critics, he is a divisive and sectarian figure.488 This reception was inevitable. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb 
challenged the established teachings and customs of his time. He revived some of the earliest debates 
in Islamic theology around what constitutes belief (īmān) in Islam; what makes one a Muslim and why. 
As a consequence, he condemned most of the professed Muslims of his age as unbelievers and 
mushrikūn, likening his time to the pre-Islamic period of ignorance (jāhiliyya). The historian Ḥusayn 
ibn Ghannām (d. 1811), a contemporary of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and chronicler of the movement, 
captures this: 
 
Most Muslims, at the start of the twelfth century Hijrī (i.e start of eighteenth century) had regressed into 
shirk (irtakasū fī al-shirk), and apostasized into the jāhiliyya, and erased the light of guidance from within 
themselves, given the triumph of ignorance over them…They had turned their backs on the Book of God 
Most High, and followed what they found their forefathers doing by way of error. 489 
 
After a pact with the ruler Muḥammad ibn Su’ūd, in his capacity as chieftain of the town of al-Dir‘iyya 
in 1744, which gave him political backing, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s movement went on to conquer large 
parts of the Arabian Peninsula. After a chequered history, the movement known as Wahhābism remains 
an influential branch of Sunni Islam and provides the theological basis for the modern Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. The term ‘Wahhābī’ has since entered Western discourse as a byword for a strict and 
intolerant form of Islam.490 This chapter focuses on Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s life and thought. It does not 
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address the later tradition and movement bearing his name, nor the contested place of Wahhābism in 
contemporary Islam.491 A growing body of scholarly literature on Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, some of which 
can be described as polemical or apologetic, often engages his works through the later Wahhābī tradition 
or a modern lens.492 This chapter situates him in his own terms and context. It also focuses on conceptual 
history, examining the key doctrinal or theological ideas expressed in his writings. With some 
exceptions, it does not address the implementation of these ideas in time and space. The social and 
political history of the early Wahhābī movement lies beyond the scope of this chapter and has been 
addressed in detail elsewhere.493  
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb was born in 1702 in the town of al-‘Uyayna in the region of Najd, central Arabia. 
The area does not appear to have undergone any major economic, social or political change for 
centuries.494 The religious environment was almost exclusively Ḥanbalī but, as a remote and sparsely 
populated desert region, Najd was not a center of religious learning.495 It is known that Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb travelled as a young scholar, reaching as far as Basra in southern Iraq, before returning to Najd 
to start his movement in 1741.496 His writings are exclusively local in character and do not engage 
realities outside his milieu of central Arabia. There were no Jewish or Christian minorities in central 
Arabia at the time, meaning these groups hardly feature in his works. Nor does the spectre of the West 
(al-gharb) figure in his writings.497 The imminent colonial conquest of the Muslim world is nowhere 
perceived as Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb focuses on those within his local religious and cultural tradition.498 
This chapter is broadly divided into three sections. It first outlines Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s background, 
intellectual genealogy and gives an overview of the core features of his thought. This section sheds light 
on both the style of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s writings and the early spread of his movement. The second 
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section examines in detail the place and function of the doctrine of shirk or ‘association’ with God in 
his works. Noting his expansive definition of what it means to commit shirk, this section reveals the 
clear thread that connects shirk to notions of unbelief (kufr), excommunication (takfīr) and, ultimately, 
conflict (qitāl) in Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb. This is rooted in a doctrinal reading of the nature of belief (īmān) 
that prioritises outward acts (a‘māl) as the decisive measure of faith. The third section addresses some 
of the scholarly opposition to Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, examining two contemporaneous critiques that 
illustrate major trends in the reception of this thought.  
An overview of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s life and thought 
 
The assumption throughout Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s writings, echoed in Ibn Ghannām, is that the majority 
of the professed Muslims of his time were no longer Muslim. This was due to the popularity of a range 
of beliefs and practices in eighteenth century Arabia, centred around the cult of saints, that he sees as 
constituting shirk or ‘association’ with God. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb views most of his contemporaries as 
either engaged in or tolerant of shirk and, by consequence, of having left the faith. His use of language 
and terminology reflects this. Writing in a homogenous milieu of eighteenth-century Arabia, the 
frequent general references to unbelievers (kāfirūn) or mushrikūn in Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s writings 
refer to Muslims outside his fold. The term mushrik, for Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, refers to professed 
Muslims engaged in what he considers shirk. Thus, he often writes of the “mushrikūn of our time” 
(mushrikī zamāninā) and contrasts this to the time of the Prophet.499 Introducing his treatise, Kashf al-
Shubuhāt (‘Disclosing of Doubts’), Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb describes his scholarly opponents as “the 
scholars of the mushrikūn” (‘ulamā’ al-mushrikīn):  
(If) you realize that the path to the worship of God will always have enemies upon it, who might be 
people of eloquence, knowledge and evidence, then it becomes obligatory to learn enough of God’s 
religion so that this knowledge is a weapon with which you can fight these devils (shayāṭīn)…Indeed, 
one average unlearned person from the people of tawḥīd (al-‘āmmī min al-muwaḥḥidīn) can overcome 
one thousand of the scholars of these mushrikūn. 500 
 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb appears to reserve the epithets of believers (mu‘minīn) and monotheists 
(muwaḥḥidūn) for those in his movement. A common complaint is that critics sought to “block people 
from the religion of God and His messenger.”501 Ibn Ghannām similarly describes those who deserted 
the early Wahhābī movement as having apostatized (irtaddū).502 This gives a clear sense of exclusivism 
to Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s works. But this is combined with activism. It is not sufficient for Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb to adhere to the true faith. One must be active in showing hostility, in some way, to those 
outside the fold. Thus, in an early epistle dated to 1742 he writes:  
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Do not think that if you say, ‘This is the truth. I follow it and eschew all else, but I will not confront them 
and I will say nothing concerning them’, do not think that that will profit you. Rather, it is necessary to 
hate them, to hate those whom they love, to revile them, and to show enmity to them.503 
 
If a man says, ‘I follow Muḥammad, he has the truth, but I will not confront al-Lāt, al-‘Uzza, Abū Jahl 
and the likes of them; I have no obligation with respect to them.’ Then his Islam would not be sound. 504 
 
A true Muslim, then, must also show enmity to unbelievers and mushrikūn. This offers a brief overview 
of the basic contours of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s thought. It is worth noting, however, that many of the 
beliefs and practices that he targets were deeply embedded aspects of Islamic tradition. It is thus not 
surprising that he faced much opposition throughout his life. While this chapter explores two particular 
critics in detail, several key themes emerge from the refutational literature that are worth noting at the 
outset. The first is the common claim by critics that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s ideas, in particular his 
exclusionary attitude towards other Muslims, was without precedent in scholarship.505 In a sense, this 
was an image that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb cultivated for himself. In an early epistle dated to 1744 he flatly 
denies the influence of any of his teachers and accuses all other scholars, including those of earlier 
generations, of having failed to understand the true meaning of ‘no god but God’. His own knowledge 
of this, he adds, came in the form of an enigmatic blessing (khayr) from God: 
 
I sought learning, and those who knew me believed I had some, yet at that time I did not know the (true) 
meaning of ‘there is no god but God’, nor did I know the religion of Islam, before the blessing which 
God bestowed upon me. Likewise, none among my teachers knew it. If any of the scholars of the ‘Arid 
claims that he knew the meaning of ‘no god but God’, or the meaning of Islam, before this time…he lies, 
fabricates, leads people astray, and falsely praises himself. 506 
 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb never specifies the nature of this blessing from God.507 Yet as Cole Bunzel 
observes, later Wahhābī tradition seems sensitive to the idea of a complete break with scholarly 
precedent - precisely what he appears to claim – and fashions a scholarly pedigree for Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb, providing detailed lists of the teachers he reportedly studied with in Mecca and Medina.508 
Another major claim for critics, distinct from this, is that Abdul Wahhāb represented a re-emergence of 
the heretical Khārijite sect.509 A third claim, contrary to both, is that the source of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s 
doctrine was the work of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). The Yemeni jurist Ibn al-Amīr al-Ṣan‘ānī (d.1768), 
initially a supporter of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, writes: 
 
We saw him to be the kind of man who knows a portion of the sharī‘a but has not examined it carefully, 
and who did not study with those who could guide him to the path of guidance…Instead, he read some 
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of the works of Shaykh Abū al-‘Abbāss Ibn Taymiyya, and the works of his student Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyya, and blindly followed them poorly (wa qalladahumā min ghayr al-itqān), even though both 
prohibit blind following (taqlīd). 510 
 
These diverse and contradictory claims reflect the various attempts by critics to conceive and respond 
to Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and his movement. Against the charge of representing the Khārijites however, it 
is worth noting at the outset that much of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s thought is not distinctive. Many of his 
ideas and arguments find clear precedent in Islamic tradition, particularly in the works of Ibn Taymiyya. 
Yet equally, this is only a selective engagement. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb ignores much of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
corpus and draws only on those aspects, mainly relating to the cult of saints, that he deems relevant to 
his own time and that serve to buttress his arguments. He alludes to this: 
 
In our opinion, Imam Ibn al-Qayyim and his teacher (Ibn Taymiyya) are Imams of the Ahl al-Sunna and 
their books are the most noble of books. However, we do not blindly follow them in every issue. 
Everybody has some of their statement taken and some left save for our Prophet. 511 
 
Samira Haj writes that this selective use of Ibn Taymiyya, engaging aspects of his corpus that serve Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb’s project but overlooking others, reflects the ‘discursive tradition’ of Islam.512 Much 
of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb is thus not innovative and this chapter illustrates his use of ideas and arguments 
from the Islamic tradition, exploring how he applies these in his milieu of eighteenth-century Arabia. 
In so doing, it also reveals how Ibn Abdul Wahhāb recasts these trends and arguments to emerge as an 
original and creative figure in his own right.  
 
Two final aspects are worth noting in this introduction. The first is the need to separate Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb from the pact with Muḥammad ibn Su’ūd in 1744. A close reading nuances this picture and 
reveals that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb was well-known and even notorious to critics in Arabia before the pact 
in al-Dir‘iyya.513 In one of the first refutations, dated to 1743, the Meccan scholar ‘Abd al-Wahhāb ibn 
Aḥmad Barakāt al-Ṭandatāwī (d. 1773) condemned the movement emerging in Najd.514 Dismissing Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb as a “person from the masses”, al-Ṭandatāwī defends the practices associated with the 
cult of saints, such as seeking assistance (istighātha) and intercession (tawassul) from saints, and 
accuses Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb of deriving rulings from the Qur’an and sunna directly without deferring 
to established rulings.515 Al-Ṭandatāwī also accuses him of declaring the unbelief of saints like ‘Abdul 
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Qādir al-Jīlānī.516 Drawing on the popular Ḥanbalī text, the Iqnā’ of al-Ḥajjāwī, al-Ṭandatāwī declares 
takfīr or excommunication of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and calls for some form of action against him: 
 
It is incumbent upon those Muslim rulers who are capable of doing so to restrain him and hinder him 
until he repents of his horrific acts… And it is stated by the Companion of the Iqnā’ that there is 
consensus on the declaration of takfīr over he who leads astray this community. And there is no doubt 
that words of this man (Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb) clearly does this! 517 
 
The treatise closes with encomia by ten Meccan scholars, from across the legal schools, which echo al-
Ṭandatāwī. The comments of the Ḥanafī scholar As‘ad ibn ‘Abdullah al-‘Atāqī are of note: 
 
If he is insane, he should be imprisoned, beaten and treated with medication for insanity…(If not) it has 
become clear that he is a misled misleader, who should be killed after being publicly denounced so as to 
deter the likes of him… If my own hands could reach him, I would kill him (wa law tanāluhu yadayya 
la-aqtulannahu). 518 
 
These alarmist responses, from 1743, predate the pact with Ibn Su’ūd. Critics were thus quick to respond 
to what they perceived as the divisive nature of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s thought, its challenge to 
established beliefs and custom. Opponents did not respond to Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb only after he became 
a political force, nor is his thought entirely synonymous with the pact in al-Dir‘iyya in 1744. We find 
fierce rejections of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, extending to takfīr and calls for his murder, soon after he began 
his mission in 1741.  
 
The second aspect concerns the oral nature and spread of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s works. Many of his 
most famous texts, such as the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, take the form of condensed units of thought, called 
qawā’id (principles) or masā’il (matters), and often consist of Qur’an or hadith citations with short, 
sparse lines of commentary. His authorial voice does not come to the fore. This style of writing is itself 
contested. To critics, it points to the sense of intellectual paucity in Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb.519 To 
supporters, it reveals his roots in the Qur’an and sunna.520 Both overlook the oral nature and spread of 
the movement. Living in an age and milieu before print, the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd and other works reflect 
the matn genre of literature, short epistles designed for oral instruction and memorization.521 Historical 
sources support this and speak of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s followers publicly reciting his works amid large 
 
516 Ibid., 391, 400. 
517 Ibid, 401-3.  
518 Ibid., 411-2.  
519 Algar, Wahhabism, 14. (“All of his works are extremely slight, in terms of both content and bulk.”) Also 17. (“One has, 
indeed, the impression that…(he) regarded the authorial act as one more unauthorized innovation that for centuries had clouded 
the Muslim mind.”)  
520 Abu Ammaar Yasir Qadhi, An Explanation of Muhammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s The Four Principles of Shirk: taken from 
the works of ‘Abdullāh ibn Jibrīn, Sālih Āl al-Shaykh and others (Birmingham, UK: Al-Hidaayah Publications, 2002), 11. (“In 
his works, the Muslim finds that the author (‘Abdul Wahhāb) hardly speaks himself; rather he lets the Qur’an and sunnah do 
the talking for him.”)  




public audiences. Michael Cook cites a contemporary account of how the masses were exposed and 
educated in Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s ideas: 
 
The tribes, chiefs, jurists and administrators would be present and would listen to what he read to them 
in the regular observance (wird) which they call the lesson (dars), and the hearers would memorise it, so 
that in his lands there did not remain anyone – old or young, man or woman, free or slave – who did not 
have it by heart, reviewing it with him and vying in giving it his entire attention. 522 
 
The style and delivery of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s works, then, indicates a concern for the proper 
catechization of the masses. Yet alongside this oral and public endeavor, his collection of personal 
letters (Rasā’il Shakhsiyya) reveal another means of propaganda. Many of his letters are more detailed 
and digressive than his published works. They point to a complex, multifaceted personality and address 
both scholars and laity, supporters and critics. His letters use classical Arabic and local dialect and range 
from calm and reflective in tone to adamant and hostile.523 They give a rich insight into the nature of 
his thought, his debates with opponents and the early spread of the movement. Across the Rasā‘il Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb names no less than twenty opponents and a common complaint is that his critics spread 
lies and false information about him. Thus we read:  
 
It has reached me that Ibn Suḥaym’s letter has arrived to you, and that it was accepted and believed by 
some of those with knowledge among you. And God knows that this man has lied about me, saying (I 
say) things that I have never said. 524 
 
So these are my words. I trace them back to God and His Prophet. This is what stands between you and 
us. So if anything else is mentioned about us, other than this, it is lies and falsehood. 525 
 
Sulaymān ibn Suḥaym was an early follower who later became an ardent critic.526 But Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb had good reason for concern: in an environment where the distribution and public recitation of 
epistles was a key means of communication and propaganda, false reports could be hugely damaging 
for the movement, as his tone suggests. The clear sense from this brief overview, then, is of a grassroots 
movement emerging in eighteenth-century Najd which rejected many of the established beliefs and 
practices of the age. This movement spread via the public recitation of epistles, aimed at lay audiences 
and contested rival forms of scholarly authority. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb would find political backing for 
this mission in the pact with Muḥammad ibn Su’ūd in in al-Dir‘iyya in 1744, but not before raising 
alarm and fierce refutations by critics who condemned his ideas in the strongest terms. Indeed it seems 
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that if Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and his movement remain controversial in contemporary Islam, as noted 
earlier, this is perhaps the most enduring feature of the movement. 
 
‘Associating’ with God in eighteenth-century Arabia 
 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s writings paint a picture of deep religious ignorance in eighteenth century Arabia. 
He conceives and expresses this largely via the concept of shirk or ‘association’ with God. Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb gives a broad reading of what it means to ‘associate’ with God and the clear sense from his 
works, also in Ibn Ghannām, is that most of the popular beliefs and practices of the age fell under the 
category of shirk. Briefly, his Kitāb al-Tawḥīd condemns the custom of seeking blessings (al-tabarruk) 
from stones and trees, likening this to the worship of pre-Islamic idols.527 Ibn Ghannām condemns the 
worship of these inanimate objects (al-jamādāt) in Arabia.528 He speaks of a popular custom by which 
women would travel and make sacrificial offerings to a sacred tree in the hope of finding a spouse: 
 
Women and men would come to the little town of al-Fidā…where they would do the most ugly things, 
such as seeking blessings from and believing in a small date palm. Women who had been waiting in 
vain to be wedded sought this palm. They would embrace the trunk of the tree and then cry out, ‘O 
male date palm! I desire a husband before I become barren! 529 
 
Ibn Ghannām reports that one of the first acts of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb after announcing his mission was 
to fell a tree allegedly worshipped in the area.530 Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb includes other customs, like the 
protective use of amulets and charms (ruqyā wa tamā‘im), under the banner of shirk.531 This is also the 
defining feature of rival schools and sects, particularly Shī‘ī Islam and Sufism. There is no sense of his 
reading of Shī‘ī or Sufi texts. He prefers blanket condemnation over closely engaging each tradition. 
On the Shī‘ī’s, ‘Abdul Wahhāb condemns all as unbelievers who commit shirk through the worship of 
‘Alī and the imams.532 This sect, he writes, were the first to bring shirk to the community.533 Nor does 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb engage the diverse branches of Sufism.534 We see a slight nuance as he separates 
the Ḥanbalī Sufi ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 1166) from the purported shirk of his followers: 
 
The mendicants of Satan (fuqarā’ al-Shayṭān) attribute themselves to Shaykh ‘Abdul Qādir, may God 
have mercy on him, but he is free of them… Whoever supplicates to ‘Abdul Qādir is an unbeliever and 
‘Abdul Qādir is free of them…O people whom God has guided, do not think these people truly love the 
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saints; they are the enemies of the saints!...Whoever loves a people obeys them. So, whoever most loves 
the saints and obeys them believes (like them) only in God.535 
 
This seems a blanket condemnation of the Qādirīyya, an established Sufi order. Elsewhere he condemns 
the shirk of Ibn ‘Arabī and Ibn al-Farīd, both of whom seem to have enjoyed a following in the region.536 
In perhaps his first epistle, which Bunzel dates to 1741, ‘Abdul Wahhāb condemns the shirk of al-Burda 
(The Cloak), a famous devotional litany in praise of the Prophet by the Egyptian Sufi al-Buṣīrī (d. 1294). 
‘Abdul Wahhāb quotes the offending line in question:  
 
Some of the early authors committed something of the branches of greater shirk (al-shirk al-akbar)…on 
account of ignorance. An example of this is the statement in al-Burda: “O most noble of creation (the 
Prophet), none have I to seek refuge in but you.” (yā akrama al-khalq, mā lī alūdhu bihi 
siwāka)…Whenever one of the mushrikūn contend with you, referring to the greatness of the author, his 
knowledge and righteousness…Say; ‘More knowledgeable than he, greater and more righteous, were the 
companions of Moses, whom God chose over all the worlds…yet they still said; ‘Moses, make for us a 
god as they have gods.’ (Q 7:138)…Shirk may be committed by the righteous and knowledgeable.537 
 
We note that defenders of al-Buṣīrī are summarily described as mushrikūn. Yet Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb 
reserves perhaps his sharpest criticism for local saints and cult-like figures in Arabia. These were called 
Tāj, Shamsān and Idrīss.538 We learn little about these figures from his works but it seems, based on the 
references of his critics, that they were descendants of the Prophet to whom votive offerings were made 
by followers.539 Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb condemns their veneration as worse than pre-Islamic idolatry: 
 
Indeed I declare and call Shamsān and others like him to be false gods (ṭawāghīt). This is because they 
call people to worship them in place of God with a worship that is grosser than even the worship of al-
Lāt and al-‘Uzza. My words are not reckless. They are but the truth (laysa fī kalāmī majāzafa bal huwa 
al-ḥaqq.) 540 
 
Crawford suggests this is found in one of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s earliest letters.541 If so, it further 
explains the force of the opposition he faced, as the divisive potential of his thought upon established 
belief and custom became clear. More commonly, Ibn Abdul Wahhāb does not specify Tāj, Shamsān 
or Idrīss but condemns the cult of saints in general terms. This is a recurring theme in the Rasā‘il.542  
 
I call people to be sincere in their worship to God alone, and I prohibited them from supplicating to living 
and dead saints (al-ṣāliḥūn), and others, and of committing shirk in the worship of God by way of making 
 
535 ‘Abdul Wahhāb. ‘Rasā‘il Shakhsiyya’, 5/52-4. See also 5/66, 69, 89, 148, 151.  
536 For references to Ibn ‘Arabī, see ‘Abdul Wahhāb. ‘Rasā‘il Shakhsiyya’, 5/126. It is far from clear however as to the nature 
of this influence. The Wahhābī scholar Shaykh ‘Abd al-Laṭīf also speaks of “al-ittiḥādiyya” – probably a reference to Ibn 
‘Arabi’s school - enjoying followers at the time of ‘Abdul Wahhāb: Al-Shaykh, ‘Abd al- Laṭīf ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān. Miṣbaḥ 
al-ẓalām (Riyādh: Maktabat al-Mālik Fahad al-Waṭaniyya, 2003), 44. 
537 Ibn Qāsim, ed. Al-Durar Al-Saniyya, 2/11. C.f, Bunzel, ‘Manifest Enmity’, 396.  
538 For references to these figures see ‘Abdul Wahhāb. ‘Rasā‘il Shakhsiyya’, 5/52, 75, 148 and 182. 
539 Cook. ‘Written and Oral Aspects’, 167, n.20. 
540 Ibn Ghannām. Tārīkh Najd, 1/186.  
541 Crawford. ‘The Da’wa of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’, 151.  





sacrificial offerings (dhabh), vowing (nudhr), reliance (tawakkul) and prostration (sujūd), and other acts 
which are the right of God alone…This is what all the prophets called to, the first and last of them. 543 
 
Ibn Ghannām adds that shirk came to dominate Arabia via the popular veneration of saints and 
shrines.544 Devotional acts of supplication (du‘ā’), vowing (nudhūr) and prostration (sujūd) are all acts 
of worship (‘ibāda), Ibn Abdul Wahhāb insists, and belong to God alone.545 He also rejects seeking the 
intercession (tawassul) or assistance (istighātha) of any prophet, saint or intermediary.546 The terms for 
idols in the Qur’an (aṣnām, awthān) also reemerge to a large degree in his works. These are synonyms 
for graves:  
 
We prohibit people from the idols (awthān) placed on the grave of (the Companions) of Zubair and Talḥa. 
And if you say that these are not idols, and that supplicating to the people of graves and seeking their 
assistance (al-istighātha bihim) in times of hardship is not shirk…this is unbelief. Between you and us 
are the works of all the scholars, the earlier and later generations, both Ḥanbalī’s and others. 547 
 
Ibn Ghannām reports that Ibn Abdul Wahhāb destroyed the grave of the companion Zaid ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, 
an object of local veneration, in 1743.548 This act, he writes, served to publicly announce the mission.549  
 
The notion of shirk or ‘associating’ with God thus appears a vast category, extending to many of the 
established beliefs, customs and sects of the age. Several key conclusions emerge from this overview. 
First, it is worth noting that much of this is not new. The critique of Shī‘ī Islam or Ibn ‘Arabī echoes 
Ibn Taymiyya, for example, even if the nature of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s encounter with these groups, 
and his grasp of their thought, is unclear. Opposition to the cult of saints also follows Ibn Taymiyya.550 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb is well aware of this and speaks of sending Ibn Taymiyya’s works to his 
contemporaries to defend and explain his position: 
 
And I sent you the epistle of Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn (Ibn Taymiyya) where he mentions that whoever 
supplicates to a prophet, companion or saint…in an unbeliever by consensus, and you praised it, and you 
declared it was the truth.551  
 
 
543 Ibid., 5/36.  
544 Ibn Ghannām. Tārīkh Najd, 1/13-20. 
545 ‘Abdul Wahhāb, ‘Rasā‘il Shakhsiyya’, 5/25, 47, 52, 111, 126, 150, 152, 154, 232. 
546 ‘Abdul Wahhāb. Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, 38-40.  
547 ‘Abdul Wahhāb. ‘Rasā‘il Shakhsiyya’, 5/137. Also 5/60, 74, 148. Also see the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd where ‘Abdul Wahhāb 
entitles a chapter ‘what is reported of exaggeration (ghulū) the graves of the righteous (al-ṣāliḥūn) turning them into idols 
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550 For references to Ibn Taymiyya in ‘Abdul Wahhāb letters see ‘Rasā‘il Shakhsiyya’, 5/29, 67, 139, 186. For an overview of 
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Hanbali School of Law and ibn Taymiyya: Conflict or Conciliation (London: Routledge, 2006), 131-169. 




The importance of Ibn Taymiyya for Ibn Abdul Wahhāb’s critique of the cult of saints is noted in 
scholarship since the works of Ignaz Goldziher and Henri Laoust.552 His blanket condemnation of Sufi 
tradition, however, extending even to the Qādirīyya, is less discriminate than Ibn Taymiyya’s complex 
attitude towards Sufism.553 Secondly, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb does not appear to engage the distinction 
between lesser and greater shirk. The impression, occasional made explicit, is that the manifestations 
of shirk in his time, particularly on the cult of saints, fell under the category of greater shirk.554 Thirdly 
and most crucially, it would seem that Ibn Abdul Wahhāb focuses exclusively on the externals of faith. 
Nowhere in his works does he discuss the underlying roots or causes of shirk, or explore the internal 
dimensions of faith. His concern is solely the outward manifestations of shirk. We see this in the Rasā’il: 
 
I say that Islam is not established in people until they know the meaning of ‘no god but God’…Yet I also 
say that only God knows our inner secret state …This is all true and I openly say it.555 
 
The question of shirk, then, is a question of what people do outwardly. The inner life, it seems, is left 
for the individual and God. Closely related to this, Ibn Abdul Wahhāb argues that anything seen to stand 
between the believer and God, regardless of its nature or identity, is an ‘idol’. He anticipates and 
dismisses claims of a qualitative difference between the idols worshipped at the time of the Prophet and 
the idols, meaning the graves, of his age. For Ibn Abdul Wahhāb, the nature of shirk is the same;  
 
If he says; ‘Shirk is the meaning of idols, and we do not worship idols.’ Ask him; ‘what is the meaning 
of the worship of idols? Do you think that they (the pre-Islamic Arabs) believed that rocks and stones 
create, give sustenance and control affairs?’…If he says; ‘No, but they would turn to the rocks and 
stones…supplicating and sacrificing to them, saying ‘this brings us close to God’… Say; ‘True! Yet this 
is what you do in front of the edifices built on the graves! This proves that you worship idols.’…Also, 
your statement, ‘shirk is idol worship’; do you mean that shirk only implies this act? And that relying 
upon saints and supplicating to them is not an example of this?...He must then admit that whoever 
worships a saint has committed the same shirk that is mentioned in the Qur’an.556 
 
Graves are idols and the identity of what is ‘associated’ with God is irrelevant for Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb. 
The essence of shirk is the same. In this way Ibn Abdul Wahhāb blurs any distinction between 
supplicating to saints in eighteenth century Arabia and worship of idols at the time of the Prophet. 
Anything seen to stand between the believer and God, whether a tree, amulet, saint, shrine or grave, 
becomes an ‘idol’ for Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, an outward manifestation of shirk that reflects his concern 
for the externals of faith. 
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(Cairo: Imprimerie de l’institut francais d’archeologie orientale, 1939), 506-40; Les Schismes dans l’Islam (Paris: Payot, 1965), 
321-2. William Montgommery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1962), 145. 
553 George Makdisi, ‘Ibn Taymiyya: A Sufi of the Qadiriyya Order’, American Journal of Arabic Studies, vol. 1 (1974); 118-
129. Thomas Michel. ‘Ibn Taymiyya’s Sharh on the Futuh al-Ghayb of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani’, Hamdard Islamicus 4:2 
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One final reflection on shirk merits consideration. This is Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s criticism of the science 
of jurisprudence (fiqh) and draws on the Qur’anic verse that accuses those Christians who take rabbi’s 
and monks as “lords besides God”. The verse in the Qur’an reads as follows: 
 
They have taken their rabbi’s and monks as lords besides God and the Messiah, son of Mary. And they 
were not commanded except to worship one God, there is no god but Him. Exalted is He over what they 
associate with Him. (Q 9:31) 
 
Ibn Taymiyya invokes this verse in his Kitāb al-Īmān to condemn the custom of deferring to established 
legal rulings, known as taqlīd, instead of drawing directly from the Qur’an and sunna.557 Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb notes this in the Rasā’il. This is one of Ibn Taymiyya’s proofs (min adillatihi), he writes, of 
the error of following the words of scholars over the text of the Qur’an.558 Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb then 
cites 9:31 but his use of this verse goes much further than just a criticism of taqlīd. It appears to reject 
the entire tradition of jurisprudence or fiqh outright as a manifestation of shirk: 
 
The messenger of God and the imams after him interpreted this verse (9:31) to be referring to what you 
call jurisprudence (fiqh), which is what God has called shirk and the taking of scholars as lords. 559 
 
The fiqh tradition is condemned as shirk in the sense that it ‘associates’ the views of scholars with 
revelation. For Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, jurisprudence turns jurists into ‘lords.’ Yet the irony is that he 
draws on the works of Ibn Taymiyya, a scholar, to argue this, and is clearly indebted to much of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s writings for his own conception of shirk. When debating opponents in the Rasā’il, 
moreover, he often invokes his Ḥanbalī credentials.560 Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb is more ambivalent towards 
legal tradition and the custom of deferring to scholars than this passage suggests, but in other passages 
he does insist upon rejecting all authority outside the Qur’an and sunna: 
 
I do not – praise to be God – follow the way of any Sufi order or jurist (faqīh), nor the course of any 
speculative theologian (mutakalim), or any other Imam such as those that I venerate, such as Ibn Qayyim, 
al-Dhahabī of Ibn Kathīr. I summon only God, only Him, and observe the path laid down by His prophet, 
God’s messenger. 561  
 
A common refrain is to dismiss the idea that only a scholar (‘ālim) or mujtahid can consult the Qur’an. 
This, he writes, is a specious argument (shubha) akin to the Christians in 9:31.562 Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb 
insists that all Muslims, not just scholars, seek knowledge from the Qur’an.563 He accuses a critic; 
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You have decided that only the mujtahid can benefit from the words of God and His messenger. You are 
saying, ‘It is prohibited for someone else to seek guidance from the words of God, His messenger and 
companions… This shubha of yours that has been cast in your hearts…is that you are not able to 
understand the words of God, the Prophet and the salaf..564 
 
This is of course rooted in the presumption that the Qur’an is easy to understand, that it has a clear, self-
evident meaning, readily accessible to all Muslims, and which accords to Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s 
thought.565 This is problematic. Critics would of course contest his reading and this sits awkwardly, 
perhaps, alongside his other key claim that most professed Muslims of his and earlier ages had failed to 
understand the religion and were, as a result, unbelievers and mushrikūn. Claims of mass religious 
ignorance, on the one hand, and the self-evident truth of the Qur’an on the other, would seem to raise a 
tension in Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb that he neither appears to acknowledge or discuss.  
 
What makes a Muslim? Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb on the nature of faith 
 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb conceives of many kinds of shirk, leaving an impression of shirk as the defining 
feature of eighteenth-century Arabia. But this is not perhaps his main contribution. As has been seen, 
much of this is derivative, particularly vis-à-vis the works of Ibn Taymiyya. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s main 
contribution and contention lies in the creedal question of the nature of faith (īmān); what makes one a 
Muslim, and why. We may even put this in negative terms; what is it that expels one from the fold of 
Islam; at what point is someone claiming to be Muslim no longer considered as such? This is the crux 
of the issue. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb here challenges his contemporaries and revives some of the earliest 
debates in Islamic theology on the nature of faith, the relation between faith and acts (a‘māl) and what 
it means to be Muslim. 
 
The question of the relation of acts (a‘māl) and faith (īmān) was a key issue in early Islamic theology.566 
This hinged on the status of the person who professed Islam but whose acts, either committing sins or 
omitting obligatory acts, contradicted that profession. Different positions arose among early theological 
schools. Briefly, the Khārijites viewed acts as a constituent part of faith and held that performance of 
sins, such as theft, fornication or drinking alcohol, was sufficient grounds for excommunication (takfīr). 
The Khārijites became notorious for the implications of this position including the murder, on grounds 
of apostasy, of early Muslims including the Prophet’s cousin, ‘Alī.567 The opposite view was the Murji’a 
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sect. Initially a political response to the Khārijites, the Murji’a argued that faith consisted of confession 
and belief alone; acts were not integral to faith and all who profess and believe in Islam were believers 
destined for heaven, regardless of acts.568 The rationalist Mu‘tazilī school sought a middle-position; a 
sinful Muslim was neither a believer or unbeliever, but in a position between them (al-manzila bayna 
al-manzilatayn); he is a fāsiq, though not excommunicated and his ultimate status is with God.569 What 
became the mainstream Sunni position is captured by the following passage attributed to Abū al-Ḥasan 
al-Ash‘arī (d. 936): 
 
We do not excommunicate anyone from the people of the Qibla by the sins they commit, like fornication 
or theft of drinking wine, as the Khārijites do…But we do say that whoever commits a major sin, such 
as fornication or theft or what is similar to that, and deems this to be permissible and not believing it 
prohibited, this person is an unbeliever. 570 
 
A Muslim who commits sins is not to be excommunicated, then, as long as he professes belief in Islam 
and does not deny the reality of the sin and prohibition. That this is the dominant view of Sunni theology 
is seen in the works of Imam al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 933), al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) and others. 571 
 
It is within this context that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb writes. His contribution lies in reviving these early 
debates, challenging what appears to have been the dominant position of his age and placing a particular 
stress on outward actions (a‘māl) as the decisive measure of faith. As will be shown, the clear sense in 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb is that the verbal declaration of the shahāda ultimately counts for little if this is 
combined with any outward act of what he considers shirk. Put differently, it does not suffice for Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb to believe in God and profess the shahāda. The shahāda alone does not guarantee entry 
into the Muslim community. One must demonstrate this by outwardly acting in line with the faith. He 
writes: 
 
There is no disagreement that tawḥīd has to be in heart, on the tongue, and by deed. If there is any 
deficiency in (any) of this, a man is no Muslim. If he knows tawḥīd but does not act on it, he is an 
unbeliever (kāfir) and disobedient (to God), like the Pharoah, Iblīs and such like. 572 
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We may call this a ‘theology of action.’573 It underpins Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s conception of faith and is 
the central pivot of this study. It may at first glance seem inconsequential to stress the importance of 
belief by heart, tongue and acts. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb presents this as a normative position. But on closer 
reading it is clear this has a much sharper meaning. He gives primacy to the role of acts in faith as a 
means of distinguishing true from false Muslims. This is clear when he derides as a great slander 
(buhtān ‘aẓīm) the idea that professing the shahāda alone enters one into Islam.574 Many passages from 
his works reveal this was precisely the argument of his opponents:  
 
And many of those who claim to have knowledge say; ‘whoever says ‘no god but God’ is not be 
declared an unbeliever, even if he rejects the resurrection or all of the sharī‘a. 575 
 
The point of these ignorant people (al-juhalā’) is to say that whoever says it (the shahāda) cannot be 
made an unbeliever, nor can he be fought, regardless of what he does.576 
 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb mines the sources of the Qur’an and sunna to support a theology of action. He asks 
if the Prophet was sent just for people to state that there is ‘no god but God’, not to act upon it.577 Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb points to the case of companion and Caliph Abū Bakr (d. 634), who fought tribes in 
the “wars of apostasy” (hurūb al-ridda) that declared the shahāda but refused to pay alms tax (zakāt).578 
To claim faith is by the shahāda alone, he adds, equates Abū Bakr with the false-prophet Musaylima.579 
Against the claim that the Prophet did not fight the hypocrites (al-munāfiqūn) in Medina because they 
professed the shahāda, despite knowing they were, at heart, unbelievers, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb counters 
that this group were only protected because their outward actions were in line with the faith: 
 
As for your reasoning that the Prophet, peace be on him, and those after him, did not takfīr the hypocrites 
or kill them; both the scholars and ordinary people know that had they manifested just one word or one 
action of idol worship, or insulted (the message of) tawḥīd that the Prophet came with, then the Prophet 
would surely have killed them. 580 
 
In this way Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb reads a theology of action into the life of the Prophet and companions. 
The point is to prove that membership of the Muslim community is defined by external acts. One cannot 
simply profess to be Muslim - there must be a practical, outward dimension to faith.  
 
Yet it is clear that critics took a different view. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb presents this as the view of the 
Prophet and companions, but his works also reveal this was a minority position in his time. To this, he 
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responds with an ethic of elitism and righteousness. Invoking the notion of the strangeness (ghurbā’) 
of the religion, often seen in the works of Ibn Qayyim, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb cites a range of 
eschatological hadiths to present himself as a lone defender of the faith: 
 
The Prophet warned us that ‘Islam will return strange (as it began strange)’, so how do you order us to 
follow the majority of people? And there are many similar hadiths, such as; ‘There will be a time when 
nothing remains of Islam but its name, nothing of the Qur’an but its script’, and many other hadiths where 
the Prophet makes clear that falsehood will one day overpower truth…So woe to you, then, that you 
expect us to follow the majority! 581 
 
In a famous hadith the Prophet spoke of seventy-three sects, ‘Abdul Wahhāb notes, only one of which 
escapes the Fire.582 The true Muslim community or jamā’a refers to those defending the truth, he adds, 
not those with the most numbers; Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855) alone was the jamā’a when defending the 
creed during the Mu‘tazilī inquisition (miḥna).583 It seems that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb understands his 
thought and movement on similar terms. Taking a marginal position on the nature of faith and what it 
means to be Muslim did not reveal his error. Rather, this only strengthens his conviction. 
 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb on excommunication (takfīr) 
 
This takes us to the place and function of takfīr or excommunication in Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb. The issue 
of takfīr is shrouded in controversy in the Islamic tradition. Both the hadith collections and jurists warn 
against declaring takfir over a professed Muslim. In a typical passage, al-Qurṭubī (d. 1259) warns: “the 
issue of takfīr is a dangerous one. Many people have undertaken it and have fallen, whereas the 
outstanding scholars have refrained from it and remained blameless.”584 This reflects the fear of the 
consequences of the charge. Declared an apostate, an individual can be killed, have their property 
confiscated, marriage annulled and be denied a Muslim burial under the classical jurisprudence relating 
to apostasy. Yet, cases of takfīr are also ubiquitous across Islamic intellectual history, without these 
requisite penalties. Takfīr has long functioned as a tool for scholars and sects to demarcate the limits of 
orthodox belief and practice. Toshiko Izutsu describes the early centuries of Muslim theology;  
 
Any article of creed, any dogmatic point asserted by a sect was likely to arouse the exercise of takfīr on 
the part of the opposing sects. And not infrequently, the exercise of takfīr was reciprocal…as theology 
developed gradually, takfīr came to be exercised freely and, apparently, without any compunction, in 
regard to the minute details of dogmatics.” 585 
 
 
581 ‘Abdul Wahhāb. ‘Rasā’il Shakhsiyya’, 254. Ibn Ghannām. Tārīkh Najd, 1/307. 
582 Ibn Ghannām. Tārīkh Najd, 1/308.  
583 Ibid., 1/309.  
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Matū (Beirut/Damascus: 1417/1996), 3/111. Cited in Camilla Adang, Hassan Ansari, Maribel Fierro and Sabine Schmidke, 
ed. ‘Introduction’, in Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic Perspective of Takfīr (Boston/Leiden: Brill, 2015), 1.  




Early Māturīdī theologians were known for the blanket takfīr of the Mu‘tazilī sect due to the view that 
humans, not God, create their actions.586 Mu‘tazilī thinkers, in turn, made takfīr of all sects affirming 
the beatific vision, on the grounds this entails an anthropomorphic conception of God.587 Mālikī jurists 
of the Mamlūk era were notorious for the tendency to execute on suspected charges of heresy.588 As 
Sherman Jackson notes, the ecumenical spirit of al-Ghazālī’s (d.1111) Fayṣal al-Tafriqa was designed 
precisely to counter the perceived overuse of takfīr in his day.589 Yet al-Ghazālī’s theological tolerance, 
we might add, did not extend to the Ismā‘īliyya or the thought of Ibn Sīnā.590 
 
Takfīr is central to the thought of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and the life of the early Wahhābī movement. The 
sheer scope of takfir in Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb is of note. If the two key strands of his thought are a vast 
reading of shirk, on the one hand, and an emphasis on outward acts as the measure of faith, on the other, 
these meet and crystallize on the issue of takfīr. With acts integral to faith, it becomes clear for Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb that any outward act of what he considers shirk expels one from the faith: one cannot 
perform acts of shirk and remain a Muslim. For Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, his contemporaries may claim to 
be Muslim, to believe in God and the Prophet, but  in their actions they proved themselves mushrikūn:  
 
Know that the proofs regarding takfīr of the righteous Muslim (al-muslim al-ṣāliḥ), if he commits shirk 
with God (ashrakā bi-llāh)… are clearly found in the words of God, the words of the Prophet and all the 
words of the scholars. 591 
 
The scholars, from all the four schools mention in the chapter concerning the rules pertaining to the 
apostate (fī bāb ḥukm al-murtad) that if a Muslim believes that God has taken a son, he is an apostate. 
Likewise, if he commits shirk then he is an apostate. 592  
 
Whoever worships God night and day, but then calls to a prophet or saint by their grave, has taken them 
as another god. They do not witness there is no god but God because God alone is He who is to be called 
upon. This is what the mushrikūn of our time do by the graves of Zubayr or ‘Abdul Qādir or others!593  
 
His vast reading of contemporary shirk, then, becomes an equally broad ethic of takfīr against the wider 
community. In the homogenous milieu of eighteenth-century Arabia, it would seem that outward actions 
were the only means for Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb to distinguish true from false Muslims. This also explains 
his use of language and terminology, which, as noted earlier, refers in general terms of the unbelievers 
and mushrikūn of his time. But we also find quite direct and targeted accusations of unbelief in the 
Rasā’il. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s address to his opponent Ibn Suḥaym is instructive: 
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587 Ibid., 18-19.  
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589 Jackson, On the Boundaries, 5-12. 
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Before answering, we must say that you and your father are steeped in kufr, shirk and hypocrisy (nifāq)… 
neither you nor your father, until now, understand the declaration of ‘no god but God’. And I myself will 
testify to this on the Day of Judgment … So we will clearly reveal this to you now, in the hope that you 
repent unto God, and return to the religion of Islam, if God so wishes to guide you. 594 
 
It is clear, reading the epistle, that the reason for this was Ibn Suḥaym’s defense of the cult of saints.595 
Yet, this ethic of takfīr was not restricted to intellectual debate or abstract scholarly discourse. Rather, 
it underpinned the political and military spread of the movement. While there is no sign of any doctrinal 
development or change in Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s works, both Crawford and Bunzel observe a shift in 
language and emphasis from 1744 onwards, after the pact with Ibn Su’ūd.596 From this period Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb starts to link takfīr with “fighting” (al-takfīr wa al-qitāl).597 An initial emphasis on 
takfīr now lays the basis for armed conflict. In Kashf al-Shubuhāt, dated to 1750, he insists on the 
obligation to fight the mushrikūn in the manner of the Prophet: 
 
You must understand that the Prophet…fought them on account of their shirk, called them to sincerity 
in the worship of God alone…the Prophet fought them so that all du‘a’ is to God alone, all sacrifice is 
only in His name…indeed all types of worship are only to and for Him. It was this fact that made their 
blood and property permissible to the Prophet, only then have you understood the tawḥīd that the 
Prophets called to. 598 
 
He defends this stress on qitāl in the Rasā‘il, arguing: “we only fight (nuqātil) the worshippers of idols, 
just like the Prophet did.”599 We therefore find a clear thread in Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb connecting shirk, 
takfīr and qitāl. Rooted in a theology of action, outward acts of shirk lead inevitably to takfīr. This, in 
turn, makes one a target for qitāl. Conflict between Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and professed Muslims outside 
his fold seems not only justifiable, then, but inevitable. Yet it is also worth noting that he calls for 
conflict only after 1744, after his movement gained the political backing of Ibn Su’ūd. This suggests a 
political pragmatism on his part, one perhaps in contrast with a theological exclusivism and a clear 
emphasis on shirk and takfīr that is found in his earliest works.600 
 
Lordship (rubūbiyya) and Divinity (ulūhiyya)  
 
This suggests there is no real distinction between the categories of shirk and kufr. If any act of shirk 
takes one outside the fold of Islam, shirk becomes synonymous with kufr. In the Rasā’il Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb uses the terms interchangeably, condemning votive offerings (nudhūr) and supplications 
 
594 ‘Abdul Wahhāb. ‘Rasā’il Shakhsiyya’5/126. Ibn Ghannām. Tārīkh Najd, 1/299. We should note the apologetic defense 
offered by Zarabozo, The Life, Teachings and Influence, 119. (“perhaps it was his overabundant love for the truth in the face 
of absolute refusal to listen that lead him to (these) harsh words.”) 
595 Ibn Ghannām. Tārīkh Najd, 1/299-304.  
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(du‘ā’) to saints as both kufr and shirk.601 He writes the “religion of unbelievers is the belief in saints” 
(dīn al-kuffār huwa al-‘itiqād fī al-ṣāliḥīn).602 But Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb is aware that opponents, those 
subject to takfīr and qitāl, were professed Muslims who claimed to believe in God and the Prophet. To 
lay out a deeper, conceptual basis for takfīr he draws on a distinction in the tradition between two forms 
of tawḥīd. This is the distinction between oneness of God’s lordship (tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya) and divinity 
(tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya). This likely originates with Ibn Taymiyya though there are traces of this distinction 
in the works of the Ḥanbalī Ibn Baṭṭa al-Ukbarī (d. 997).603 This is a major feature of Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb’s theology and represents perhaps the deepest influence of Ibn Taymiyya upon his thought.  
 
Following Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb explains that tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya denotes a basic form 
of monotheism. This is the recognition of a single God who is the Creator and Sustainer of the universe. 
Tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya, by contrast, denotes the exclusive worship of God. This is to direct all acts of 
worship to God alone. Crucially, only tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya enters one into Islam: 
 
Know that tawḥīd is of two types: tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya, this is that God is recognized as Creator and 
Controller (al-mudabbir) of all affairs…This is true but it still does not enter the person into Islam since 
most created beings recognize this truth…What guarantees entry into Islam is tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya, and 
this is when nothing is worshipped except God.604 
 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb repeatedly invokes this distinction in the Rasā’il.605 It is tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya alone, 
he insists, that is the “difference between unbelief (kufr) and Islam.”606 The clear implication is that his 
contemporaries, those engaged in the cult of saints and other forms of shirk, had fallen short of ulūhiyya 
by failing to direct all worship to God alone. This is clear from the Rasā’il as Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb is 
seen defending his stress on takfir by insisting and even struggling to convince others of this distinction. 
In one letter, he attempts to convince a contemporary named Ḥasan who writes that the division between 
two kinds of tawḥīd is “hard to accept” (yushkilu ‘alayya).607 Elsewhere, he praises an unidentified 
scholar in Tharmadā’ who appears to have been convinced, as Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb has it, that “one does 
not enter Islam by tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya alone unless it is joined with tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya.”608 In these 
passages it appears the entire Arabian Peninsula, for Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, is conceived in terms of this 
distinction between rubūbiyya/ulūhiyya.  
 
 
601 On votive offerings, see ‘Abdul Wahhāb. ‘Rasā‘il Shakhsiyya’, 5/12 (kufr) and 232 (shirk). On supplications, see 5/33, 
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A common argument found in the works of Ibn Taymiyya is that the group known as the mushrikūn in 
the Qur’an affirmed tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya.609 Again, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb follows this and cites the 
Qur’anic verses that point to the common ground between the mushrikūn and the Prophet, including the 
shared belief in the same God, Allāh, who is Creator and Sustainer. 
 
Know that God sent the Prophet to a people who worshipped, performed the pilgrimage, gave alms, and 
remembered God. Yet they would also make created objects (makhlūqāt) intermediaries between them 
and God and say; ‘We only desire to come closer to God through them, and we wish that they interceded 
for us with Him.’ (Q 11:18, 39:3)…Otherwise, the mushrikūn testified that Allāh is the sole creator…that 
no one grants life or death except Him, and that no one controls the affairs of creation except Him. 610 
 
The rationale for invoking the Qur’anic mushrikūn is clear. This group is a foil for Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s 
contemporaries. The point is to stress that the Prophet was sent to a community who believed in God 
and performed many acts of worship, yet were still condemned for their shirk. The parallel with the 
professed Muslims of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s time, then, is clear. Yet Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb then makes a 
claim that does not appear in the works of Ibn Taymiyya, or perhaps any other scholar. The mushrikūn 
of his own time, he argues, were qualitatively worse than those at the time of the Prophet:  
 
The mushrikūn of our time are in more extreme shirk than those of the past (mushrikī zamānina aghlaṭ 
shirkan min al-awallīn). Those from the past would commit shirk in times of ease (al-rakhā’), and were 
sincere to God (yukhliṣūn) in times of hardship. But the shirk of the mushrikūn of our time is constant, 
in times of both hardship and ease. And the proof of this is (the verse): ‘And when they board a ship they 
call to God sincerely, yet when He delivers them to land they associate with Him’ (Q 29:65) 611 
 
The mushrikūn of our time have exceeded the unbelievers from the time of the Prophet (mushrikī 
zamāninā qad zādū ‘alā kuffār al-nabī) for they would call to saints and righteous people in times of 
both ease and hardship…  612 
 
We find this in one of his first works, ‘The Four Principles of Shirk’ (Fī ‘Arbā‘a Qawā‘id al-Shirk) 
dated to 1743, a version of which was distributed orally among early Wahhābī settlements and 
memorized by all followers, scholars and laity.613 Non-Wahhābī Muslims of eighteenth century Arabia, 
then, those devoted to the cult of saints and other forms of shirk, are conceived and condemned as worse 
than the Qur’anic mushrikūn, a group that denied the Prophet and that are said to have worshipped idols. 
The logic for this is that the Qur’anic mushrikūn were less consistently devoted to their shirk. The sense 
of exclusion towards rival Muslims outside the Wahhābī fold is absolute. Yet we can comprehend this 
only through a theology of action - only on the basis of outward acts, by emphasizing acts as the decisive 
measure of faith, the determinant of a Muslim or mushrik, can a category like the Qur’anic mushrikūn 
be qualitatively superior to the purported mushrikūn of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s time. While an original 
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claim, not found in the works of any other scholar, it could also be argued that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb is 
here entirely consistent and faithful to his doctrinal reading of the measure of faith. 
 
A final aspect of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s approach to takfīr is of note. This is what Crawford calls 
“secondary takfīr.”614 This is the obligation to excommunicate not only those guilty of shirk but, equally, 
all who hesitate or fail to declare takfīr of such. Failure to excommunicate shirk is in itself grounds for 
takfīr. We see this across his writings as Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb writes:  
 
Whoever does not pronounce takfīr over the mushrikūn, or is doubtful as to their unbelief (aw shakka fī 
kufrihim), or affirms the legitimacy of their school (aw ṣaḥḥaḥa madhhabahum), he is an unbeliever by 
consensus (fa huwa kāfir ifmā’an).615 
 
Whoever does not excommunicate them (the mushrikūn), he is by that an unbeliever. (wa man lam 
yukaffiruhum fa huwa kāfir).616 
 
This suggests a subtle difference between kāfir and mushrik in his thought. A mushrik commits acts of 
shirk, perhaps, while a kāfir refers to those who hesitate or fail to takfīr. Yet the principle of secondary 
takfīr is not innovative. Again, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb takes this from Ibn Taymiyya.617 The relevant 
passage in Ibn Taymiyya is part of a polemic against the purported heresies of Shī‘ī sects. Of those who 
believe that ‘Alī is a god or prophet, Ibn Taymiyya writes: “There is not a doubt about his unbelief. 
Rather, there is no doubt about the unbelief of those who refrain from declaring their unbelief (man 
tawaqquf fī takfīrihi).”618 The idea of secondary takfīr is however firmly rooted in Islamic intellectual 
history. Mu‘tazilī thinkers of the classical period, to give one example, declared the unbelief of anyone 
who doubted the unbelief of the Ash‘arī doctrine of the beatific vision.619 The principle is not an 
innovation and has a deeper history than perhaps Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb realizes. Yet of note is how he 
draws on a principle of secondary takfīr found in Ibn Taymiyya, recasting this to apply it to the shirk 
and the mushrikūn of his time. The aim is to draw a sharp binary in the Arabia Peninsula on the issue 
of shirk in which there is no room for neutrality or middle ground. For Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, there seems 
no option outside the binary of declaring takfīr of the cult of saints, in effect joining the movement, on 
the one hand, or being subject to takfīr, on the other. We see a thread tying shirk to takfīr to secondary 
takfīr in his thought, one in which any sense of tolerance of the cult of saints or other forms of shirk 
makes one an unbeliever and target of confrontation.  
 
Was Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb a Khārijite? 
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It would seem from the foregoing that there are clear parallels between Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and the 
Khārijites, the early sect of the seventh century. With an emphasis on actions as the measure of faith, a 
broad takfīr of all professed Muslims outside his fold and calls for conflict after 1744, Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb comes to resemble Khārijite thought and practice in important ways. It is not surprising that 
critics made this link. In response to the claim by Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb that he “hated” the doctrine of 
tawḥīd, for example, the critic ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Īsā al-Muwais retorts: 
 
We only hate what you, at your whim, have called tawḥīd, which entails excommunicating Muslims 
(takfīr al-muslimīn) and deeming their blood and property licit, with not support from God and His 
Messenger, except in the way of the Khārijites.620 
The Ḥanbalī critic Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Saffarīnī likens Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb not to the Khārijites 
generally, but to Nāfī’ ibn al-Azraq (d. 685) in particular, the notorious leader of the most violent 
subsect of the Khārijites, the Azraqiyya.621 The Yemeni reformer Muḥammad al-Shawkānī (d. 1839), a 
critic of the cult of saints and initially supportive of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, later retracted his support after 
learning of his takfīr of professed Muslims. Al-Shawkānī wrote several poems criticizing Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb in this regard and comparing him to the Khārijites.622 This is a common trope in the refutations 
of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb in later centuries. It is seen in the work of later Ottoman critics, like Aḥmad 
Zaynī Daḥlān (d. 1886) and Ibn ‘Ābidīn (d. 1836), and continues to appear to modern sources.623  
 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb addresses this claim in his writings. His response is significant for he rejects the 
association with the Khārijites but maintains an emphasis upon both outward actions and takfīr. Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb carefully distinguishes his theology, presented as Sunni tradition or ‘the people of 
Sunna and the community’ (ahl al-sunna wa al-jamā’a), from the Khārijites in a letter to Ibn Suḥaym: 
 
You say that the scholars (ahl al-‘ilm) say; ‘It is not permitted to pronounce takfīr of the Muslim on 
account of his sins’. And this is right but nonetheless this is not what we do. The Khārijites declare takfīr 
over he who commits illicit intercourse (zina) or steals or sheds blood - every sin, if the Muslim commits 
it, is an unbeliever (according to them). As for the people of the sunna and their madhhab: (we say) the 
Muslim cannot be declared an unbeliever except by shirk (illā bi-shirk) and we never excommunicated 
idols (ṭawāghīt) and their followers except on account of their shirk. 624 
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It is uniquely the sin of shirk, then, of associating with God in worship, that leads to takfīr. Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb states to not excommunicate on the basis of other sins like drinking, adultery or fornication, 
and in this sense is distinct from the Khārijites. But the distinction offered to Ibn Suḥaym is perhaps 
deceptive. Critics could of course point to Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s broad reading of shirk, to the fact he 
speaks of the “mushrikūn of our time” and describes his scholarly opponents as “ulamā’ al-mushrikīn”, 
to question its value. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb offers a conceptual distinction with the Khārijites, then, but 
one may question its practical worth. 
 
This also reveals Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s attitude to matters of sin and morality. It would seem there is 
room in the Muslim community for Muslims who steal or drink alcohol. It is uniquely the sin of 
‘associating’ with God that leads to takfīr. But this leads to something of a tension. It seems preferable 
not to pray at all, than to pray by a grave or shrine.625 The first is a sin, the second is shirk. It seems 
better to fornicate than to supplicate (du‘ā’) to a saint. And critics were quick to note this. In 1743 al-
Ṭandatāwī accuses Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb of a perverse sense of ethics and priorities;  
 
One of the most amazing things about him… (is that) he leaves alone the unbeliever, he leaves alone 
those groups whose corruption is agreed upon, such as the adulterer and the drinker of alcohol, and he 
excommunicates only those whom perform acts of remembrance (dhikr) or believe in a saint. 626 
 
In response, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb reverses the critique. Alcohol and adultery are sins, he explains, but 
they are not major doctrinal infractions that challenge the very core of the faith. In Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s 
terms, they relate to the branches (fur‘ū) of the religion, not its roots (uṣūl): 
 
But this (shirk) is not a sin in the branches (fur‘ū) of the religion…like adultery or theft. By God, by God 
and by God again, it is a much greater issue than this! 627 
 
Both sides accuse the other of misplaced priorities. To critics, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb appears indifferent 
to issues of morality and ethics, with little interest in cultivating virtues for believers or the community. 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, in turn, accuses his opponents of failing to understand that shirk, not drinking or 
adultery, is the major sin in the Qur’an, with its elimination the purpose for God sending prophets.628  
 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and his critics 
 
The third and final part of this chapter examines the nature of scholarly opposition to Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb. The names of critics run throughout the Rasā‘il and provide a backdrop to his life and thought. 
 
625 On juristic debates over the status of the individual who neglects prayer see Robert Gleave, ‘Abandoning Prayer and the 
Declaration of Unbelief in Imāmī Jurisprudence’ in Accusations of Unbelief in Islam, 414-434.  
626 Traboulsi, ‘An Early Refutation’, 402.  





Attention has been drawn to critics like Ibn Suḥaym and al-Ṭandatāwī. Yet it is worth noting, briefly, 
the attempts of later followers to defend Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb from his critics. A contemporary Saudi 
theologian writes: 
 
The most prominent reason for the slanders of opponents in their works…(is that) many of these 
opponents and those who claim to follow Islam (al-muntasibīn ilā al-islām) were in error and far from 
the straight path. Errors and corrupt beliefs reached a great many Muslims before the Shaykh started his 
mission…Most Muslims worshipped their Lord in ignorance…innovation (bid‘a) and things relating to 
shirk (shirkiyyāt) thus naturally appeared in various forms. 629 
 
Natana De Long Bas argues that opposition to Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb was rooted in power struggles with 
rival scholars, not religious teachings.630 This is hardly convincing. It ignores the deeper doctrinal nature 
of the challenge that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb posed, his rejection of most of the beliefs and practices of his 
age and his mass takfīr of other Muslims. In lieu of the sharp binary drawn between the followers of 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and those outside the movement, in which there seems no middle group between 
membership of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s movement or being liable to takfīr, it is hardly surprising that he 
raised alarm and fierce opposition among scholars.  
 
In what follows this chapter examines two refutations of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb.631 One is written by his 
brother, Sulaymān, the other by the largely unknown figure, ‘Abdullah ibn Sayyīd ‘Alāwī al-Ḥuḍārī. 
Both were contemporaries of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and condemn his takfīr of professed Muslims. Each 
refutation, however, is rooted in a rival conception of shirk. Al-Ḥuḍārī offers a different conception of 
greater shirk (shirk al-akbar), defends the cult of saints and is rooted in Sufi tradition, citing Sufi figures 
such as Ibn ‘Aṭā Allāh al-Iskandārī (d. 1309). Sulaymān, by contrast, is a product of the same Ḥanbalī 
milieu as his brother. He criticizes the cult of saints and is equally indebted to the works of Ibn 
Taymiyya, whom he accuses his brother of misreading. Sulaymān’s treatise hinges on the distinction 
between greater and lesser shirk, and an insistence upon the strict legal requirements for any charge of 
takfīr. Taken together, Sulaymān and al-Ḥuḍārī give an insight into the breadth of opposition to Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb. They also reveal how rival conceptions of shirk, of what it means to ‘associate’ with 
God and the consequence of the charge, underpin much of this critical reception. 
 




629 Al-‘Abd al-Latīf, Da‘wā al-Munāwi‘īn, 89.  
630 De Long Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 19. (“the fact that his teachings were accepted until the local authorities began to feel their 
bases of power threatened makes it clear that the issues were really about power struggles and not so much about heretical 
religious teachings.”)  
631 For works engaging the full breadth of refutational sources, see Esther Peskes, Muhammad b. ‘Abdalwahhab (1703-92) im 
Widerstreit: Untersuchungen zur Rekonstruktion der Frühgeschichte der Wahābīya (Beirut-Stuttgart, 1993), 49-121. Buntzel, 
‘Manifest Enmity’, 33-96. For treatments of specific refutations, see Paul Heck. An Early Moroccan Response to Wahhabism: 
The Politics of Intercession’, Studia Islamica, 107:2 (2012); 235-54. Hamadi Redissi. ‘The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic 
Sources, 1745-1932’ in Madawi al-Rasheed, ed. Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi Arabia’s Political, Religious and Media 




We have little information on al-Ḥudārī. His name suggests a link to another critic, the Yemeni Sufi 
‘Alawī ibn Aḥmad al-Ḥaddād (d. 1817).632 His refutation has been published and translated albeit 
without analysis of its contents.633 It is a short but dense treatise. Al-Ḥudārī centers on four points and 
reveals a clear familiarity with Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s ideas. It also seems to have been influential in its 
time. The entire treatise is copied verbatim, without attribution, in al-Ḥaddād’s lengthier refutation, 
Miṣbāh al-Anām.634 A number of passages are found, again without attribution, in the Ḍurrār al-Saniyyā 
fī al-Radd ‘ala al-Wahhābiyyā by the Ottoman critic Aḥmad Zayn al-Daḥlān (d. 1886).635 This suggests 
al-Ḥudārī was an important resource for later generations of critics.636 It is clear from the text that Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb was alive at the time of writing, allowing us to date it to before his death in 1792.637  
 
Al-Ḥudārī first rejects the division between tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya and ulūhiyya. It will be recalled that 
this provides the conceptual basis for Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s approach to takfīr: contemporaries affirmed 
tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya but fell short of ulūhiyya and were thus outside the fold of Islam. Against this, al-
Ḥudārī argues this division of tawḥīd has no basis in the Qur’an or tradition: 
 
One of the astonishing things in the works of Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb is that the people of the 
qibla, who declare ‘no god but God and Muḥammad is the Messenger of God’, do not know tawḥīd. (He 
says) tawḥīd is of two kinds; rubūbiyya, which the unbelievers and mushrikūn affirm, and 
ulūhiyya….which enters one into Islam. I wish I could know how the unbelievers could have a concept 
of tawḥīd!... Have you ever heard, Muslims, anything in the traditions or the biography to the effect that 
the Prophet, when the Bedouin came to him to accept Islam, distinguished between these two and told 
them that only ulūhiyya enters them into Islam?! Did he not just accept the profession of the shahāda and 
rule this an acceptance of Islam? What slander and falsehood upon God and the Prophet!638  
  
This distinction served to conflate the mushrikūn of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s time with those from the time 
of the Prophet. Both sets of mushrikūn, for Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, affirmed tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya and he 
uses the Prophet’s encounter with the mushrikūn as a foil for his community. Al-Ḥuḍārī challenges this. 
The Muslims of eighteenth-century Arabia are distinct from the mushrikūn in the Qur’an, he insists, as 
the latter were a group that denied the Qur’an and prophecy. For al-Ḥuḍārī, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb 
conflates two entirely distinct categories of people; 
 
Regarding the noble verses he uses to declare takfīr over Muslims … These verses refer to the unbelievers 
of Mecca, not Muslims … If you ponder these verses which he has made a proof (hujja) to declare takfīr 
 
632 Not to be confused with his famous grandfather, the Sufi master ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Alī al-Ḥaddād (d.1720). Al-Ḥudārī’s 
refutation is not mentioned in the overviews provided by Buntzel, ‘Manifest Enmity’, 33-94. Or Peskes, Muhammad b. 
‘Abdalwahhab, 49-121. 
633 R. Y. Ebied and M.J.K Young. ‘An Unpublished Refutation of the Doctrines of the Wahhabi’s’, Revista degli studi orientali 
1 (1976); 377-97. 
634 The full title is Miṣbāh al-Anām wa jalā al-ẓalām fi radd shubah al-bid‘ī al-Najdī allati aḍalla bihā al-‘awāmm (Cairo: al-
Maṭba’a al-‘Amīra al-Sharafiyya, 1325/1907).  
635 Noted in Hamadi Redissi. ‘The Refutation of Wahhabism’, 161.  
636 Crawfords comments seem pertinent here. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 15. (“The polemics of his (‘Abdul Wahhāb’s) enemies 
have fared less well. Many of them, influential at the time, have sunk from sight over the centuries.”)  
637 Ebied and Young suggest the last quarter of the eighteenth century. “An Unpublished Refutation”, 378. 
638 Ibid., 383 (English), 393-4 (Arabic). For a list of scholars whom echo this critique of the rubūbiyya/ulūhiyya distinction, 




over Muslims, you will find he has acted blindly; they do not contain any proof at all; they apply to the 
person who asserts that God has daughters, sons and associates (shurakā’), these people deny the Qur’an 
and reject the Prophet and deny the Resurrection. What connection is there between a Muslim and an 
unbeliever?! How weak his intellect! How small his powers of judgment! 639 
 
For al-Ḥuḍārī, that contemporary Muslims affirm the Prophet and the authority of the Qur’an renders 
any comparison to the Qur’anic mushrikūn erroneous. But it is clear that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb measures 
faith by different standards. A theology of action means professing the shahāda is not decisive. Rather, 
outward actions are the measure of faith and, in this way, the comparison with the Qur’anic mushrikūn 
is seen to be valid. In this light, al-Ḥuḍārī and Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb argue past each other. 
 
Al-Ḥuḍārī then examines the meaning of shirk. He writes there are two kinds of shirk, lesser and greater 
shirk, with lesser shirk consisting of religious ostentation (riyā’).640 He then conceives of greater shirk 
or shirk al-akbar in very different terms to Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb. Al-Ḥuḍārī defines greater shirk as shirk 
in “essence and attributes” (shirk bi-dhāt wa ṣifāt).641 This is the view that either God’s essence or His 
attributes, like creating, sustaining life, or giving death, are found in other than God.642 He writes: 
 
The meaning of oneness (waḥdaniyya) is that there is none beside Him. As long as you have in your 
mind the view that there is something independent alongside God, whether in His essence or resembling 
His attributes or even in participating in His actions, you are a mushrik with your Lord…For God has 
said of Himself; ‘there is nothing like Him’ (Q 42:11). 643 
 
This implies that greater shirk is essentially outright polytheism; the notion that there is another deity 
alongside God. It suffices to insist upon God’s uniqueness, then, that ‘there is nothing like Him’, to 
avoid falling into this form of shirk. Al-Ḥuḍārī writes: 
 
We do not assert the divinity of any of these things which he claims to be gods and which, he says, we 
worship in spite of God, for ‘There is nothing like Him’ (Q 42:11). God is One in essence and attributes 
and actions…If then it is established from the Qur’an that God is One, there is nothing like Him, and that 
He has no partner in His Kingdom, where then are these mushrikūn…? And Shamsān and Idrīss and Tāj 
and others say that God is Exalted above what the wrongdoers say. 644 
 
Al-Ḥuḍārī conceives of shirk not in terms of outward acts, but as the view that any aspect of divinity 
resides in other than God. On this basis he defends the veneration of Tāj and Shamsān. Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb, to recall, condemns venerating these saints as worse than the worship of pre-Islamic idols.645 
Rival conceptions of shirk al-akbār between Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and al-Ḥuḍārī thus lead to very 
different attitudes towards the cultural and religious environment of eighteenth-century Arabia. Al-
 
639 Ebied and Young. “An Unpublished Refutation”, 386-38 (English), 395-96 (Arabic).  
640 Ebied and Young. “An Unpublished Refutation”, 380 (English), 392 (Arabic). 
641 Ibid. 
642 Ibid., 380-1 (English), 392 (Arabic).  
643 Ibid., 384 (English), 394 (Arabic).  
644 Ibid., 384-6 (English), 394-5 (Arabic).   




Ḥuḍārī finally challenges Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb on the cult of saints. He denies that veneration of saints 
is shirk, defending this as a legitimate aspect of Muslim piety, amply attested in the Qur’an and Muslim 
tradition: 
 
Among his ravings are that belief in righteous figures (al-ṣāliḥūn) constitutes shirk al-akbar … As for 
the intercession (shafā‘a) of saints and their special status with God: even if one could only adduce the 
words of Muḥammad), peace be on him; ‘Indeed, through a righteous Muslim God repels evil from a 
hundred of his neighboring people’, and his words, ‘the earth shall always have upon it forty men the 
like of Friend of the Merciful (khalīl al-Raḥmān, Abraham), through them you will be given water, 
through them you will be helped, not one will die without God replacing him with another’, it would be 
sufficient. What intercession could be greater, than that God should repel evil through them, and cause 
rain to descend?...If you consider these traditions and others you see how statements denying intercession 
and the saints special status with God have no other cause than stubbornness and fanaticism. 646 
 
Al-Ḥuḍārī defends the custom of seeking blessings (al-tabarruk) from saints and sacred relics. Citing 
the Shifā of Qāḍī Iyād (d. 1149), he writes that companions like Mu‘awiyah and Khālid ibn al-Walīd 
sought blessings from relics like the Prophet’s cloak and hairs.647 The saints have special qualities and 
secret knowledge gifted to them by God, he adds, including knowledge of “inspiration” (‘ilm al-ilhām) 
and “disclosure” (‘ilm al-kashf).648 Many of these arguments are not new. Much of al-Ḥuḍārī’s treatise 
echoes the defense of the cult of saints by Taqī al-Dīn al-Ṣubkī (d. 1355), for example, in his refutation 
of Ibn Taymiyya.649 Nor is this treatise designed to convince Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb. Much of Al-Ḥuḍārī’s 
language and argument reflects the kind of devotion to saints that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb condemns as 
shirk. Al-Ḥuḍārī’s aim, then, is to defend the beliefs and customs that were under attack since Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb, not to convince his adversary. This explains his use of key figures from Sufi tradition, 
like Ibn ‘Aṭā Allāh al-Iskandārī (d. 1309) and al-Baydāwī (d. 1286), rather than those figures, like Ibn 
Taymiyya, to whom Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb might defer.650 This is precisely the tactic of our next treatise. 
 
The Ḥanbalī response: Sulaymān ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb   
 
We have little information on Sulaymān.651 There is little to indicate his early life and education and it 
is not clear if he was older or younger than his brother. A fellow scholar, it is known that after the death 
of their father in 1741 Sulaymān assumed his position as judge (qāḍī) of the town of Ḥuraymilā’.652 His 
treatise, dated to 1753, is titled al-Ṣawā‘iq al-Ulūhiyya fī al-Radd ‘alā al-Wahhābiyya (The Divine 
 
646 Ebied and Young. “An Unpublished Refutation”, 388-91 (English), 396-7 (Arabic). 
647 Ibid., 389 (English), 396 (Arabic). 
648 Ibid., 390 (English), 396 (Arabic).  
649 Taqī al-Dīn, al-Ṣubkī. Shifā’ al-siqām fi ziyārat khayr al-anām, 2nd ed. (Beirut: 1978). This is analyzed in Christopher S. 
Taylor, In the Vicinity of the Righteous: Ziyāra and the Veneration of Muslim Saints in Late Medieval Egypt (Leiden/Boston: 
Brill, 1999), 195-219. Al-Ṣubkī’s critique of Ibn Taymiyya was in turn rebutted by the student and follower of Ibn Taymiyya, 
who continued Ibn Taymiyya’s polemic against saint worship and shrines. Muḥammad bin ‘Abd, al-Hādī. Al-Ṣārim al-Munkī 
fī al-radd ‘alā al-Subkī (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Rayyān li-Tibā’ah wa al-nashr wa al-tawzī, 1992).  
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Lightning in Refutation of the Wahhābī’s), though this is likely a later title.653 Sulaymān’s is thus a later 
refutation, coming a decade after al-Ṭandatāwī’s in 1743 and nine years after the pact with Ibn Su’ūd 
in 1744. The reason for this, again, is unclear. The refutation comprises forty-five chapters and is one 
of the most detailed refutations of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb. Later sources recognise Sulaymān as a major 
opponent and there seems a sense of embarrassment that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s brother was an ardent 
critic. Ibn Ghannām speaks of a deathbed repentance by Sulaymān, a view echoed in later tradition.654 
This is perhaps apocryphal, with modern supporters of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb insisting how even prophets 
like Adam, Noah and Muhammad had relatives reject their message.655  
 
Two features of Sulaymān’s treatise stand out. The first is the deference to Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 
Qayyim.656 He cites these on almost every page, naming them the “two shaykhs” (al-shaykhayn) and 
describing Ibn Taymiyya by the honorific shaykh al-Islām.657 This is not just a “clever rhetorical 
stroke”, as David Commins assumes, a tactic of using his brother’s sources against him.658 Rather, it is 
clear that Sulaymān is deeply indebted to the works of Ibn Taymiyya and his treatise reads as much a 
defense of the latter as a refutation of his brother. The second feature, linked to the first, is Sulaymān’s 
criticism of the cult of saints. Sulaymān echoes his brother and speaks of the “ignorant people (ahl al-
jahl) among us”, lamenting how many visit shrines over the ka‘ba itself.659 This may explain the silence 
in Sulaymān on his brothers destruction of the tomb of Zaid ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, perhaps a tacit sign of 
approval. It is clear, then, that Sulaymān offers a very different refutation to al-Ḥuḍārī. His refutation 
does not preclude some key common ground with his brother.  
 
The crux of Sulaymān’s treatise, that which underpins and animates the refutation, is a rejection of his 
brother’s takfīr of professed Muslims. Sulaymān reflects many of the fears of the wider Islamic tradition 
around the practice of takfīr. In one of the opening passages, Sulaymān asks of his brother: 
 
You declare takfīr over he who witnesses that there is no god but God, that Muhammad is his slave and 
messenger, and over he who performs the prayer, gives alms tax, fasts during Ramadan, all the while 
believing in God, His angels, books and messengers…And so we must ask you…from where have you 
got this?! 660 
 
 
653 Sulaymān, ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb. Al-Ṣawā‘iq al-Ulūhiyya fī al-Radd ‘alā al-Wahhābiyya, ed. Ibrāhīm Muḥammad al-Buṭāwā, 
5th edition (Cairo: Dār al-Insān, 1492/2008).  
654 Ibn Ghannām. Tārīkh Najd, 2/812-3. 
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656 On the popularity of Ibn Taymiyya in this period, see Basheer Nafi, ‘A Teacher of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’: Muhammad Hayat 
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Sulaymān repeatedly insists that membership of the Muslim community rests upon the verbal profession 
of the shahāda. A central refrain is that whoever affirms ‘no god but God’ and Muhammad’s prophecy 
enjoys the legal status and protection of a Muslim. Sulaymān cites fifty hadith narrations that prohibit 
takfīr of anyone professing the shahāda.661 Invoking the Kitāb al-Īmān, he cites Ibn Taymiyya to argue 
that this is the reason the Prophet did not fight the hypocrites in Medina.662 Ibn Qayyim, he adds, writes 
the shahāda alone enters one into Islam and ensures the repentance of the apostate.663 Sulaymān accuses 
his brother of going against the consensus (ijmā’) of the scholarly tradition in declaring takfīr and calling 
for conflict against professed Muslims:  “this is consensus (ijmā’) from the umma. The scholars (ahl al-
‘ilm) have agreed that whoever utters the shahādatayn, he becomes in accordance with the laws of 
Islam.” 664 Like al-Ḥuḍārī, on this basis Sulaymān rejects any link between the Qur’anic mushrikūn and 
the Muslim community of eighteenth-century Arabia.665 As with other critics, he likens his brother to 
the Khārijtes as the only precedent in Muslim history.666 It is thus clear, early in the treatise, that 
Sulaymān targets above all his brother’s emphasis on takfīr, rejecting the idea that the majority of the 
professed Muslims were mushrikūn and unbelievers. This underpins the two key pivots of his argument.   
 
Sulaymān is critical of the cult of saints, but also his brother’s use of takfīr. The legal category of lesser 
shirk (shirk al-asghar) affords him this balance. Sulaymān argues that many of the beliefs and practices 
associated with the cult of saints fall under this category and, as such, do not merit takfīr. This is not 
his own view, he insists, but that of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim: 
Where did you get that a Muslim…if he supplicates to a living or dead (saint), makes vows or sacrifices 
to him or touches his tomb, taking from the earth around it, that all this is shirk al-akbar…If you say you 
have taken this from the writings of scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah or Ibn Qayyim, as they called all this 
shirk, we say; this is right and we agree with you in following these two…Yet they did not say what you 
say, that this is greater shirk that excludes one from Islam…You take from their works what works for 
you and ignore what doesn’t. Their works prove that these actions are lesser shirk (shirk al-asghar). 667 
Ibn Taymiyya condemns supplicating and sacrificing to saints, also touching and circumambulating 
graves, in terms of sin, error (ḍallāl) and innovation (bid‘a), Sulaymān argues, not as acts that exclude 
one from Islam.668 Moreover, scholars disagree on the legitimacy of the cult of saints, he adds, but none 
has ever made this grounds for takfīr.669 It is also wrong to claim that graves are idols, he insists, as the 
Prophet affirmed in the hadiths that idols will not return to Arabia after Islam.670 Throughout the treatise 
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lies a deeper question of reasonableness for Sulaymān. Noting the cult of saints has been established in 
Muslim lands for centuries, he adds dryly that, if his brother is indeed correct, there will have been no 
real Muslim for the last eight hundred years except Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and his movement.671  
 
Sulaymān is not the first critic to invoke the category of lesser shirk. An early Ḥanbalī critic, Ibn ‘Afāliq, 
offers the same argument.672 But we may question this reading of Ibn Taymiyya. As seen in the previous 
chapter, Ibn Taymiyya is highly critical of the cult of saints and it could be argued that Sulaymān 
underplays the depth of Ibn Taymiyya’s critique.673 Perhaps sensing this, he turns to a second argument. 
Even in cases of greater shirk, Sulaymān writes, one should not rush to takfīr. He writes that takfīr is 
ultimately a legal ruling (ḥukm shar‘ī), and that legal tradition urges caution in this situation. Sulaymān 
here invokes the legal principle of hujja or ‘manifest proof’. This is the principle that the person guilty 
of greater shirk should not be subject to takfīr until the ‘proof’ of their error is presented to them, a legal 
stratagem designed to mitigate against takfīr in cases of ignorance, coercion or insanity. Once again, 
Sulaymān roots this in the works of Ibn Taymiyya; 
You say: The Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn (Ibn Taymiyyah), may God have mercy on him, said that if a petitioner 
requests things from an object, such as forgiveness of sins, entry in heaven, deliverance from fire, the 
sending down of rain…or anything like that – anything from the characteristics of God’s rubūbiya – then 
this is shirk and error and the person must seek repentance or else he is to be killed (as an apostate). We 
say: Yes, but (Ibn Taymiyyah said) also that the person who does this is not be declared an unbeliever 
until the proof (hujja) is revealed to him…by clear speech (bayān kalām), if God wills. 674 
Sulaymān never directly cites Ibn Taymiyya on this point. Yet we find evidence for this throughout Ibn 
Taymiyya’s works. In Al-Istighātha, for example, Ibn Taymiyya writes: 
 
Declaring a person an unbeliever (al-takfīr) is only for God; no one is to be regarded an unbeliever except 
the one whom God and His Messenger have ruled is such. This verdict…and the permissibility of 
sentencing him to death is conditional upon the prophetic proof (al-hujja al-nabawiyya) having reached 
him…otherwise, not everyone unaware of some matter of Islam is an unbeliever.675 
 
Sulaymān repeats the principle of hujja across the treatise.676 In this way he argues that acts of greater 
shirk do not, in themselves, lead to takfīr. The individual guilty of greater shirk retains the legal status 
of a Muslim - on the basis of his or her shahāda - and must be educated as to the nature of their error; 
what Sulaymān terms fahim al-hujja. Sulaymān insists on this point because he accuses his brother of 
performing a generalised, mass takfīr of Muslims (takfīr bi ‘umūm), without engaging the stringent legal 
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requirements. This practice, he notes, has its origins in the Khārijites.677 But Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb also 
invokes the principle of hujja in his works.678 He equally insists in the Rasā‘il that he does not pronounce 
takfīr until the hujja has been presented. Yet upon closer inspection, it is clear that the idea of hujja 
means something very different for Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb. He writes:  
The clear proof of God is the Qur’an and whomever the Qur’an reaches then the hujja has reached 
him…Most of the unbelievers and the hypocrites did not understand the hujja of God after it was 
presented to them, as God said: ‘Do you think they hear and reason?’ (Q 25:44) 679 
For Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, the hujja is the Qur’an itself and whoever the Qur’an reaches becomes legally 
accountable to avoid shirk. Understanding is no prerequisite. But it is difficult to imagine that anyone 
in eighteenth century Arabia had not encountered the Qur’an in some form, meaning Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb likely views his entire Arabian milieu as liable for takfir.680 Both brothers engage the principle 
of hujja, then, but do so for opposite ends. Sulaymān invokes the hujja to excuse the shirk of his 
community and to protect from takfīr. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb uses the hujja, by contrast, to condemn any 
Muslim engaged in shirk. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s use of the hujja seems an effective takfīr bi ‘umūm in 
which there is no room for ignorance, with all presumed to be accountable to avoid shirk.681 
 
In a basic sense, this reads as a legal debate between two brothers over the specific legal requirements 
for takfīr. Sulaymān accuses his brother of too readily excommunicating Muslims. But there is a deeper 
way of reading this debate. It would seem this legal debate is itself rooted in deeper doctrinal differences 
over what it means to be Muslim. Sulaymān insists upon the legal restrictions of takfir precisely because 
he assigns more weight and value to the verbal profession of the faith. For Sulaymān, it is possible to 
remain a Muslim while committing outward acts of shirk - the shahāda ensures this legal status and 
protection. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s broad takfir, by contrast, reflects his conviction that outward acts are 
key criterion of faith, that a Muslim cannot, by definition, perform any act of shirk. This fixation on 
what people do outwardly underpins his readiness to apply takfir to those claiming to be Muslim. 
Sulaymān’s criticism of takfīr and allusions to the Khārijites are common to critics. The idea that Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb had misread the works of Ibn Taymiyya is also a recurring theme.682 Yet Sulaymān’s 
treatise is important for many reasons, including its impact. Ibn Ghannām writes that Sulaymān turned 
the town of Ḥuraymila against his brother. He describes the town as having apostatized (irtaddū) and 
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notes that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb ordered the killing of anyone caught with the epistle.683 Perhaps due to 
its influence, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb wrote a refutation of his brother.684 Alluding to Sulaymān as an 
“atheist” (mulḥid), he affirms his stress on takfīr in cases of shirk and also his reading of Ibn Taymiyya: 
 
Some atheists attribute to the Shaykh (Ibn Taymiyya) that these are lesser shirk...And yet you – may God 
have mercy on you – will find in his words, from the first to the last, in the first and second chapters, 
clearly stated, without need of allegorical interpretation (ta‘wīl)… that du‘a’ to the dead, and vowing in 
their name that they may intercede with God, is all greater shirk that God sent the Prophet to prevent. 
And he declared as an unbeliever who did not repent from it and he fought them. 685  
 
The allusion to Sulaymān is clear. But Sulaymān’s treatise is also significant for its difference with al-
Ḥuḍārī and what this reveals of the diversity of opposition to Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, all of which is seen 
to center on rival notions of shirk. Al-Ḥuḍārī offers a rival conception of the nature of greater shirk and 
defends the cult of saints. In contrast, Sulaymān shares much of his brother’s critique but challenges 
the idea that acts of shirk must lead to takfīr. Though different critics, the principle of ‘secondary takfīr’ 
means Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb would see little difference between them. Both al-Ḥuḍārī and Sulaymān 




The conflict between Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and his critics was eventually settled by the force of arms. 
The Wahhābī movement, with the forces of Muḥammad ibn Su’ūd, conquered most of the Arabian 
Peninsula and extended into the Hijāz and southern Iraq shortly after Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb’s death in 
1792.686 It is worth noting, however, that Sulaymān seems to have written one of the last refutations 
that Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb faced. Bunzel surveys the breadth and chronology of the refutational sources 
and notes a sharp decline after Sulaymān in 1753.687 The reason, he suggests, is that critics came to 
conclude that refuting Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb was futile.688 As early as the late 1740’s we see a Ḥanbalī 
critic, Ibn ‘Afāliq, imply this in a letter to a supporter of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb: “You react to every piece 
of writing that comes your way by rejecting it and cursing it and ridiculing its author, even before it is 
opened and looked at.”689 A later critic, ‘Abdullāh ibn Dawūd al-Zubayrī writes how most opponents 
realized the futility of attempts to dissuade Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and thus waited for force of arms to kill 
off the movement: 
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Most of the scholars of the lands wrote refutations of him…then, when the scholars saw that he was not 
responding to the truth…that advising him was unsuccessful, but rather his terrible acts were only 
multiplying, they stopped refuting him, and they said; ‘this man is misled, and will only recant when he 
is overcome by force; nothing will deter him but the sword of the Sultan.690 
 
This is indeed what happened as the first Wahhābī state was crushed by Egyptian forces, upon Ottoman 
request, in the early nineteenth century.691 But critics were perhaps more effective than they realized. A 
close reading of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb reveals a clear sensitivity to their claims. He responds to the charge 
that he represents the Khārijites, for example, or ignores the principle of the hujja. He refutes his brother 
and calls for the execution of anyone possessing Sulaymān’s treatise. A common complaint in the 
Rasā’il, seen earlier, is that critics spread false information about the movement.692 None of this 
suggests indifference. It is perhaps only on this basis, moreover, that we understand some of the striking 
passages in the Rasā’il where Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb denies some of the key aspects of his thought. On 
occasion, he distances himself from any association with takfīr: 
 
God knows that people invent things about me that I have never said…(for example) that I pronounce 
takfir over those who seek intercession by saints, that I pronounce takfir over al-Busīrī…or, that I say 
that, if I were able to destroy the dome above the Prophet’s mosque, then I would certainly do that…and 
that I prohibit visiting the grave of the Prophet and that I reject visiting the graves of parents, and others, 
and that I pronounce takfir over those who vow in the name of other than God, and over Ibn Al-Farīd or 
Ibn ‘Arabī… and my response to all of this is that I say ‘Praise be to God! This is great slander!’ 693 
 
But much of this is not slander at all. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb here disowns many of the ideas that are found, 
and defended, elsewhere in his works. It is hard to explain this passage. But it could be the case that Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb was at times forced, in response to the claims of critics and the opposition to his 
movement, to conceal the true nature of his thought, disguising his most controversial positions. Though 
Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb was not dissuaded by the arguments of critics, as they might wish, he was 
sufficiently concerned and responsive to the extent of denying some of his own key teachings.  
Critics dismissed Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb as a representative of the Khārijites, but this overlooks how many 
of his ideas were not innovative. The criticism of the cult of saints, distinction of ulūhiyya and 
rubūbiyya, and even the principle of secondary takfīr all have roots in Islamic tradition. Even major 
refutations, like Sulaymān’s, point to areas of common ground. If there is a distinctive element to Ibn 
‘Abdul Wahhāb, then, underlying the controversy and polemics surrounding his thought, it is his focus 
on external, visual dimensions of faith. He conceives of shirk almost exclusively in terms of its outward 
manifestations. His theology of action means that professing the shahāda counts for little if this is joined 
with any outward display of shirk. As seen earlier, he acknowledges this emphasis on externals: 
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I say that Islam is not established is not established in people until they know the meaning of ‘no god but 
God’…Yet I also say that only God knows our inner secret state …This is all true and I openly say it.694 
 
This is also the crux of the divide with his brother. In essence, Sulaymān insists one must look beyond 
the shirk that Muslims perform outwardly. For Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb this is not possible - outward actions 
were the very measure of faith. But it could of course be asked where outward displays of shirk come 
from if not a deeper, prior form of ‘association’ with God residing in the head and heart of the believer? 
On this, Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb is silent. He does not engage the inner dimensions of faith. There is nothing 
in his works akin to a theology of love (maḥabba) to explain the deeper causes or nature of shirk. Nor 
does he ever speak of the need to cleanse the heart of attachments to other than God. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb 
is consumed by what people do outwardly. One might argue this is a response to the state of affairs as 
he sees it. The shirk of his time was so brazen, perhaps, that a focus on externals had to take priority. 
We sense this in the following passage, as Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb complains that the shirk of his age was 
no less manifest than that during the time of the Prophet; 
 
If you think that those among you appear to be following the religion of the Prophet…and have 
abandoned shirk in their words and speech, and what remains is only hidden…and that they have killed 
their false gods and destroyed their places worshipped in place of God, then tell me. And if you think 
that the shirk the Prophet fought was greater than this, tell me. And if you think that a person if he appears 
to be Muslim cannot be excommunicated, even if he worships idols, then tell me… 695 
 
A society free of shirk, then, is conceived as a society free of its outward manifestations, the saints, 
shrines, trees and other ‘idols’ seen to stand between the believer and God. The internal dimensions of 
faith and shirk, the notion of sincere belief or shirk residing in the head or heart of the individual, is not 
his concern. Everything hinges on external, visual acts. Herein lies the difference, for Ibn ‘Abdul 
Wahhāb, between Muslim and mushrik.  Herein is what makes the shirk of eighteenth-century Arabia 
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Chapter V: Shirk, reason and colonial modernity: Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) 
 
Before the end of the sixteenth century, the West, thanks to its conquest of the Ocean, had succeeded in 
throwing a lasso round Islam’s neck; but it was not until the nineteenth century that the West ventured 
to pull the rope tight.696 
Like Ibn Taymiya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad ‘Abduh responded to perceived threats to Islam 
from social and political change. The difference lay in Shaykh ‘Abduh’s attempt, like the Mu‘tazila, to 
articulate a view of Islam at home in a world of change and non-Muslim intellectual challenges…‘Abduh 
faced challenges that differed…The late nineteenth century brought to Islam the challenges of modernity 
and the politically and economically powerful “West”. 697 
 
The British historian Sir Arnold Toynbee (d. 1975) writes that in the modern encounter between Islam 
and the West, the former “is once more facing the West with her back against the wall.”698 Others 
describe the Islamic world as “conscripted” onto a European-led project of modernity.699 The French 
invasion of Egypt by Napoleon’s forces in 1798 is said to have first opened Arab eyes to the new 
strength of Europe.700 The French invasion heralded the European colonisation of Islamic lands over 
the course of the next century. Egypt saw British military intervention in 1882 to secure control of the 
Suez Canal. The new reality of colonialism pervades the writings of Muslim thinkers of the period. 
Describing the works of the prominent Muslim reformer Rashīd Riḍā’ (d.1935), Simon Wood writes; 
Whereas European and other Christians grappled with the relationship between tradition and modernity, 
but not in response to the humiliation and trauma of subjugation by a religious ‘other’, Rida’s writings 
reflect an overwhelming awareness of Muslim weakness relative to non-Muslim strength. 701 
European colonialism was not just a political and military challenge for the Muslim world. It was also 
intellectual. Closely tied to the colonial project were new and confident forms of knowledge and 
epistemology centred around the latest findings and theories of scientific rationalism, logical positivism, 
Darwinian evolution and, above all, a liberal secular worldview that differentiated religion from other 
spheres of public life.702 On the latter, Jurgen Haberman describes the ways in which various fields of 
knowledge moved apart from the authority and purview of religion in eighteenth century Europe: 
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By the end of the eighteenth century, science, morality, and art were even institutionally differentiated 
as realms of activity in which questions of truth, of justice, and of taste were autonomously elaborated, 
that is, each under its own specific aspect of validity. 703 
This was a period of great social change in the Arab world. New means of travel and communication, 
like the steam engine and telegraph, led to increased mobilisation of trade, people and ideas between 
Europe and the Arab world. The rise of the printing press in nineteenth century Egypt, introduced by 
Napoleon in 1798, had a profound impact upon the public access and contribution to knowledge. Print 
technology spawned greater rates of literacy, wider access to classical texts and the emergence of a new 
class of educated Muslims that were able to contest scholars’ monopoly on religious discourse and thus 
the basis of their authority. As Skovgaard-Petersen writes: 
Although the introduction of printing has attracted little interest among scholars of Islam, the period 
1850-1900 is hardly understandable without due consideration of how thoroughgoing were the changes 
in Egypt’s cultural production. 704 
The new technology of print also led to a mass translation movement, as western works of science, law 
and political theory were translated into Arabic.705 These were just some of the changes and challenges 
of what is called ‘modernity’ from the non-European, Muslim perspective. The reality of colonialism 
affected not just the political sphere but was felt no less deeply in the intellectual challenges and social 
changes that were facing Arab and Muslim societies.  
There remains no single Muslim response to colonial modernity. One of the main trends can be called 
the ‘modernist’ response. This is defined as an intellectual trend that emerged in response to the decline 
of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of European economic, political and military power in the late 
nineteenth century. This trend sought to demonstrate that what it considered ‘true’ Islam, that contained 
in the teachings of the Qur’an and sunna, was compatible with and even mandated the modern forms 
of knowledge and progress emerging from Europe. It sought to reform Islam and the Muslim 
community through a complex and selective engagement with both European thought and Islamic 
tradition. The origins of this trend are found in the late eighteenth century in the works of Khayr al-Dīn 
al-Tūnisī (d. 1890) and Rifā’a al-Taḥtāwī (d. 1873), both of whom travelled to Europe to study its social, 
political and educational systems up close and argued for its introduction in the Arab world on their 
return. In this formative period, however, European strength was perceived as largely an opportunity 
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for Arab growth.706 The period of 1877-82 changed this, giving what Hisham Shirabi terms a “menacing 
aspect” to the rise of Europe.707 Russia attacked the Ottoman Empire in 1877. Tunisia was occupied by 
French forces four years later. Britain, in turn, occupied Egypt in 1882.  
This chapter explores the life and work of the Egyptian reformer Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), perhaps 
the most influential and famous figure associated with the modernist school.708 ‘Abduh’s biography is 
well covered in scholarship.709 Born in 1849, ‘Abduh was a student at al-Azhar university when he 
became a disciple of the pan-Islamic revivalist, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d. 1897). After graduating 
from al-Azhar ‘Abduh became a teacher, newspaper editor and critic of European influence in Egypt. 
Involved in the failed ‘Urābī revolt of 1882, a nationalist uprising against the monarchy, ‘Abduh was 
imprisoned and later sentenced to exile. Utilising the power of print, in 1884 he moved to Paris to start 
a pan-Islamic journal with al-Afghānī that was critical of British imperialism, called ‘The Strongest 
Bond’ (al-‘urwa al-wuthqā). Returning to Egypt in 1886, ‘Abduh separated from al-Afghānī, allied 
with the British Lord Cromer (d. 1917) and focused on educational, not political reform. In 1899 he 
became the Chief Muftī of Egypt, its highest legal authority. Throughout this period ‘Abduh travelled 
frequently to Europe to discuss and spread his ideas with a range of interlocutors.710 He wrote influential 
works, including an unfinished commentary of the Qur’an, and a modernist theological treatise, the 
Risālat al-Tawḥīd. ‘Abduh also established a journal with his student, Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), that 
articulated his ideas of reform, al-Manār (The Lighthouse). He is remembered as a major voice of 
Islamic reform in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: 
There is little doubt that anyone writing about Egypt as it emerged from the nineteenth century and 
plunged its way into the twentieth could imagine not acknowledging the enormous contribution of 
Muhammad Abduh to modern Islamic thought. 711 
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‘Abduh’s work has been elaborately discussed, embraced, repudiated, and adapted throughout the 
twentieth century by a wide range of secular and Islamic intellectuals that span the Arabic world and 
beyond. In this sense, ‘Abduh’s ideas form one of the intellectual cornerstones of modern Arabic 
thought. 712 
For many, the importance of ‘Abduh for modern Islamic thought is clear. Charles C. Adams cites 
biographers who call ‘Abduh “one of the founders of modern Islam” and “one of the creators of modern 
Egypt.”713 Reflecting both the scope of his influence and the new media of print communication, 
‘Abduh was solicited for religious rulings from Muslims from as far as South Africa.714 Others trace 
‘Abduh’s influence upon later generations of reformers within and beyond the Middle East, extending 
to Indonesia and China.715 Yet ‘Abduh’s importance is also contested. Weismann notes that ‘Abduh 
was only one of many Muslim reformers in his time and suggests that his influence has been exaggerated 
by scholars.716 Others point to his perceived failure to enact any serious political or intellectual reform 
in Egypt or elsewhere.717 ‘Abduh’s influence is debated, then, but he remains significant as a 
representative of the period in which he lived. In his career as a theologian, journalist, editor, political 
activist and traveller to Europe, perhaps no figure better reflects the changes and challenges of the age.  
‘Abduh and the roots of Islamic modernism 
 
The second half of the nineteenth century has been called “the period of the first modern 
globalisation.”718 With closer ties between Europe and the rest of the world, driven by the new means 
of travel and communication, this is described as a time of heightened intellectual exchange between 
Europe and the Arab world. Jonathan Buessow writes that ‘Abduh’s life neatly captures this period: 
Compared to earlier examples, Muhammad ‘Abduh’s life bears witness to the increased mobility of 
people, goods and ideas during the late nineteenth century. His travels led him to a good part of the 
Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa and Europe…In all these places, he frequented cosmopolitan circles 
of political emigres, anti-colonial activists and religious enthusiasts. 719 
This means that we have two ways of reading ‘Abduh’s life and thought. On the one hand, ‘Abduh 
deeply engages with European thought. His writings reveal a clear readiness to draw on Europe so as 
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to initiate reform in Egypt. Indeed ‘Abduh never hides his admiration for Europe. He speaks of 
travelling to Europe precisely to find knowledge and inspiration for domestic reform: 
I never once went to Europe that there was not renewed within me hope of the change of the present state 
of Muslims to something better…whenever I returned to Europe and remained there a month or two, 
these hopes came back to me, and the attainment of that which I had been accounting impossible seemed 
easy to me. 720 
‘Abduh learnt French to gain access to Western sources.721 As a traveller to Europe he personally visited 
museums, universities, the British Houses of Parliament and even met the English philosopher Herbert 
Spencer, while corresponding with other figures such as Leo Tolstoy.722 In these letters Abduh reveals 
both his enthusiasm for Tolstoy’s ideas, but, equally, the intellectual connections that were now possible 
for European and Arab thinkers in a modern age of print and communication. ‘Abduh writes to Tolstoy: 
Although I have not had the pleasure of being personally acquainted with you…the light of your thoughts 
has shone upon us…making a bond of friendship between the minds of the intelligent here (in Egypt) 
and your mind. 723 
‘Abduh cites the works of Voltaire, Aquinas, Tertullian, John Draper, Walter Scott and other thinkers.724 
His personal library is said to have held Arabic and French editions of Comte, Descartes and Kant.725 
More deeply, throughout his works ‘Abduh attempts to reconcile Islamic teachings with many of the 
new ideas and processes that were inspired by the European Enlightenment. In an age of scientific 
rationalism coming from the West, for example, ‘Abduh exalts Islam as a preeminent religion of reason 
and insists there is no contradiction between religion and science, reading the existence of microbes and 
bacteria into the Qur’anic references to jinn: 
The scholars have said that the jinn are living bodies which cannot be seen. Al-Manār has said more 
than once that it is permissible to say that the minute living bodies which today have been made known 
by the microscope and are called ‘microbes’ may, possibly, be a species of the jinn…However, we 
Muslims are fortunately under no necessity of disputing with science…The Qur’an is too elevated in 
character to be in opposition to science. 726 
He does the same for the survival of the fittest (baqā al-amthal) theory and natural selection (al-intikhāb 
al-ṭabī‘ī).727 ‘Abduh affirms the existence of angels on the basis of modern science, which, he says, 
proves the existence of immaterial beings.728 It could be argued that ‘Abduh’s call for legal reform and 
his critique of the custom of deferring to established legal rulings, known as taqlīd, is shaped to some 
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extent by the negative Enlightenment valuation of tradition.729 Drawing on popular European themes of 
moral, social and intellectual progress, ‘Abduh takes a progressive reading of history and argues that 
his own generation can be equal, even superior, to earlier generations in terms of acquiring knowledge: 
Some of those frozen, stagnant enemies of the Qur’an have come to say; ‘indeed, earlier times were better 
than the later, and the end of time is about to arrive, and man has fallen into corruption…so there is now 
no benefit to strive and work, we must only wait (for final judgement)…(so we say) We seek refuge in 
God from this!730 
Islam insists that mere precedence in time is not a sign of knowledge, nor of superior intelligence. The 
preceding generations and the later generations are equal in terms of critical acumen and natural ability. 
Yet, the later generations have knowledge of past circumstances, and a capacity to reflect upon them, 
and to profit by their effects …that their fathers and forefathers who preceded them did not have. 731 
In this way ‘Abduh overturns popular notions of an inevitable decline and corruption of the times (fasād 
al-zaman), as later generations of Muslims proceed further from the age of the Prophet.732 He praises 
the empirical method (al-manhaj al-tajribī) of learning pioneered by Enlightenment figures such as 
Francis Bacon.733 ‘Abduh views this as a main source of European progress and argues that its origins 
are in the intellectual contact with Arab Muslims in the Crusades.734 ‘Abduh writes how one European 
scholar, unnamed but identified as the historian Francois Guizot, attributed this change in medieval 
Europe to the influence of Islam.735 The roots of Europe’s growth, then, are read back into Muslim 
sources. In light of the foregoing, it is perhaps not surprising that critics perceived in ‘Abduh’s works 
not an attempt to reform Islam, but to Europeanise it. ‘Abduh travelled to Europe, critics wrote in the 
Egyptian press, but never performed the pilgrimage to Mecca.736 Indira Falk Gesink has covered this 
opposition to ‘Abduh in detail.737 
This is not an exhaustive account of all the ways in which ‘Abduh engages European thought or attempts 
to reconcile its ideas with Islamic teachings. If suffices to offer a brief overview. But on the other hand, 
one cannot reduce ‘Abduh to these European influences alone. It is important to stress the degree of 
continuity in ‘Abduh and his deep engagement with the Islamic tradition. Firstly, ‘Abduh justifies and 
conceives of his modernist project as nothing but a return to the true teachings of the Qur’an and the 
beliefs and practices of the earliest generation of Muslims, the salaf. ‘Abduh writes: 
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I spoke on behalf of two causes. The first of these was to liberate the mind (taḥrīr al-‘aql) from the 
constraints of blind following in matters of law (taqlīd) and return to the understanding of faith of our 
righteous forefathers (salafuna al-ṣāliḥ), before division arose, and also to return to learn our religion 
from its earliest sources (the Qur’an and sunna). 738 
‘Abduh’s student Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) echoes his mentor and speaks of the need to;  
Return the religion to its original simplicity – when even the shepherd could understand the religion as 
it was restricted to only the guidance of the Book (Qur’an), the sunna and the practice of the salaf – and 
also remove all later innovations to the religion by those who followed; this included extremism in 
religion, adding many innovations while making them very difficult to understand. 739 
The need to return to the original simplicity (sadhāja) of the Qur’an and sunna against later innovation 
(bid‘a) is a central theme in ‘Abduh.740 For his reason he has been called a salafī in scholarship, the 
same label applied to figures like Ibn Taymiyya and the Muḥammad ibn ‘Abduh Wahhāb.741 Though 
contested, others specify ‘Abduh as a “modernist salafī” or “enlightened salafī”.742 ‘Abduh’s emphasis 
on the place of reason (al-‘aql) in matters of faith, moreover, need not be seen as inspired by the 
rationalist discourses of Europe. It has roots internal to the Islamic tradition, as seen in the fact ‘Abduh 
was accused of representing the Mu‘tazilī school of theology in his time.743 We find traditions of 
rationality in Islamic intellectual history in the fields of speculative theology (kalām) and philosophy, 
and ‘Abduh speaks of studying these subjects in private classes with al-Afghānī soon after his arrival 
in Cairo.744 While ‘Abduh prioritises a return to the scriptural sources, his works reveal a far more 
complex relation to classical thinkers and texts. ‘Abduh criticises his fellow scholars, for example, for 
ignoring the works of the medieval Hanafi jurist al-Zaylā’ī and attempts to reintroduce the works of Ibn 
Khaldūn (d. 1404) to the curriculum at al-Azhar.745 An early chapter of the Risālat al-Tawḥīd, on logic, 
draws heavily on the creed of al-Sanūsī (d. 1490).746 Scholars note the deep influence of al-Ghazālī (d. 
1111) and al-Shātibī (d. 1388) for ‘Abduh’s legal thought.747 Riḍā tells us that ‘Abduh considered al-
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Shātibī’s al-Muwāfaqāt the best work of Muslim legal theory.748 While ‘Abduh accepts many of 
Europe’s modernising features, moreover, he rejects the prescription of liberal secularism and the 
exclusion of religion from the public sphere. Defending the public role of Islam, he writes that 
secularism led to growth in Europe but it did not account for Muslims’ very different historical 
experience;  
Muslims have never encountered at any stage in their long history something like the Papacy in Europe, 
nor were they ever exposed to a Pope-like figure who could and did exert power to remove Kings and 
banish princes, extract taxes and decree Divine laws, all on behalf of the Christian communities.749 
The point is not to explore this in detail. It is to note, briefly, that ‘Abduh is equally rooted in the Islamic 
intellectual tradition, engaging trends, thinkers and arguments from the classical heritage that serve his 
reformist project. 
We therefore have two ways of reading ‘Abduh. He engages both European thought and different trends 
from Islamic tradition. This seems to have led to a historiographical tension in scholarship, with ‘Abduh 
described by a range of varying epithets, from modernist and Mu‘tazilī to salafī.750 A common theme 
in some works, well represented but not exclusive to Albert Hourani, is to depict ‘Abduh’s modernism 
as representing a ‘break’ from the classical Islamic tradition. According to this narrative ‘Abduh departs 
from the tradition to make Islam amenable to the modern age. In engaging European thought, Hourani 
writes: 
…It was, of course, easy in this way to distort if not destroy the precise meaning of Islamic concepts, 
that which distinguishes Islam from other religions…It was perhaps this of which his conservative critics 
were uneasily aware. There was bound to be something arbitrary in the selection and the approximation. 
Once the traditional interpretation of Islam was abandoned….it was difficult if not impossible to say 
what was in accordance with Islam and what was not. 751 
This is an overly reductive or narrow impression of ‘Abduh’s thought, emphasising his modernism and 
overlooking his engagement with Islamic tradition. More deeply, it reveals an essentialised or static 
understanding of Islamic ‘tradition’, from which ‘Abduh’s modernism is seen as a departure. Against 
this, Samira Haj argues that Islamic tradition is not something static, fixed and unchanging, but is rather 
flexible and dynamic. Islam, she writes, is a ‘discursive tradition’ in which successive generations of 
thinkers selectively draw on different thinkers, arguments and trends from the Islamic tradition in light 
of their contemporary relevance. Haj writes:  
Tradition is not simply the recapitulation of previous beliefs and practices, rather, each successive 
generation confronts its particular problems via an engagement with a set of ongoing arguments. In 
constructing their arguments, Muhammad ‘Abduh…had to argue from within the tradition. This does not 
mean…(he was) mimicking the past…(Rather he was) attempting to make persuasive arguments for the 
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present by referring to a past and to an authoritative corpus…Islamic tradition is not fixed but is 
constantly changing..752 
In this way, Haj offers a nuanced reading of how ‘Abduh’s engagement with both European and Islamic 
sources is not a betrayal of Islamic tradition. It is, rather, constitutive of the inherent dynamism of that 
tradition.753 In the same vein, depictions of ‘Abduh as either Mu‘tazilī or salafī raise issues of definition 
and meaning that risk reducing him to a singular tradition, overlooking the complex ways that he draws 
on European and Islamic thought. If this chapter describes ‘Abduh as a modernist, it is not in the sense 
of Hourani. This term is chosen to convey ‘Abduh’s readiness to draw on European thought, but does 
not presume a ‘break’ with the classical tradition as such. Nor is ‘Abduh unique in attempting to fuse 
Islamic tradition with the challenges of colonial modernity, as the group of Ottoman reformers, centred 
around the figure of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī (d.1914), attest.754 This chapter now turns to explore some 
of the key features of ‘Abduh’s theology. 
A theology of reason (‘aql) and worldly progress  
 
Examining ‘Abduh’s theology is a challenge. The modern researcher of ‘Abduh faces several obstacles. 
First, ‘Abduh’s writing style is highly scholastic, dense and impenetrable. His ideas are seldom 
presented in a clear, systematic fashion, and he avoids discussing his most important and consequential 
ideas in any depth, explaining this as a desire to preserve unity and avoid division among Muslims.755 
Second, there are perennial questions over the textual basis for studying ‘Abduh’s theology. We find 
intensive debates over the authorship of two treatises published under ‘Abduh’s name: the Risālat al-
Wāridāt fī sirr al-tajalliyāt and al-Ta‘līqāt ‘alā sharḥ al-Dawānī li-l-‘aqā’id al-‘aḍudiyya.756 The 
former in particular is a theosophical treatise that expounds a cosmology rooted in the concept of the 
unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd). It would seem that these works cannot be attributed to ‘Abduh, 
however, and were delivered as lectures by his mentor, al-Afghānī, only copied and edited by ‘Abduh.757 
There is also the challenge of separating ‘Abduh from his student, Rashīd Riḍā. Mohammad Haddad 
has revealed the editorial strategies by which Riḍā shaped ‘Abduh’s corpus and legacy after his death. 
In several studies, Haddad points to the ways that Riḍā selected, edited and published ‘Abduh’s works, 
adding footnotes and introductions, expanding some texts while neglecting others and writing a 
 
752 Haj, Reconfiguring, 6-7.  
753 Ibid., 1-30, 70-71, 99-107, 188-203.  
754 For more on this group of Ottomon salafī reformers, see Commins, Islamic Reform, 49-104. Iztchak Weismann, A Taste of 
Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus (Leiden: Brill, 1997); idem., “Geneologies of 
Fundamentalism: Salafi Discourse in 19th century Baghdad’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36 (2009); 69-82; 
idem., “Between Sufi reformism and Modernist rationalism – a reappraisal of the origins of the salafiyya from the Damascene 
angle’, Die Welt des Islams (2001); 206-37. Mun‘im Sirry, ‘Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī and the Salafi Approach to Sufism’, Die 
Welt des Islams 51 (2011): 75-108. For a study of the overlaps between this Otttoman group of reformers and ‘Abduh, J. H. 
Escovitz. ‘“He was the Muhammad ‘Abduh of Syria”; a study of Ṭāhir al-Jazā’irī and his influence’, International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 18 (1986); 293-310.  
755 ‘Abduh. Al-A‘māl al-Kāmila, 3/353. 
756 For an overview of this debate, see Wielandt. ‘Main Trends’, 716-19.  




biography of his teacher, to present an image of ‘Abduh that matched his own intellectual interests.758  
Following the findings of Haddad, Rotraud Wielandt writes; “henceforth information provided by Riḍā 
concerning ‘Abduh’s theology cannot be relied on any more.”759 For this reason, the following study of  
‘Abduh is based on the edited collection of Muḥammad ‘Amāra, largely avoiding the al-Manār journal, 
and focusing on ‘Abduh’s most famous theological work, the Risālat al-Tawḥīd. 
Two key features of ‘Abduh’s theology are central to this chapter. The first is his stress on the primacy 
of reason (al-‘aql) in faith. This has received considerable attention in scholarship.760 Throughout his 
writings ‘Abduh repeatedly exalts Islam as the preeminent religion of reason, insisting that the Qur’an 
encourages the use of reason to think about revelation and the laws and principles that govern the 
universe. The following passages neatly capture the spirit of ‘Abduh’s works. 
In its call to believe in the existence of God, Islam depends only on arousing human reason (al-‘aql), and 
directing it to consider the universe and to use correct analogy from this, returning to the order and 
arrangement of the universe, its causes and effects, in order to reach a view that the world has one 
necessarily existent,  all-knowing, wise and omnipotent maker (ṣāna‘a).761  
The Qur’an directs us, with the power of reason and intellectual enquiry, to the signs of the universe and, 
as much as possible, into its particulars, to come to certainty with respect to things in which it guides. 762 
Reason alone is able to discern many truths on its own, including the existence and some attributes of 
God. Revelation, then, comes to confirm (tahtbīt) the findings of reason.763 It also clarifies aspects, like 
the ritual acts of worship, that lie beyond the purview of reason.764 If reason did not precede revelation 
in discerning the existence of God, ‘Abduh writes, there would be no basis to accept the authority of 
revelation at all.765 ‘Abduh also makes a rational case for the proof of prophecy based on the 
inimitability of the Qur’an.766 Invoking the universal rule (al-qānūn al-kullī) of al-Rāzī (d. 1209), he 
asserts the precedence of reason over the literal meaning of scripture in cases of conflict between the 
two: 
There is general agreement among Muslims that in case of any conflict between reason and the evident 
reading of revelation (naql), the conclusions arrived at by reason are given preference, leaving two 
options for the reading of revelation. The first is to delegate (tafwīd) the meaning of the text to God. The 
second is to re-interpret the text rationally, in line with the well-known rules of language. 767  
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 ‘Abduh argues that reason is no less a divine gift than revelation itself. Man is a “rational being” (kawn 
‘aqlī), he writes, with reason part of his natural, God-given constitution (fiṭra).768 It is on this basis that 
‘Abduh sees no conflict between reason, religion and science. With reason and revelation both creations 
of God, Islam cannot oppose the major product of human reason - the findings of modern science. 
God has sent down two books: one created, which is nature. And one revealed, which is the Qur’an. The 
latter leads us to investigate the former by means of the intelligence which was given to us. He who 
obeys will become blesses; he who turns away, goes toward destruction.769  
This explains ‘Abduh’s readiness to read modern scientific findings into the Qur’an. He thus insists that 
Islam is unique among religions in grounding belief solely on the basis of rational proof (dalīl ‘aqlī).770 
Much of this celebration of reason, however, takes only the form of general admonitions or principles. 
There is little specific in ‘Abduh beyond a general call to return to the Qur’an and to engage the text 
rationally. Elsewhere, his trust in reason is limited. On a range of dogmatic issues, he refuses to discuss 
in detail how reason and revelation relate to each other and seems acutely aware of the limits of reason. 
Reason affirms the existence and attributes of God, for example, but ‘Abduh offers the qualification: 
Speculation about the essence of the Creator… is an attempt to probe that which is forbidden to 
reason…the pursuit of His essence is beyond the grasp of human faculties. It is foolish and dangerous, 
foolish because it is a search for what is unattainable, dangerous because it is a strike against faith in that 
it attempts to define what cannot be defined... As for His attributes… it is sufficient to know God has 
these attributes. Anything beyond this, God has concealed and it is not possible for reason to attain it. 771 
Reason is not just limited, then, but its overuse is an act against the faith. ‘Abduh also forecloses rational 
enquiry into the nature of the soul and the question of free-will versus divine predestination.772 Once 
the truth of prophecy is proven on rational grounds, moreover, he writes that one must accept all the 
prophets’ message, even if it is not understood.773 ‘Abduh stresses the place of reason and its harmony 
with revelation, then, but also insists on its limits and refuses to engage the complexities or implications 
of this argument. Roxanne Euben suggests that ‘Abduh did not wish to confuse his readers on issues 
they may not understand.774 Others write that ‘Abduh avoids fully discussing his theology of reason due 
to the desire, often stated in his works, to avoid complex and controversial issues that would only divide 
Muslims.775 But there is a tension in ‘Abduh, perhaps, between his emphasis on Muslim unity, on the 
one hand, and his insistence elsewhere that all Muslims must exercise their reason to independently 
engage the Qur’an to reach their own conclusions: 
In its general call to understand, comprehend and reach certainty regarding the contents of the Qur’an, 
Islam commanded that every believer take knowledge from God’s book and His law. It finds all men 
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equally able to do this – so long as they reach the requisite level of understanding. This is easy to attain 
for the great majority of Muslims. It is not limited to a particular class, or a particular time. 776 
This reveals a high trust in the rational capacity of believers. But calling for individual engagement with 
the Qur’an risks, perhaps, precisely the kind of intra-Muslim division that ‘Abduh hopes to avoid.777 
‘Abduh is silent on this and it is not clear if he explains, or even recognises, this tension.  
‘Abduh’s support for reason in religion is only vague and general, then, eschewing complex areas while 
raising questions that are left unaddressed. It could be argued this is because ‘Abduh’s theology is itself 
rooted in entirely practical, pragmatic concerns. It has a specific, reformist function. In a specific sense, 
‘Abduh emphasises the use of reason in religion to critique the legal practice of taqlīd, the custom of 
deferring to established legal rulings. For ‘Abduh, this means the acceptance of inherited beliefs without 
the full exercise of reason. He condemns taqlīd as contrary to the injunctions of the Qur’an and 
considers it a major source of Muslim stagnancy and decline:  
Islam will not tolerate taqlīd, against which it campaigns relentlessly to break its power of men’s minds 
and to eradicate its deep-seated influence…Islam alerts and arises the power of reason in man, out of a 
long sleep. Islam declares that man was not created to be led by a halter. He was endowed with 
intelligence to take knowledge and be guided by science and by the signs of the universe. 778 
‘Abduh’s criticism of taqlīd, his attempts at legal reform and his modernist legal theory have been 
addressed in detail in scholarship.779 In a more general sense, ‘Abduh’s emphasis on the role of reason 
in Islam serves his reformist project by empowering Muslims without splitting this from the realm of 
faith. For ‘Abduh, it means that Muslims can be open to new forms of knowledge, seek worldly progress 
and remain firmly rooted and faithful in their religion. Wael Hallaq alludes to this in the following 
summary;  
The elevation of reason to a fairly independent position, has, to be sure, a pragmatic function in ‘Abduh’s 
theory. It allows the individual to determine for himself what is good and what is bad behaviour, and at 
the same time, it enables this rational capacity to make such distinctions in an organic relationship with 
the effects of revelation.780 
If ‘Abduh refuses to explore the complexities of the relation of reason and revelation, then, it is because 
this does not serve his reformist project. ‘Abduh’s use of reason in faith does not aim to be systematic. 
It is driven by the need to lay out a basis for modern Muslim reform. Complex theological questions 
that emerge from this and distract from these aims are either dismissed or left unaddressed. 
This leads to the second feature of ‘Abduh’s theology. It is axiomatic for ‘Abduh that Islam, properly 
understood, leads to worldly progress. The sociologist of religion Abdulkader Tayob describes ‘Abduh 
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as an example of a “functionalist” approach to religion in the modern period whereby Islam is defined 
above all by its social and political ends.781 Tayob writes that, for ‘Abduh, the real of meaning of Islam 
as a rational religion is that Islam is no impediment to material progress. Islam serves as a basis for a 
progressive and modern Muslim society. Tayob notes the sharp difference on this point between ‘Abduh 
and classical writers: 
The goals of religion in pre-modern discussions always reverted to its value for individual fulfilment and 
salvation ultimately in another world. The political was merely a means to higher goals that lay elsewhere 
in time and space. Under a modern new theology, however, (like ‘Abduh’s) one could not even imagine 
that religion might not always be beneficial in society…that religious values might not always be 
conducive to social and political progress was unthinkable…Islam was inextricably tied to its worldly 
success and value….the truth of Islam had to be continually proved in its success in the world here and 
now, or at least in the achievements of Muslims in the past. 782 
This is a neat characterisation of ‘Abduh. Islam as a religion of reason, then, is closely linked to socio-
political progress and reform. This is clear in his insistence on the harmony between religion and 
science. It is also seen in ‘Abduh’s stress that Islam poses no obstacle to learn more about the natural 
world and even encourages the pursuit of such learning.783 One sees this in ‘Abduh’s treatment of 
Islamic history. ‘Abduh views the achievements of Islamic history as a direct and logical result of the 
religion. With the arrival of Islam, ‘Abduh writes, the “power of reason was released” (fa-aṭlaqa bi-
hadhā sulṭān al-‘aql) and reason “returned to its kingdom” (wa-raddahu ilā mamlakatihi).784 The result 
was the emergence of a civilisation founded on learning and justice to an degree unknown in history:  
Islam emerged, both its spirit and practice… And it civilised the barbarians through its schools. It taught 
not to ‘give to Caesar what is Caesar’s’ but rather made Caesar himself accountable for his actions. This 
religion guided the lost, softened the harsh, taught the ignorant and alarmed the idle… It reformed the 
ethics of the corrupt and united the divided…It established justice, reformed the laws and established 
systems for those who entered it that far exceeded all what preceded it…This religion was a blessing for 
its people in all its affairs. 785 
This is why the rapid spread of Islam, he adds, was “unknown in the history of religions.”786 As noted, 
a common theme is to attribute the strength of Europe to Muslim sources. Europe progressed from the 
Middle Ages, ‘Abduh writes, only after discovering the virtues of independent will, thought and opinion 
(istiqlāl al-irāda wa istiqlāl al-ra’y wa al-fikr).787 This came via contact with Muslims in the Crusades, 
from whom Europe learnt that “freedom of thought and striving for knowledge were a means to faith, 
not against faith” (ḥurriyat al-fikr wa-si‘at al-‘ilm wasā’il al-īmān lā al-‘awādī ‘alayhi).788 The strength 
of Europe, then, is itself a testament to the social and political benefit of Islam.789  
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‘Abduh makes deeper or more specific doctrinal claims to assert Islam as a source of worldly progress. 
The notion of the transcendence (tanzīḥ) of God, which is intrinsic to the doctrine of tawḥīd, he argues, 
in itself encourages progress. Divine transcendence puts man in the direct vicinity of God, encouraging 
striving and effort by making the believer solely accountable for their acts: 
Islam leads the servant directly to God, giving him the right be stand before God alone without any 
intermediary. Islam decreed that all created beings stand in servitude to none but the Omnipotent (al-
qāhir). The only barrier between the believer and God is his acts. This is how Islam, understood correctly 
(al-islām al-ṣaḥīḥ) lifts the servant to reach higher stages of perfection (marātib al-kamāl).790 
In its doctrinal teachings and historical record, then, Islam leads to worldly success. This also means 
the current weakness and division of the Muslim world is not only removed from Islam. More deeply 
for ‘Abduh, it is the essential opposite of Islam. In many passages ‘Abduh insists that the majority of 
Muslims have deviated from the true message and principles of the faith.791  
You see today that what is called ‘Islam’ is not really Islam. It is only the preservation of some ritual 
actions like prayer, fasting and the pilgrimage, or the retention of certain expression, even though the 
meanings of these have also been corrupted. People have led their religion to innovations and 
superstitions (al-kharāfāt) and thus to stagnation (jumūd)…We seek refuge in God from them and from 
whoever speaks falsehood of God and His religion! Everything that is defective today among Muslims 
is not from Islam, rather it is from something else that has been called ‘Islam.’792  
The roots of the malaise are many. While the Qur’an commands the use of reason, he claims, many 
Muslims follow superstition (al-kharāfāt) and whim (hawā).793 ‘Abduh presents Islam as a religion of 
doctrinal unity (al-dīn al-islāmī dīn tawḥīd al-al-‘aqā’id lā dīn tafrīq fī al-qawā‘id), but regrets that 
Islamic history is full of theological and political Muslim division.794 Many Muslims, he regrets, accept 
the innovation (bid‘a) that reason is not compatible with revelation and that religion is an enemy of 
science (al-dīn min ashadd ‘adā‘ al-‘ilm).795 The point is to stress that ‘Abduh links the social and 
political weakness of Muslims in direct proportion to their deviation from the principles of Islam. Seen 
from a different angle, this may also challenge the claims of Hourani that ‘Abduh is concerned not with 
proving the doctrinal truth of Islam, but its compatibility to the modern world. Hourani writes: 
Polemics have their danger; in defending oneself, one may draw closer to one’s adversary’s than one 
thinks. It is significant that both his (‘Abduh’s) controversies were concerned not with the truth or falsity 
of Islam, but with its being compatible with the supposed requirements of the modern mind.796 
Yet this rests on a false distinction. Against Hourani, a stronger reading is to suggest that ‘Abduh insists 
so forcefully upon Islam as a source of progress precisely to prove its doctrinal truth. The truth of Islam, 
for ‘Abduh, is measured and manifest by its amenability to modern knowledge, learning and progress.  
 
790 Abduh. Al-A‘māl al-Kāmila., 3/233. 
791 Ibid., 3/465-9. 
792 Ibid., 3/341. 
793 Ibid., 2/159-61.  
794 Ibid., 3/390.  
795 Ibid., 3/474 and 470-1. For an overview of ‘Abduh’s critique see Haj, Reconfiguring, 99-108. Gesink, Islamic Reform, 59, 
66-7, 75, 86, 232-33.  




 On shirk or ‘association’ with God  
 
‘Abduh can therefore be considered a political theologian in the sense that he insists upon the social 
and political value of Islam. ‘Abduh’s theology is tied to its social and political benefit. This is perhaps 
not surprising. Debates over the rationality, relevance and public role of religion were central to 
European discourse of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, these debates reached a global, non-European audience. Ammeke Kateman describes these as 
some of the “shared questions” over the category and meaning of religion between ‘Abduh and his 
European interlocutors.797 Albert Hourani again writes:  
His (‘Abduh’s) intellectual problems were those of Islamic thought but they were also those of nineteenth 
century Europe, in particular the great debates about science and religion…Islam seemed to him to be a 
middle path between the two extremes: a religion fully consistent with the claims of the human intellect 
and the discoveries of modern science, but safeguarding the divine transcendence…Islam indeed 
was…the answer to the problems of the modern world.798 
‘Abduh contributes to this debate, stressing the rationality and the worldly value of Islam. He uses 
reason in the service of religion, not in opposition to religion, and thus offers an Islamic conception of 
rationalism and progress. Presenting Islam as a source of socio-political progress, he contests the secular 
European conception of religion as a purely private affair, removed from political or communal affairs. 
In this way ‘Abduh carves a distinct place and role for Islam in his age of colonial modernity. 
This chapter turns to explore ‘Abduh’s treatment of the concept of shirk or ‘association’ with God. Only 
after examining his conception of Islam as a religion of reason and worldly progress does his treatment 
of shirk make sense. To date, there has been no scholarship on the place of shirk in ‘Abduh’s works. 
What follows is a close reading of the relevant sources. This lacuna is explained in a number of ways. 
Firstly, ‘Abduh’s treatment of the concept of shirk appears scattered, spread across a range of different 
contexts that do not, at first, seem connected in any meaningful sense. Another reason is the common 
presumption that ‘Abduh does not engage with the concept at all. We find this across several studies: 
In his Risālah al-Tawḥīd he (‘Abduh) is more concerned with the power of reason, its relation with 
revelation, prophecy, man’s free-will and free act and the like, than with questions of imān, kufr and 
shirk, which occupied an important place in the works of the classical theologians. 799 
(The Risāla) deals with issues such as liberty, independent reasoning, and self-help that were never the 
concern of the traditional ulema, often using concepts derived from nineteenth century European thought 
…that Muslims of earlier centuries would have had difficulty in comprehending. The contrast between 
Muhammad Abduh’s work and traditional Muslim scholarship in absolute. 800 
Against this, this chapter demonstrates that concept of shirk remains important for ‘Abduh. He discusses 
the concept in his works but does so in a different way that is not, perhaps, always readily apparent. 
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‘Abduh often uses the term wathaniyya, for example, derived from the term for idol, wathan. Also, his 
discussion of shirk is often only implicit in his works. The key here is the stress on Islam as a rational 
religion. With Islam linked to reason, shirk becomes tied to notions of irrationality and superstition in 
religion. If Islam extols the powers of reason, as ‘Abduh insists, shirk is defined by the suspension of 
reason. This theme runs implicitly throughout his works. To return to Tayob:  
‘Abduh thought of religion as an essential and powerful human quality. It thrived in the presence of 
rational development, but led to unfortunate consequences when irrationalism held sway…there was a 
close and symbiotic relationship between religion and reason.801 
‘Abduh discusses the meaning and nature of shirk though his condemnation of the irrational in religion. 
This also means that shirk is a political concept for ‘Abduh: shirk is both irrational and, following this, 
a source of backwardness and decline. Shirk is an obstacle to progress. The two are inverse and cannot 
be separated. While ‘Abduh’s treatment of shirk often appears scattered, then, expressed in different 
ways and across a range of works, this reading of shirk as both irrational and a source of socio-political 
decline is the common underpinning throughout.  
‘Abduh’s Theology of Religious History 
 
‘Abduh’s account of religious history and prophecy, for example, reveals a discourse of tawḥīd and 
shirk that is expressed through a lens of reason and irrationality. ‘Abduh’s view on the relation between 
Islam and other religions is ambivalent. At times, he expresses the traditional Muslim view that the 
“religion of tawḥīd” is the true religion of all prophets. ‘Abduh writes how all the prophets, from Adam 
to Muhammad, preached the same essential message of the oneness and transcendence of God:  
Islam came to call people to tawḥīd…(this is) the religion of God (dīn Allāh), from Adam, Noah, 
Abraham to Moses, then the prophets after Moses, including the seal of the Israelite prophets, 
Jesus….(All of these prophets) called for nothing a but a return to the worship of God alone, and to 
liberate them from the authority (sulṭa) of leaders and rulers who assaulted man’s reason.802 
The message of earlier prophets was corrupted by later followers, he adds, and only the message of 
Muhammad, correctly understood, represents the true religion of God (dīn Allāh).803 To this, however, 
‘Abduh adds a distinctly modernist reading of religious history and prophecy in the Risālat al-Tawḥīd. 
Abduh presents the series of revelations from Judaism to Christianity to Islam as an evolutionary 
process of divine education and rational growth in man.804 The strict legal rules of the Old Testament, 
he writes, reflect the carnal and primitive impulses of man at an early stage of his development. At this 
stage man did not perceive anything beyond his senses.805 Man then reached a higher stage, moving 
beyond the senses to develop an internal consciousness (wijdān). The Gospel reflects this later stage, 
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appealing to emotions and sensitivities.806 Mankind then reached a final stage of intellectual maturity 
(rushd). The Qur’an thus addressed our reason and comprehension (al-fahm): 
Human society then reached a point when man reached his full stature. Islam supervened to present its 
case to reason…to call on mind and intelligence for action, alongside emotion and feeling, for mans 
guidance towards earthly and heavenly bliss…Islam deals with man as a wide and sober teacher would 
deal with a mature person, summoning him to his full powers…When will anything comparable be found 
in other religions, where reason goes awry and there is no way clear way to the pure secrets of divine 
oneness and transcendence (al-tawḥīd wa al-tanzīḥ)?807 
This is why Muhammad is the seal of the prophets. Since we have developed our rational capacity and 
the Qur’an enjoins us to do this, ‘Abduh writes, there is no need for revelation after the Qur’an: 
When one has sound training, does one need a mentor? No! For the true has been distinguished by the 
false and all that remains is to follow the guidance and from the hands of mercy take the way that brings 
one to happiness in the here and hereafter. For this reason, Muhammad’s prophecy brought prophecy 
itself to an end. His message terminated the work of the messengers.808  
It is unlikely that ‘Abduh takes this evolutionary model of prophecy from the classical tradition.809 More 
likely, this is a gloss of Comte’s law of three stages, a progressive view of history that envisioned a 
childish religious stage, an adolescent metaphysical stage and a final, ‘developed’ stage of reason and 
science.810 But the key is the link, once again, between Islam and reason. ‘Abduh presents the message 
of the Qur’an and the doctrine of tawḥīd to reflect the highest stage of man’s rational development.  
This implies, of course, that the doctrine of shirk is linked to the failure of reason.  This is clear when 
‘Abduh discusses the history of idolatry. ‘Abduh links evolutionary notions of moral and intellectual 
progress to the doctrinal victory of monotheism over idolatry. While the prophets are those perfected 
souls chosen by God, ‘Abduh writes, later communities failed to fully understand and thus corrupted 
their message of tawḥīd due to the weakened, immature states of their intellect. It was this that led them 
to worship a host of other things in place of God: 
Some were led to the animal kingdom…. Others sought the stars and planets and its effects. Others see 
it in the trees and rocks. Others again have divinised special powers belonging to diverse species…But 
whenever feelings have been refined and thinking grown more subtle and awareness more penetrating, 
these (false) ideas have been transcended.811 
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‘Abduh uses the term wathaniyya to described the idol worship of earlier times, not shirk. He defines 
wathaniyya as the worship of tangible objects (al-mawjūdāt al-mādiyya), visible objects (al-mawjūdāt 
al-mashūda) and stone statues (tamāthīl hijriyya).812 Noting that this kind of idolatry or wathaniyya 
characterised the religions of the ancient Greeks and Egyptians, ‘Abduh explains this by arguing for the 
weakened intellects of the masses in these earlier generations: 
So, we see that it was the weakness of reason (ḍa’af al-aql), the scarcity of knowledge (qillat al-‘ilm) 
and lack of insight (idrāk) among those who believe in these kinds of intermediaries (in worship). 
However, armed with reason (al-‘aql), the power of spiritual vision (baṣīra) and the use of knowledge, 
followers are always able to reach the true reality of existence, which shines upon everything. 813 
Ancient Greek and Egyptian philosophers knew the falsity of idol worship and had some knowledge of 
divine transcendence (tanzīh), ‘Abduh writes, but had to keep this knowledge from the masses.814 While 
this kind of idol worship can be proven false by reason alone, ‘Abduh insists, it is still found in places 
like Africa or India.815 This is, of course, a highly critical judgement against African animist or Hindu 
religious belief and practice. ‘Abduh rejects outright the notion that these could be rich and sophisticated 
traditions. The crux of the issue is that man’s rational development parallels his doctrinal turn towards 
monotheism. The history and reality of idol worship, in turn, is rooted in a lack of reason and intellect.   
This extends to ‘Abduh’s engagement with another religious category; the group of opponents of the 
Prophet called the mushrikūn in the Qur’an. ‘Abduh discusses the Arabs of pre-Islamic Arabia in terms 
that strengthen the link between idols and irrationality. ‘Abduh refers to this group not by their Qur’anic 
title of mushrikūn, but wathaniyyūn.816 This reflects the traditional image of wooden and stone idolatry 
said to be widespread in pre-Islamic Arabia. ‘Abduh specifies wathaniyya as prevalent in the time of 
revelation (zaman al-tanzīl).817 For ‘Abduh, the pre-Islamic idolaters were, above all, irrational.  
The Arab nation consisted of various tribes, sundered by conflicts and enslaved by passions. Each tribe 
gloried in wars with its neighbour, capturing women folk, killing chieftains and pillaging land. Greed 
inspired these perpetual battles. With this decay went every sort of evil. But so low did the Arab’s 
intelligence sink (sukhāf al-‘aql) that they even made sugar idols and worshipped them, then ate them 
after that when they were hungry.818 
This, ‘Abduh tells us, was the essence of pre-Islamic idolatry. The mushrikūn worshipped idols because 
of their lack of reason. Following this, it seems symptomatic of ‘Abduh that he distinguishes the Prophet 
in his milieu as much for his rational skills as his moral character: 
His (Muhammad’s) contemporaries had grown up in the days of jāhiliyya and his companions were 
sworn idolaters (wathaniyyūn). He was among the patrons and servants of images; his own relatives 
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shared in the worship of idols (aṣnām). Nevertheless, he grew into a fine character – morally and 
rationally (‘aqlan). 819 
The explicit language of shirk is absent in ‘Abduh’s account of prophecy and religious history. But the 
idea is clearly present. ‘Abduh describes idol worship in terms of wathaniyya, not shirk. In addition, 
this is tied to notions of irrationality and the lack of intellectual development. The religion of Islam, for 
‘Abduh, is as much a religion of tawḥīd over wathaniyya as it is reason over irrationality. The two are 
intertwined, even inseparable.  
Christianity, reason and shirk  
 
‘Abduh’s engagement with Christianity reinforces the link between shirk and irrationality. It also points 
to a connection between shirk, irrationality and social and political decline. While the Qur’an discusses 
Christianity in many ways and distinguishes Christians as ‘people of the book’ from outright mushrikūn, 
it reserves sharp critique for some Christian doctrines (Q 4:17, 17:111, 19:34). On this basis, the Islamic 
tradition has understood Christian doctrine through the lens of shirk.820 Notions of the Trinity and 
Incarnation, however understood by Muslim thinkers, are widely seen to reflect Christian shirk and the 
religion’s later corruption (taḥrīf) by its followers. As Jon Hoover notes, this view crosses doctrinal and 
sectarian lines.821 Some of the largest refutations of Christian doctrine are seen in the works of the Shī’ī 
Abū ‘Īsa al-Warraq, the Mu‘tazilī ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī (d. 1025) and the Ḥanbalī traditionalist 
Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328).822 To cite from ‘Abd al-Jabbār: 
They (Christians) believe in and worship three gods and lords…If they say, ‘We do not single out any 
one of these Gods for worship. Rather we worship all of them as one’, one should reply; ‘this does not 
get you out of having committed shirk in the matter…nor does this diminish what we have said about 
you. For by this thinking it would be correct if we worshipped as one a hundred thousand objects.823 
In ‘Abduh’s time, the encounter with Christianity was seen not through a doctrinal lens but as part of a 
much broader political and ideological Western incursion upon the Muslim world. Christianity was the 
religion of the colonial powers and the colonial backdrop is key to ‘Abduh’s engagement. This is clear 
from two famous episodes in his lifetime. In a series of articles written for the Egyptian press, since 
collected and published, ‘Abduh responded to the polemics against Islam made by the former French 
foreign minister, Gabriel Hanotaux (d. 1944), and the Arab Christian secular intellectual Farah Anṭūn 
(d. 1922).824 Both justified the ‘civilising mission’ of Western powers over the Muslim world and 
ascribed the decline of Muslims to Islamic teachings. Both contrasted a backward and despotic Islam 
that was hostile to science, reason and philosophy with a Christianity that encouraged the pursuit of 
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learning. For Anṭūn, the historical Christian tolerance to science and learning paved the way for the 
development of modern European civilisation.825 For Hanotaux, the fusion of religion and politics in 
the East had made any progress impossible. Muslims, he writes, must separate religion from political 
affairs, as had happened in Europe.826 Neither Anṭūn or Hanotaux argue explicitly for the doctrinal truth 
of Christianity over Islam. This is implicit, however, in their attempts to prove the doctrinal harmony 
between Christianity and European progress and development. Like ‘Abduh, it appears that doctrinal 
truth was measured and manifest in the amenability to worldly progress.  
An in-depth study of the arguments made by Anṭūn and Hanotaux, also ‘Abduh’s response to such, lies 
beyond the scope of this chapter.827 There is much overlap in ‘Abduh’s two responses, yet what is most 
notable is his general take on the essential difference between Islam and Christianity. This reverses the 
claims of his interlocutors. ‘Abduh presents a clear and consistent contrast between Islam as a religion 
of reason and Christianity as an irrational and superstitious faith. This is a central theme.  
The most foundational basis for all Christians, and this is not contested by the Catholics, Orthodox or 
Protestants, is that belief is a gift (from God) to which reason (al-‘aql) does not pertain, and that religion 
(al-dīn) is something that contradicts the rulings of reason (mā yunāqiḍ aḥkām al-‘aql), meaning that 
whatever contradicts the dictates of reason, that is what one must believe. As Anselm said; ‘One must 
believe first…and then strive to understand what one believes’. 828 
‘Abduh describes the defining feature of Christianity as the belief in the irrational (al-īmān bi ghayr al-
ma‘qūl).829 It is clear that he writes with the doctrine of the Trinity (tathlīth) in mind. Descriptions of 
the Trinity as “contradictory to the rulings of reason” (mā yunāqiḍ aḥkām al-‘aql) are found throughout 
the Islamic tradition.830 And elsewhere, ‘Abduh is more explicit:  
Indeed, we have not heard of any Christian who truly believes and worships God as a man, despite their 
statements to this effect. Nor have we ever seen any Christian attempt to rationalise the doctrine of the 
Trinity (la yu‘aqqil ‘aqīdat al-tathlīth). Rather, they insist that this is a doctrine to which reason does not 
pertain.831 
‘Abduh also describes Christian doctrine in terms of wathaniyya.832 The language of shirk, we may 
note, is absent in ‘Abduh’s engagement with Christianity. Instead, he stresses the irrational nature of 
Christian doctrines like the Trinity. It would seem that ‘Abduh draws heavily on the traditional Muslim 
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critique of Christianity, then, but expresses this in a different way. In his critique of Christian doctrines 
like the Trinity, ‘Abduh closely connects, even synonymises, notions of shirk and irrationality in faith.  
‘Abduh then ties the shirk or irrationality of Christian doctrine to a theme of decline and backwardness. 
He addresses the question of the doctrinal suitability of Islam and Christianity to worldly progress. 
‘Abduh inverses the claims of his opponents and argues that Christianity, not Islam, has been a staunch 
opponent of learning, knowledge and progress throughout its history. Pointing to the history of Arab-
Muslim scientific invention, ‘Abduh argues that Islam is in perfect accord with reason and science and 
that Christianity, by contrast, has proven across its history to be hostile to free thought and the spirit of 
scientific enquiry.833 ‘Abduh also accuses “earlier religious communities”, a reference to Christianity, 
of innovating the idea that religion and science are in tension with each other.834 Against Anṭūn, ‘Abduh 
argues it was not a supposed Christian tolerance for science and learning that led to progress in Europe. 
Rather, the long history of Church intolerance to science eventually led to the relegation of religion to 
the private sphere and to the secularisation of Europe: 
Is it right to describe surrender to the victorious as ‘tolerance’? Is it right to equate powerlessness with 
lenience?...Is it not more truthful to explain the present harmony between religion and science (in Europe) 
a result of political tolerance for religion - not religious (Christian) tolerance for political power and 
science? Should we really call the triumph of science over Christianity…(religious) tolerance?” 835 
History also proves, ‘Abduh writes, that Christianity is far from a religion of tolerance.836 He notes with 
in a  sarcastic tone that it would “take all year” to list the historical record of violence committed in the 
name of Christianity.837 Islam, in contrast, has not known the practice of forced conversion or the 
violence over issues of doctrine that were common to medieval Christianity: 
Whoever heard of wars between the early salaf and the Ash‘arī’s despite their disagreement, or between 
ahl al-sunna and the Mu‘tazilī’s despite the great differences of their creeds. Moreover, we never heard 
of Muslim philosophers becoming a sect and entering into violent war…838 
Examples that could prove otherwise, for ‘Abduh, like the Khārijite sect or the inquisition (miḥna) over 
doctrine of the createdness of the Qur’an, were isolated cases and rooted in political, not doctrinal 
concerns.839 It is on this basis that ‘Abduh rejects Hanoteaux’s prescription of secularism as a condition 
for progress for the Islamic world, as noted earlier, pointing to the different historical experience of the 
Muslim world.840 
The irrational nature of Christian doctrine, then, is clearly reflected in its historical record. ‘Abduh thus 
upturns notions of a despotic, anti-intellectual East and a tolerant Christian West that were common to 
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colonial-era discourse. But there is a tension here. ‘Abduh argues this against a civilizational reality that 
appears to favour Christian Europe over the Islamic world. ‘Abduh negotiates this in several ways. As 
has been shown, he ties the growth of Europe to Muslim sources.841 Elsewhere, he refuses to ascribe 
the strength of Europe to Christian teachings and argues that Europe has progressed by turning its back 
on Christianity, not because of it:  
There is no relation between the Christian religion and its present civilisation (in Europe). This is because 
the Gospel…orders a withdrawal from the world (insilākh) and asceticism in it… It teaches a full 
separation (inqiṭā’) from the world...It states clearly to ‘give to God what is God’s and to Caesar what is 
Caesar’s…Is this what we see in the civilisation based on this religion? European civilisation is the 
civilisation of Kings and Emperors, of gold and jewels… This has nothing to do with the Gospel! 842 
This is not to praise Christian virtues, but to deny the link of European strength with Christian doctrine. 
Indeed ‘Abduh criticises Christianity for its perceived emphasis on the Hereafter to the neglect of this 
world. Islam, he writes, corrects this by embracing both this world and the next.843 Elsewhere, ‘Abduh 
ties the rise of Europe to the Protestant Reformation. He praises Protestantism as a reformist (iṣlāḥ) 
movement that challenged blind taqlīd of the medieval Church and, in so doing, lifted Europe out of its 
backward state in the Middle Ages: 
With such extremism (al-ghulū) in religion…darkness spread, knowledge vanished and the (use of) 
reason was forgotten, the pillars of social order were destroyed and corruption spread throughout all 
Christian countries, until that reform (iṣlāḥ) movement came to defeat all of this, and Europe set out on 
its well-known course. We have already explained this many times… 844 
As a movement that rejects clerical authority and calls to return to the original sources, ‘Abduh ties the 
strength of Europe to Protestantism to reinforce his own ideas of Islam and religious reform. Except for 
the prophecy of Muhammad and some ritual acts, he writes, Protestantism is “different from Islam in 
name, but not meaning.”845 But he is also critical. Figures like Luther and Calvin were violently hostile 
to science and their opponents, ‘Abduh notes, while Protestants did not challenge the irrational nature 
of Christian doctrine.846  
The point in this chapter is not to measure the strength of these claims. It is to illustrate that ‘Abduh’s 
use of Christianity reinforces the two key aspects of his thought. The first is his connecting, even 
synonymising, notions of irrationality and shirk. ‘Abduh draws on the traditional Muslim critique of 
Christian doctrine but never expresses this in terms of shirk. The Trinity is condemned because it is 
irrational. It would seem that ‘Abduh engages the concept of shirk, but expresses this in a different way. 
His stress on the irrational nature of Christianity is a means by which ‘Abduh discourses the nature and 
meaning of shirk. From this, ‘Abduh’s use of Christianity also reflects his ‘functionalist’ approach to 
religion, the notion that religion is defined by its social and political ends. The irrational nature of 
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Christian doctrine has to be reflected, for ‘Abduh, in its historical record as an impediment to 
knowledge, learning and progress. ‘Abduh’s use of Christianity thus neatly reflects his broader 
conception of shirk as both irrational and a source of worldly decline.   
 On science, technology and shirk  
 
In a second article, Hanotaux attributes the decline of the Muslim world to a perceived emphasis in 
Islam on the omnipotence and transcendence of God. The stress on the absolute power and will of God, 
he writes, renders human beings fatalistic and passive, deprived of free will and the capacity to change 
fate accept through prayer. Christianity, by contrast, elevates human beings via free will and lessens the 
divide between humanity and God through the Incarnation. This, Hanotaux writes, explained the 
productivity and industriousness of Europe and the inertia and stagnation of the Muslim world: 
The Christian conception (of God) is more comforting for mankind, and leads mankind to approach God 
through his acts because it does not cut the ties (between man and God). Yet the fierce God of Muḥammad 
allows his creatures to drift aimlessly in space, behind the stress on his transcendence, with no resource 
except prayer… (this is why) the word "Islam" means "surrender” to God's will.847 
Again, the truth of a religion is manifest by its perceived doctrinal suitability to progress. This was a 
common view of Islam in Europe at the time. The philosopher Ernest Renan (d. 1892) offered much the 
same assessment.848 For this reason, and to counter the idea that Islam is an obstacle to progress, ‘Abduh 
addresses the issue of free will and predestination in several places.849 Conceding the reality of fatalism 
and apathy among Muslims, he argues this is because doctrines like predestination (qadr) and trust in 
God (tawakkul) have been misunderstood.850 For ‘Abduh, the correct understanding of divine decree or 
qadr does not deny human freedom, nor leave Muslims passive before an almighty God.851 Invoking 
the classical Ash‘arī doctrine of kasb or ‘acquisition’, by which man ‘acquires’ his actions from God 
through his free will, ‘Abduh insists upon man’s free will and his accountability for his actions: 
The Creator (of man) endowed him with free choice by which he can act independently, so what he 
acquired is his and what he acquired is upon him. (fa-la-hu mā kasaba wa ‘alayhi mā iktasaba).852 
The man of sound mind knows in himself that he exists, needing no guide or teacher to prove this. It is 
the same for the actions of his will (a‘mālahu al-ikhtiyāriyya).. He weighs their consequences in his 
mind, measures them in his will, and acts upon them…To deny any of this would be to deny existence 
itself….(Yet) the believer also confesses that in all his acts of choice, rational or physical, he proceeds 
upon powers and capacities granted to him by God.853 
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‘Abduh refuses to speculate further on the question of free will versus predestination. This leads only 
to division, he writes, and the essence of qadr will remain a mystery.854 The aim is clearly to invoke the 
doctrine of kasb to refute the idea that Islam renders Muslims passive and fatalistic. In so doing, ‘Abduh 
also refutes a common idea of how Islam was a barrier to progress.   
From this, ‘Abduh discusses the meaning and nature of shirk. In this passage the concept of shirk is not 
implicit, subtly embedded in a discourse on irrationality. Nor is it expressed in terms like wathaniyya. 
This is ‘Abduh’s most explicit and sustained reflection on shirk. The passage is worth citing in full: 
Some claim that belief in man’s acquisition (kasb) of his actions leads to the sin of shirk with God – the 
supreme wrong. But such views have not taken into account the Qur’anic significance of shirk and its 
meaning in the sunna. It is the belief that something other than God has a superior causation to that which 
God, by His gift, has set in manifest causes (al-‘itiqād an li-ghayr Allāh athran fawq mā wahhabahu 
Allāh min al-asbāb al-ẓāhira) and that there is a greater force (sulṭān) than that which arises from the 
created order. It is the belief of those who exalt other than God to divine authority by presuming to 
dispense with the means He has given – seeking victory in war without the strength of military forces, 
for example, or healing from sickness without use of the medicines given by God, or happiness in this 
life and the next without the paths and laws (sunna) that God has ordained. To seek these and similar 
ends in neglect of the divine means is a form of the sin of shirk. It was this that characterised the pre-
Islamic idolaters (al-wathaniyyūn) and thus the sharī‘a came to eradicate it. 855 
The depth and complexity of this passage is of note. It is also clear that this is not a traditional reflection 
on kasb. ‘Abduh draws on a classical term and concept but does so for modern ends, as seen in the 
reference to military forces and modern medicine.856 This may also explain the distinction in his works 
between wathaniyya and shirk. The former relates to the worship of tangible objects like idols or statues, 
perhaps, while ‘Abduh uses the latter to express this much broader, thematic meaning.  
In a general sense, ‘Abduh argues that many of the features of the modern world, like modern medicine 
and weaponry, are gifts from God. These are the ‘means’ God has provided for health and military 
victory in this life. To seek these eīīnds via other means, then, is a form of shirk. This rejects God’s 
dispensation for man and implies a faith in another superior force or causation. It is possible to read this 
as a kind of sanctification in ‘Abduh for the latest science and technology. On this basis his English 
translator Kenneth Cragg (d. 2012) offers a critique: 
That to be remiss about military preparedness, or negligent of the medicines God has given, is a form of 
shirk is a fascinating window on Islam as an approach to existence…(But) taken seriously, it would seem 
to exclude the sort of ‘criticism’ of existing ‘givens’ which has been the cutting edge of scientific and 
technological development. 857 
‘Abduh’s adulation of science, warns Cragg, could impede future scientific progress by fostering too 
deferential an attitude to its latest findings. But there is no reason why this must be the case. Against 
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Cragg, it could be argued that ‘Abduh is not suggesting that scientific progress should not be made. 
More likely, he argues the opposite. Muslims must strive for this as this would equally be from God’s 
bounty for human beings. In a journal article on criticism (al-intiqād), for example, ‘Abduh insists that 
a continual striving for progress in knowledge is essential to society, with criticism a vital guarantor 
against social decline (qahqarā) and stagnation (waqfa).858 Failure to strive for progress in science and 
other fields would likely constitute shirk, for ‘Abduh, on the same grounds as that outlined above. 
In a deeper and more specific sense, this reflection on shirk leads one to ‘Abduh’s idea of the sunna of 
God (sunnan Allāh). This is not explicitly referred to in this passage on shirk but it is only against this 
background that ‘Abduh’s passage fully makes sense. A central theme in his works, ‘Abduh describes 
the sunnan Allāh as the fixed, unalterable laws that govern the universe. They are the means by which 
created events occur and effects come into being. ‘Abduh writes: 
The sunan are those well-established paths along which all things take their course and in accordance 
with which effects follows causes; they are what are also called sharā’i, nawāmīs and some people call 
them qawānīn. What difference does it make? The Qur’an uses a variety of expressions to declare that 
the order of human society, whatever happens in it, is of a single order, unaltered and unchanging, and 
that whoever seeks happiness…must then look to the sources of this order. 859 
Islam has shown that the great phenomena of the universe follow a custom which God has fixed in His 
eternal knowledge and which no accident can change.860  
‘Abduh writes that the sunnan Allāh are “also known as the laws of nature” (al-ma‘rūfa bi-nawāmīs al-
kawn).861 His sunnan Allāh are often equated with natural theology.862 The key is that all aspects of 
existence, for ‘Abduh, follow a sunna created by God. Everything occurs according to a fixed rule that 
cannot change, he writes, and makes no exception even for Prophets.863 In this way ‘Abduh insists that 
the world is governed by divinely-willed regularity and causality, not instantaneity and chance. It is on 
this basis that he is sceptical of the existence of miracles (khawāriq). He writes: 
Islam did not make any kind of miracles a part of the proofs of prophecy, upon them be peace, nor does 
it claim that those calling to the truth are able to change anything of the sunnan Allāh. This is so clear, 
so famously known, we have no need to further expand upon it.864 
Muslims of all shades and sects are unanimous that there is no obligation to believe in any such miracles 
on the part of a saint since the rise of Islam. It is permissible for every Muslim, by communal consensus, 
to deny the occurrence of any miracle whatever by any saint, whoever he may be. Such a denial in no 
way contravenes the fundamentals of Islam. 865 
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‘Abduh thus offers marked scepticism on belief in the miracles of saints (karamāt al-awliyā’), a key 
feature of traditional Sunni piety throughout history.866 Miracles, by definition, contradict the laws of 
nature (khāriq al-‘āda) and thus the sunnah Allāh. The miracle of the Qur’an is the sole exception.867 
‘Abduh criticises Christianity for its perceived dependence upon miracles (khawāriq). This, he writes, 
is the primary basis (al-aṣl al-awwal) of Christianity and reflects the irrational nature of its doctrines.868  
Yet the sunnan Allāh does not refer only to the laws of nature. It also refers to what ‘Abduh sees as the 
fixed, intelligible laws of human social and political history. This is how it relates to his reflection on 
shirk. It is clear, for ‘Abduh, that medical health or military victory is only achieved by way of natural, 
intelligible forces, by following causes that arise from the created order. In his Qur’anic exegesis 
‘Abduh outlines that there is a fixed sunna of God for achieving victory in war. Following this leads to 
victory, he writes, while deviating from it leads to destruction.  
If God did not repel the people of falsehood and corruption with those of truth and reform (ahl al-iṣlāḥ), 
the people of falsehood and corruption would overcome the righteous (al-ṣāliḥīn) and conquer the lands, 
corrupting all the earth. So it is from the grace of God to all people of the worlds that he gives permission 
to those of his true religion to fight the unbelievers and corrupters…God will grant them victory so long 
as they strive for truth and reform (al-iṣlāḥ) in the land…This is one of the sunnan of God in relation to 
human social affairs (sunna min sunnihi fī al-‘ijtimā‘a al-bashrī), that people of truth and falsehood will 
always fight and resist the other. 869 
Coupled with his reference to “the strength of military forces”, it would seem there is no other way to 
achieve this victory for ‘Abduh other than the pursuit of the latest weaponry. This is the sunna of God. 
To seek military victory via other means, then, becomes a form of shirk. This rejects the sunnan Allāh 
and implies there is higher form of causation, separate to that which God has constituted.  
It is worth recalling that this reflection on shirk proceeds from a discussion on kasb, where ‘Abduh 
affirms man’s freedom to act and refutes the charge of compulsion and passivity. ‘Abduh’s aim, then, 
is to present an image of Islam that is rational and logical, amenable to modern science and technology, 
but that also empowers man to act, strive and determine his fate. Islam mandates the acquisition of the 
latest science and technology, ‘Abduh insists, and to seek worldly progress via other means is a form 
of shirk. But there is a tension here. It could be argued that ‘Abduh offers an overly rationalised theology 
that strives to accommodate the latest science and technology, but is removed from the piety of ordinary 
believers. ‘Abduh’s stress on the sunnan Allāh insists that God intervenes only through fixed laws that 
govern the universe, but many believers seek more than this - they seek the closeness and intervention 
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of God in their daily lives. ‘Abduh does not accommodate this. His comments for those who seek 
medical health through supplicating to God are a case in point: 
The sick man who implores God to restore his health is in fact asking; ‘O God, Suspend for my sake 
your Laws which you say cannot be changed or modified’! 870 
If this passage on shirk depicts ‘Abduh in strongly rationalist and modernist terms, it may also reveal 
his divide from the hopes, fears and inclinations of the wider community. 
This also captures the tie between Islam and worldly progress, shirk and worldly decline, in his thought. 
‘Abduh’s uncritical embrace of modern science and technology is of note. There is no sense of any 
scepticism or hesitancy as ‘Abduh presents these as wholly good, part of God’s dispensation for man, 
with their acquisition mandated by His sunna. ‘Abduh predates the rise of nuclear weapons, mass 
pollution and environmental crises that came to define the twentieth century, and which may have led 
to a more critical engagement with modern science and technology.871 Yet perhaps most revealing is 
the allusion to military preparedness and the acquisition of latest weaponry as part of the sunna of God. 
While ‘Abduh is often depicted as conciliatory towards British colonial rule in Egypt, there are clear 
passages in his works that reveal an urge to restore the military strength of the Muslim world so as to 
achieve independence from colonial rule.872 Muslims, he writes, must learn the secrets of Western 
military development for their own self-defence and liberation:  
The unbelievers must be fought with the same means they employ for fighting Islam. It is included in 
this, that one must rival them in our time in the manufacture of canons and rifles, or warships and airships, 
and other kinds of instruments of war. This all makes perfection in the technical and natural sciences 
obligatory for all Muslims only by this means can military preparedness be attained.873 
This supports Nikki Keddie’s contention that ‘Abduh, like his mentor Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d. 
1897), was primarily concerned and amazed by the sheer military might of the West: 
It is hard to escape the impression that what really appealed to him both in early Islam and in the modern 
West was political strength. His…attempts to prove that the Koran enjoins the acquisition of the most 
modern and effective armaments supports this idea. 874 
But the issue is not just political, as Keddie suggests. It is no less theological. The two are inverse and 
cannot be separated. Acquiring modern science, technology and weaponry is a key source of social and 
political strength and a means of achieving independence from colonial rule. But this is also a religious 
obligation for ‘Abduh, part of the sunnan Allāh. Conversely, seeking military victory without procuring 
the latest weaponry is a form of shirk for ‘Abduh, as has been shown, but it also guarantees military 
defeat. The same applies for seeking medical health without the latest medicine. ‘Abduh condemns this 
 
870 Cited in Nasution. The Place of Reason, 181.  
871 This is not to suggest that there were no such critical voices in his time. It is remarkable to contrast ‘Abduh’s attitude in 
this regard that of his contemporary, the perenniallist writer Rene Guenon (d.1951). See Mark Sedgwick, Against the Modern 
World; Traditionalism and the Secret History of the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
872 Ana Belen Soange. ‘Shura and Democracy; two sides of the same coin?’, Religion Compass 8/3 (2014); 97.  
873 Adams, Islamic Modernism, 136.  
874 Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism; Political and Religious Writings of Sayyed Jamal al-din “al-




as shirk but it is also, clearly, a cause of illness. The link between Islam and worldly progress, shirk and 
socio-political decline is clear. The key is that Muslims had idolatrously turned their backs on the 
sunnan Allāh. The consequence of this was manifest in the colonised and backward state of the Muslim 
world.  
On the cult of Muslim saints 
 
In a general sense, this reflection on shirk in the Risālat al-Tawḥīd seems to condemn a worldview or 
mentality, a ‘closed’ attitude that does not embrace the perceived benefits of modern science and 
technology. More specifically, the passage can be read to critique those seeking miraculous 
interventions in worldly life, those who believe that medical health or military victory can be achieved 
by any means other than the practical, rational acquisition of the latest forms of medicine and weaponry. 
One may therefore link this passage on shirk to ‘Abduh’s critique of the cult of saints. This is a central 
theme in his works. ‘Abduh is highly critical of the veneration of saints and shrines. Numerous passages 
in his works reflect this: 
Shirk is of various types…including that which has come to affect the Muslim masses (‘āmat al-
muslimīn) in their worship of other than God by way of bowing and prostration. And the greatest of these 
kinds of shirk is that by way of supplicating and seeking intercession (with God) by placing 
intermediaries between themselves and Him…And we certainly see this shirk among Muslims today. 875 
And you will not see any god added to this religion… except that (expressed by) the word “intercession” 
(shafā‘a), which its practitioners reckon is a means of veneration the prophets and saints, but which is, 
in reality, a means of turning its them into idols, that disgrace the greatness of the Lord of the Worlds. 
The only explanation for this is in the whispers of Satan.876 
This is “manifest shirk, not hidden”, writes ‘Abduh, and a heretical innovation (bid‘a) that was unknown 
to the salaf.877  In his commentary on the Qur’an ‘Abduh reads criticism of the cult of saints into verses 
that seem unrelated to the issue. On the ‘throne verse’ (Q 2:226, ayat al-kursī), for example, ‘Abduh 
condemns the popular custom of seeking blessings (tabarruk) from the relics of saints: 
The true God is the one who is worshipped deservedly…while gods who are worshipped undeservedly 
are indeed very many. To the extent that those who believe in the benefit (derived from) certain trees or 
inanimate objects, like Hanafī’s tree or Kalshānī’s sandal, they are to be considered worshippers of these 
objects in reality. 878 
These passages echo the criticism of the cult of saints in the works of Ibn Taymiyya and Muḥammad 
ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that ‘Abduh was called a “Wahhābī” in his 
time.879 His student, Rashīd Riḍā, faced the same charge and was forced to flee Ottoman Damascus on 
these grounds.880 Scholars have noted these parallels. Orientalist Ignaz Goldziher (d. 1921), a 
 
875 ‘Abduh. Al-A‘māl al-Kāmila, 2/230. For similar passages see Ibid., 1/37, 369, 371, 379-80, 718, 720-1, and 2/247, 291, 
574.  
876 Ibid., 1/721.  
877 Ibid., 4/544-45.  
878 Ibid., 1/718.  
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contemporary of ‘Abduh, speaks of the “cultural Wahhabism” (kulturwahhabismus) in ‘Abduh 
regarding the cult of saints.881 Louis Massignon refers to ‘Abduh in a passage on the intellectual origins 
on the Wahhābī movement.882 The notion that ‘Abduh is deeply indebted and influenced by Ibn 
Taymiyya continues in the works of Norman Calder, Frank Griffel and others.883 
We should take this with caution. It is contested, for example, whether ‘Abduh ever engages the works 
of Ibn Taymiyya.884 Descriptions of ‘Abduh as “Wahhābī” reflect a polemical use of the term on the 
part of defenders of the cult of saints. ‘Abduh seldom mentions the Wahhābī movement in his works 
and criticises the perceived intolerance of the sect.885 But more deeply, it could be argued that the nature 
of ‘Abduh’s critique of saint veneration is distinct. The cult of saints is shirk, for ‘Abduh, because it is 
perceived as irrational, associating saints with a power or causation that is distinct from what God has 
set forth in his sunnan. Pleading for the miraculous intercession or intervention of saints runs directly 
counter to the scientific, rational emphasis on the sunnan Allāh. It is also, for this reason, a source of 
Muslim decline. We get a sense of this after a long passage in which ‘Abduh emphasises the Qur’anic 
enjoinment to seek answers through rational investigation and determined effort. He then writes: 
The early Muslims (salaf) lived by these laws. While the Muslim spirit was exalted by these noble beliefs 
and worked them out in worthy actions, others suppose that by their prayers they can shake the earth and 
rend the heavens with their lamentations, while they wallowed in their passions and persisted in 
extravagant ways, so that their idle hopes of intercession (shafā‘a) profited them nothing. 886 
‘Abduh condemns the cult of saints, then, for its perceived irrationality in age of science and reason and 
because he views it as a source of lethargy and passivity. In these passages one senses the frustration in 
‘Abduh, even embarrassment, that as Europe colonised the Muslim world with the latest science, and 
technology, many Muslims sought the miraculous interventions of saints. ‘Abduh’s polemics against 
the cult of saints echo the works of earlier reformers, but this masks an entirely different, modernist 
concern. It again reveals the close link between shirk, irrationality and worldly decline in his thought.     
A defence of images and statues in Islamic law  
 
‘Abduh’s final engagement with shirk further reflects his stress on the rationality of Islam and the link 
to worldly progress. But this is in a different way. In this instance, ‘Abduh does not follow the views of 
earlier figures, as with the cult of saints, but rather overturns a medieval understanding of shirk on the 
grounds of it having become redundant in the modern age. We see this in an important, if largely 
overlooked, legal ruling (fatwā) by ‘Abduh on the permissibility of statues and images in Islamic law. 
 
881 Ignaz Goldziher, Die Richtungen der Islamischen Koranauslegung (Leiden: Brill, 1920), 321. 
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883 Ibid., 210-12. Norman Calder. ‘The Limits of Islamic Orthodoxy’, in A. Rippin, ed. Defining Islam: A Reader (London: 
Routledge, 2007), 221.  
884 A point noted in Haddad. “Abduh et ses lecteurs”, 28; “Relire Muhammad Abduh”, 61-62. It is noticeable that Griffel does 
not cite any primary sources when describing ‘Abduh as “heavily influenced” by Ibn Taymiyya. See Griffel. ‘What do we 
mean by ‘salafi’’, 210-12. 
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These have been traditionally proscribed in Islamic law on the basis of numerous hadith narrations. The 
prohibition focuses on issues of shirk or idolatry, the fear of worshipping the image in place of God or 
for intercession with God, also the idea that the image-maker (al-muṣawwir) haughtily attempts to 
replicate the creation of God. The prohibition is expressed by the Shāfi’ī jurist, al-Nawawī (d. 1284);  
The authorities of our school and others hold that the making of picture of any living thing is strictly 
forbidden and that it is one of the great sins, because it is specifically threatened with the grievous 
punishment mentioned in the Hadith…This is the summary position of our school on the question, and 
the absolute majority of the Companions of the Prophet and their immediate followers the succeeding 
generations accepted it. 887 
In a legal ruling entitled ‘Statues and Images; their benefits and legal ruling’ (al-taṣwīr wa al-timthāl; 
fawā’iduha wa ḥukmuha), ‘Abduh overturns this proscription. He gives this ruling after a trip to Sicily 
in 1903, where ‘Abduh favourably observes the European custom of preserving works of art and history 
for the sake of knowledge and for the benefit of future generations. He contrasts this with the perceived 
miserable state of affairs in Egypt: 
We (Egyptians) do not take any interest in preserving anything so we can retain its benefits for those who 
have yet to come…the gift of preservation is not part of what we inherit. Instead, what is inherited are 
the gifts of malice and resentment, passed on from fathers to sons until their corrupt men and ruin 
countries.888  
‘Abduh then addresses the issue of shirk directly. He argues the hadith proscriptions against images and 
statues were revealed during the age of pre-Islamic idolatry (al-wathaniyya) and thus no longer apply. 
This is because the threat of images becoming objects of worship is absent in the modern age. Egyptians 
must instead collect, document and preserve statues and images for their educational value. ‘Abduh 
insists that if one were to approach a scholar on this question, specifically;   
regarding the hadith ‘those people who will be most tortured on the day of Judgement are the fashioners’ 
and other such things from the Ṣaḥīḥ, he will say to you that this came during the days of idolatry (al-
wathaniyya). Images were taken up during this time for two reasons: the first was distraction and the 
second was to seek blessings from whichever righteous figure was depicted. The first reason religion 
detests and the second, Islam came to wipe out. The fashioner is both cases is a distraction from God and 
facilitator of shirk. (But) if these obstacles are removed and the benefit pursued, then… it seems to me 
that Islamic law is far from prohibiting one of the best tools for learning after it has been established that 
it is not a threat to religion. 889 
‘Abduh thus discredits the threat of statues and images becoming a means to shirk. There may be several 
reasons for this. It may be the case that, in an age of colonialism, the issue of the permissibility of statues 
is no longer a chief concern. Or, it could be argued that ‘Abduh, himself a product of the modern period, 
a time of print media and technology, fails to see any problem with images at all. Yet this did not affect 
 
887 Sharaf al-Dīn Nawawī. Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Imām Muslim (Cairo: Al-Maṭba‘a al-kubrā al-Amīrriyah, 1305/1887), 8/398. See 
Thomas W. Arnold, Painting in Islam: A Study of the Piece of Pictorial Art in Muslim Culture (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928), 9-
10. Shahab Ahmed, What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 49-
50.  
888 ‘Abduh. Al-A‘māl al-Kāmila, 3/203. For an overview see Dina Ramadan. ‘One of the Best tools for Learning: re-thinking 
the role of ‘Abduh’s fatwa in Egyptian Art History’, in Gitti Salami and Monica Blackmum Misona., ed. A Companion to 
Modern African Art (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2013); 137-153.  




other scholars of the period. There is a wider political context that is perhaps important to this ruling. 
Some decades previous, in the 1870’s the Egyptian Khedive Isma’īl (d. 1895) erected numerous public 
statues in Cairo as part of a raft of pro-European policies. Scholars from al-Azhar condemned the 
statues, likening them to the idols cleared from the ka‘ba by the Prophet.890 ‘Abduh would likely have 
been aware of this episode and uses his ruling, perhaps, as a further means of buttressing his ‘modernist’ 
credentials and of stressing the amenability of Islam to the modern age.891 
Art historians have lauded ‘Abduh’s ruling as an enlightened Muslim appreciation of the arts.892 A close 
reading of the text, however, reveals no interest in art or aesthetics. ‘Abduh’s focus is strictly on statues 
and images as sources of knowledge and learning.893 In this vein, the ruling reinforces ‘Abduh’s stress 
on Islam as a rational faith that is no barrier to worldly success and progress. It would seem that once 
‘Abduh perceived the benefits of images and statues, as during his visit to Sicily, his ‘functionalist’ 
conception of Islam means that the faith cannot be an obstacle to a source of progress. This is clear in 
‘Abduh’s brief comments on legal methodology. While standing against the weight of the classical legal 
tradition, ‘Abduh’s comments are terse: 
I would say to you that the fashioner has fashioned (the image) and the benefit is unquestionable, 
undisputed. The idea of worship (‘ibāda) or the exaltation (ta’ẓīm) of pictures and statues has clearly 
been wiped from people’s minds…In general, it seems to me that Islamic law is far from prohibiting one 
of the best tools for learning after it has been established that it is not a threat to the religion.” 894 
In this episode it is the medieval understanding of shirk that is an obstacle. The classical view of statues 
and images as a means to shirk had itself become irrational and a source of backwardness in his time. 
‘Abduh thus swiftly rejects a medieval reading of shirk. To maintain the classical ruling of an-Nawawī 
vis-à-vis images and statues in the current age, in light of their benefits for Muslims, did not support 
‘Abduh’s insistence that Islam is a rational faith, nor his orientation towards worldly progress.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter is not an exhaustive account of ‘Abduh’s life and thought. It suffices from the foregoing 
to draw out some general themes. In an era defined by Enlightenment notions of ‘reason’ and ‘progress’, 
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prohibited as a means to idolatry (al-wathaniyya) and argues that erecting statues is a custom that has been imported from the 
West and that those arguing for its practice perform “taqlīd of the polytheists and Christians” (p. 95).  
892Egyptian art historian Samīr Gharīb has “no doubt that this fatwa (of ‘Abduh) played an important role in supporting the 
fine arts and artists and in and encouraging research in the arts.” Samīr Gharīb, Fī Tārīkh al-Funūn al-Jamīla (Cairo: Dār al-
Shurūq, 1998), 68. ‘Abduh is described as a “connoisseur of the arts, a lover of artistic creativity” in Muḥammad ‘Amāra. Al-
Islām wa al-Funūn al-Jamīla (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1991), 136. See Ramadan. ‘One of the Best tools for Learning’, 138.  
893 Ramadan. ‘One of the Best tools for Learning’, 148. (“Even while ‘Abduh is praising both (images and statues) forms of 
expression, he is flattening them into a means of documentation, emptied of any kind of aesthetic worth, measured in terms of 
accuracy and ability to capture “truth” there is certainly no celebration of creativity or aesthetic pleasure.”)  




‘Abduh insists Islam is inherently rational and progressive. The crux of the matter, for ‘Abduh, is that 
Islam is not against many of the changes of the modern world, nor are these a threat to faith. Properly 
conceived, Islam is compatible and even mandates these changes. Yet ‘Abduh offers a distinct Islamic 
conception of ‘modernity’, one in which reason works in the service of faith, not in opposition to it, and 
Islam is not an obstacle to worldly progress, but the source of it. ‘Abduh thus challenges European 
discourses of reason and a secular definition of religion as a purely private matter. This underlines his 
responses to Anṭūn and Hanoteaux, who justify the ‘civilising mission’ of Europe and call for secular 
rule in the Arab world. ‘Abduh embraces much of what we call ‘modernity’, then, but he also 
reconfigures it. And if his treatment on shirk appears scattered, expressed in different terms and across 
a range of contexts, from the nature of idolatry to Christian doctrine, from the acquisition of modern 
science and technology to a critique of the cult of saints and defence of statues and images, what ties 
this together is a view of shirk as both irrational and a source of worldly decline. This is the common 
underpinning. This is, of course, an inversion of ‘Abduh’s conception of Islam as a rational and 
progressive religion. In line with a ‘functionalist’ reading of religion, where Islam is defined above all 
by is worldly benefits, it seems that the punishment for shirk is not left until the hereafter. Rather, it is 
seen in the here and now.  
His attempt to straddle Islamic and European traditions leads to a historiographic tension in scholarship, 
with ‘Abduh variously termed a modernist, salafī, Mu‘tazilī, even Wahhābī. Yet his works raise other 
difficulties. ‘Abduh avoids exploring his most consequential ideas in depth. His stress on the place of 
reason in faith is never fully explored. His treatment on shirk leaves a range of questions that are never 
addressed. It is not clear, for example, why his reflection of shirk in relation to Christian doctrine is 
only implicit, couched behind a discourse of irrationality, but explicit in relation to the cult of saints. 
The reflection on shirk in the Risālat al-Tawhḥīd appears briefly and only implicitly engages his notion 
of sunnan Allāh. Nor is the relation between shirk and taqlīd addressed in ‘Abduh’s thought. As seen 
earlier, polemics against the legal custom of taqlīd are an important theme in ‘Abduh. He writes: 
How far those who believe in taqlīd are from the guidance of the Qu’ran!...Islam forbids us to use 
taqlīd…. If we continue to follow this way of taqlīd, there will be no one who holds to the religion. But 
if we return to the use of reason to which God directs us…there is hope we can revive the religion. 895 
There seems clear overlap of shirk and taqlīd. ‘Abduh condemns both for the failure to use reason, with 
both seen as sources of decline. ‘Abduh even expresses his critique of taqlīd in terms deeply resonant 
of the idea of shirk, describing taqlīd as “worship of scholars” (‘ibādat al-‘ulamā’).896 Jurists, he adds, 
take their legal texts over the Qur’an as the “foundation of the religion” (asās al-dīn).897 Perhaps ‘Abduh 
imagines taqlīd to be a kind of shirk, a way of ‘associating’ jurists with the tenants of revelation. But 
he never makes this clear. This leads to what is perhaps the key tension in his works. ‘Abduh defends 
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the rational and progressive nature of Islam, it seems, only by distancing this from much of Islamic 
history and practice. We see this across this chapter. His scepticism of miracles goes against a key 
feature of traditional Muslim piety.898 ‘Abduh criticizes Christianity for positing miracles as proof of 
faith. But as critics like Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī (d. 1954) noted, the Islamic tradition also views miracles as a 
proof of Muhammad’s prophecy.899  His stress on sunnan Allāh, as seen, suggests a disconnect from the 
life of ordinary believers. A common theme is to defend the rational nature of Islam against the beliefs 
and practices of many Muslims: 
What is called ‘Islam’ is not really Islam. It is only the preservation of some ritual actions like prayer, 
fasting and the pilgrimage, or the retention of certain expression… Everything that is defective today 
among Muslims is not from Islam, rather it is from something else that has been called ‘Islam.’900  
This ultimately means that ‘Abduh calls to a rational and progressive Islam that, by his own admission, 
did not exist. It existed only in his vision of ‘true’ Islam, one that stood in stark contrast to what Islam 
had become in his time. ‘Abduh defends Islam, then, by severing it from the beliefs and practices of 
Muslims and key aspects of Islamic history. Only in this way can he carve a place for Islam in an age 
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Chapter VI: Shirk and the Political Sphere: Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966) 
 
Islam must govern. (lā budd li al-islām an yaḥkum).901 
To give people sovereignty over people is to deify them. (taḥkīm al-nās fī umūr al-nās ta‘līh lahum) 902  
 
Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966) is among the most controversial thinkers of twentieth century Islamic thought. 
A major figure of recent Egyptian and Islamic history, Quṭb is widely known as an “Islamic 
fundamentalist theorist” given his influence upon a range of radical movements in the second half of 
the twentieth century.903 The leaders of Al Qaeda, among other groups, have described Quṭb as an 
inspiration.904 For this reason Quṭb has attracted considerable attention in the West in recent years. His 
biographer John Calvert notes: 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 atrocity, commentators scrambled to piece together Al Qaeda’s ideological 
geneology…Generally, in these studies, Qutb stands at the fore of the genealogical trail. A consensus 
has emerged that the ‘road to 9/11’ traces back to him…One cannot deny Qutb’s contribution to the 
contemporary tide of global jihad. 905 
Yet the importance of Quṭb for scholars of Islamic studies and for modern Muslim discourses is not 
limited to his link with groups like Al Qaeda.906 Quṭb’s influence lies in his status as an early ideologue 
of the Muslim Brotherhood revivalist movement (ikhwān al-muslimīn), his writing in a turbulent period 
of Egyptian and Arab post-colonial history, his execution in 1966 at the hands of the Egyptian regime 
and, lastly, his producing a dramatic and highly engaging prison exegesis of the Qur’an. Written in 
several drafts between 1954 and 1966, this is Quṭb’s magnum opus and considered one of the most 
influential, widely read and translated Qur’anic commentaries of recent times.907 
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We have a wealth of biographical literature on Quṭb.908 Quṭb was born in 1906 and was for most of his 
life an essayist, poet and literary critic.909 Only in the 1940’s did he turn to write on Islamic themes. 
This was in response to wider events in the region; the Second World War and the coming independence 
of Egypt after British colonial rule, also the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.910 A two-year study 
visit to the United States sharpened this turn and Quṭb joined the Muslim Brotherhood (hereon: MB) 
upon his return. Quickly emerging as a leading ideologue of the MB after the assassination of its 
founder, Ḥassan al-Bannā (d. 1949), Quṭb and other MB members were imprisoned by the regime of 
Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir in 1954 on conspiracy charges. Quṭb spent most of the rest of his life in prison. It 
is widely-known that his experiences in prison, the isolation and torture he received, had a dramatic 
effect upon Quṭb’s thought.911 From the vantage point of prison, Quṭb wrote his most famous and 
controversial works, including his Qur’an commentary, entitled In the Shade of the Qur’an (Fī Ẓilāl al-
Qur’an: hereon Fī Ẓilāl), and his prison manifesto, Milestones (Ma‘ālim fī al-Ṭarīq; hereon 
Ma‘ālim).912 Both works call in effect for an Islamic revolution to overthrow the secular, Egyptian 
regime. Quṭb was executed by the al-Nāṣir regime, ostensibly due to the ideas contained in these works, 
in 1966.913 He has since been lauded as a martyr for later generations of followers.914 
An outline of Quṭb’s thought 
 
This chapter examines Quṭb’s thought in its final, most developed form. Drawing primarily on the final 
edition of his prison commentary and Ma‘ālim, this chapter engages Quṭb’s ideas in the last two years 
of his life, from 1964-66. Quṭb’s very writing style in these works mark a break with the conventions 
of classical scholarship. His sentences are brief. The frequent use of exclamation marks gives his works 
a dramatic, urgent tone. The flow and cadence of his prose reveals his literary background while the 
emphasis throughout is on moral exhortation rather than sober, scholarly analysis.915 One senses the 
prison environment in these works and a dominant theme in Fī Ẓilāl is Quṭb’s deep aural and aesthetic 
appreciation of the Qur’an. Quṭb writes of the “atmosphere” (jaww) of the Qur’an and notes the distinct 
 
908 See Calvert, Sayyid Qutb, 23-197. Adnan A. Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of 
Radical Islamism (London: Praeger, 2005). Sayed Khatab, The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The theory of jahiliyya 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2006), 44-58. Carré, Mysticism and Politics, 1-21. Albert J. Bergesen, ed., The Sayyid Qutb 
Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion and Society (New York & London: Routledge, 2008), 1-33. The most 
authoritative Arabic biographies are Ṣalāḥ ‘Abd al-Fatāh al-Khālidī. Sayyid Quṭb; min al-Mīlād ilā al-istishhād (Dimaqsh; 
Dār al-Qalam, 2010). This is an expanded version of his Sayyid Quṭb: al-Shahīd al-Ḥayy (‘Ammān: Maktabat al-Aqṣa, 1985). 
‘Adīl Hamūda. Sayyid Quṭb: min al-Qarya ilā al-Misnaqa: tahqīq wāthā‘iqī, 3rd edition (Cairo: Sina li-l-Nashr, 1990).  
909 A full compilation of Quṭb’s poetic works written in this period has been published. Sayyid, Quṭb. Al-A‘māl al-Sha’riyya 
al-Kāmila, ed. ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-‘Aṭiyya (al-Qāhira: Markaz al-Ahrām lī al-Tarjama wa al-Nashr, 2012). 
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“personality” (shakhsiyya) of each chapter, even likening its effect to musical rhythm (īqā’ mūsiqī).916 
Quṭb insists the Qur’an should be internalized as a lived experience, not engaged as a text for scholarly 
analysis: 
Living in the atmosphere of the Qur’an does not mean studying the Qur’an, reciting it, becoming familiar 
with Qur’anic scholarship…Rather, what we mean by living in the atmosphere of the Qur’an is for man 
to live in an atmosphere, in circumstances, in a movement, even in suffering and a struggle…like those 
within which this Qur’an was revealed. 917 
It is known that Quṭb’s ideas changed in prison but it is worth noting how Quṭb conceives of this change. 
Quṭb describes his transformation in deeply spiritual, even mystical, terms, depicting his prison years 
as a time in which some of the hidden truths and mysteries of the Qur’an were revealed to him. The 
sense is of a kind of spiritual awakening. His introduction to Fī Ẓilāl reads: 
Life in the shade of the Qur’an is a blessing. A blessing that only he who has tasted it (man dhāqahā) 
knows. A blessing that lifts, blesses and purifies the age…Praise be to God…Who has blessed me with 
this life spent in the shade of the Qur’an…in which I have tasted (dhuqtu) such from His blessing that I 
had never tasted before in my life… I have lived to hear God – Praise be to Him – speaking to me, a 
humble and insignificant slave, through this Qur’an…918 
Quṭb draws heavily on the language of taste (dhawq), a term highly resonant in Sufi tradition. In Sufi 
literature the notion of dhawq has special significance and conveys a sense of direct experience or 
awareness of God, encountered through spiritual wayfaring and divine disclosure rather than books or 
doctrine. This use of dhawq plays a central role in the famous conversion to Sufism of Abū Hāmid al-
Ghazālī (d. 1111), for example, and recurs throughout his spiritual tome, the Iḥyā.919 This is in line with 
Quṭb’s use of the term and means that Quṭb’s prison works are never without a deeply mystical element. 
His Arabic biographer Ṣalāḥ ‘Abd al-Fatāh al-Khālidī captures this and speaks of the spiritual signs (al-
ishārāt) disclosed to Quṭb in prison.920  
Quṭb’s prison writings are rooted in his conception of tawḥīd. This doctrine has a clear political and 
legislative dimension for Quṭb and this underpins his prison writings. The core doctrine of the oneness 
of God, Quṭb repeatedly stresses, cannot be limited to personal belief or ritual acts. It must underpin the 
social and political system. The real meaning of ‘no god but God’ for Quṭb is that there is no sovereign 
or authority other than God. Quṭb’s conception of tawḥīd, then, involves the rejection of all humanly-
constructed forms of governance: 
Islam is not just a number of beliefs that our minds accept, nor a host of rituals and acts of worship, nor 
a worldly system (niẓām) that is separated from faith and worship. It is a program that combines all these 
 
916 Quṭb. Fī Ẓilāl, 1/27-9. See also Issa J. Boullatta. ‘Sayyid Qutb’s Literary Appreciation of the Qur’an’ in Issa J. Boulata, ed. 
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aspects and unites them together on the basis of belief in tawḥīd and in deriving all systems and 
legislation from Him alone. There can be no division between accepting tawḥīd and implementing the 
sovereignty of God. 921 
There is no faith (īmān) in the person who objects to an order of God, whether on a big or small matter 
in the affairs of his life…or who depends upon human sources, other than God, to govern his economic, 
social and political life.922 
Quṭb describes the declaration of ‘no god but God’ as a “revolt (al-khurūj ‘alā) against all forms of 
human authority.”923 This means that the central theme in Fī Ẓilāl and Ma‘ālim is the call to govern 
exclusively by Islamic law or sharī‘a. From prison, Quṭb proposes an Islamic alternative to the 
dominant political systems and ideologies of the West, such as capitalism, communism and nationalism. 
It is axiomatic for Quṭb that our experiments with Western systems and ideologies had failed. Islam, he 
insists, offered a ready alternative to assume the leadership of humankind. In a dramatic opening to 
Ma‘ālim, Quṭb writes: 
Mankind today stands on the brink of a precipice! Not because of the danger of complete destruction that 
hangs over its head – this being just a symptom and not the real disease – but because humanity is devoid 
of those values necessary for healthy development and real progress… it is essential for mankind to have 
new leadership! 924 
As a mid-twentieth century Muslim thinker, Quṭb writes in a post-colonial environment where Western 
political and cultural influence is pervasive. His prison works are set against the backdrop of the height 
of the Cold War, with the demise of Fascism still in vivid memory. This prevailing political context is 
key. From the 1950’s Quṭb speaks of the rival blocs or “camps” (mu‘askarāt) of capitalism, communism 
and Islam.925 He stresses what he terms the comprehensiveness (shamāliyya) of Islam.926 The religion 
of Islam, he writes, offers an independent (mustaqal) and complete (mutakāmil) system that is entirely 
distinct and not dependent upon any Western system or ideology.927 Yet the influence of these rival 
systems was not of course limited to the West. It extended to the Muslim world. In Egypt, the al-Nāṣir 
regime of Quṭb’s time was a major advocate of the movement of pan-Arab nationalism (al-qawmiyya 
al-‘arabiyya), taking Egypt in a socialist and secular direction after the overthrow of British colonial 
rule in 1952.  
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925 Sayyid, Quṭb. Al-‘Adāla al-Ijtimā‘iyya fī al-Islām (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1413/1993), 190, 214 and 216. Sayyid, Quṭb. 
Dirāsāt Islāmiyya (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1402/1982), 172. Jan Peter Hartung, A System of Life: Mawḍūdī and the 
Ideologisation of Islam (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), 202. 
926 Sayyid, Quṭb. Khaṣā’iṣ al-taṣawwur al-Islāmī wa Muqāwimātuhu (Cairo: ‘Īsá al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1962), 17. For a 
translation see Sayyid Quṭb. Basic Principles of the Islamic Worldview, trans. Rami David (New Jersey: Islamic Publications 
International, 2006), 91-119. 
927 Quṭb. Al-‘Adāla al-Ijtimā‘iyya, 91-2 and 97. This is stressed in the opening chapter of Quṭb. Khaṣā’iṣ al-taṣawwur, 2-30. 
Basic Principles, 19-41. See also William E. Shepard. ‘Islamic and a ‘System’ in the Later Writings of Sayyid Qutb’, Middle 
Eastern Studies 25:1 (1989), 37. (“he insists that Islam is not to be identified with, or interpreted in terms of, Western ideologies 




The political theorist Roxanne Euben offers a perceptive reading of Quṭb that is central to this chapter. 
Euben presents Quṭb as essentially a critic of secular, Enlightenment rationalism. The insistence upon 
implementing divine law or sharī‘a that defines Quṭb’s prison works is, for Euben, an attempt to 
challenge modern notions of political sovereignty and governance that have, since the Enlightenment, 
excluded religious authority and transcendent truth from the political sphere, seeking instead to govern 
society solely on the basis of rationalist discourse. Euben writes:  
Virtually all of what we have come to call “modern” forms of authority are premised upon the right of 
human beings – either through a leader or representative or directly – to rule the public sphere … Qutb 
(thus) engages not just institutional and historical reality of secularism, but the epistemology and 
worldview upon which it is founded … (that is) the claim that knowledge is ascertainable through human 
reason, and that a theory of legitimate authority must be premised upon the right of humans to govern 
without the necessity of divine intervention. 928 
This is the crux of the issue for Quṭb. As early as his 1954 work al-Mustaqbal li-Hadhā al-Dīn (The 
Future of this Religion), Quṭb heavily engages European and Enlightenment history and condemns the 
Western separation of religious from political authority. Quṭb calls this a “hideous schizophrenia” (al-
faṣām al-nakd).929 He writes:  
It is not in the nature of a religion that it be separated from worldly life, nor for the divine system to be 
confined to personal feelings, ethical rules and ritualistic worship. Nor is it in the nature of a religion to 
be kept restricted to one corner of human life and be called a ‘personal affair’. No revealed religion can 
isolate just one small section of human life for God. 930 
In Ma‘ālim he finds the roots of this rupture in the Protestant reformation. Challenging Church 
corruption, Quṭb writes, led Europe to reject the idea of divine authority itself.931 Quṭb condemns what 
he calls the ‘western concept of religion’ (al-taṣawwur al-gharbī li ṭabi‘at al-dīn), which relates only 
to belief in heart (al-‘aqīda fī al-ḍamīr) and does not insist upon taking control of the social and political 
sphere.932 He stresses throughout Fī Ẓilāl that the very purpose of the Qur’an was not just to reveal the 
doctrine of the oneness of God, but to “establish a practical system” (inshā’ al-niẓām) based on that 
doctrine.933  
Quṭb is of course not the first or only Muslim thinker to critique Western secularism and this is a 
common trope in twentieth century revivalist writings.934 Euben’s analysis, however, situates and points 
to the essence of Quṭb’s thought. Firstly, it becomes clear that Quṭb’s prison works are not only directed 
at his secular and socialist Egyptian regime, nor Western systems, but more deeply at “rationalist 
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discourse itself.”935 Quṭb challenges the epistemological basis of Enlightenment secularism. This also 
challenges the common image of Quṭb in scholarship as an “anti-modern” thinker.936 Following Euben, 
Quṭb appears not anti-modern as such, but against the particular Enlightenment conception of 
‘modernity’ and what this entails of the exclusion of divine authority from the political realm.937 This 
critique is, in fact, as old as the Enlightenment itself; it echoes the counter-Enlightenment tradition of 
Herder (d. 1803), de Maistre (d. 1812) and others that challenged the notions of human reason 
championed in the Enlightenment.938 As if to show this, Quṭb praises the technological and scientific 
advances of the modern West and argues for their adoption in the Muslim world.939 This is, again, a 
common theme in modern Muslim discourse, rooted in a basic and perhaps problematic asssumption 
that Western material and scientific knowledge can be neatly excised from the secular environment 
from which it came.940 Yet Quṭb is aware of the danger of drawing on Western sources and urges 
caution, lest the adoption of Western science lead Muslims to imbibe something of the secular spirit:  
If we rely on Western ways of thought, even in teaching the Islamic sciences, it will be an unforgiveable 
blindness on our part. Indeed it is incumbent on us, while learning scientific and technological sciences 
for which we have no other but Western sources, to remain on guard…a slight influence from them can 
poison the clear spring of Islam.941 
This passage gives an insight into Quṭb’s binary distinction between the secular West and Islam. But it 
also reveals his awareness of the present weakness of Muslims. The decline of Muslims in the fields of 
science and technology, coupled with the Western expertise in these areas, means that even in his final 
works Quṭb is unable to countenance a complete break with Western sources and knowledge.  
The doctrine of jāhiliyya 
 
A common theme in Quṭb’s prison works is to avoid discussing some of the most complex and 
controversial areas of Islamic theology and law. We find little interest in Fī Ẓilāl, for example, with 
issues like the relation of reason and revelation, the interpretation of the divine attributes or the question 
of free-will or predestination.942 Quṭb’s focus is not on classical dogmatics, then, but in expounding the 
implications of his reading of tawḥīd for the social and political spheres. In this context the doctrine of 
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jāhiliyya is a defining feature of Quṭb’s prison works. He has been called the “exponent of jāhiliyya par 
excellence.”943 Derived from the root j-h-l, which has connotations of ignorance, the term jāhiliyya is 
usually translated as the ‘Age of Ignorance’. It is commonly understood to refer to the period of pre-
Islamic Arabia. In the pre-Islamic sources and the Qur’an, however, where the term appears four times, 
the term seems to have a range of meanings and often denotes a sense of barbarism or extreme 
behavior.944 Thus the Qur’an speaks of the zealotry (ḥamiyyat) of jāhiliyya: 
When those who disbelieved had put into their hearts zealotry - the zealotry of the time of ignorance 
(ḥamiyyat al-jāhiliyya). But Allah sent down His tranquillity (sakīnatihi) upon His Messenger and 
upon the believers and imposed upon them the word of righteousness, and they were more deserving of 
it and worth of it. And God is all-Knowing of all things. (48:26)  
Izutsu describes the Qur’anic use of jāhiliyya as referring to “the peculiar attitude of hostility and 
aggressiveness against the monotheist belief of Islam.”945 Yet other verses do seem to allude to a 
historical epoch, as when the Qur’an speaks of the “first jāhiliyya” in verse 33:33.946 This becomes its 
dominant sense in the hadith traditions. The Prophet is reported to use the term in a historical sense in 
al-Bukhārī. For example, we read: “the Quraysh used to fast ‘Āshūra in the jāhiliyya” and “the best 
people in the jāhiliyya are the best people in Islam.”947 Quṭb draws on the common historical sense of 
the term, but then recasts it. He excises the term from a specific era and asserts jāhiliyya as a state of 
being, an essential condition, that is possible in any time or place. This state arises whenever the laws 
of God are suspended on earth: 
Jāhiliyya – as God describes it and as His Qur’an defines it – is the rule of humans over humans because 
it involves making some humans servants to others, rebelling against God… Jāhiliyya is not a period of 
time but a condition, a condition which exists today, and will exist tomorrow…People – in any time and 
place – are either governed by God’s sharī‘a – entirely, without reservations – accepting and submitting 
to it, in which case they are following God’s religion, or they are governed by a sharī‘a invented by 
humans…in which case they are in jāhiliyya…Whoever does not desire the rule (ḥukm) of God desires 
the rule of jāhiliyya, and whoever rejects the sharī‘a of God accepts the sharī‘a of jāhiliyya and lives in 
jāhiliyya. 948 
Extracting jāhiliyya from a specific, pre-Islamic period is not entirely innovative. The Wahhābī 
chronicler Ibn Ghannām (d. 1811) describes the Arabian peninsula of his day as jāhilī given the spread 
of ostensibly idolatrous practices.949 Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) condemns the perceived ignorance of 
Muslims of his time in similar terms.950 It would seem Quṭb first encounters this particular use of 
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jāhiliyya, relating to the absence of sharī‘a, in Arabic translations of the Indian revivalist, Abū ‘Ala 
Mawdūdī (d.1979).951 The idea of jāhiliyya does not originate with Quṭb, then, though it is a major 
feature of his works and the doctrine for which he is most famous. 
For Quṭb, then, the state of jāhiliyya is rooted in an absence of sharī‘a. It arises from the secular 
separation of religious from political authority. By 1964 in Ma’ālim Quṭb no longer speaks of different 
camps (mu’askarāt) or systems but of a stark, Manichean divide between Islam and jāhiliyya. There are 
only two kinds of society, he insists, the Islamic or the jāhilī:952 
The jāhilī society is any society other than the Muslim society. More specifically, we can say that any 
society is a jāhilī society if it does not submit itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs, ideas, 
worship, and legislation. According to this definition, all the societies existing in the world today are 
jāhilī! 953 
Quṭb warns readers not to be fooled by the outward differences between capitalism and communism.954 
The shared rejection of the sharī‘a means that all these societies, for Quṭb, fall under the single category 
of jāhilī.955 Quṭb also distinguishes this from what he calls the earlier, more simple forms of jāhiliyya. 
While jāhiliyya was previously rooted in a basic ignorance of God, Quṭb explains, it was now more 
assertive, actively prescribing laws in defiance of the law of God and assuming a concrete, organized 
form in society.956 Most crucially, the scope of modern jāhiliyya was not limited to the West. It extended 
to modern Muslim societies. Quṭb is aware that no Muslim society of his time governed exclusively by 
the mandates of the sharī‘a. Some Muslim societies, he adds, even openly declare their secularism.957 
The Muslim world, then, was no less a manifestation of jāhiliyya: 
All the so-called Muslim societies today are (in reality) jāhilī societies. We classify them among jāhilī 
societies not because they believe in other gods alongside God…but because their way of life is not based 
on submission to God alone.958 
We can say that the Muslim community has been extinct for some centuries…the term ‘Muslim 
community’ is the name for a group of people whose manners, ideas, concepts, rules and regulations, 
values and criteria, are all derived from an Islamic source. The Muslim community with these 
characteristics vanished the moment the laws of God were suspended on Earth!959 
For Quṭb, then, there is no real difference between the Islamic world of his time and the West. The 
absence of divine law or sharī’a meant all modern society was jāhilī and that the Islamic world, properly 
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speaking, had ceased to exist. This final point, we may note, is a break with Mawdūdī.960 While Quṭb 
first encounters the idea of jāhiliyya in the works of Mawdūdī, he takes the implications of this doctrine 
much further.  
Quṭb reaches this stark appraisal of the Muslim world only in his final years, from 1964.961 We can 
perhaps read this as a culmination of his prison experience; subject to years of torture as a political 
prisoner in an ostensibly Muslim country, Quṭb concludes, perhaps, that the forces behind this injustice 
and the society that either supports or is indifferent to it could not be truly Islamic. But this also leads 
Quṭb to deeper reflection on the nature of jāhilīyya. While rooted in the absence of sharī‘a, it was not 
confined to the sphere of politics or legislation. Rather, it covered all facets of life, extending to the 
realm of values, concepts, philosophy, traditions and ethics. Quṭb thus condemns “jāhilī ways of 
thinking” (manāhij al-tafkīr al-jāhilī) and even writes in Ma’ālim that jāhilīyya has “robbed us of our 
minds.”962 Quṭb writes: 
We are surrounded by jāhiliyya today, which is of the same nature as it was during the first period of 
Islam, or perhaps more unjust (aẓlam). Our whole environment, people’s beliefs and ideas, habits and 
arts, rules and laws, is jāhiliyya. Even what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic 
philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of jāhiliyya! This is why true Islamic values never 
enter our hearts, our minds are never illuminated by Islamic concepts, and why no group arises among 
us like those of the first generation of Islam. 963 
All facets of society, then, even our conceptions of Islam, are the products of jāhilīyya. Quṭb thus 
presents jāhilīyya as an all-pervasive, multi-dimensional phenomena and, in this light, we can perhaps 
read the jāhilīyya doctrine as a metaphor for secular, Enlightenment modernity. It captures the essence 
of Quṭb’s Enlightenment critique. Rooted in an absence of divine law, Quṭb perceives the influence of 
secular concepts, culture and values as having so penetrated the Muslim world that even what were 
considered Islamic were, in fact, jāhilī constructs. For Quṭb, the age of secular modernity was essentially 
an age of jāhiliyya. It was not an age of enlightened progress, but a regression to a godless state of 
zealotry, barbarism and ignorance.  
The sovereignty (ḥākimiyya) of God 
 
The doctrine of tawḥīd, then, is not realized without implementing the sharī‘a. The society that fails to 
govern in line with the mandates of the sharī‘a is jāhilī and cannot be considered Islamic. This, in turn, 
leads Quṭb to a second major doctrine. This is the idea of sovereignty or ḥākimiyya. Quṭb insists in Fī 
Ẓilāl and Ma‘ālim that sovereignty is an attribute of God, often describing this as the primary attribute 
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of God (al-ḥākimiyya awwal khaṣā’is li-llāh) and pairing it with ‘legislation’ (al-ḥākimiyya wa al-
tashrī‘i).964 He writes: 
Jāhiliyya is based on a rebellion against the sovereignty of God (ḥākimiyya) on earth. It transfers to man 
one of the primary attributes of God, namely sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others…. 
Jāhiliyya…takes the form of claiming the right to legislate rules of collective behavior…without regard 
to what God has prescribed.965 
William Shepard summarizes Quṭb’s position: “Jāhiliyya is the ḥākimiyya of man; Islam is the 
ḥākimiyya of God.”966 Yet the term ḥākimiyya is a neologism. It is not found in the Qur’an or classical 
tradition. Again, Quṭb encounters this in Arabic translations of Mawḍūdī.967 The term is widely 
associated with Quṭb and Mawḍūdī even though the idea of the sovereignty of God was a central theme 
in Indian Muslim discourse of the early twentieth century, where Mawḍūdī likely encounters the term, 
with it meaning different things in different contexts.968 The term derives from the Qur’anic root ḥ-k-
m, derivations of which are found in over two hundred and fifty verses with connotations of judgement 
and authority. In three verses the Qur’an states; “judgment belongs only to God” (lā ḥukm illā li-llāh, 
12:40, 67; 6:57). These verses are crucial to Quṭb’s thought but it is worth noting, briefly, that medieval 
exegetes display considerably less interest. Focusing on Q12:40, al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) understands this to 
mean simply that God alone should be worshipped.969 Al-Qurṭubī (d. 1273) briefly comments that God 
is creator of everything.970 Others use this passage to argue a broader theological point.971 Thus al-Rāzī 
(d. 1209) argues on this basis against the idea of free will and stresses God determines all without man’s 
agency.972 In general, this verse fails to generate much discussion among the classical exegetes. 
By contrast, Quṭb’s discussion on 12:40 in Fī Ẓilāl marks a break with the classical exegetes. His 
comments on this verse reflect all the key hallmarks of his thought, capturing his insistence on the 
importance of sharī‘a and the exclusive sovereignty of God. Quṭb writes:  
(This verse means) judgment (al-ḥukm) belongs to God alone due to His divinity. Sovereignty 
(ḥākimiyya) is among the major attributes of divinity. Whoever claims sovereignty – whether an 
individual, a class, party, institution, community or humanity at large in the form of international 
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organisations – challenges this primary attribute of divinity...God alone is the source of authority…Even 
humanity does not have the right to sovereignty…people have only the right to implement what God has 
laid down with His authority. 973 
The contrast between Quṭb and classical exegetes, in substance and emphasis, is clear. Quṭb is 
concerned not with a classical theology of free-will over predeterminism, but with questions of 
legitimate authority and governance. Divine sovereignty is clearly conceived on political and legislative 
terms. While al-Ṭabarī and al-Qurṭubī comment briefly that God is the source of everything, Quṭb 
interprets 12:40 to reject all man-made systems of governance; human sovereignty is, by definition, 
illegitimate. Equally evident is the mid-twentieth century political environment in which Quṭb writes. 
He reads a rejection of the authority of class, party and even international organizations, alluding to 
initiatives like the Geneva Convention, into the Qur’an. 
Implementing the sharī‘a is thus central for what it means to be Muslim, to live in an Islamic society 
and to believe in the oneness of God. Quṭb writes that the purpose of Qur’anic revelation was to found 
an umma, order a society and establish a State (dawla).974 But this raises the question of what a society 
that submits to the sovereignty of God looks like for Quṭb. On this, he is notably silent. Quṭb insists 
upon the sharī‘a as an alternative to Western systems, then, but is not clear what this means in practice 
and refuses to lay this out in explicit terms.975 It is clear that this is not a call for the restoration of the 
historical Caliphate (al-khilāfa): Quṭb hardly mentions this in his works.976 Nor does he engage the rich 
field of fiqh or jurisprudence. The fiqh literature attest to a rich tradition of diversity and disagreement 
(ikhtilāf) among jurists over the exact meanings and ordinances of the sharī‘a, yet these debates are 
absent in Quṭb. There is much ambiguity, moreover, over the role of religious scholars (‘ulamā’) and 
jurists (fuqahā’) in his vision. These groups are seldom mentioned in his works and the impression, 
reading Quṭb, is that he envisions the sovereignty of God to be implemented free of any human 
mediation or interference. But this overlooks, of course, the traditional role of the jurists to be the 
guardians and interpreters of God’s law.  
This refusal to lay out a clear vision of Muslim society is not a curious lacuna but a considered choice. 
It is grounded in what Quṭb calls the “nature of the Qur’anic method” (ṭabi‘at al-manhaj al-Qur’ānī).977 
Quṭb reads a lack of theory and planning into the very essence of Islam. His argument proceeds in two 
stages. First, Quṭb writes that for thirteen formative years in Mecca the Qur’an revealed only the 
doctrine (‘aqīda) of no god but God. It did not give details of the society to be built on that creed: 
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Those who call to God’s religion and want to establish the way of life prescribed by this religion should 
ponder at length over the significant fact that, for thirteen years, the Qur’an exclusively expounded (the 
issue of) doctrine (al-‘aqīda) and did not deviate from this to describe the details of the system (tafṣīlāt 
al-niẓām)  that would be established on this faith, nor any of the laws for the organization of the Muslim 
society. 978  
The only aim of the Meccan period, writes Quṭb, was to “instill belief in hearts and minds.”979 Secondly, 
Quṭb notes that the Qur’anic verses giving rules and laws for society were revealed only after the 
establishment of the Muslim community in Medina.980 This proves that Islam, he writes, is a “practical 
program” (manhaj ‘amalī) concerned with “actual situations” (ḥālāt wāqa‘iyya), not theoretical 
abstractions (wa lā naẓariyya).981 Quṭb thus argues that the laws, details and technicalities of a Muslim 
society should be addressed only as and when these issues arise - in other words, only after the 
establishment of a true Muslim community;  
It is first necessary that a Muslim community come into existence which believes there is no god but 
God, commits itself to obey none but God, denying all other authority, and which challenges any law not 
based on this belief. Only when such a society comes into being, faces various practical problems and 
needs a system of law, does Islam initiate the constitution of law and injunctions, rules and regulations. 
It addresses only those who have in principle already submitted themselves to its authority. 982 
In this way Quṭb rejects outright the need to lay out his vision. This goes against the practical nature of 
the faith. In a notable passage in Ma‘ālim Quṭb scorns the very notion of theory and planning and sees 
in this an insidious ploy to distract and delay the Islamic state:  
The jāhiliyya which surrounds us…raises a very delicate question. It asks; ‘what are the details of the 
system (niẓām) you are calling to? How much research have you done? How many studies have you 
prepared and how many subjects have you written about? Have you constituted its jurisprudence (fiqh) 
on new principles? As if nothing were lacking for the implementation of sharī‘a except research in fiqh 
and its details, as if everyone had agreed upon the sovereignty of God and were willing to submit to His 
laws!... This is a vulgar joke on Islam, and any person whom respects Islam should raise themselves 
above it… By these tactics, jāhiliyya looks for an excuse to reject the divine system. 983 
Discourse on jurisprudence (fiqh) and the details of an Islamic society are a “waste of time”, Quṭb 
writes, akin to “building castles in the air”.984 Perhaps sensitive to a counter-charge, Quṭb insists he is 
not against fiqh as such; he embraces what he calls “dynamic fiqh” (fiqh ḥarakī), over the “fiqh of 
papers” (fiqh al-awrāq), the latter referring to the intellectual speculation he seeks to avoid.985 We 
should not, he adds, conceal God’s religion in books.986  
It is tempting to see in this a sensitivity in Quṭb over the complexities of fiqh, an awareness that abstract 
and technical discourse on jurisprudence will not usher in the sovereignty of God. It will only prolong 
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the jāhiliyya. But there is of course a key difference between the ‘Qur’anic method’ in Medina and 
Quṭb’s own time. Unlike the first generation of Muslims, Quṭb does not live in an age of revelation. His 
is not an age in which new Qur’anic verses are revealed to respond to practical situations as and when 
they arise. The age of revelation has ended and the sources from which a Muslim society will be built, 
presumably the Qur’an, sunna and fiqh tradition, are readily available. Quṭb’s allusion to the Qur’anic 
method in Medina thus does not obtain and it would seem that he reads his own anti-theoretical ethos 
into the sources. The paradox, then, is that Quṭb calls to a Muslim society that he ultimately refuses to 
define. The call to govern exclusively by the sharī‘a is the dominant theme across Quṭb’s prison 
writings, but he never defines what he means by the sharī‘a, nor develops a vision of alternative Muslim 
society. The sharī‘a remains a vague, if evocative, category in his works. Islam, he insists, is a practical 
religion that demands action first.  
On the nature of modern shirk 
 
The clearest way that Quṭb expresses his vision of tawḥīd is by condemning its opposite. This leads us 
to the place and function of shirk in his thought. While a true Muslim society that submits solely to the 
sharī‘a remains an ideal for Quṭb, he is able in contrast to point to what he considers the many 
manifestations of shirk in his time. At the outset, it is a challenge to separate notions of shirk from 
jāhiliyya in Quṭb. He does not explicitly distinguish the two and often describes jāhiliyya in terms highly 
resonant of shirk. In Ma‘ālim, for example, Quṭb describes deviation (inḥirāf) from the worship of one 
God.987 Only on closer reading do we find a subtle difference. While jāhiliyya denotes a general, 
underlying condition of ignorance, it would seem shirk conveys a more active, specific form of 
‘association’ with God that arises from this state. Put simply, it is symptomatic of jāhiliyya that people 
engage in shirk. Quṭb writes: 
Jahiliyya is not a specific of time, nor a particular stage, but a complete regression (inḥisār) of 
understanding the true meaning of divinity (al-ulūhiyya)…This regression leads people to commit shirk 
while reckoning that they follow the religion of God, as is the state in all the countries of the world. 988 
We therefore understand jāhiliyya and shirk as two categories that significantly overlap in Quṭb, but are 
not complete synonyms. The crucial connection is between shirk and ḥākimiyya. For Quṭb, anything 
less than exclusive submission to the sharī‘a constitutes shirk for it associates a core attribute of God, 
namely His sovereignty or ḥākimiyya, with other than Him. This is the essence of shirk for Quṭb.989 It 
is to grant sovereignty to other than God and Quṭb describes this as no less an act of shirk than 
prostration before an idol or image; 
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Islam considers this shirk; it considers that giving people the power to pass judgment and govern in 
human affairs is to deify them, to make them rivals to God, and Gods forbids this just as He forbids 
prostration to images and idols. Both are the same in Islamic usage. Both are shirk. 990 
In reality, the term mushrikūn applies to those who not only associate images and idols with God…but 
who give people (not God) the right to legislate for society and individuals, prescribing customs and 
ruling… in line with human, not divine, customs and opinions. 991 
Quṭb writes there is no difference between a belief in multiple gods and ascribing sovereignty to other 
than God: both are shirk.992 It does not matter, he adds, if those granted sovereign are called gods or 
not; the reality of shirk is the same.993 Quṭb reads this into the Qur’anic verse that condemns Christians 
for taking scholars and rabbis as lords (arbāb) besides God (9:31). Christians did not really worship 
scholars or believe them to be gods, he explains, but accorded them power to legislate and govern their 
affairs over God.994 The doctrine of shirk, then, is as equally tied as tawḥīd to notions of governance, 
legislation and sovereignty. All rival political systems and ideologies become tangible manifestations 
of shirk in that they usurp the divine attribute of sovereignty.  
Throughout Fī Ẓilāl Quṭb dismisses what he terms the ‘naïve’ (sādhij) conceptions of shirk that relate 
to images of wooden and stone idols from the pre-Islamic period. The idols of the present age, he writes, 
are manifest in the ‘idols’ of capitalism, communism, nationalism, secularism. Each of these systems, 
these ‘isms’, usurp God’s ḥākimiyya and submit Muslims to man-made legislation. We find clear 
allusions to these systems across his commentary: 
We see in our times various types or aspects of shirk, by people who otherwise claim to believe in God’s 
oneness…Today, people glorify certain gods which they may call ‘the folk’ (al-qawm) or ‘the nation’ 
(al-watan) or ‘the people’ (al-sha‘ab), or a host of other names. These are no more than unshaped idols 
similar to the naïve (sādhija) idols that the pre-Islamic idolaters had … People today acknowledge their 
Lord, but they abandon His commandments and His laws while they consider the orders and requirements 
of their own gods as sacred. For the sake of these gods, the commandments and laws of God are 
disregarded … We deceive ourselves when we restrict pre-Islamic idolatry (al-wathaniyya) to the naïve 
form of idols and statues…As for the essential nature of shirk, this remains the same beneath all of its 
different forms and shapes. We must not lose sight of this fact! 995  
Elsewhere, in a discussion on Abraham’s destruction of idols in the Qur’an, Quṭb writes: 
The worship of idols that Abraham prayed to God to spare him and his offspring from does not take only 
the naive form practiced by pre-Islamic idolaters and other communities…To limit the concept of shirk 
to this naïve form stops us from seeing other forms which affect humanity…we need to have a fuller 
understanding of the nature of shirk, its relevance to idols, and the nature of idols… (this is that) when 
banners or slogans are raised in any community which gives rulers or priests power to put in place laws, 
values, standards and practices at variance with what is acceptable to God, these are in effect gods like 
the idols of old. We see today that nationalism (qaymiyya), patriotism (waṭaniyya) or a certain class in 
society as a whole are made like banners or slogans venerated in place of God…whenever sharī‘a comes 
into conflict with the service of such banners and slogans, then God’s law is set aside and the 
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requirements of these banners are met…this is indeed a form of idol worship, because an idol need not 
be made of wood and stone. It can be represented in a doctrine or a slogan. 996 
Modern shirk is manifest is the ideologies and political systems of the age. More deeply, the essential 
nature of this shirk is the rejection of divine authority in the political sphere - it is the secular insistence 
upon the right of human beings to govern and legislate in place of religious authority. Quṭb knows he 
presents a fresh reading of shirk, hence the need to move beyond the ‘naive’ conceptions of pre-Islamic 
idolatry. This is also far removed from a traditional discourse on shirk that relates to saints, shrines and 
debate over intercession.997 Quṭb offers a dynamic and highly politicized reading of Qur’anic shirk in 
which the political systems of the mid-twentieth century are brought heavily to bear on the Qur’an. The 
scope of Quṭb’s reading seems both local and universal. References to ‘the people’ (al-sha‘ab) point to 
Western-style democracy. References to the nation (al-waṭan) or nationalism (al-waṭaniyya) probably 
have closer connotations: this is a thinly disguised reference to the trend of Arab nationalism popular 
in Quṭb’s Egypt.998 
Echoing the distinction between modern and earlier forms of jāhiliyya, it appears the nature of modern 
shirk is different, even more insidious, to that found in the past. In places one detects a sense of nostalgia 
in Quṭb for earlier, pre-Islamic forms of shirk. Quṭb notes almost wistfully how pre-Islamic idols were 
simple structures made of wood and stone, rooted in a basic ignorance of God. This, he writes, is less 
dangerous than the modern shirk of capitalism, communism and nationalism. These new idols are more 
aggressive and assertive, actively prescribing values, worldviews and laws: 
God – praise be to Him – issues a clear commandment that human beings should observe chastity and 
dress modestly. But the ‘nation’ or ‘productivity’ require women to go out revealing their beauty, to work 
as hostesses in hotels quite like the geisha girls in idolatrous Japan! So which gods orders are they 
following? … God – praise be to Him – commands that doctrine (‘aqīda) should be the basis of society. 
But ‘patirotism’ or ‘the nationalism’ orders that doctrine be disregarded and that nationality or race 
become the basis of society! ... God – praise be to Him – orders that His sharī‘a is Sovereign, but a single 
slave, or a group of people, say; “No! Slaves are those whom legislate, and their sharī‘a is Sovereign!” 
So which god is being followed? 999 
If pre-Islamic idols of wood and stone were a ‘naïve’ form of shirk, modern shirk is an active and 
dynamic force. It is a more conscious and assertive form of idol worship. In this vein Quṭb describes 
the communists, capitalists and secularists of his age as greater unbelievers (ashaddu kufran) than the 
pre-Islamic idolaters and opponents (mushrikūn) of the Prophet.1000 Quṭb, it seems, faces a more 
dangerous form of shirk than the Prophet himself.  
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Contemporary shirk is more dangerous in another sense. This again closely parallels modern jāhiliyya. 
The shirk of Quṭb’s age, unlike pre-Islamic idol worship, actively masquerades as Islam. We recall that 
Quṭb views none of the Islamic societies of his age fully applying the sharī‘a. While some Muslim 
countries openly proclaim secularism, he notes in Ma‘ālim, others pay lip service to Islam yet none 
fully govern by God’s law. The modern Muslim community, then, is in reality a mushrik community. 
Quṭb writes: 
We still need to explain who are meant by the term ‘mushrikūn’. These are those who claim that any 
being has a share of God’s attributes…(including) acknowledging the authority to legislate. Needless to 
say, the term mushrikūn includes those who claim this for themselves, however strongly they profess to 
be Muslims. We should be clear about who belongs to our faith. 1001 
The term mushrik applies to all regimes that grant sovereignty to other than God, regardless of whether 
they identify as Muslim. Qutb writes of ostensibly Islamic regimes luring unsuspecting Muslims into 
submission to other than God, under the veneer of Islam. The impression is that this is a more 
duplicitous and dangerous form of shirk:  
These regimes may profess to be Muslim…but at the same time they suspend God’s law and replace it 
with man-made law…Despite all this, people continue to think that they live as true Muslims in a Muslim 
society. Is it not true, they ask, that the good among them continue to pray and fast? The central question 
of whether sovereignty belongs to God alone or to a diversity of deities no longer concerns them since 
they have been tricked into thinking it has nothing to do with religion. 1002 
A society of praying and fasting Muslims, then, does not constitute a true Islamic society. Quṭb 
describes the majority of Muslims as ‘tricked’ into ignoring the question of sovereignty and his account 
of the origins of this deception are of note. Quṭb ascribes this to Zionist and colonial attempts to weaken 
and divide the Muslim world.1003 The promotion of false and narrow conceptions of Islam that relate 
only to ritual acts, Quṭb writes, and the creation of Muslim states that profess Islam while suspending 
God’s law, are the latest in a string of Zionist and colonial schemes against the Muslim world.1004 But 
this also exposes the divide between Quṭb and the lives of the majority of Muslims. A life of prayer, 
charity and fasting, for Quṭb, becomes a life spent in ignorance of the real meaning of ‘no god but God’. 
It is to be the unwitting subject of Zionist and colonial designs. Quṭb’s prison writings presume an 
esoteric distinction between those like Quṭb who perceive the true reality of things, the real nature of 
modern jāhiliyya and shirk, and the mass of ordinary Muslims, who do not.  
At this stage one must address the notion of takfīr or excommunication in Quṭb. As addressed in a 
previous chapter, the relation between sins and unbelief was an early debate in the history of Muslim 
theology. Mainstream tradition responded to the Khārijite’s by reaching a consensus that performance 
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of sins did not, in itself, constitute unbelief.1005 But Quṭb’s exact stance on takfīr is unclear. Much of 
Quṭb’s writings seem almost designed to invite accusations of takfīr. We recall Quṭb’s claim that the 
Muslim world was jāhilī, that the term mushrik extended to those claiming to be Muslim, and that the 
essence of tawḥīd was the recognition of God’s exclusive sovereignty, a criteria notable absent in the 
modern world. He writes: 
Those who say they are Muslims…in reality they are not sincere in their worship of God, and they do no 
actualize, in reality, the testimony that there is no god but God. They submit their necks to (other) slaves 
like them, who act like gods over them and legislate for them…They are not believers.  1006 
The question in essence is between unbelief and belief, shirk and tawḥīd, jāhiliyya and Islam. This must 
be clear. People are not Muslims, even if they proclaim to be, as long as they live a life of jāhiliyya…This 
is not Islam, they are not Muslims. Today our task is to return these ignorant people to Islam and make 
them Muslims all over again. 1007 
Quṭb often speaks not of the Muslim world but the “world that claims to be Muslim.”1008 Yet he never 
directly addresses the issue of takfīr in Ma‘ālim or Fī Ẓilāl. He never engages the fiqh or jurisprudence 
of apostasy, meaning the kinds of passages above are never clarified. Only during his final trial, on 
being questioned by the prosecution, did Quṭb dissociate himself from a mass takfīr of Muslims. Quṭb 
affirms the presence of individual Muslims in a broader culture of jāhiliyya and shirk: 
What I mean the ‘Muslim umma’ is that which governs all of its worldly affairs, individual and general, 
political, social, economic and ethical, according to the sharī‘a of God…By this standard, it is not present 
in Egypt or in any other country. But this does not preclude the presence of individual Muslims. As for 
the individual, then judgment relates to his doctrine and ethics. As for the umma, judgment relates to its 
entire system of life. 1009 
Quṭb thus places his entire discourse on a macro-level. The notion of individuals committing acts of 
shirk largely recedes from view. The problem of jāhiliyya and shirk is the problem of the prevailing 
cultures, structures and systems of the age, one in which the belief and status of individual Muslims is 
not denied. 
It could be argued that Quṭb, a literary scholar, writes idiomatically in prison, that his discourse of 
jāhiliyya and shirk should not be taken literally but is, rather, a poetic call for a more deeply Islamic 
society. This is how supporters have read his works. In the editorial footnotes to a recent edition of 
Ma‘ālim, his Arabic biographer al-Khālidī writes: 
We need to remember that jāhiliyya does not necessitate kufr…Sayyid Quṭb is often accused of declaring 
takfīr over Muslims…even though he did not think in this way. (What Quṭb means by jāhiliyya) is that 
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we simply have to purify our thoughts, cultures and sciences that all the errors of jāhiliyya are linked to, 
that confuse us, and that narrow our path… 1010 
Others argue that Quṭb uses the category of jāhiliyya, not kufr, precisely to avoid takfir.1011 His brother 
Muḥammad Quṭb (d. 2014) cites the defense at trial, noted above.1012 In this way Quṭb’s supporters seek 
to distance him from any association with takfīr. But these attempts to absolve Quṭb perhaps only serve 
to reinforce the link. Nor, it seems, do they factor all the available evidence. It could be argued that 
Quṭb’s defense at his trial conceals his real attitude vis-à-vis the Muslim masses. Attention is drawn 
here to Quṭb’s final, uncompleted work, published only posthumously in 1985, in which he strongly 
alludes to the unbelief of anyone who actively or passively supports non-Islamic government.1013 Quṭb 
condemns these as “helpers of false gods” (anṣār al-ṭawāghīt), and writes: 
We stand before a group today…that claim to believe in what the Prophet revealed. They say, ‘We 
declare there is no god but God, Muhammad is the Prophet of God, we affirm the truth of the messengers, 
angels, Hereafter…. But God does not accept this from them! Nor does he consider these statements 
(sufficient for) faith!...Why? Because, as they say this, they submit to the rule of false gods, not the 
sharī‘a of God….God thus does accept their speech. Their speech does not enter them into Islam, give 
them the label ‘Muslim’, or protect their blood and wealth, as it is joined with a willingness to submit to 
the sharī‘a of other than God. 1014  
This seems directed at the masses of Muslims and not limited to the macro-level, forcing us to rethink 
Quṭb’s position on takfīr. It may reflect the final stage of development in his thought. Or, it may reflect 
a long-held view that Quṭb never disclosed previously and which he conceals during his trial. We cannot 
be certain. The question of shirk, takfīr and Quṭb’s real attitude to the Muslim masses, then, remains 
unclear.  
In light of this it should not surprise that fears over takfīr in Quṭb are not new. These fears emerged in 
MB circles during the final years of his life.1015 Three years after Quṭb’s death, then-leader of the MB 
Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī (d. 1973) wrote the treatise Du‘āt, lā Qudāt (Preachers, not Judges).1016 Ostensibly 
addressed to Mawdūdī though clearly aimed at Quṭb, al-Ḥudaybī rejects the notion of ḥākimiyya as 
alien to classical tradition.1017 He argues that the message of the Qur’an has been available to guide 
Muslims since the Prophetic era; given the universal nature of the message, it is false to claim Islam no 
longer exists in society.1018 Lastly, al-Huḍaybī argues with recourse to Muslim scripture and the 
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1016 Ḥasan, al-Huḍaybī. Du‘āt, lā Quḍāt (Cairo: Dār al-Ṭibā‘a wa al-Nashr al-Islāmiyya, 1977). Barbara Zollner argues al-
Hudaybi wrote the work alongside clerical scholars from al-Azhar and senior Muslim Brothers, all of whom were anxious to 
confront the radical interpretations of Qutb’s thought. See The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2009). 
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classical tradition that once a person declares the shahāda he is a Muslim, even if he sins. Al-Huḍaybī 
reflects the ambivalent reception of Quṭb in later MB history.1019 He also sets the terms for a common 
critique of Quṭb in subsequent decades. Later critics follow the basic contours of al-Huḍaybī’s treatise 
and view Quṭb’s ideas as contrary to the established teachings of Islamic tradition, with a clear potential 
for radical, exclusionary interpretations.1020  
Another question arising from Quṭb concerns the method for removing shirk and implementing the 
sharī‘a. Quṭb emphasizes action over theory, as has been seen. Indeed the whole tenor of his prison 
works is that Islam cannot rest while non-Islamic regimes are in place. Rival political systems are not 
neutral – they usurp the divine attribute of sovereignty and subject people to man-made legislation, 
actively prescribing laws over the law of God. Modern shirk also masquerades as Islam to lure 
unsuspecting and ignorant Muslims. Quṭb is clear: the message of Islam is to remove such shirk.  
The role of Islam is not only to destroy wooden and stone idols. That was not the purpose of all the efforts 
and sacrifices made by God’s messengers and their followers in history…it is necessary to look carefully 
at forms and appearances in every situation to establish whether the existing order conforms to the 
concept of tawḥīd or to a form of shirk. 1021 
This takes us to role of jihad, a major theme in Quṭb.1022 Quṭb extols jihad as the means God has provided 
to establish the rule of God.1023 He speaks of jihad by both preaching (dawā) and what he ambivalently 
terms “the movement” (al-ḥaraka). It is clear the latter means use of force. Drawing on notions of a 
practical religion, Quṭb writes that Islam engages preaching to reform ideas and beliefs and the 
‘movement’ to tackle the practical barriers to the implementation of sharī‘a.1024 He insists it is naïve to 
think one can remove the jāhilī system by preaching alone.1025 History, he writes, proves that jāhiliyya 
will fight to preserve its existence.1026 Reading this into the life of the Prophet, Quṭb notes the Prophet 
did engage in preaching in his early Meccan years but insists this was a temporary strategy; the real 
principle of jihad is the use of force, as seen in the Prophet’s final years in Medina.1027 Moreover, he 
argues the conflict between Islam and jāhiliyya is an eternal state, not a temporary phase, as Islam 
cannot compromise on the sovereignty of God.1028 It is at this point that Quṭb’s writings acquire a 
revolutionary tone: 
Establishing the rule of God on earth, abolishing the rule of man, returning sovereignty to God from its 
usupers…cannot be achieved only through preaching. Those who have usurped the sovereignty of 
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God…are not going to give up their power merely through preaching. If this had been so, the tasking of 
establishing God’s religion would have been easy!...This cannot be attained unless both preaching and 
movement are used.1029 
This religion is…a comprehensive revolution (thawra shāmila) against the sovereignty of man 
(ḥākimiyyat al-bashr), in all of its forms and manifestations, its systems and places. It is a complete revolt 
(tamarudd kāmil) against any place on earth where mankind rules…Any system where judgment is 
reserved to men, or the source of authority is men, deifies men. 1030 
The quietism of traditional Sunni political theory, stressing obedience even to corrupt rulers, is nowhere 
in evidence here.1031 Quṭb describes jihad as a liberation (taḥrīr) from the rule of men over men but 
insists this does not mean the forced imposition of belief. 1032 Jihad, he writes, aims only to remove the 
physical obstacles that prevent the sovereignty of God; once in place, people are free to believe or 
not.1033 Yet one suspects that Quṭb presumes an Islamic system would be so manifestly superior that 
non-Muslims would surely convert en masse. From this Quṭb attacks the argument, common to Muslim 
discourse in the twentieth century and promoted by figures like ‘Abduh, that jihad means only defensive 
war.1034 These ‘defeatist’ Muslims, as Quṭb calls them, perceive neither the true nature of Islam or 
jāhiliyya: 
This group of thinkers, a product of the sorry state of the present Muslim generation, have but the label 
of Islam and have laid down their spiritual and rational arms in defeat. They claim, ‘Islam prescribes 
only defensive war!’, and think they have done some good by depriving Islam of its method by which it 
abolishes all injustice from the Earth, to bring people to submission to God alone.1035 
Conflict with non-Islamic systems is not only permissible, then, but a sacred obligation, an essential 
part of the faith. It is the means of establishing the rule of God on earth. In this way Quṭb’s conception 
of tawḥīd appears inherently combative. The core doctrine of the oneness of God, manifest through the 
sharī‘a, cannot be realized except by resisting its opposite.  
There is little doubt that Quṭb envisions some kind of confrontation with the secular Egyptian regime. 
This also likely precludes any role for the masses, who, for Quṭb, were ignorant of the true nature of 
the faith. But much else of Quṭb’s writing on jihad is ambiguous. There is nothing explicit in his works 
as to the timing, tactics or legitimate targets of jihad, for example, while questions over the scope and 
method of violence are also unaddressed. Quṭb calls for a revolution against the jāhiliyya, but gives 
little practical detail to achieve this. Shepard writes: 
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In fact, very little in Qutb’s description of his “revolution” is specific. There is no indication of its precise 
circumstances; of how the revolutionary vanguard would be recruited, led, or organized; or what tactics 
it would use. All of this would presumably be dealt with when the time came.1036  
 
This could reflect Quṭb’s distaste of theory and speculation, seen earlier, or it may be that such practical 
matters were not yet resolved within Quṭb himself. Writing from prison, perhaps, Quṭb could personally 
attest to the importance of removing the jāhiliyya but the practical details of this were not yet worked 
out. Alternatively, John Calvert suggests that such discussions were taking place among Quṭb and his 
followers in prison but were not written down.1037 The imperative of jihad is a key theme in Quṭb’s 
prison writings, then, but its scope and method is another considerable area of ambiguity.  
The sharī‘a kawniyya (cosmic law).  
 
This chapter now turns to briefly examine a second reflection on shirk in Quṭb. The doctrine of jāhiliyya 
that defines Quṭb’s prison works, we recall, is not limited to issues of legislation and governance. This 
is the central attribute but jāhiliyya extends to the cultural, intellectual and philosophical levels. It is as 
a metaphor for all aspects of secular, Enlightenment modernity. Quṭb’s discourse of jāhiliyya thus 
extends beyond the call to govern by the legal commands of the sharī‘a and points to a deeper sense of 
disenchantment and alienation that Quṭb perceives to lie at the heart of secular modernity. This, in turn, 
leads to another reflection on shirk. This second reflection evokes a different kind of ‘association’ with 
God, in which people turn to material ‘gods’ and idols to placate the loss of a sense of the sacred in the 
secular world.  
Quṭb conceives of Islamic law as a cosmic law or sharī‘a kawniyya which connects man’s inner nature 
with the wider workings of the cosmos. As God is creator of both man and the universe, the sharī‘a 
harmonises man with the universe around him. Quṭb notes in Ma‘ālim: 
The sharī‘a which God has given to man to organize his life is a cosmic law (sharī‘a kawniyya). It is 
related to the general laws of the universe and harmonious (mutanāsaqa ma‘ahu) with it. Thus, obedience 
to the sharī‘a is a necessity for human beings so that their lives become harmonious and in tune with the 
rest of the universe. Also, obedience to sharī‘a is the only way harmony is found between the physical 
laws operative in the biological life of man, and the moral laws which govern his voluntary actions. Only 
in this way does man’s personality, internal and external (muḍmira wa ẓāhira), become integrated. 1038 
The sharī‘a provides a sense of unity, harmony and balance between man and the laws of the universe. 
All aspects of life, for Quṭb, from the inner working of the body to the movements of the planets, are 
regulated and governed by this law. Further appealing to dhawq, the true believer, Quṭb writes, ‘tastes’ 
the union between the cosmos and individual.1039 This, he adds, is the nature of the straight path (al-
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ṣirāt al-mustaqīm) that is referred to in the first chapter of the Qur’an, which regulates man’s primordial 
nature (fiṭra) with the movements of the cosmos.1040  
This is the essence of Quṭb’s call for sharī‘a. It is more than just a call to govern by its legal injunctions 
and Quṭb criticizes the “narrow” interpretations of sharī‘a that relate only to legal commands (aḥkām 
qānūniyya).1041 The crux of the malaise of modern jāhiliyya, then, is not only that non-Islamic systems 
usurp the attribute of divine sovereignty and subject people to man-made law over the law of God. More 
deeply, the problem is that under non-Islamic systems we invariably lose this sense of cosmic harmony 
and balance. Quṭb explains:  
Man is incapable of making laws for a system of life which can be in complete harmony with the universe 
or can harmonize his physical needs with external behaviour. The capability belongs solely to the 
Creator…Conflict begins when man deviates from the truth…under the influence of his own desires, and 
when he follows laws based on his own opinions instead of God’s commandments. Instead of submitting 
to the True Master with the rest of the universe, he rebels and revolts.  1042 
The failure to implement the sharī‘a means misery and corruption on earth. There is a strong Hobbesian 
element in Quṭb, a clear if implicit assumption that life is ‘nasty, brutish and short’ if removed from 
God’s law. Quṭb sees this evident in the modern world. He defines non-Islamic systems as the “slavery 
of man over man” (‘ubūdiyyat al-bashr lil-bashr) and his critique of secular systems is marked by 
scathing depictions of their apparent injustices: a common theme is to condemn the inequalities and 
exploitations of capitalism and the atheist materialism of communism.1043 More deeply, however, 
Quṭb’s critique of jāhilī society looks beyond these manifest injustices and points to a deeper sense of 
confusion, disenchantment and misery: 
Present-day humanity is afflicted with misery, anxiety, bewilderment and confusion; it flees from its true 
self by taking recourse to opium, hashish and alcohol… All this, despite material prosperity, high 
productivity and a life of ease with abundant leisure. In fact, this emptiness and confusion increase in 
proportion to material prosperity and convenience…the first impression gained by anyone visiting the 
prosperous, wealthy countries of the world… (is that) he will quickly realize that this material prosperity, 
sensual enjoyment and sexual satiation lead to a sinking into the morass of nervous and psychological 
disease, sexual perversion, constant anxiety, illness and lunacy, frequent crime, and the lack of any 
human dignity in life. 1044 
 
Quṭb presents an image of secular modernity as essentially one of misery, crisis and decay. Removed 
from the sharī‘a kawniyya or cosmic law, modern man is confused, unhappy and ill at ease. We do not 
live in a state of cosmic balance and harmony. Instead, we live a life of “hideous schizophrenia.”1045 
Quṭb’s project, then, is not only political in the sense of challenging the secular distinction between 
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religious and political authority. His call to implement the sharī’a is also part of a much deeper call for 
cosmological integration and re-alignment.  
This opens another reflection on shirk in his writings. Having lost a sense of the sacred, modern man 
seemingly turns to the false gods of materialism. A core aspect of secular, jāhilī society for Quṭb is that 
material goods are worshipped in God’s place. If not rooted in God’s law, we commit shirk through the 
false gods of pleasure and property. Quṭb writes: 
In America, new gods are worshipped, which are thought to be the aim of human existence - the gods of 
property, the god of pleasure, the god of fame and the god of productivity. So it is that in America men 
cannot find themselves, for they cannot find the purpose of their existence. The same is true of other 
states of ignorance, where similar gods are worshipped, and people cannot find God. 1046 
 
Quṭb spent some years in America and uses this to buttress his claims.1047 In Fī Ẓilāl Quṭb also speaks 
of the ‘lords of fashion houses’ (arbāb al-azyā’) that demand obedience from modern women. The 
following passage is significant for Quṭb here ties this to the issue of sovereignty and extends the scope 
of ḥākimiyya beyond the realm of legislation and governance: 
 
The servitude (al-‘ubūdiyya) towards men rather than God does not stop simply at servitude of judges, 
leaders and legislators…When the god of fashion prescribes a certain style in clothes, cars, buildings, 
parties people unquestioningly follow them. No-one even contemplates dissidence. If people submitted 
themselves to God in an even smaller measure than they do to fashion lords, they would be truly 
devout…If this is not sovereignty (ḥākimiyya) and lordship (rubūbiyya), what is?…The poor woman 
who feels she must wear something too revealing, despite its being unsuitable for her figure, and wear 
make-up that leaves her subject to ridicule, cannot stand up to the lords of fashion (arbāb al-azyā’) with 
their great power, nor the society devoted to it. If this is not sovereignty (ḥākimiyya) and lordship 
(rubūbiyya), what is? 1048 
Quṭb detects in this another underhand Zionist conspiracy. He notes how most of the fashion houses are 
“financed by Jews, who make the greatest profits from the fashion industries.”1049 Zionist influence, 
again, lies behind Muslim shirk. This sheds light on two reflections on shirk in Quṭb. The dominant 
reflection is the issue of sovereignty and the need to implement sharī‘a law in society. On this basis, all 
secular systems are manifestations of shirk. But this does not preclude another dimension of shirk, 
which points to a deeper sense of alienation inherent in secular modernity and which leads Quṭb to 
speak of the ‘lords of fashion houses’. Quṭb alludes to the latter in Fī Ẓilāl when he warns readers of the 
kind of shirk that is “stronger, deeper and harder” than that relating to legislation and governance.1050 
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In conversation with Western thought 
 
It becomes clear from the foregoing that Quṭb critiques all aspects of modern secular society. Beyond 
the key issue of sovereignty, he also detects a deeper misery and angst intrinsic to the secular world. It 
could be argued on this basis that Quṭb’s prison writings should be taken in broader perspective, that 
his notions of jāhiliyya and sharī‘a engage questions of authority, sovereignty and the nature of 
Enlightenment secularity that concern political theorists more broadly. This final section examines this 
in more detail. It reveals that Quṭb is a much richer and more complex figure than a one-dimensional, 
straightforward critic of the West. First, there is significant common ground between Quṭb and a range 
of Western theorists who share much of his critique of secular modernity. Secondly, a closer reading of 
Quṭb’s prison writings reveals the deep imprint of the very twentieth century ideologies that he 
condemns. This points to a latent tension in his works that belies his claims to Islamic purity, to be free 
of jāhilī influences. As will be shown, this tension appears to crystallize on Quṭb’s writings on shirk. 
As noted earlier, Roxanne Euben reads Quṭb as essentially a critic of modern, Enlightenment-inspired 
rationalism and the parallel rejection of religious authority from the political sphere. But it is important 
to note that much of Quṭb’s critique echoes a ‘counter-Enlightenment’ tradition that finds its origins in 
the Enlightenment project itself, and which continues in various guises into the modern period. Indeed, 
Euben’s main conclusion is to point to the clear parallels between Quṭb and a range of Western political 
theorists who critique the Enlightenment project on similar grounds. Euben writes:   
Several Western political theorists share with Qutb a vision of modernity as a condition of crisis and 
decay, despite radical differences with Qutb and with each other about the ways in which the “modern 
malaise” may be remedied…Qutb shares with a diverse array of Western theorists – and of Westerners 
in general - the anxiety that modern rationalism has exacted too heavy a toll. 1051 
Qutb’s concerns about the schizophrenia of modernity and the costs of rationalism resonate with those 
in the West who are similarly concerned with the ways in which the rupture with tradition and 
transcendent foundations has resulted in crises of authority, morality and community.1052 
In particular, Euben points to moral philosophers like Alasdair McIntrye (b. 1929) and Charles Taylor 
(b. 1931) as two Western theorists concerned with a perceived rupture with tradition in the West, and 
the crises of authority that flow from a lack of transcendent foundations.1053 Quṭb has great differences 
of course with these and other thinkers in conceiving the malaise in terms of jāhiliyya and presenting a 
vague if evocative call to the sharī‘a as the solution. But it is worth noting that his essential critique of 
secular modernity, its perceived sense of alienation and lack of spiritual, moral and transcendent 
foundations, is shared with these Western interlocutors.1054 This deepens our reading of Quṭb. His 
critique of Enlightenment modernity, captured in the doctrine of jāhiliyya, is not an example of 
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“orientalism in reverse”, as has been claimed.1055 Nor is James Toth correct to describe Quṭb’s writings 
as “an awkward outpouring of defensive discourse.”1056 Rather, Quṭb presents a considered critique of 
the sense of spiritual vacuity, materialism and secular legislation that lies at the heart of Enlightenment 
modernity, the latter rooted in an elevation of human reason at the expense of transcendent authority. 
In so doing, Quṭb reveals his common ground with a range of Western political theorists who critique 
Enlightenment notions of rationalism and secular modernity on similar grounds. 1057 
Quṭb’s relation to Western thought can be addressed from another angle. This relates to the tension in 
Quṭb’s works between his claims to ideological purity, on the one hand, and the implicit indebtedness 
to many of the core concepts and categories of the modern, jāhilī world, on the other. It is clear in 
Ma‘ālim that Quṭb views himself entirely free of jāhilī influence. He speaks in the past tense of a time 
when jāhilī influences clouded his thought: 
The person writing these lines has spent forty years of his life in reading books and researching almost 
all aspects of knowledge…then he turned to the fountainhead of his faith (the Qur’an). He came to feel 
that whatever he had read so far was nothing in comparison to what he found there. But he does not regret 
spending his life in pursuit of these sciences, because he came to know the nature of jāhiliyya, its 
deviations, errors, ignorance, its pomp and noise, arrogance and boastful claims. Finally, he became 
convinced that a Muslim cannot combine these two sources – the source of divine guidance and the 
source of jāhiliyya. 1058 
A recurring theme is to revive the “purity” and “pure way of thinking” of early Muslims, the ‘unique 
Qur’anic generation’.1059 Yet a deeper look at Quṭb challenges his pretensions to purity and reveals the 
clear influence of jāhilī sources. In many ways Quṭb’s conception of Islam is remarkably modern. 
Frequent descriptions of Islam as a system (niẓām), for example, reflect modern usage.1060 The concept 
of ḥākimiyya, central to Quṭb, is a neologism not found in the Qur’an or the classical tradition. Quṭb 
seems aware and tries to reconcile this; hence the claim in Ma‘ālim that the first Muslims knew 
instinctively that the term divinity (ulūhiyya), meant sovereignty (ḥākimiyya) and revolution 
(thawra).1061 Quṭb’s conception of sovereignty is also distinctly modern - we recall the difference 
between Quṭb and classical commentators on the verse 12:40 – and tied to notions of authority and 
legislation that make sense perhaps only in the context of a modern nation state. The sociologist 
Anthony Giddens observes that modern states are sovereign because, unlike their pre-modern 
counterparts, they are able: 
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To make laws and effectively sanction their upkeep; exert a monopoly over the disposal of the means to 
violence; control basic policies relating to the internal political or administrative form of government; 
and dispose of a national economy that is the basis of its revenue.1062 
The parallels with the all-encompassing nature of jāhiliyya are clear.1063 Quṭb takes a modern conception 
of political and legislative sovereignty, then, and applies this to the law of God. In sum, Quṭb’s attempt 
to revive a past ideal of Muslim purity, free of jāhiliyya, jars with a vision of Islam that is deeply shaped 
by the modern world in which jāhiliiya is such a defining part.1064 
This tension is most explicit in Quṭb’s writing on shirk. To recall, Quṭb views any challenge to divine 
sovereignty as a manifestation of shirk. The secular systems of communism, capitalism and nationalism 
are condemned by Quṭb as the ‘idols’ of the age. Yet a closer reading of Quṭb reveals the deep imprint 
of these systems upon his thought. In Ma‘ālim Quṭb describes Islam as 
a universal declaration of the liberation of man from servitude to other men… it is a comprehensive 
revolution (thawra shāmila) against the idea of the sovereignty of man…Any system where final 
decisions are referred to human beings, in which the sources of authority are human, deifies human 
beings and makes them lords over others in place of God. 1065 
Descriptions of Islam as a ‘comprehensive revolution’ reveal the influence of twentieth century Western 
trends of liberation theology and Marxism, not classical tradition.1066 Quṭb’s vision of a dedicated 
vanguard (ṭali‘a) of Muslims, moreover, tasked with overthrowing the jāhilī system and to whom he 
dedicates Ma‘ālim, echoes Marxist theory.1067 There is perhaps a Marxist-inspired dialectic in his stress 
on a timeless battle between Islam and jāhiliyya. The claim that ordinary Muslims falsely believe they 
live in the Muslim world, rather than in jāhiliyya, echoes a Marxist false consciousness. Even the 
language Quṭb often uses to depict the jāhiliyya, such as the “servitude of man over man” (ubūdiyyat 
al-bashr lil-bashr), appears modeled on class conflict. Scholars of Quṭb note these parallels.1068 Quṭb 
dismisses a secular system like Marxism as a manifestation of modern shirk, then, an idol of the age, 
but much of the language, methods and categories of Marxist thought seem integral to Quṭb’s own 
conception of Islam.  
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It would seem Quṭb is aware of the tension. He anticipates claims that his vision of Islam is not too 
distinct from the very systems he models this against. In a brief passage in Ma‘ālim, he insists that any 
similarities between the Islamic and jāhilī system are entirely coincidental: 
Sometimes it appears that some parts of Islam resemble some parts of the life of people of jāhiliyya, but 
these aspects are not jāhilī nor are they from jāhiliyya. This apparent resemblance in some minor aspects 
is a mere coincidence. The roots of the two trees are entirely different.1069  
Quṭb cannot of course acknowledge his deep indebtedness to these jāhilī systems. This would undercut 
both his claims to be free from any traces of  jāhili influence and his emphasis, seen earlier, on the 
comprehensiveness (shamāliyya) of Islam, the idea that Islam is a distinct and dissimilar alternative to 
all rival systems. More often Quṭb criticizes other Muslim thinkers who strive, in his view, to find 
similarities between Islam and the West. Quṭb describes these as ‘defeated’ Muslims: 
There is nothing in our Islam of which we are ashamed about... This is the defeated mentality; defeated 
before the West, the East and all forms of jāhiliyya. This is found in some people – Muslims – who search 
for resemblances to Islam in man-made systems, or who find justifications for the actions of Islam and 
its decisions on certain matters by means of the actions of jāhilī civilization. A person who feels the need 
of defense, justification and apology is not capable of presenting Islam to people. Indeed, he is a person 
who lives a life of jāhiliyya. 1070 
This critique is aimed at Muslims who would see the West as a possible source of guidance and imitation 
for Muslims. Yet Quṭb is clearly guilty of what he condemns in others. He falls short of his own 
standards, albeit with the caveat that his indebtedness to Western thought is implicit, couched behind a 
discourse of modern jāhiliyya and shirk. Perhaps this should not surprise us. Quṭb is himself a product 
of twentieth-century Enlightenment modernity, a context in which Western thought and influence was 
pervasive. It is hardly credible that his conception of Islam will be inculcated entirely from the milieu 
in which he lived. This is precisely what he claims, of course, but a closer reading reveals Quṭb is 
influenced and repulsed by Marxism in equal measure.  
Conclusion   
 
In closing, two final aspects of Quṭb’s prison writings merit closer scrutiny. Firstly, it is clear that in 
many ways Quṭb is not a unique or original figure in recent Egyptian or Islamic history. It has been 
argued that Quṭb is known more for his impact than originality; “Quṭb stepped into a stage largely 
constructed by the intellectual and political work of others.”1071 We see this in several ways. In an 
Egyptian context, Quṭb is tied to the trajectory of the MB movement as its leading ideologue after the 
assassination of Ḥassan al-Bannā, in 1949. Quṭb also draws on broader revivalist streams that gained 
currency across the mid-twentieth century, particularly the works of Mawḍūdī.1072 The notions of 
jāhiliyya and ḥākimiyya, key pivots of Quṭb’s thought, were taken from Arabic translations of Mawḍūdī, 
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with the latter a popular theme in Indian Muslim discourse at the time.1073 More broadly, Quṭb engages 
questions of authority, sovereignty and secularism that speak to political theorists more broadly, and 
makes a critique of secular modernity that resonates with several Western theorists. One finds the clear 
imprint of revolutionary trends of Western thought, particularly Marxist ideology, for Quṭb’s 
conception of Islam. In total, then, Quṭb can be seen to draw on a broad range of trends from Islamic 
and Western discourses. Quṭb’s importance and contribution to modern Islamic thought lies less in 
originality, perhaps, than in an ability to synthesize these multiple, diverse strands of influence. 
The second aspect of Quṭb’s writings is its strong sense of ambiguity, the refusal to be bound by the 
questions that have historically preoccupied Islamic thinkers. Quṭb refuses to define the meaning of 
sharī‘a and is ambivalent on both the issue of takfīr and the scope of jihad. He never fully explores or 
unpacks his most consequential ideas. There may be several reasons for this. Subject to torture and 
isolation, Quṭb’s prison works do not aim to be dry and scholastic, perhaps, but aim to express, in fluid 
and powerful prose, the core truth of jāhiliyya as Quṭb had come to perceive it, and to offer an urgent 
call to action. A literary scholar who ruminated on the Qur’an in prison, it is no surprise his works seem 
ambiguous when approached through the lens of the classical tradition. Alternatively, it could be argued 
that Quṭb had not resolved many of these matters in his own mind - he had not, perhaps, found the 
answers to the questions his ideas raised by the time of his execution. We could also point to the mystical 
nature of Quṭb’s prison works. Quṭb, we recall, engages the idea of dhawq or taste in prison. In this vein 
Quṭb writes in Ma‘ālim that his idea of a future Muslim society is clear, but only ‘in his heart’;  
If, because of the sorry state you are in, you cannot see the true picture of the Islamic life, because your 
enemies, the enemies of this religion, are all united against the establishment of this way of life, against 
it taking a practical form, then let us show it to you. Thank God, this picture is in our hearts (ḍamā‘irna), 
seen through the window of the Qur’an, (a picture of) our sharī‘a, our history, our vision of the future, 
whose coming we do not doubt! 1074 
The echoes with the ‘eye of the heart’ (ayn al-qalb), a common term in Sufi discourse, are clear. The 
vision of a true Islamic society, for Quṭb, is thus not to be detailed in books or articles, in what he calls 
‘the fiqh of papers’, to the uninitiated. It has to be ‘tasted’ to be known. Rooted in a sense of dhawq, 
Quṭb may feel no need to specify the precise details of his thought. It is the preserve of the chosen few 
who, like him, have ‘tasted’ the truth.  
Quṭb’s lasting influence in the Arab and Muslim world tells us the sense of ambiguity of his works has 
not affected his appeal. The attraction of Quṭb likely rests in the power and flow of his rhetoric, his 
criticism of Western influence in the Muslim world, his evocative call to live by the sharī‘a and, above 
all, his status as a martyr. Accounts of Quṭb’s execution have acquired an aura of sanctity for later 
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followers, blurring the lines between hagiography and history.1075 Among this is a famous poem, written 
by his sister, Amina Quṭb, shortly after Quṭb’s execution: 
 Did you envision us meeting? Or has it already, 
Taken place in the land of the mirage,  
Then it withdrew and its shadow vanished,  
And turned into tortuous memories,  
Thus asks my heart whenever,  
The days grow long, after your absence…. 
Did we not walk upon the truth together? 
So that Good can return to barren land,  
So we walked along a thorny path,  
Abandoning all ambitions,  
We buried our desires deep within ourselves,  
And we strove on in contentment, expecting a reward from God.1076 
It is worth noting in conclusion that Quṭb’s conception of shirk played a direct role in his final trial and 
execution.1077 According to official court transcripts, the state prosecutor questioned Quṭb on his 
understanding of Islam and nationalism (waṭaniyya). The dialogue is recorded: 
(Question): What is your view of the current regime? 
(Quṭb’s answer): I consider it a jāhilī regime! 
(Question): So this means you see the need to change this regime? 
(Answer): It will be changed once there emerges the basis for an Islamic regime.  
(Question): And what is the meaning of idol (ṭāghūt) in your view? 
(Answer): It means any sharī‘a other than the sharī‘a of God! 
(Question): And what is your view of nationalism? Do you acknowledge or reject it?  
(Answer): In my view nationalism has to be based on doctrine (‘aqīda), not land. And we need to change 
the understanding of this term, as it is restricted to a region, to this much broader understanding…. 
(Question): And what is the meaning and significant of ḥākimiyya in your view? 
(Answer): It means the sharī‘a of God and the basis of all legislation.1078 
Quṭb then condemns both patriotism (qawmiyya) and nationalism (waṭaniyya) as non-Islamic notions 
rooted in Zionist and colonialist attempts to weaken and divide the Muslim world. He stresses that 
sharī‘a alone should be the basis for Egypt.1079 There is nothing in this testimony that is not readily 
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evident across his prison works. The crux of the issue for Quṭb is that a Muslim cannot distinguish the 
core doctrinal belief in the oneness of God, or tawḥīd, from exclusive submission to His law. This 
conviction, with its promise of hostility and revolution towards all non-Islamic systems, led to Quṭb’s 
eventual execution by the Egyptian government in 1966. Unique among figures surveyed in this thesis, 
then, Quṭb’s conception of the nature and meaning of modern shirk, its attribution to all secular regimes, 

































































That one should rethink the nature of shirk beyond ‘simple’ definitions of gross outward idolatry…seems 
to me an important and necessary task for both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. 1080 
 
In a semi-autobiographical work that explores the role and meaning of the sharī‘a in the modern world, 
Khaled Abou el Fadl opens by stressing the inevitability of change and historical contingency. This, he 
writes, invariably impacts how each generation engages the normative tenets and meanings of the faith. 
El Fadl writes: 
Since the Qur’an…was revealed, for centuries Muslims have memorised and recited the same words and 
verses about compassion, mercy, and love. The words have not changed. But what did mercy, 
compassion, or love mean fourteen hundred years ago, and what do they mean today? …. Even if the 
basic dogma and rituals of Islam remain unaltered for centuries, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
Muslims are forced to constantly restate, re-articulate, and rephrase their religious tradition…in essence, 
consecutive generations of Muslims have had to struggle with what Islam means to them and, as 
importantly, with what Islam means to the world in which they live…Generations of Muslims wrestled 
with these questions, and the generations of the twenty-first century and beyond will be no different. 1081  
What, then, does it meant to commit shirk, to ‘associate’ something with God? Echoing El Fadl, we can 
state that for centuries Muslims have read and recited the same Qur’anic verses that warn against shirk. 
But what did shirk mean at the advent of Islam, what did it mean throughout later Islamic history and 
how is it to be understood today? As central a concept as shirk is to Islam, this thesis reveals how there 
is no one understanding or definition of this concept. The prohibition of shirk is central to the Qur’an 
and lies at the heart of the Islamic understanding of monotheism. In this vein, shirk has a special power 
and potency in Islamic thought. Yet this thesis reveals that shirk is a multifaceted concept, open to a 
wide range of dynamic interpretations.   
The Qur’an has multiple ways of speaking of shirk and offers a range of reflections on the nature of 
‘association’ with God. This continues across later Islamic thought. In the life of the Prophet, shirk is 
equated with the literal worship of idols. Yet later figures came to interpret shirk in ways that reflected 
the social and intellectual contexts and concerns of their age. For Ibn Taymiyya, shirk is conceived as 
the love of other than God and manifest in the cult of Muslim saints, a response to the dominant Ash‘arī 
school and the defining feature of Mamlūk-era piety. For Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, shirk is a vast catch-all 
category that covers almost all facets of popular Muslim belief and practice. Stressing actions as the 
key criterion of faith, outward acts of shirk are the means by which Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb distinguishes 
true from false Muslims. A vast reading of shirk becomes an equally broad takfīr of the Muslim 
community. Muḥammad ‘Abduh insists that Islam is a rational and progressive religion at home in an 
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age of colonial modernity. ‘Abduh presents a range of reflections on shirk, yet the central idea that shirk 
is irrational and a source of socio-political decline is a common underpinning throughout. Sayyid Quṭb 
insists on sovereignty as a divine attribute, wherein the oneness of God entails exclusive submission to 
Islamic law. All political systems and ideologies of his Cold War age, from nationalism to fascism to 
communism, become reflections of shirk. Each of these figures were, and remain, controversial. They 
faced critics in their own time and beyond. Each of these figures devote their lives to the faith and lived 
in periods of national and political crisis. The power and potency of the idea of shirk lent added value 
to their works and sharpened their critique of Muslim societies. Yet what is key for our purposes is how 
each of the figures present what they view as the true nature and image of shirk in their time. The 
different reflections on shirk outlined in this thesis are many. What they do not offer is a single and 
fixed image of shirk. This thesis ultimately challenges any attempt at an essentialised definition of what 
it means to ‘associate’ with God.   
This is by no means an exhaustive study. On the contrary, it focuses primarily on readings of shirk as 
conceived by a small sampling of thinkers. Readers will note a lack of figures from the formative period 
of Muslim theology, the ninth to twelfth centuries, also the absence of representatives from the Shī’ī 
and Sufi traditions. These are potential areas of research and raise the prospect of further studies 
exploring interpretations of shirk across the many schools, sects and trends of Islamic thought. Even 
within the constraints of this thesis, moreover, it has not been possible to cover all material. The task of 
devoting one chapter to each of these figures means that we have not included all aspects of their life 
and thought, reception histories and intellectual legacy, nor exhaustively examined the mutual 
influences and crossovers between them. This is either alluded to in each chapter, signposted in 
footnotes, or awaits further scholarly investigation. Yet it could be argued that the selective focus of 
this study is a strength that serves to reinforce its central theme. Even here, in the examination of only 
four thinkers, we find a wealth of different readings of shirk and sufficient material for further 
discussion, reflection and study. And even points of overlap between thinkers, upon closer inspection, 
reveal their different projects. The best example of this is the cult of saints. The idea that popular 
veneration of saints and shrines constitutes shirk is a repeated theme. Muḥammad ‘Abduh, to recall, 
writes:  
Shirk is of various types…including that which has come to affect the Muslim masses (‘āmat al-
muslimīn) in their worship of other than God by way of bowing and prostration. And the greatest of these 
kinds of shirk is that by way of supplicating and seeking intercession (with God) by placing 
intermediaries between themselves and Him…And we certainly see this shirk among Muslims today. 1082 
These words could easily have come from Ibn Taymiyya or Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb. Yet in what sense can 
the cult of saints be said to constitute shirk, what is the nature of ‘association’ implicit in saint 
veneration? For ‘Abduh the cult of saints is shirk in the sense that it is an irrational form of piety against 
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the scientific and technological spirit of his age. In this, it is also a source of socio-political decline. For 
Ibn Taymiyya the cult of saints reflects a love for that which is other than God. For Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb, 
saint veneration reflects a failure to outwardly express the faith in one’s actions, making its adherents 
and defenders unbelievers. Each figure condemns the cult of saints, but does so in a different way. 
Shared reflection on shirk masks different ways of conceiving its essential nature and meaning. 
The primary aim of this thesis is to present the history of an idea: an enquiry into what it means to 
‘associate’ with God. But this thesis is also an investigation into the life and thought of four distinct 
thinkers, each of whom spoke of shirk. Exploring Muslim interpretations of shirk offers a window into 
the dynamism and transformation of the Islamic intellectual tradition itself. The words of Daniel Brown 
are pertinent here:  
Tradition is not an enemy of change, but the very stuff that is subject to change. Tradition both changes 
and may be used to justify change; it can, in fact, be revolutionary. The history of Islamic thought 
provides numerous examples of how the intellectual tradition of Islam has provided the underpinnings 
for adaption, reform and revolution. 1083   
We have seen this across this thesis. Whether shirk relates to Ash‘arī readings of the divine attribute of 
love, for example, or to Enlightenment notions of rationalism, law and political authority, tells us as 
much about the different historical contexts and intellectual projects of Ibn Taymiyya and Sayyid Quṭb, 
as the meaning of shirk itself. ‘Abduh’s vision of shirk as irrational and a cause of social and political 
decline is clearly shaped by the era and challenges of colonial-modernity in which he lived. In short, 
shirk offers a lens through which we explore wider changes and transformations across the history of 
Islamic thought. From one perspective, then, this is a study into the meaning of shirk. From another, it 
treats shirk as a cipher for exploring broader issues and debates in Islamic intellectual history. 
Despite being integral to Islamic thought, a sustained enquiry into the meanings of shirk remains a 
major lacuna in scholarship. This is perhaps rooted in a tendency in the field of Islamic Studies to focus 
on the study of specific thinkers, regions or time-periods. Studies rooted in conceptual history, tracing 
the history and evolution of a certain term or concept, remain uncommon.1084 Another reason is perhaps 
the tendency to readily equate and reduce shirk to the literal worship of idols or physical beings. As has 
been noted, shirk is often translated as ‘idolatry’ in English-language scholarship.1085 This is of course 
the original or even archetypal image. The Qur’anic account of shirk is traditionally viewed as targeted 
at idol-worshipping opponents of the Prophet. Belief in God and the Prophet is said to have meant an 
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end to idolatry and the destruction of idols. Kenneth Cragg argues that this traditional image of pre-
Islamic Mecca as a centre of idolatry has ever since ‘monopolised’ the idea of shirk:  
The commonest forms, in the first days of such shirk were those arising, of course, from idolatry. For to 
substitute an idol for God is manifestly to do Him wrong…Idolatry has almost entirely monopolised ever 
since the Muslim idea of what shirk is, partly because it is relatively easy to castigate polytheists when 
one is in no danger of being one, or to shatter with an eager iconoclasm the ‘gods’ that are amenable to 
destruction by hammers. 1086 
 But this study shows that shirk is not limited to idols in a literal sense. Running throughout this thesis 
is the idea that, after the time of the Prophet, Muslim thinkers moved beyond this original image to 
conceive different kinds of shirk in the societies of their time. Saints, shrines and even political 
ideologies become the ‘idols’ of the age for later thinkers. Like the idols of pre-Islamic Arabia, however, 
shirk continued to be understood not just in abstract doctrinal terms but with a clear social dimension. 
For all the figures explored in this study, shirk is more than a doctrinal or metaphysical error. It has 
tangible manifestations in the social and political sphere. From the destruction of idols in the life of the 
Prophet to Quṭb’s vague if evocative calls for revolution, the battle against shirk has involved more than 
reforming beliefs. It has included no less the active reshaping of the social and political space.  
Idols do of course give a clear and defined image of what shirk is. They stand as a stark antithesis to 
monotheist belief and practice. But this only further reinforces the need to look beyond idols when 
attempting to understand the meanings of shirk. Perhaps the most salient facet of shirk arising from this 
thesis is the idea that shirk is both internalised within the Muslim community and is even hard to avoid, 
including for Muslims. The ease with which humankind is seen to fall from the worship of one God is 
a recurring theme. In the Qur’an shirk is viewed as a supreme error but one that is deeply-rooted in 
human history. It is condemned by all the prophets. Early Muslim tradition reveals the struggle to fully 
renounce idols, pointing to the continuing appeal of idols even among newly-converted Muslim tribes. 
Ibn Taymiyya acknowledges the challenge, even for sincere believers, to treat God as the sole object of 
love and to avoid turning others into idolatrous ‘rivals’ of God. Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb and ‘Abduh share 
a conviction that much of Islamic history and contemporary Muslim practice constitutes shirk and has 
departed far from the normative tenets of the faith. For Quṭb, the only way to avoid shirk is to submit 
to an Islamic state that did not exist and which he refuses to define. Put simply, it seems easier to commit 
shirk, than avoid it. Much of the problem of shirk appears to lie in the ease with which we are led to 
‘associate’ with God. While the threat of Muslims worshipping pre-Islamic idols no longer pertains, 
then, the threat of shirk remains and this has in fact been conceived as a defining feature of various 
Muslim societies by a range of thinkers across Islamic history.  
A gradual image thus emerges of shirk as a problematic category in Islamic thought. While shirk is the 
ultimate doctrinal sin, it became a complex trope to evoke the certain aspects of human history. The 
 




condemnation of shirk lies at the heart of the Qur’an and Islamic tradition. Avoiding shirk, however, 
appears a challenge that even the sincere believer may struggle to overcome.  
In recent times the spectre of shirk has been linked to the phenomenon that is typically called ‘Islamic 
iconoclasm’. As seen in the Introduction, recent years have witnessed the destruction of ancient heritage 
sites and places linked to Sufi and Shī’ī tradition in various parts of the Islamic world. Most famous has 
been the destruction of sites such as Palmyra in Syria by the group known as Islamic State (IS), also the 
removal of the Bamiyan Buddha statues in Afghanistan by the Taliban in 2001.1087 These actions have 
been framed and justified as representing the groups commitment to removing shirk from Muslim lands. 
To recall, in February 2015 an unnamed IS fighter stood before ancient relics outside the city of Mosul 
and declared: 
O Muslims! Indeed, these relics behind me are but idols (aṣnām) from the people of previous centuries 
that were worshipped in place of Almighty God. What we call the Ashurians, Assyrians, Arkadians and 
others, used to take these (false) gods for rain, provision and war. They committed shirk with these gods 
(yushrikūn) with Almighty God…And God Most Hight says; ‘We never sent any messenger before you 
without revealing to Him: there is no god but Me, so serve Me’ (Q 21:25).1088 
We can of course question the motivations behind these acts. Omur Harmanshah argues it was precisely 
the high value placed on these heritage sites by international observers that led to their destruction by 
IS.1089 Yet the theology used to justify the acts was clear. This was said to reflect the clear aims of IS to 
follow the example of the Prophet. It expressed in vivid terms an atavistic return to the age of the 
Prophet, one in which shirk was manifest once again in literal, pre-Islamic idols of wood and stone. 
Jamal J. Elias has explored in detail the context surrounding the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas 
in Afghanistan by the Taliban in 2001 and highlighted similar themes. Analysing the statements 
released by the Taliban, Elias notes the common claim that the statues depicted pre-Islamic idols and 
had to be destroyed in the manner of the Prophet. Mullah Omar, then leader of the Taliban, is reported 
to have said that the statues  
have been used as idols and deities by the non-believers. Only Allah deserves to be worshipped, not 
anyone or anything else…We do not understand why everyone is so worried…All we are breaking are 
stones.1090  
Elias notes other arguments made by the Taliban and supporters in the Pakistani press. A common 
theme was a perceived Western hypocrisy. International outrage at the proposed destruction of statues 
was contrasted with a sense of indifference towards mass humanitarian suffering in Afghanistan, then 
 
1087 See Finbarr Barry Flood. ‘Between Cult and Culture; Bamiyan, Islamic Iconoclasm and the Museum’, The Art Bulletin 
84:4 (2002); 641-659. Ondrej Beranek and Pavel Tupek, The Temptation of Graves in Salafi Islam; iconoclasm, destruction 
and idolatry (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018). James Noyce, The Politics of Iconoclasm; Religion, Violence 
and the Culture of Image-Breaking in Christianity and Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).  
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Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcGfyeBY-7c (Accessed 12 March 2016).  
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suffering from drought, poverty and a crippling sanctions regime. A crucial moment was a large 
financial offer to save the statues by the New York Museum of Metropolitan Art. As Elias writes; 
The religious argument (against idols) was linked to the accusation of hypocrisy on the part of the 
international community. The very fact that money was offered to save the statues transformed then from 
artefacts into idols since they were now being venerated more than human lives, and this reverence 
necessitated their destruction.1091 
Western actions, it seems, turned the statues into ‘idols’ in the eyes of the Taliban. Reinforcing the link 
to the prophet Abraham, Elias notes the time of year in the Islamic calendar. The announcement of the 
destruction of the statues came only one week before the festival of ‘īd al-aḍhā,:   
Mullah Omar’s choice of occasion can hardly be considered coincidental, since the other major act for 
which Abraham is remembered is his decision to break from the idolatry of his fathers and ancestors, an 
obvious precedent on which the Taliban modelled their decision to right the wrongs of their forefathers 
in Afghanistan and destroy idols that they openly acknowledged were part of Afghanistan’s pre-Islamic 
heritage. 1092 
Critics both within and outside the Islamic world condemned the actions of IS and the Taliban, insisting 
that Islam did not sanction the destruction of historical treasures. Yet the key point for the present study 
is to question how the preceding analysis of shirk impacts our understanding of these acts. 1093 In a sense, 
this was of course unprecedented. Ancient relics hitherto preserved for centuries were suddenly, in the 
modern age, classified as shirk and destroyed. But from another angle, in terms of engaging the doctrinal 
question of what constitutes shirk, there seems little new here. Both the Taliban or IS root themselves 
in the Qur’an, particularly the stories of idol-destruction by the prophet Abraham. They use this as a 
foil from which to conceive the forms of shirk manifest in the world around them. If their vision of 
shirk is controversial and contested, moreover, this is again a recurring feature throughout the history 
of Muslim discourse on shirk. Most crucially, the meaning of shirk has been repeatedly subject to 
change, adaptation and reinterpretation. We have seen how the concept of shirk can be construed in 
many different ways. And if we reject the idea of any single essentialised image or definition of shirk, 
the concept is free to be developed in new, controversial and unexpected ways. If we observe how the 
idea of shirk has been put to myriad uses, from the worship of pre-Islamic idols, the popular veneration 
of saints like Tāj and Shamsān, the failure to acquire modern science and even submission to Western 
ideologies, the question arises as to why the elasticity of shirk could not apply to the preservation and 
honour afforded pre-Islamic relics. The point is to stress that it is perhaps easier to denounce such 
‘Islamic iconoclasm’ on the basis of ethics, sincerity of motive and respect for cultural heritage, than 
on the basis of engaging debates over what constitutes shirk. The latter provides a rich array of responses 
and opens a contested area of enquiry.  
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Both IS and the Taliban frame their acts as demonstrating the commitment to a core tenet of the faith; 
belief in one God and the worship of God alone. This is, again, a central underpinning of this thesis. 
Shirk derives its great power and potency in Islamic thought for what it reveals of its opposite. Belief 
in the oneness of God undergirds all Islamic thought. Later expressed in the term tawḥīd, this captures 
the idea of monotheism in Islam. To return to the quote with which we opened this thesis, the 
foundational importance of tawḥīd is neatly expressed in the following words by the Shī’ī scholar, 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā‘ī;  
Islamic intellectual history can be understood as a gradual unfolding of the manner in which successive 
generations of men have understood the meaning and implications of professing God’s unity. Theology, 
jurisprudence, philosophy, Sufism, even to some degree the natural sciences, all seek to explain at some 
level the principle of tawhid, “To profess that god is One.”1094 
The common thread throughout this thesis, from the Qur’an through to Quṭb, is that a valuable way of 
expressing what the oneness of God means for Muslims is by condemning its opposite. Different 
readings on shirk reveal, in turn, different conceptions of tawḥīd. Whether the doctrine of the oneness 
of God entails the exclusive love of God alone, the rational acquisition of modern science and 
technology or the exclusive submission to the sharī‘a, for example, reveals fundamentally different 
conceptions of tawḥīd among the figures surveyed in this thesis. These are also, of course, integral to 
their respective visions of shirk. This thesis ultimately demonstrates the mutual impact and influence 
of shirk and tawḥīd upon the other. As conceptual opposites, shirk and tawḥīd appear as complementary 
doctrines, giving meaning and shape to the other. Yet if Muslim interpretations of shirk are subject to 
change, this raises the question of what shirk could mean in the future. Sayyid Quṭb’s vision of shirk, 
mapped onto the Western political systems and ideologies of his age, was not possible in the Mamlūk 
era of Ibn Taymiyya. Though only half a century separates the death of Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhāb from the 
birth of ‘Abduh, the reality of colonial modernity is entirely absent in the former and deeply shapes the 
latter. The historian of religion Wilfried Cantwell Smith argues the focus of intellectual historians 
should not only be the past, on what ideas and terms meant in previous times, but on what this means 
for their growth and development in the present and even into the future: 
By all means let us, with regard to anything, know how it became; but let us study further how and what 
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